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Preface 
This volume is intended to serve as a water handbook. It represents 
the collective knowledge about water resources management acquired 
over recent years, both within the World Bank water team and with 
counterparts working in the Arab countries of North Africa and the 
Middle East (MNA).  
The chapters offer a cornucopia of ideas and themes. Some chap-
ters are based on background papers prepared for the 2007 “MNA 
Development Report on Water.” Others draw on sector work prepared 
at the request of client countries. Yet others summarize observations 
based on study tours or other learning events sponsored by the World 
Bank.   
Upon reviewing this lodestone of embedded knowledge, we real-
ized that bringing together our observations and analyses could serve 
a useful purpose for public officials, other practitioners, academics, and 
students who are interested in learning more about the complexities 
of managing water resources management in one of the driest parts 
of the world. 
N. Vijay Jagannathan
Ahmed Shawky Mohamed 
Alexander Kremer
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Introduction: Beyond WRM— 
Unbundling Water Management 
in MNA Countries
N. Vijay Jagannathan, Ahmed Shawky 
Mohamed, and Christopher J. Perry
Over the past two decades, water management in the MNA countries has been strongly influenced by the idea of inte-grated water resource management (IWRM). This process 
advocated new approaches for the assessment, management, and 
development of freshwater resources. 
IWRM processes attempt to provide holistic solutions to water 
issues. They depend on the commitment of governments and com-
munities to adopt new approaches and back them by “substantial and 
immediate investments, public awareness campaigns, technology de-
velopment, capacity building programs, and legislative and institutional 
changes” (Salman 2006). 
In the MNA context, IWRM is particularly vital because hydraulic 
infrastructure plays such a critical economic role. These countries are in 
either the arid or hyper-arid zone, depend on seasonal rainfall, have very 
few rivers—some of which carry runoff from other countries—and often 
rely on fragile (and sometimes nonrenewable) aquifers. Consequently, their 
economies are much more sensitive to the way that water is extracted, 
conveyed, and consumed than are the economies of other regions.
Frederiksen (2005) distinguishes between resource stewardship 
(which is always a function of government, exercised on behalf of the 
nation) and service provision (which may be public, private, or coopera-
tive). Once water resources are scarce and the possibility arises that 
one use affects another, the stewardship function must set some of the 
boundaries for service provision to protect the interests of all users.1 If 
1 The same point, although described for just the water supply and sanitation sec-
tor, is made by World Bank 2004. 
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these institutional processes are inadequate or arbitrary, the outcome 
will not be optimal; but rather, one of wasted public finances, conflicts, 
and unproductive water use. 
New Concern: Climate Change 
Looking ahead, climate change poses additional challenges for IWRM:
“Water managers have long dealt with changing demands for water 
resources. To date, water managers have typically assumed that 
the natural resource base is reasonably constant over the medium 
term and, therefore, that past hydrological experience provides a 
good guide to future conditions. Climate change challenges these 
conventional assumptions and may alter the reliability of water 
management systems.” 
—Bates and others, Intergovernmental Panel  
on Climate Change, 2008, 48
This stark statement applies nowhere more forcefully than in the 
MNA countries. While average rainfall worldwide is anticipated to in-
crease marginally, for the MNA region, the picture is quite different. For 
North Africa and the Middle East region over the next century, the 2008 
IPCC report anticipates declining rainfall (–10 percent to –25 percent); 
declining soils moisture (–5 percent to –10 percent), declining runoff 
(–10 percent to –40 percent), and increasing evaporation (+5 percent to 
+20 percent) (IPCC, figure 2.8; 
ranges are indicative, interpreted 
from figures in text).
Figure 1.1 reproduces figure 
2.10 of the IPCC report, showing 
the details for runoff.
The key IPCC messages for 
MNA are the high incidence of 
reduced flows; severity of the 
projected declines in rainfall; 
higher temperatures; and agree-
ment (indicated by hatching in 
figure 1.1) of the vast majority 
of models on the negative direc-
tion of change. These changes 
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Sources: Milly and others 2005; IPCC 2008.
Notes: White areas: Less than 66% of the ensemble of 12 models agree on the sign of 
change. Hatched areas: More than 90% of models agree on the sign of change .
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will create a new and more difficult context for water management. 
They further elevate the significance of the stewardship function of 
current generations of water managers for the future generations of 
water users for two reasons: 
The future is likely to experience more competition and conflict 1. 
among countries, sectors, communities, and individuals over water. 
The farmer lobby likely will demand more water, arguing that crop 
needs increase with temperature and rainfall variability. Urban water 
utilities will demand more water to meet the needs of growing, more 
prosperous populations. Finally, increased environmental flows will 
continue to be necessary for rivers and streams to maintain and 
regenerate themselves. At either the subregional or regional level, 
finding solutions to move water from one location to another (as 
from sparsely populated irrigated areas to growing cities, or from a 
municipal treatment plant to a water-stressed agricultural region for 
reuse) will meet stiff political and social resistance.2 At the macro and 
international levels, crafting politically acceptable policies that set in 
motion the required adjustments among all the affected stakehold-
ers will require institutional mechanisms that mitigate conflicts and 
enhance a culture of benefit-sharing.3 Under these circumstances, 
policymakers are faced with the challenge to craft policy instruments 
that balance sustainable water management against the various 
political and social conflicts, while learning what is working and 
what is not working in existing programs and policies. 
Agriculture (which utilizes 80 percent–90 percent of water in most 2. 
MNA countries)4 will not enjoy guaranteed water supply at past 
historical quantities. If there is increased variability in rainfall (as 
has been experienced in southeast Australia in the Murray-Darling 
Basin), increased requirements for municipal and industrial use will 
cut into agriculture’s water share.5 Farmers perforce will have to 
change water usage patterns at a time when plant water requirements 
2 “Subregional level” refers to aquifers and river basins within a country. “Regional 
level” refers to watercourses that are shared between two or more countries.
3 See Sadoff and others (2008) for a description of how benefit-sharing concepts 
have led to greater cooperation among Nile riparian countries. 
4 Share of different subsectors’ water consumption in the MNA countries is avail-
able in the “MNA Development Report on Water” (World Bank 2007).
5 Personal communication from Professor Michael Young, who has been advising 
the water regulators of the Murray Darling Basin on how to regulate and manage 
these difficult trade-offs.
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are increasing. For areas that already are operating with far less water 
than is required, changing water use patterns will make management 
more difficult. For areas whose supplies currently are adequate (most 
of Egypt, for example), the entirely new challenge of managing 
alternating abundance and scarcity will arise.6 Country- or region-
specific strategies for agricultural water management will need to be 
developed that focus on agricultural income productivity per unit of 
water, rather than per unit of land.7 
In brief, IWRM approaches so far have advocated a holistic “think 
integrated,” but “act disintegrated” approach to water management. In 
contrast, the forthcoming challenge—due to climate change—will be to 
also manage the social, political, and institutional processes of balancing 
the water use interests of present generations vs. future generations.8
What do these trends imply for IWRM programs in MNA countries? 
This volume argues that one needs to look beyond IWRM processes 
to learn more about the key actions that need to be taken on the in-
stitutional, economic, and technological fronts. 
Are the Arab Countries Well-Positioned to Face These New 
Challenges? 
Most countries in the MNA region face challenges on both fronts, 
with regard to both managing water resources in a sustainable manner 
and ensuring affordable and reliable water service delivery to farmers, 
households, and industries. 
In the case of water resource management, mechanisms for allo-N
cating water among countries and among sectors within countries 
need to focus on generating sustainable outcomes. The outcomes 
6 IPCC estimates suggest that, with higher rainfall in the catchment areas of the 
Nile River, the inflows into Lake Nasser-Nubia are likely to increase, leading to larger 
spillovers into the Toshka depression because of capacity constraints in this massive 
reservoir. Meanwhile, downstream in lower Egypt, municipal and industrial uses will 
continue to cut into the agricultural water share. The abundance of water is in an 
area of hyperaridity and very low population density (Toshka), whereas the scarcity 
of water is in the area of very high population density (Nile Delta). 
7 The good news is that recent developments in technology have the potential to 
enable this shift in measurement. See chapters by Bekele and others and Perry and 
Bucknall. 
8 See Briscoe and Malik 2007.
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must be sustainable in both their social/political aspects (that is, 
minimizing prolonged conflicts among competing users), and the 
environmental aspect (that is, soundly managing aquifers to avoid 
groundwater depletion, and maintaining instream water quality in 
rivers and lakes).
Regarding water service delivery, responding to user demand is a N
continuous challenge that will be exacerbated by climate change. In 
addition, several countries in the region have a vicious circle of poor 
service delivery exacerbated by high operations and maintenance 
(O&M) costs, low end-user tariffs, the resultant tendency to “back-
load” or defer maintenance, and, consequently, poor services.
 
In summary, water management in general has suffered from 
poor accountability (both external to service users and internal within 
resource management and service delivery organizations). More and 
more investments are being required to remedy the deferred mainte-
nance of already installed hydraulic infrastructure in the region (World 
Bank 2007). 
Figure 1.2 represents four possible outcomes. The vertical axis 
classifies two situations: (1) one in which the financial sustainability 
of irrigation and water supply services has been achieved by recover-
ing O&M costs from service users, and (2) the other in which there 
is inadequate cost recovery. The horizontal axis classifies countries 
in two categories: according to whether they have or have not been 
able to sustainably manage the water resource base. It describes their 
success in achieving the stewardship function. Predictably, countries 
with sources of renewable sur-
face water (such as large rivers) 
do relatively better in water re-
source management compared 
to countries that depend wholly 
on groundwater, which is easier 
to over-exploit, and more dif-
ficult to control.
Of the four possible out-
comes, conceptually only one 
(the upper right box) will lead 
to sustainable outcomes, or the 
IWRM ideals. In the other three 
boxes, failures in policy, or in the 
Figure 1.2  Conceptual Framework to Explain Ideal IWRM 
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implementation of policy, result in countries falling short of the IWRM 
ideals. 
The two axes of this diagram (finance, and water) present the 
two key facets of IWRM. The vertical axis describes to what degree 
a country is managing its water in a financially sustainable manner. 
The rules for financial accounting are known and proven—there is 
no debate about what constitutes a payment, a receipt, a stock, and 
a flow. There is an economic and political trade-off between spending 
$1 toward construction of an urban water supply system vs. spending 
$1 on an irrigation system. Once the system is constructed, unless 
costs of investments, operations, and maintenance can be recovered 
from the users, the contingent liability in the Ministry of Finance will 
increase rapidly.9 
Box 1.1 What a Water Steward Should Monitor
To avoid the obvious confusion that arises when improved efficiency in one sector increases 
the water available for other uses, while improved efficiency in another sector decreases 
the availability for other uses, the following terminology was recently adopted by the 
International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (Perry 2007):
Consumed fraction (evaporation and transpiration) comprising
Beneficial consumption, consisting of water evaporated or transpired for the intended N
purpose—for example, evaporation from a cooling tower, transpiration from an ir-
rigated crop.
Nonbeneficial consumption, consisting of water evaporated or transpired for purposes N
other than the intended use—for example, evaporation from water surfaces, weeds, 
moist or waterlogged land.
Nonconsumed fraction, comprising
Recoverable fraction, consisting of water that can be captured and reused—for N
example, flows to drains that return to the river system and percolation from irrigated 
fields to aquifers; return flows from sewage systems.
Nonrecoverable fraction, consisting of water that is lost to further use—for example, N
flows of brine from a desalination plant.
9 Countries have major variations in cost recovery policies, with consequences for 
benefit incidence. See Shawky chapter on “Benefit Incidence Analysis in Egypt’s 
Water Resources and Irrigation Sector.”
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The horizontal axis describes how far a country is managing its 
water in an environmentally sustainable manner. This aspect is more 
complex in terms of monitoring and building up remedial actions. For 
example, when a cubic meter of water allocated to an urban water 
supply system goes to a household, most of this water is released back 
to the water system as wastewater. If the latter is collected and treated 
(requiring capital-intensive investments, of course), the receiving 
water body is able to regenerate itself in both quantity and quality. In 
contrast, a cubic meter of water delivered to an irrigation project will 
largely be consumed— through transpiration by crops and evapora-
tion. The remaining part of the original diverted water is returned to 
the hydrological system. 
Urban water supply systems 
serve primarily nonconsumptive 
users, while the whole purpose of 
an irrigation system is to increase 
crop water consumption. “Using” 
water is thus not as unambiguous 
as “spending” money, because 
agriculture has both consump-
tive and nonconsumptive uses 
of water. The proportions of the 
two categories vary from region 
to region. Depending on agro-
climatic conditions, the sustain-
ability of the water resource base 
could be severely jeopardized by 
unproductive consumption by agriculture and by inadequate policy 
attention being paid to managing the recoverable, nonconsumed frac-
tion.10 Figure 1.3 shows these distinctions with illustrative data. In a dry 
region such as MNA, minimizing nonbeneficial consumption (such as 
evaporation from reservoirs, open canals) and optimizing the extraction 
10 Definitions: (a) Water use is water made available deliberately by rainfall or other 
natural means for an identified activity. The term does not distinguish between uses 
that remove water from further use (evaporation from wet soil or wetlands; tran-
spiration from irrigated crops, forests) and uses that have little quantitative impact 
on water availability (navigation, hydropower, most domestic uses).
(b) Withdrawal is water abstracted from streams, groundwater, or storage for any 
use, comprising (1) groundwater sinks, deep aquifers that are not economically ex-
ploitable, or (2) flows to the sea.
Consumed fraction
Nonconsumed 
recoverable
Total
Consumed, non-
bene!cial
Nonconsumed
nonrecoverable
Figure 1.3  Water Consumptive Uses and Losses 
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of recoverable fractions (such as sewage flows and farm runoffs) clearly 
become key policy priorities of future stewardship.
Organizational Framework for the Contributions to This Volume
The volume is organized around the observation by Perry (2003, 2008, 
and forthcoming) that water management at a time of societal competi-
tion for the resource could be viewed in terms of five elements:11
That the water supply is known and accessible to the user 1. 
groups —not necessarily precisely, but at least based on experience. 
Over time, and with experience, the users are able to ASSESS the 
availability of water and what institutional measures it would take 
to keep this availability in future years.
The users at each level have agreed on the principles for sharing 2. 
water (for example, prioritized by use or shared in accordance with 
land-holding or contribution to the original development). This is 
a BARGAINING process.
The agreed principles for sharing are translated into operational 3. 
rules that govern day-to-day distribution of water. This is a process 
of CODIFICATION.
Where necessary—particularly for larger schemes in which a number 4. 
of farmer groups exist—intermediate responsibilities and arrange-
ments for implementation are defined. This is DELEGATION.
Finally, delivering the service requires infrastructure— 5. 
ENGINEERING.
Taking a historical example, the Egyptian irrigation system evolved 
over several millennia as riverine communities learned how to harness 
the annual floods to develop irrigated agriculture in an arid climate. 
Through collective action that involved defining individual and group 
roles and responsibilities, these communities constructed inundation 
canals, and later devised the sakia, or Persian wheel, to lift water to 
their fields. Similarly, in the coastal areas of Yemen, communities 
harnessed flash floods or spate flows from the highlands through an 
elaborate system of earthen dikes and irrigation structures to grow food 
and cash crops. Developing complex institutional rules that created 
11 The framework was adopted during a meeting in Abu Dhabi in July 2008 to consider 
the proposed Arab Water Academy as a hub for organizing research and training.
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incentives to collaborate and constructing physical structures that 
provided irrigation water to groups and to farmers within groups were 
the two key features of Yemen’s process. Obviously, another key ele-
ment was the learning and feedback loop, through which institutions 
evolve and more hydraulic infrastructure gets augmented.
Where there was more than one level of management (as in 
Egypt’s inundation systems, or among the spate structures of Yemen), 
the framework can be applied at both levels—first allocating the main 
supply among user-groups, then allocating the group supply among 
individuals.
Organizing this book around the ABCDE framework enables the 
reader to appreciate the multifaceted nature of water management. In 
other words, public, private, and individual actors all contribute to 
successful water resource management; a variety of technologies are 
useful; both written laws and customary practice are effective; and 
facilities may be collectively owned, or constructed and operated by 
government. Successful water resource management requires that all 
the ABCDE elements are in place and are mutually compatible. The 
key is not particular patterns of ownership, types of water rights, or 
irrigation technology, but rather that each component is compatible 
with the other parts. Because they are integrated, when any of these 
components is changed, there will be significant implications for other 
components.
Compatibility among the ABCDE components is a feature of tradi-
tional water management systems that are based on limited information 
but extensive experience, simple technologies, and predictability of 
natural events (floods, droughts, seasonal rainfalls). For example, the 
organization of spate irrigation in Yemen, aflaj in Oman, qanat in Iran, 
and mesqas in the Nile delta was based on the knowledge passed down 
from one generation to another of water stocks, flows, and seasonal 
variability. Bargaining within groups led to the internalization and in-
stitutionalization of behaviors within and among groups. Codification 
took place either informally through norms and conventions, or formally 
through Islamic jurisprudence. Certain rights and responsibilities were 
delegated among farmers, while others devolved to village leaders and 
sheikhs. Decisions on when and what to construct were based on a long 
process of community engagement that was fairly well grounded in terms 
of (1) awareness of water availability and constraints, (2) institutional 
rules that were accepted by community members, and (3) construction 
technologies familiar to communities. 
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Much of traditional water management has changed in the past 50 
years. New technologies arrived that short-circuited traditional pro-
cedures for accessing and utilizing water. Financing options for lumpy 
investments changed relationships within communities and, more im-
portantly, between communities and the state. In the latter situation, 
state agencies assumed the full responsibility for the assessment phase, 
as well as for codifying rules to access investment finances. In practical 
terms, the state appropriated the right to decide where and when to 
invest in hydraulic infrastructure and to whom to provide the resultant 
water services. Under these circumstances, bargaining processes that 
had centered on local, well-understood norms and conventions were 
supplanted by communities “receiving” irrigation and water supply 
services from large government-sponsored programs. The decline of 
informal norms and conventions led to examples of water capture by 
elites, particularly when energy subsidies gave wealthy landowners 
privileged access to powerful pumpsets. Overall, these capital-intensive 
investments substantially impacted delicate water balances, altered 
the flow of rivers, increased the pace of groundwater extraction, and 
aggravated competition among water users. 
Observed Variants of the ABCDE Model
In this section, some observed “unbundled” practices are described in 
terms of the ABCDE framework. 
Moving Straight from A to C 
In this variant, assessment of water availability is based on historical 
data and onsite technical investigations by a state agency. Little atten-
tion is paid to water accounting (box 1.1). The state agencies usually 
assume that, because water is available at the proposed investment 
location, the water “surplus” can be used either without detriment, or 
with suitable compensation, to existing users. The state agency also 
makes no attempt to define a formal specification of a water entitlement. 
Under these circumstances, not enough attention gets paid to assessing 
what worked and what did not work in existing informal institutional 
arrangements. Codification is focused around financing rules, because 
the state typically finances the capital investments. However, it im-
poses weak conditionalities for cost recovery from users. Once funds 
are made available, engineering solutions are implemented.
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Moving Straight from A to C and Then to D
In response to the weaknesses of the earlier approach, the codification 
process recognizes the need to delegate responsibilities with a modified 
set of rules that separates the public and private good aspects. The for-
mer are paid by the state; the latter are paid by water users who benefit 
from using the service. Concerning water resources, in the absence of 
a basin- (or aquifer-) level accounting framework, there is no certainty 
that water entitlements are consistent with overall availability.
Introducing B in the Process 
Given today’s climate change concerns, assessments of water availability 
based on past data are no longer reliable. For example, in Morocco’s 
river basins, recent precipitation has been 30 percent–40 percent lower 
than the historical trends (although 2009 rainfall has been adequate). 
Irrigation infrastructure in the large-scale irrigation perimeters (ORM-
VAs, or regional irrigation and agricultural development agencies) was 
designed based on rainfall data of past decades. Thus, this infrastruc-
ture over-designed water conveyance networks and under-served the 
beneficiary farmers. Farmers respond to the lack of reliable surface 
water by investing in pumping groundwater, often in excess of safe 
yields. Under these uncertainties, A and B become immediate priori-
ties. Assessments and feedback of the risks to water resources from 
accelerating climate change, financing constraints, and population 
shifts to cities require information and knowledge-sharing among all 
water stakeholders in the country. Different forms of bargaining and 
institutional arrangements ranging from informal contracts to tradable 
water rights become relevant policy options that need to be debated.
Organization of Chapters
The chapters of this book are organized to present MNA staff obser-
vations and analyses of various aspects of IWRM through 3 types of 
activities commissioned over the past 3 years:
First and most significant, the MNA Sustainable Development 1. 
Department’s economic and sector work (ESW) in Arab countries. 
This work was summarized in the 2007 “MNA Development Report 
on Water” and in other initiatives of individual team members. 
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Insights and analyses by the MNA water unit staff on specific country-2. 
oriented topics that could be of general interest in Arab countries. 
Observations from study tours and project-level engagements by 3. 
MNSSD staff. 
The organizing principle for these chapters has been the ABCDE. 
Predictably, the assessment section has the largest and most diverse 
selection of chapters. They range from general themes such as gov-
ernance and climate change to specific assessments of topics that of-
fer useful learning and knowledge-sharing to the reader. The second 
(B) section illustrates the importance of bargaining among water stake-
holders to reach sustainable solutions. The third section reviews the 
various “rules of the game”—both formal codification experiences in 
the region vis-à-vis water laws and specific financing rules that alter 
incentives for water service delivery. The fourth (D) section reports 
on specific country-level initiatives that have delegated water service 
responsibilities to the lowest appropriate level. The final section evalu-
ates the emerging opportunities offered by innovative technologies that 
could be harnessed to meet the emerging water challenges. 
Assessments of Water Availability and Water Management
A1. Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management: Lessons 
from the “MNA Development Report on Water”
N. Vijay Jagannathan
A2. Egypt: Water Sector Public Expenditure Review Ahmed Shawky Mohamed and N. Vijay 
Jagannathan
A3. Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: 
Spending Less for Better Services
Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Alexander 
Kremer, and Manish Kumar
A4. Applications of Latest Technologies and Hydrological Models 
in Water Resource Management and Planning in MNA Region 
Bekele Debele Negewo, Julia Bucknall, and  
Ahmed Shawky Mohamed
A5. Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World: New 
Analytical Tools for New Challenges 
Christopher J. Perry and Julia Bucknall
A6. Egypt Case Study: Energy Efficiency CDM Program: 
Irrigation and Drainage Pumping Sector
Abdulhamid Azad
A7. Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance:  
Japan’s Experience
Satoru Ueda and Mohammed Benouahi
A8. Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization 
and Management 
Mohamed El Hedi Louati and Julia Bucknall
A9. Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply  
and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq
Sana Agha Al Nimer 
A10. Governance in Yemen’s Water Sector: Lessons from  
the Design of an Anticorruption Action Plan 
Maher Abu-Taleb and Richard Calkins 
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The first 10 chapters summarize the World Bank Middle East and 
North Africa Region (MNA) findings from assessments of key policy 
issues relating to water management in terms of the resource itself 
(both in terms of quantity and quality), financing, and implications for 
global public goods. 
The first chapter summarizes the lessons from the 2007 “MNA N
Development Report on Water.” 
The second and third chapters describe the findings of a Public N
Expenditure Review (PER) on water in Egypt, and analyze who 
among the various stakeholders have benefitted from existing public 
expenditures on water. 
The fourth chapter describes how remote-sensing (RS) data and N
modeling techniques provide new tools for water planners and 
project managers. 
The fifth chapter looks at how irrigation management practices need N
to be changed to effectively respond to climate change predictions. 
The sixth chapter describes the new financing mechanisms made N
available to the irrigation sector in reaction to rising global concerns 
about climate. 
The seventh chapter presents the Japanese experience in bench-N
marking the performance of the water and sanitation service 
providers. 
The eighth chapter presents the case of inter-basin water transfers N
in Tunisia. 
The ninth chapter describes the lessons learned in Iraq toward N
reforming the water supply and sanitation sector after the war. 
The last chapter discusses new institutional arrangements in Yemen N
aimed at governance and anticorruption reforms.
Bargaining among Water Stakeholders
B1. Water Allocation Conflict Management: Case Study  
of Bitit, Morocco
Rachid Abdellaoui
B2. How Did a Small, Poor, and Remote Rural Village in 
Djibouti Recently Become a Government Priority to Receive 
Water Supply and Sanitation?
Sarah Houssein, with Julia Bucknall and 
Nathalie Abu-Ata
B3. Water Conflict in Yemen: The Case for Strengthening 
Local Resolution Mechanisms
Christopher Ward
B4. Water Diplomacy in the 21st Century N. Vijay Jagannathan 
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The second group of chapters is devoted to bargaining, by which 
affected stakeholders are able to exercise voice and choice in decisions 
that relate to their water resources and water services. 
The first chapter discusses how bargaining and consequent trading N
of informal water rights have taken place in a Moroccan village.
The second chapter describes how a poor community in Djibouti N
was able to exercise its voice with the government. 
The third chapter describes the role of tribal and local traditions N
in resolving conflicts over water in Yemen.
The last chapter describes the emerging lessons for water diplomacy N
or bargaining among countries sharing watercourses.
Codification Experiences in MNA
C1. Comparative Analysis of Water Laws in MNA Countries Jackson Morill and Jose Simas
C2. Subsidies for the Poor: An Innovative Output-Based Aid Approach 
Providing Basic Services to Poor Periurban Neighborhoods in Morocco 
Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier 
Mantovani
C3. Use of Output-Based Aid to Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply 
Service Market in Morocco 
Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier 
Mantovani
C4. New Approaches to Private Sector Participation in Irrigation: 
Lessons from Egypt’s West Delta Project
Aldo Baietti and Safwat Abdel-Dayem
The third group of chapters is elucidates codification in the water 
sector. 
The first chapter describes the region’s experience with formal N
codification through water laws and regulations. 
The next two chapters summarize an experience of targeting N
subsidies to poor households so that they are able to access safe 
drinking water with house connections in urban and rural areas 
in Morocco. 
The forth chapter describes a new set of project rules aimed at gen-N
erating public-private partnerships in Egypt’s irrigation sector.
Delegation to the Lowest Appropriate Level
D1. Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in 
Yemen 
Naji Abu Hatim and Ahmed Shawky 
Mohamed
D 2. Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of 
User Satisfaction in Yemen
Susmita Dasgupta, Craig Meisner, Andrew 
Makokha, and Richard Pollard
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D3. Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework: Case Study of 
Application in the Delta Region, Egypt 
Ayat Soliman, Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, 
Maged Hamed, Wendy Wakeman, and 
Mohammed Mehany
D4. Water Management in Spain: Highlights Relevant  
for MNA Countries 
Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Abdulhamid 
Azad, and Alexander Bakalian
 
The fourth group of chapters describes MNA staff experiences 
with delegation of services to the lowest appropriate level. 
The first chapter analyzes an interesting experience in participatory N
irrigation management and cost-sharing in Yemen. 
The second chapter evaluates user satisfaction with community-N
managed RWSS services in Yemeni villages. 
The third chapter discusses new planning approaches to rural sani-N
tation in Egypt, incorporating both extending sanitation services 
and improving water quality in receiving bodies. 
The last chapter is a report based on a joint study tour to Spain by N
MNA water staff and counterparts. During this trip, they learned 
how that country implemented delegation to the lowest appropri-
ate level in both aspects of water management: the resource itself 
and water supply, sanitation and irrigation services. 
Engineering New Approaches
E1. Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta Jose Simas, Juan Morelli, and  
Hani El Sadani 
E2. Water Reuse in the MNA Region: Constraints, Experiences, and 
Policy Recommendations
Claire Kfouri, Pier Mantovani, and Marc 
Jeuland
E3. Desalination Opportunities and Challenges in the Middle East 
and North Africa Region 
Khairy Al-Jamal and Manuel Schiﬄer 
E4. Enhancing the Socioeconomic Viability of Spate Irrigation 
through Conjunctive Use in Coastal Areas in Yemen: Case Study of 
Wadi Ahwar
Arjen de Vries and Tarun Ghawana. 
Supervised by Ahmed Shawky Mohamed
The f ifth group discusses engineering aspects and comprises 
forward-looking studies of new water investment approaches. 
The first chapter presents a very interesting experience in Egypt, N
whereby engineers “right-sized” design standards with community 
participation.
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The next two chapters summarize the findings of World Bank MNA N
staff studies that evaluate the potentials of wastewater reuse and de-
salination, which, given climate change, are two important areas. 
The last chapter looks at the findings of a study on conjunc-N
tive use of spate irrigation and groundwater in the coastal areas 
of Yemen. 
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Bridging the Practice Gap  
in Water Management:  
Lessons from the “MNA 
Development Report on Water”
N. Vijay Jagannathan
In March 2007, the Middle East and North Africa Region (MNA) of the World Bank launched the “MNA Development Report on Water.”1 It was the culmination of two years of consultations, stud-
ies, and analyses of water issues in the region.2
The report had three main conclusions:
Water is scarce and has competing uses.1.   Thus, it needs a manage-
ment strategy that goes beyond merely finding engineering solutions 
to include revisiting the rights regime, regulatory framework, and 
public-private partnerships.
To improve water management, 2.  accountability—whether external to 
users of water, or internal to sector financiers and policymakers—needs 
to be deliberately promoted. To this end, information about water—on 
both public expenditures and environmental impacts of existing pat-
terns of use—should be fully shared among all stakeholders.
To improve water management, policies outside the water sector often are 3.  
as important as those within the sector. This conclusion applies to mac-
roeconomic, trade liberalization, agricultural, and urban policies.
The overall point of the report is that although the principles of 
water policies are quite well understood, public policy choices get circum-
scribed by political, legal, or social considerations. For example, reforms 
introducing sensible pricing and tradable water rights are constrained by 
political and social resistance. Fiscal prudence is inhibited by inadequate 
1 World Bank 2007.
2 This chapter is a modified version of an essay in honor of Dr. V.S.Vyas (IDS 2009).
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monitoring of wasteful public expenditures in hydraulic infrastructure. 
Irrigation subsidies encourage crops that yield low “crop per drop.” 
The Challenge
The challenge confronting water policy lies in bridging the “practice” 
gap between choices that would lead to sustainable outcomes and 
the perceived feasible set. This practice gap could be construed as the 
chasm between the universally recognized principles (as confirmed in 
major sectoral events such as Dublin, Rio, Kyoto, and Mexico City) and 
observed expediency in decisionmaking. For example, the importance 
of sound water management for sustainable economic development, 
universal public reverence for clean water, and the potential of lever-
aging expanding knowledge of the surface and subsurface water cycle 
all are accepted by stakeholders. However, in the “pragmatic” dimen-
sion, decisionmaking is severely constrained by political considerations. 
Water governance is the business of all levels of the government and 
is very sensitive to prevailing norms and conventions. In countries of 
the Middle East, for example, many leaders are reluctant to charge 
for water services because they fear creating political opposition that 
could exploit a widely held belief that Islamic traditions require water 
to be a free commodity.
Box 2.1  Water Is Everybody’s Business: Morocco
This photograph of a river basin in Morocco illustrates the reason that stakeholders outside 
the sector are so important for water reforms. The winding river services the farms and 
a growing urban and regional economy. 
Improved agricultural practices have 
been fuelled by excellent road connec-
tions to the export market for fruits and 
vegetables. Large urban centers have 
become magnets for migrants from rural 
areas, attracted by off-farm jobs. How-
ever, these centers’ untreated wastes 
pollute the river downstream. Water is 
everybody’s business, and its manage-
ment is influenced by policy within and 
outside the water subsectors.
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If pragmatism requires focusing on the feasible set of policies, the 
basic question is: Where does this leave policymakers in an environment 
in which politics triumphs over principles but in which every succeeding 
generation faces the cascading of the harmful consequences of past 
water policy missteps? The thesis of this chapter is that outside drivers 
often are critical factors in bringing about principled pragmatism.
“Outside” Drivers That Bridge the Practice Gap in MNA Countries
The most important driver from “outside” the water sector in MNA 
countries is the increasing political recognition of the irreversible adverse 
consequences of global warming. 
“Outside Driver” 1: Climate Change
The recent International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) findings 
confirm trends observed over past decades in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia: that historic data on rainfall patterns no longer provide accu-
rate projections for future precipitation.3 For example, over the last 
three decades, dams constructed in Algeria and Morocco have been 
able to store, on average, only approximately half their design capacity 
because of inadequate annual precipitation. As a consequence, farmers 
have become acutely aware of the uncertainty of their water rights, 
and irrigation agencies in the command areas struggle with rationing 
uncertain water supply to the 
politically important farmer 
constituency. The IPCC report 
confirms these trends, and what 
earlier was seen as a prolonged 
drought is now being interpreted 
as a secular decline in precipita-
tion caused by global climate 
change (figures 2.1 and 2.2).
The problems of global 
warming will affect other re-
gions as well. For example, water 
resources in Bangladesh, Bhu-
Figure 2.1  Projected Decreases in Rainfall, 2000–70
Source: Background paper, Stern Report.
3 Bates and others 2008.
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tan, China, India, Nepal, and 
Pakistan are likely to face rapid 
shrinking because of reductions 
in water stored in the Himalayan 
glaciers as a result of changes 
in the duration and intensity 
of rainfall. The effects in the 
Western Himalayas are likely to 
be particularly dramatic—with 
increased flows over the next 4 or 
5 decades, followed by dramatic 
reductions—of 40 percent–60 
percent of flow—over the subsequent century. Since the rivers flowing 
from this massif support the “breadbaskets” of South Asian countries, 
the impacts will affect agriculture and urban water use (figure 2.3 shows 
predicted declines in Indus River flows in Pakistan).
The secular decline and increased variability in rainfall will radically 
affect the flows and seasonality of major rivers in the subcontinent, 
and seriously put in doubt past assumptions on how to design hydraulic 
infrastructure. 
The solution is to develop a package of reforms that tackle both the 
demand (incentives to shift to crops with high water productivity) and 
supply (water conservation through modernized irrigation and better 
tracking of the water/evapotranspiration cycle) sides.
“Outside Driver 2”: High-Value 
Farming Changes the Politics  
of Irrigation
A second set of factors outside 
the water sector that is helping 
to narrow the practice gap is the 
pressure from farmers benefiting 
from the recent growth of high-
value agriculture. These farmers 
have secured significant gains in 
income by adopting agricultural 
and irrigation practices that have 
enabled them to join the supply 
chain to get high-value consumer 
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markets in Europe and North America. Their prosperity is reflected in 
a change in water consumption usage. They earn significantly higher 
incomes per drop of water than conventional irrigators are able to 
earn. The hope is that such leading-edge farmers will support demand-
management measures.
The key policy question here is how to allocate water efficiently 
between its two different forms, namely, high-security water, which 
is needed by those making major investments in annual crops and in 
industry; and low security water, which farmers use for annual crops 
when it is available. Managing water as different products is performed 
well by water markets in Australia, Chile, Mexico, and the western US. 
In these countries, users of low-security water sell their water to users 
of high-security water in times of scarcity, making both parties—by 
definition, since the transfer is voluntary—better off. 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the trends of water use in MNA countries. 
Green represents renewable sources (from both surface and ground-
water), and includes desalinated water, an important source of re-
newable water in the Arabian 
Peninsula and North Africa. The 
pink shaded area represents the 
proportion of water extracted 
from nonrenewable sources, 
and the brown represents the 
water “virtually” available as the 
water used to grow agricultural 
commodities that are imported 
through trade. For example, 
increased rice, wheat, dairy, and 
beef imports result in much more 
virtual water being available 
to local consumers, whereas 
exports of citrus, olives, and vegetables generate equivalent or higher 
value exports with relatively low water use.
The preconditions for high-value farm exports were the physical 
access and information access necessary for supply chain management, 
that is, roads, high-speed internet, and container terminals. Each of 
these facilitated the growth of two-way trade, principally with Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. A similar pattern has oc-
curred in all of these growth centers:
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Investors and farmers were able to respond to the growing demand 1. 
for high-value farm products.
Farm products in which the Region has comparative advantage—2. 
olives, citrus, herbs, and other fruits and vegetables—constituted 
the bulk of exports.
These products generated more value per drop.3. 4 
State-of-the-art technology is used to sort, pack, and store; and 
to enable conveyance technologies to bring fresh farm products to the 
supermarkets within the contracted period (a few hours to Europe and 
a week to Canada and the US). 
Agricultural practices have begun approximating the norms of 
efficient business enterprises. However, regarding labor productivity, 
more jobs are generated in the logistics and supply chain aspects than 
in conventional employment of farm labor. The new paradigm suits 
the expectations of a changing labor force; rural youth desire a higher 
quality of life than the drudgery of traditional farming can provide. 
Two key actions outside the water sector unleashed the potential 
of high-value agriculture:
On the demand side, changing demand patterns in the EU encour-4. 
aged large supermarket chains to search for reliable suppliers of 
cheaper, high-quality fruits and vegetables. 
On the supply side, the farmer’s ability to manage supply chain 5. 
risks hinged on reliable, good quality, irrigable water. 
Typically, a farm entrepreneur begins—with no support from the 
surface irrigation bureaucracy—by investing his or her private funds 
in water-conserving irrigation infrastructure (usually drip or sprinkler), 
and by carefully monitoring his water quality. S/he then invites the 
supermarket chain to inspect the facilities to ensure that the fruits and 
vegetables are produced using acceptable technologies. These include 
being irrigated by water that is free of contaminants, both chemical and 
biological. Thereafter, the farm secures a Good Agricultural Practices 
(GAP) certificate from an independent European certification agency. 
This seal of good housekeeping facilitates contracting with the very 
quality-conscious European supermarkets. Passing the GAP criteria, 
4 These crops generate more value per unit of evapotranspiration (ET) (see chapter 
by Perry and Bucknall for a discussion on the significance of ET).
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rather than the much laxer national regulatory laws, ensures respect 
for international water quality standards. 
The key point is that these entrepreneurial farms have invested 
in groundwater-based irrigation to informally create water rights for 
themselves. Furthermore, these farmers expect little, if any, support 
from the substantial surface water irrigation infrastructure. They are 
aware that these public sector organizations have neither the institu-
tional capability nor accountability mechanisms to serve the specific 
quality and timing requirements of the export-oriented farms. In the 
few cases in which these farmers use surface irrigation, they privately 
finance investments to mitigate water supply risks by (a) excavating a 
part of the farmland as a storage reservoir, then (b) developing a pres-
surized, piped drip, sprinkler, or pivot irrigation distribution system. 
However, these individual, private solutions are socially costly because 
productive farmlands are being lost to water storage. They also are 
inequitable because small farmers who lack financial resources and 
knowledge of supply chain management are de facto excluded.
Even when a farmer has been able to mitigate supply risks from 
surface water irrigation, a major remaining risk is the farm’s ability to 
maintain water quality norms required by the importing country’s en-
vironmental regulations. Nowhere is this challenge more visible than in 
Egypt. Farms on the desert and scrubland in the periphery of the Nile 
delta have been able to participate in the export market though ground-
water-based irrigation systems. However, hundreds of thousands of 
farmers in the delta a few miles east and north are unable to do so. The 
surface water that they receive through Nile surface irrigation system 
is highly polluted, and therefore not capable of meeting the demanding 
EU water quality standards for all edible export crops. 
Pressure from the high-value farm lobby is helping to narrow the 
practice gap in water management. For example, in the West Delta 
area of Egypt and in Guerdaine, Morocco, investors financed high-
value agriculture in desert lands that have access to groundwater. 
Utilizing their knowledge and connections to obtain credit, technical 
knowhow, and access to European markets, these groups have created 
large export-oriented markets for grapes, citrus, and other fruits and 
vegetables. While their entrepreneurship is laudable, the income and 
employment generated in the regional economies also enabled them to 
successfully lobby governments for supplemental surface water irriga-
tion once groundwater started getting depleted. On the positive side, 
one could argue that these groups have influenced political leaders and 
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water policymakers to appreciate the benefits of transferable water 
rights, irrigation modernization, and water conservation.5 
Moreover, high-value farm exports generate better jobs with bet-
ter pay in the services sector. Thus, they help reduce the exodus of 
the rural population to urban centers and Europe in search of better 
livelihoods. 
With a large and increasingly affluent urban middle class in MNA, 
the demand for high-value crops is growing. To meet this demand, 
countries have begun investing in large-scale investments in irrigation 
modernization. The preconditions for such investments are an adequate 
road infrastructure to ship the produce in a timely manner to markets 
and ports, stabilizing rural electricity services, and speeding up border 
procedures. These broad and deep changes must be made for demand 
for water-conserving irrigation technologies to become strong enough 
to increase pressure on policymakers for reform. 
“Outside Driver 3”: The Call for Clean Water
A third set of factors outside the sector that is narrowing the practice 
gap has been political pressure on decisionmakers to focus more on 
water quality. Obviously, the exporters of high-value farm products 
have been one of the influential lobby groups creating this pressure. 
However, there have been other contributors. Many countries are 
benefiting from a tourism boom, as “package tours” from Europe and 
the Gulf countries to the historic and seaside resorts of several MNA 
countries have grown enormously. Along the Mediterranean and Red 
Sea coasts alone, many resorts have been developed in the past two 
decades to take advantage of this boom. By contrast, some other high 
potential areas, such as the coastline of the Nile delta, have not been 
able to take advantage of these opportunities because of beach contami-
nation by polluted Nile waters. Tour operators and resort owners are 
5 For example, in both Guerdaine and West Delta, financing has been obtained 
from the World Bank Group for surface irrigation infrastructure via public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). For the former, half of the investment costs was financed by 
a capital subsidy from the government. For the latter, the investment costs were 
financed by an IBRD loan but were recovered from the water users. Both projects 
have enabled the governments to test new models of service provisioning (see Baietti 
chapter). For the West Delta project, most of the transferred water will originate 
upstream of the delta barrages, that is, before it gets polluted by the agricultural or 
sewage return waters. The concentration of the water pollutants in the Rosetta 
branch culminates only in the downstream. 
Bridging the Practice Gap in Water Management  N  27
powerful interest groups who 
have joined environmentalists 
and farm exporters to lobby for 
better water quality manage-
ment (WQM). 
Analytical work also has 
helped build the case for this 
coalition of interests to demand 
better WQM. For example, the 
World Bank initiated a series of 
studies estimating the oppor-
tunity costs of environmental degradation in major MNA countries, 
including both water pollution and groundwater degradation (figure 
2.5). These estimates, shown as a percentage of forgone GDP, were 
disseminated to a wide range of stakeholders through workshops, media 
events, and publications. The study findings coincided, particularly in 
Egypt, with growing public dissatisfaction with water quality in irrigation 
canals, so were picked up by the media. The studies’ conclusion that 
poor water management harmed the economy by slicing off percentage 
points of GDP resonated with decisionmakers in economic ministries 
and pushed governments to pledge significant increases in public fund-
ing for remedial actions.6 Figure 2.6 estimates the opportunity costs 
to GDP due to savings losses. 
Emerging Lessons from MNA for Bridging the Practice Gap 
The analysis suggests that countries in the region have taken steps 
to narrow the ”practice” gap 
in response to powerful po-
litical drivers outside the wa-
ter sector. Inf luential groups 
have highlighted the need for 
water reforms, although usu-
ally only for their own narrow 
reasons. Leveraging these oppor-
tunities to promote broad-based 
reforms is the next big challenge 
to reduce the “practice” gap. For 
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this, policymakers need to regularly evaluate and feed back the lessons 
to the sectoral decisionmaking process.
Based on past assessments, the “MNA Development Report” 
suggests three insights in this regard:
Reforms are inherently a political process and one in which the 1. 
technical and political dynamics are difficult to separate. Politically, 
an initial driver of change (such as farmers’ demand for better water 
quality) could be leveraged if there were a preexisting broader coali-
tion of stakeholders willing to support more broad-based reforms 
than the farming lobby wants to promote.
Non-water policies are critically central to water policy reforms 2. 
because the coalition becomes energized when colleagues outside 
the water sector (agriculture, energy, environment, trade, transport, 
and banking, to name a few) already are engaging, or are willing 
to engage, in complementary actions.
Improved accountability of government organizations to users of 3. 
water services is a third essential leg for reducing the gap. Mecha-
nisms for public accountability form the bridge between users of 
water and their governments by channeling relevant information and 
voice and ensuring fairness in resolving conflicts that may arise.
How to Bridge the Practice Gap in Developing Countries
Coordination and Strategic Monitoring of Water Policy Actions 
The problem of coordination is accentuated by divided responsibilities 
for water management among various levels of governance, typically, 
the center, governorates, and citizens. This institutional confusion is 
compounded by a tendency of rules and norms that focus more on the 
planning and resource allocation phase than on the actual implementa-
tion phase and on thoroughly evaluating outcomes. 
For example, in large river basins such as the Nile Delta, pollution 
from human settlements affects water quality downstream, which in 
turn reduces the crop choices of farmers. For example, a farmer in 
the Nile Delta cannot think of growing high-value, export-oriented 
crops because the water quality does not meet the minimum EU 
Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) irrigated water standards. The 
Ministries of Water Resources and Irrigation, Housing, Agriculture, 
Local Government, Health, and Environment must devise coordinated 
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responses to this challenge. Within the Water Resources and Irrigation 
Ministry itself, multiple sectors (mechanical and electrical engineering, 
drainage, irrigation improvement, and planning) need to work together 
seamlessly to make the irrigation service meet the farmers’ needs for 
high-value agriculture.
On the sanitation side, the practice gap does not get bridged 
because tackling pollution requires staff from various agencies to 
work outside their silos, think laterally, and, most importantly, engage 
stakeholders who are outside their internal organizational structures. 
Common observations on factors that contributed to this practice 
gap are:
Key stakeholder groups were disinterestedN . Pollution abatement had 
downstream benefits, so was not politically attractive to political 
leaders and even the local public.
Operations and maintenance (O&M) burdens were heavyN . Moreover, 
in a context in which tariffs are substantially below operating costs 
and environmental regulations rarely enforced, sewage treatment 
plants get shut off. The untreated effluents are bypassed to down-
stream water bodies. 
Raw sewage can be used for freeN  for high-value fruits and vegetables 
by surrounding farmers because environmental regulations are 
neither enforced nor internalized by communities.
The practice gap can be bridged by coordination and strategic 
management with stakeholders who have an interest in achieving 
planned outcomes. Active engagement and dialogue are required 
among sewerage engineers with urban planners, agriculture and en-
vironment ministry staff, and program beneficiaries in both planning 
and implementation. 
Establish Water Executive Management Programs 
The solution is to radically redefine the learning and capacity build-
ing program for water management. Water executive education 
programs need to be developed to inspire and train water man-
agers to see beyond their narrow specializations. The inspiration 
comes from successes in the field of business management through 
executive management programs that promoted “lateral” thinking 
by visionaries such as Alfred Sloan and Peter Drucker.7 Through 
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these programs, business management became a more systematic 
process of directing and motivating people and entities to accomplish 
an enterprise’s goals. 
Water management is as multidisciplinary as running a modern 
business enterprise. The former requires the integration of the dif-
ferent ways of thinking of a diverse range of stakeholders from farm-
ers, slum dwellers, other civil society, media, and political leaders to 
civil servants, planners, economists, and engineers. Key stakeholders 
need to debate and discuss the practice gap, and reach a common 
appreciation of what is required for long-term sustainability in water 
outcomes. This consensus requires appreciating the human, finan-
cial, environmental, and technological aspects of water management 
through the systematic engagement of stakeholders in learning about 
water management. 
The MNA countries have recognized this challenge. Through the 
leadership of the Arab Water Council (AWC), they have established 
an Arab Water Academy so that such learning events are organized 
and a new genre of “water managers” and water stewards are created 
from different disciplines and represent all sections of society. 
Inclusion of Stakeholders in Water Dialogues 
Water is both a finite resource and subject to intense competing de-
mands. Political realities in all developing countries hinder, or prevent, 
water policymakers from using normal economic policy instruments, 
such as water pricing and transferable water rights, as mechanisms for 
resource allocation. In their absence, informal arrangements dominate 
the institutional environment (Shah 2007). The most noticeable evi-
dence of these are the explosive growth of tubewells, fuelled in most 
countries by subsidized energy; inadequate water resource regulations; 
and self-provisioning by urban households (HH) for water supply and 
sanitation facilities. 
Over time, the adverse environmental consequences have become 
unavoidable, notably in the form of continuous groundwater draw-downs. 
These sources provide the mainstay for farm production in several regions 
of the world, despite the knowledge that the long-term consequences 
will be disastrous to these very same farming communities. Equally 
7 McDonald and others 2003; Business Week 2005.
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visible is the unequal access to this water by the poor in both rural and 
urban areas.
Several MNA countries are facing the devastating consequences 
of similar trends because their groundwater resources, having a 
very low renewal rate, are already running out. In some of the 
most affected countries, such as Yemen, entire farm communities 
have had to leave their villages because the groundwater extraction 
rates greatly exceeded the replenishment rate, fuelled in particular 
by cheap subsidized electricity. MNA has other variants of this 
type of “tragedy of the commons,” especially those resulting from 
unchecked pollution of water bodies from urban, industrial, and 
agricultural runoffs. 
The way out is to communicate with and engage the affected 
stakeholders in finding solutions. No amount of executive training and 
management will work unless there is an educated and informed group of 
water users who are aware of the consequences of today’s actions on 
tomorrow. In other words, water management requires all individuals 
to understand that that they are a part of the problem as well as the 
possible solution.
Managing the Equity Dimension of Water
An equally important policy instrument is the use of redesigned subsidies 
to put in place incentives for public finance to target the poor and the 
environment. Some MNA countries now recognize using output-based 
subsidies as an effective tool.8 These subsidies work in:
Urban areas—by targeting low-income households with free piped N
water supply connections (thereafter, these households must pay 
tariffs for operating costs)
Rural areas—rewarding water conservation in surface irrigation N
areas by subsidizing part of investment costs of low-income farmers 
who switch from open channels to drip, sprinkler, or other more 
modern irrigation technologies
River basins and sub-basins—by reimbursing utilities/operators for N
every unit of treated effluent that meets national standards.
8 See chapters 17 and 18 by Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani.
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Focus on External and Internal Accountability
The practice gap can be narrowed by developing a culture of lateral 
thinking in water management similar to modern business management 
practices. Participation of all stakeholders and use of targeted subsidies 
are suggested as the first and second legs of this model. The third leg 
is putting in place mechanisms to enhance accountability. Account-
ability has two dimensions: (1) an “internal” aspect in which water 
organizations are accountable to their financiers and management 
structures, and (2) an “external” aspect in which they should respond 
to water user preferences and willingness to pay. The practice gap has 
arisen because, for both aspects, MNA countries have experienced 
institutional design failures. 
The internal failure is accentuated by government pledges of 
general subsidies for the water sector, with no follow-up to track 
outcomes of programs (as illustrated by GAP 1). In the urban areas, 
cross-subsidies for urban water supply reduce the incentives of utilities 
to manage services based on commercial principles, while the benefits 
end up being appropriated by the middle class urban consumers. Fur-
thermore, while this group benefits from the higher tariffs charged to 
industrial and service water users, the poor pay more while buying 
poor-quality water from vendors. In the irrigation sector, farmers do 
not have clear, predictable water rights on the basis of which they 
can plan their planting decisions. Instead, officials of the various state 
irrigation bureaucracies have the discretion to assign irrigation turns 
to the water user associations (WUAs) and farmers. This power gets 
often misused through graft and corruption (Wade 1985; Jagannathan 
1987). In both situations, water service organizations have been unable 
to set in place governance mechanisms that ensure internal account-
ability of staff to the organizational goals and external accountability 
to the water users.9
Figure 2.7 illustrates how accountability gets diluted by three levels 
of scarcity observable in the region (World Bank 2007):
Scarcity of the water resource.1.   In conditions of water scarcity the 
response has been to build “solutions” through dams, canals, and 
distribution systems. These solutions required large outlays of 
9 For discussion on MNA initiatives to improve accountability, see chapter 11 by M. 
Abu-Taleb and R. Calkins, and chapter 24 by J. Simas, J. Morelli, and H. El Sadani.
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public funds. With expe-
rience, the IWRM pro-
cesses recognized that 
public investments do not 
necessarily lead to de-
sired outcomes because 
organizational incentives 
may be misaligned.10
Scarcity of organizational 2.  
capacity to actually man-
age the demands of vari-
ous water users, and meet the growing needs of the economy. 
Scarcity of accountability3.   to achieve sustainable outcomes In the 
past decade, with climate change concerns raising serious concerns 
about sharply declining water availability in the MNA region, this 
third level has assumed prominence.11 
The thesis of the “MNA Development Report” is that, with 
the growing scarcity of water, policy focus needs to shift to allocative 
efficiency among competing water uses. For irrigation, which uses 80 
percent–90 percent of all water, redesigning incentives that direct 
farmers toward maximizing income per drop is one obvious focus. 
On the urban side, the focus needs to be on rationalizing water and 
sanitation subsidies. As mentioned earlier, general subsidies in MNA 
have tended to benefit the well-to-do (water), or no one (sewerage 
investments). Establishing clear rules for subsidies that are based on 
measurable outcomes is one obvious solution. Tracking the effective-
ness of public expenditures through regular public expenditure reviews 
is another obviously useful instrument.
External accountability is generated when lobby groups outside 
the water sector (NGOs, high-value farmers, tour operators, resort 
owners, media) pressure political leaders for efficient and high quality 
water services. As the MNA illustrations indicated, these fairly narrow 
drivers could be leveraged for broad-based reforms when the debate is 
opened up to the other suggestions in this chapter (targeted subsidies, 
user participation, and effective use of public funds that foster internal 
and external accountability. 
Engineering
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Figure 2.7  Changing Nature of Accountability
Source: World Bank 2007.
10 See chapter 4 by Shawky Mohamed and others in this volume.
11 See chapter 1, figure 1.1, and subsequent discussion on this topic.
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However, there is a need to set up appropriate organizational 
structures to govern water management. The experience of the MNA 
Region suggests that empowering river basin organizations, branch 
canal users, or aquifer-based user associations is necessary to create 
awareness of water management issues. These are relatively new or-
ganizations and have difficulty in acquiring legitimacy when faced with 
conflicts with established national or local political or administrative 
groupings, such as governorates, provinces, and districts. Obviously, 
there are no general solutions. Each country must work out solutions 
that fit its own context.
Concluding Remarks
Bridging the practice gap requires a fundamental rethinking of the way 
that water is managed and that stakeholders learn about sustainable 
management of water resources and water services. 
Over the last three decades, the dramatic shift from surface to 
groundwater in many parts of the world—by agriculture, municipal 
users, and industry—has been essentially a water privatization process, 
with no rules of the game. What is needed now are to (1) acknowledge 
de facto rights and (2) make a major effort to educate and inform on 
the need for “rights, but with rules.”
The experience suggests that water managers must recognize and 
manage the several external drivers of water use. Policies outside the 
water sector often cause unintentional harm to it. Water manage-
ment, therefore, requires active engagement, discussion, and debate 
among all parts of society before the practice gap between principles 
and pragmatic solutions can be bridged.
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Egypt: Water Sector Public  
Expenditure Review 
Ahmed Shawky Mohamed and  
N. Vijay Jagannathan 
Key Findings
In 2003–04, the Government of Egypt (GOE) budget spent 4.087 billion 
LE on water infrastructure in the irrigation and agriculture subsectors, 
and 6.697 billion LE in the WSS subsector.† Of this, approximately 79 
percent and 61 percent, respectively, were allocated for new investments; 
the balance was allocated for recurrent costs. The outcomes of such 
significant public outlays have been mixed. On the positive side, there 
have been impressive gains in agricultural productivity due to water invest-
ment and in water supply and sanitation coverage. On the negative side, 
fiscal dependence on the government remains, and a new concern that 
requires significant public finance needs immediate policy attention. The 
latter has arisen because of pollution externalities in the lower Nile Delta, 
which are exacting a heavy toll on public health and the environment. 
A 2002 World Bank study on the costs of environmental degradation 
estimates the damage costs at 1.6 percent–3.2 percent of GDP.
This chapter assesses the recent trends of public expenditures of 
the water sector. It focuses particularly on the irrigation and water 
supply and sanitation (WSS) subsectors, the two major recipients of 
public financing in the water sector. It also investigates different sources 
of fiscal stress and sources of finance, and explores the efficiency and 
equity implications of the current arrangements.1
† This chapter updates World Bank Water Policy Note 2 (2005), written as part of 
the analytical work supporting the 2005 Public Expenditure Review (PER) in Egypt, 
a Government of Egypt-World Bank collaboration.
  See chapter 4, “Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: Spending 1
Less for Better Services” by Shawky Mohamed and others in this volume.
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The following is a summary of the key findings:
Finding 1: Most investment as well as operation and maintenance 
(O&M) costs of water services in Egypt are funded from the national 
budget.2 Cost-recovery levels still are below international comparators. 
As a consequence, the sector is heavily indebted.
Finding 2: Over the last two decades, the composition of water-related 
public expenditures has changed. A higher proportion is being allocated 
to new investments—at the expense of recurrent expenditures and 
debt repayments, thereby increasing the sector’s long-term liabilities.
Finding 3: Water service coverage (in relation to both drinking water 
and irrigation) is adequate in the Nile Delta area. However, it is gen-
erally lacking in the rural/southern areas, in which water services are 
particularly inequitable for low-income communities. 
Finding 4: Reallocating budget appropriations among different budget 
chapters of water agencies, among departments within agencies, and 
among water user groups (WUGs) requires a fundamental rearrange-
ment of current budget planning and management.
Finding 5: The irrigation and water supply and sanitation (WSS) 
subsectors have three options available to finance future O&M and 
investment costs. These are identified in the Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM) Action Plan: 
Increase contributions from users, requiring changes in legislation.a. 
Decrease transaction costs and overhead expenditures through b. 
decentralization and improved efficiency in service delivery. The 
main sources of “avoidable” transaction costs are overstaffing, 
duplication of responsibilities, oversized designs, suboptimal tech-
nology, and procurement inefficiency. 
  O&M costs pertain to the following items in the budget chapters of the water-2
related ministries: 
a. Partly chapter 1: Wages that relate to O&M, as opposed to planning and other 
central administrative functions.
b. Chapter 2: Goods and services for O&M.
c. Partly chapter 3: Only regular/preventive rehabilitation (as opposed to occa-
sional/major rehabilitation).
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Facilitate private sector participation in financing, developing, and c. 
operating the irrigation systems in line with user preferences and 
willingness to pay.
Finding 6: The WSS subsector is moving toward corporatization. 
It urgently needs to address the debt overhang caused by the past 
policy of service expansion without cost recovery. Under the present 
circumstances:
For the holding company to fulfill its mandate of reforming the sec-a. 
tor, restructuring and/or writing off existing debt is inevitable. 
Any debt write-off needs to be contingent on achieving monitor-b. 
able financial and operational performance outcomes.
Future donor financing could be structured around assisting the hold-c. 
ing company to achieve the above outcomes in the medium term, 
perhaps through a sector-wide approach (SWAp) operation. 
Sector Background
Egypt is an arid country with very limited rainfall. The Nile-Lake-
Nasser system is one of the largest hydraulic infrastructure complexes 
in the world. It consists of a series of large barrages, canals, pumping 
stations, water and sewage treatment plants, and water supply and 
sewerage networks. 
Importance of Water Resource Management  
for the Egyptian Economy
The Nile-Lake-Nasser system is Egypt’s only renewable supply source 
for surface water, and constitutes 95 percent of the country’s total 
water resources. The rest of Egypt’s water resources is mainly fossil 
(nonrenewable) groundwater found in the coastal zones, deserts, and 
Sinai; and estimated at 3–4 BCM/yr. 
Egypt’s water requirements are increasing as a result of growing 
population, rising living standards, and the needs of industries and ag-
riculture (particularly in the reclaimed new lands). Of the subsectoral 
shares, agriculture (including fisheries) is the major user; it consumes 
approximately 70 percent of water. Municipal/potable and industrial 
subsectors consume only 3.5 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively. 
The balance, estimated at roughly one-quarter of the overall water 
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stock, is lost through evaporation (5 percent), and, more significantly, 
as drainage water (20 percent) discharged into the Mediterranean Sea 
and the desert fringes of the Nile system. 
Sectoral Challenges
A major challenge facing Egypt is to close the gap between the limited 
water resources available and the escalating demand for water from 
competing users. Available water per capita per annum amounts to 
some 900m³, which is already below the “water poverty” index of 
1000 m³/capita/annum. This figure is expected to fall to 670m³ by 
2017, unless policies are implemented to sustainably manage growing 
demand. Managing sustainably requires developing appropriate pricing 
and financing rules along with an institutional framework that encour-
ages sustainable use. 
Until the early 1990s, GOE’s attention was focused on “balancing” 
water supply and demand through supply augmentation. The result 
was significant investments in water supply, drainage, and rehabilitation 
of irrigation infrastructure, from both the national budget and donors. 
Nonetheless, by the mid-/late 1990s, the need for a more integrated 
approach became apparent due to: 
Continued deterioration of water qualityN
Growing demand-supply gapN
Intensification of inter-sectoral and inter-regional water allocation N
problems
Inadequacy of government funds to sustain new investments and N
O&M at current levels
Poor operational performance of water agencies.N
Since then, the government policy has shifted to integrated water 
quality and quantity management. The integrated water resources 
management (IWRM) approach seeks to address sectoral concerns 
through a mix of institutional reforms, changes in incentive structures, 
and technical innovations. 
“Public-Good” Perspective to Water Services 
Water resource management (WRM) is seen as a cornerstone of 
national security. Consequently, a significant part of the hydraulic 
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infrastructure is regarded as a public good and receives financing from 
the national budget. This infrastructure includes not only the “trunk” 
system, comprising the production, treatment, and distribution of 
water to various users/subsectors from a system of dams, barrages, 
and main canals; but also the recipient or “feeder” subsectors, which 
include irrigation, municipal, industrial, navigation, and hydropower 
users. For the latter system, there is both a public and a private good 
dimension because these users obtain privately appropriable benefits 
either by consumption or by using water as an input in production. 
Past policies have not rigorously distinguished these two aspects. 
For example:
An Egyptian farmer in the Nile Delta pays the incremental cost N
of water delivery at the farm level but not the conveyance (and 
lifting costs) from the river system.
A water supply consumer pays a tariff of approximately only 20 N
percent of the treatment and delivery costs. 
The rest of the “feeder” costs gets picked up in the public goods 
account. One could argue that apportioning the public and private costs 
in this very large, integrated hydraulic system is complex. Nevertheless, 
there clearly is significant potential to increase user contributions for 
water usage that yields private benefits.
However, greater user financing of water services requires a fundamen-
tal reorganization of Egyptian water delivery systems—from sectors and 
departments that rely on budgetary subventions to service-oriented 
utilities that respond to user preferences and willingness to pay. For 
example, in Egypt’s WSS subsector, users receive subsidized but poor 
quality services from utilities. These consumers are unwilling to pay 
higher tariffs because their expectations of service improvements 
from these providers are low. However, unless higher tariffs are paid, 
the utility will never be in a position to reduce its dependence on the 
national budget. 
While public money is financing private services, a genuine public 
service is in desperate need of public funding: infrastructure to improve 
water quality. Concerns with water quality distress urban and rural 
users of water in the Nile Delta area. The areas of concern require 
actions on several fronts: from technological innovations with greater 
user feedback and participation to improved coordination among water 
agencies. 
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This vicious cycle of poor performance, debt overhang, and private 
sector lack of interest must be broken. The current attention on public 
expenditures provides one such opportunity. 
Consequent Institutional Challenges
Centralized but fragmented management and inadequate mechanisms 
for ensuring accountability to service users affect sectoral financial and 
operational performance. For example, responsibilities—planning, de-
sign, construction, operation, research, monitoring, and regulation—are 
carried out through multiple agencies and departments within these 
agencies, and each is funded through a parallel budget line. These 
agencies are in the nature of “budget-maximizing” bureaucracies and 
have very little incentive to be accountable to the service users. 
In recent years, GOE began moving toward addressing these 
concerns. On the institutional side, “holding companies” have been 
established for both irrigation services in the “new lands” outside the 
Nile Delta and for WSS services. The explicit objective is to reduce 
the recurrent fiscal burden of the government, while improving the ef-
ficiency and sustainability of O&M services. The eventual objective is 
to convert these holding companies to off-budget entities that attract 
private sector participation. 
In the irrigation subsector, 
two holding companies have 
been established: one for the 
South Valley/West Delta and 
one for Northern Sinai. For the 
WSS subsector, a holding com-
pany subsuming 14 subsidiary 
companies nationwide has been 
established. However, before 
they can be effective, these hold-
ing companies face two major 
challenges:
There is still no suitable regulatory framework that enables tariff-1. 
setting to respond to user demand.
There is no strategy on how to write off/restructure the overhang-2. 
ing debt and create organizational structures that can respond to 
user demand/attract private sector participation. 
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Figure 3.1  Irrigation and WSS Expenditures
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In the Nile Delta area, the IWRM action plan already has instituted 
measures that enhance user voice in the O&M of services. MWRI 
successfully delegated O&M responsibilities to water user associations 
(WUAs) at the tertiary-canal (mesqa) level. MWRI also is embarking 
on an action plan to empower Water Boards to manage irrigation and 
drainage O&M at the secondary or branch-canal level. The key measure 
required is an amendment to Law 12/1984 (to empower WUAs), which 
is expected to be enacted by the end of 2009. 
Assessment of Expenditure Trends
Trends in Water Expenditures
Total water expenditures, thus including investment and recurrent invest-
ments, implemented between 1981 and 2000 reached LE 23 billion. 
The notable trend was variability in WSS project investments over 
2001–05, marking the end of an 
expansion phase that began 2 
decades back. It generated an 
increase from 5.8 million m3/
day in 1982 to 18.2 million m3/
day in 2000. Coverage figures 
achieved during this period were 
quite impressive vis-à-vis MDGs: 
potable water supply coverage 
was almost 100 percent and 
95 percent for the urban and 
rural populations, respectively. 
Per capita potable water use 
increased from 130 liters/day in 
1981 to 275 liters/day in 2000. 
Sewerage and sanitation cover-
age also increased substantially: 
from 1982–2000, wastewater 
collection increased eight-fold. 
On the MWRI side, the trend line 
was steadier, perhaps reflecting 
its consistent appropriations to 
maintain the “trunk” hydraulic 
infrastructure.
0
1
0.5
1.5
2.5
3.5
2
4
3
FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05
% irrigation to total
public investments
% irrigation to total
debt repayments
% irrigation to total
recurrent expenditures
Figure 3.2a  Trend of Irrigation Public Authorities’ 
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New Investments vs. Maintenance
Unlike other sectors of the econ-
omy, investment spending by wa-
ter utilities was a relatively high 
proportion of total expenditures 
(f igures 3.2a, 3.2b, 3.3a, and 
3.3b), because of the significant 
increase in water supply expan-
sion investments. For the overall 
water sector, the ratio of invest-
ment-to-recurrent spending has 
ranged from 200 percent–300 
percent since FY01, while invest-
ment spending has averaged only 
20 percent of recurrent expen-
ditures in other sectors. Within 
the water subsectors, there is a 
declining trend in recurrent ex-
penditures and debt repayments, 
while investment expenditures 
have remained relatively steady. 
This divergence suggests that 
new investments may be getting 
higher priority than the opera-
tion and maintenance of existing 
assets. These practices could lead to significant costs in the future in 
deferred maintenance and should be investigated.
Water Resources and Irrigation Subsector
Among MWRI departments, which are responsible for these activi-
ties, Sovereign Services Aid and Domestic Loans annually comprise 
on average approximately 75 percent of financing. However, domestic 
loans are actually long-term subsidies. The reasons are that they are 
either (a) not repaid (for example, National Water Resources Center), 
or (b) only partly repaid (for example, Egyptian Public Authorities for 
Drainage Projects, or EPADP, which repays approximately 28 percent), 
or (c) expected to be repaid by holding companies that do not have the 
requisite cash flow from revenues. In general, user/service fees repre-
sent only a few percentage points for most departments (figures 3.4 
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and 3.5). The same issue applies 
to the WSS subsector: Figures 
3.6 and 3.7. 
In aggregate terms, from 2000 
to 2005 approximately 12 billion 
LE has been spent on national ir-
rigation infrastructure and water-
resources related programs. This 
level of spending translates to an 
average annual rate of 15 percent 
of total Egyptian public invest-
ments since 2000.
User contributions: Costs of 
publicly f inanced investments 
in subsurface drainage are fully 
recovered from farmers, while 
investments in tertiary-canal (or 
mesqa) improvements are partially 
recovered through the land tax. 
Overall, farmers incur approxi-
mately 43 percent of the tertiary-
canal improvement costs.
In some cases (such as the 
World-Bank-supported Irrigation 
Improvement Project), farmers 
are fully responsible for O&M 
of the improvements provided 
by MWRI at the tertiary-canal 
(or mesqa) level. Collections 
are made through land taxes, 
levied at 30 LE/feddan/year on 
average, which accrue to local 
governments at a collection effi-
ciency of 60 percent–75 percent. 
The collected taxes amount to 
only 20 percent and 6 percent 
of the recurrent and total bud-
get appropriations, respectively, 
channeled by the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) to MWRI.
0.0
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Egypt Morocco India Phillippines Mexico Australia
Source: World BanK 2003.
Note: Ratios greater than 1 indicate user repayment not only for 0&M but also for 
Capital-replacement costs. 
Figure 3.4  Irrigation O&M Cost Recovery Ratio (%)
Change in credits 3%
Services fees 4%
Foreign loans 16%
Grants 7%
Sovereign services aid 31%
Other sources 1%
Domestic loans 38%
Source: MWRI data.
Sources of Financing MWRI – Irrigation Department Budget
Figure 3.5  Financial Resources of Irrigation Subsector, 2001–05
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
Sovereign 
service
315,547 297,609 307,801 356,629 401,912
Domestic 
loans
206,220 390,101 437,008 486,770 544,700
Foreign 
loans
58,232 177,392 175,069 219,988 205,587
Grants 67,241 91,443 93,274 93,150 30,720
Internal 
finance
10,102 4,587 530 800 701
Services 
fees
40,243 38,644 36,730 40,799 35,325
Change in 
credit
71,813 45,252 25,514 0 0
Other 
sources
45,231 13,300 11,946 0 0
Total 814,629 1,058,328 1,087,872 1,198,336 1,218,945
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For the future, there are 
two means of financing the ris-
ing O&M and investment costs: 
(1) increase contributions from 
users through reforms of the 
pricing system or (2) reduce costs 
by improving efficiency of service 
delivery. Through the Integrated 
Irrigation Improvement and Man-
agement Project (IIIMP), MWRI 
has been testing new options 
to enhance cost recovery from 
water users in the Nile Delta. In 
addition, the proposed (World 
Bank-supported) West Delta irri-
gation project would test full cost 
recovery from farmers producing 
high-value agricultural products 
in the new lands reclaimed from 
the desert. 
WSS Subsector
The WSS utilities are responsi-
ble for the management of water 
supply and sewerage networks 
serving domestic, institutional, 
and industrial water users. Nor-
mally, these networks should be 
expected to recover at least all of 
the O&M costs. The PER data 
indicated a continued reliance 
on the public budget, perhaps 
because these utilities had been 
caught in a vicious circle of low 
tariffs, poor services, and low 
consumer expectations of ser-
vice improvements, which in-
creased consumer resistance to 
price increases. There is a wide 
Change in credits 11%
Services fees 25%
Internal !nance 17%
Sovereign services aid 29%
Other sources 10%Domestic loans 8%
Source: MWRI data.
Sources of Financing Cairo Potable Water Authority Budget
Figure 3.6 Financial Resources of the WSS Subsector: Cairo 
2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05
Sovereign 
service
553,932 527,485 623,159 493,234 468,500
Domestic 
loans
104,925 114,599 74,962 174,000 229,000
Foreign 
loans
3,189 796 1,164 4,000 4,000
Grants 2,662 210 42 0 0
Internal 
finance
130,693 167,402 153,183 559,818 494,068
Services 
fees
347,544 387,433 411,030 515,500 576,645
Change in 
credit
285,848 125,089 0 285,847 285,847
Other 
sources
201,720 220,242 458,536 0 0
Total 1,630,513 1,543,256 1,722,076 2,032,399 2,058,060
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Note: Ratio > 1 indicates user repayment not only for recurrent costs, but also for 
capital costs.
Figure 3.7  Water Supply and Sanitation: Cost Recovery (%)
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gap between the actual costs of water supply (0.8–1.00 LE/m3) that 
they incur and the user-tariffs (average 0.15 LE/m3) that accrue to 
them. For example, Cairo water tariffs are among the lowest among 
developing country megacities and pay for only 25 percent and 10 
percent of the actual costs of water supply and sanitation, respec-
tively. Cost recovery in secondary cities/towns is better for water 
supply (Alexandria’s is as high as 50 percent), although equally low (10 
percent) for sanitation. Consequently, since establishing NOPWASD 
(1981) and the economic authorities (1995), these entities regularly 
have been bailed out through sovereign aid and domestic loans that 
are never repaid.
Recent attempts to increase Cairo’s tariffs are awaiting concur-
rence from the local councils and the national Parliament. Low tariffs 
not only impose a heavy recurrent fiscal burden on the national budget 
but also generate disincentives for operational efficiency and respon-
siveness to consumers. 
Prior to establishing the WSS holding company, governors had the 
authority to set water prices to a ceiling of LE 0.23 /m3. Although this 
ceiling was below actual production costs by a factor of 3–4, not many 
governors utilized even this authorization.
The final outcome was that domestic loans and sovereign ser-
vices aid (figure 3.6) became the sources of finances for even routine 
O&M. The O&M subsidies to the subsector were estimated at 
3–4 billion LE/annum, or 2.0 percent–2.5 percent of total public re-
current expenditures. Thus, the debt overhang of the WSS subsector 
reached 14 billion LE. 
Table 3.1  Recurrent Unit Costs and Associated Subsidies in WSS 
System
NOPWASD
(Municipalities)
GOGCWS
(Cairo)
AWGA
(Alexandria)
LE per m³
Estimated capital, O&M costs 1.0a 1.1b NAc
Subsidy 0.8 0.9 NA
Average user feee 0.2 0.2 0.3
Rate: Piaster /m3  d,e 15–25 15–25 25–35
Notes:
National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary Drainage.a. 
General Organization for Greater Cairo Water Supply.b. 
Alexandria Water General Authority.c. 
Wastewater tariff is 20% of water tariff for Cairo and 35% for Alexandria.d. 
These are applicable to the residential units, which have water meters. Those who do not have meters or whose meters are not working pay a e. 
fixed monthly charge for water consumption (LE 5–20 monthly/unit). The charge changes with house area. 
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Sources of Debt
In Egypt the WSS debt overhang has escalated (figure 3.9) for two 
reasons: 
First, WSS economic authorities (overseen by governorates) are a. 
expected to pay for their O&M costs through user fees. How-
ever, there is a wide gap between the actual cost of water supply 
(0.8–1.00 LE/m3) that the authorities incur, and the user-tariffs 
(0.15 LE/m3 on average) that accrue to them. The consequence is 
that since the National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary 
Drainage (NOPWASD) was established in 1981, and the economic 
authorities in 1995, these entities have been bailed out regularly by 
sovereign aid and domestic loans that rarely get repaid. 
Second, in the absence of adequate cash flow from service users, b. 
these agencies are fully dependent on O&M government budget 
transfers. As these transfers often are based on historical prec-
edents, they often become biased toward paying wages rather than 
toward creating an effective O&M; or they become biased toward 
existing assets (such as water/wastewater plants and distribution 
networks) rather than new ones. The consequence is “deferred 
maintenance,” a situation that leads to unnecessary deterioration 
of assets and (eventually) costly rehabilitation that could have been 
avoided by less costly routine/preventive maintenance. 
The rehabilitation of WSS infrastructure triggers cycles of debt be-
cause the utilities/NOPWASD are forced to borrow from the National 
Investment Bank (NIB) or seek (often off-budget) subventions to meet 
their pressing rehabili-
tation needs. Under 
these circumstances, 
passing on the debt 
to the newly created 
holding company does 
not resolve the prob-
lem. It simply passes 
on the problem to a 
new organization that 
lacks the capacity to 
manage the problem. 
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A similar analogy can be 
applied to MWRI’s holding com-
panies for new lands. However, 
GoE has not been as apprehen-
sive about the debt of the irriga-
tion subsector as it has about 
that of WSS. The reasons are 
two. First, irrigation debt has 
not reached such an unwieldy 
level as has WSS (figure 3.9). 
Second, much of the irrigation 
debt has been used to finance 
trunk-infrastructure investments 
of the “public good” type, which can be deemed sunk costs. 
Inequitable Outcomes
The equity impacts of the existing sectoral arrangements can be 
summed up in four points:
 
Customers in secondary cities and rural areas incur higher WSS 1. 
service prices than in major cities. In many rural/periurban areas, 
water vendors supply potable water to households that have stand-
pipes, charging more than 10 times the actual cost for piped-water 
prices. Moreover, poor farmers already pay as much as 10 percent 
of their incomes for wastewater removal from cesspools, which 
fact suggests their willingness to pay for a better service-provision 
option. 
WSS tariffs are heavily subsidized. Hence, increasing block tariff 2. 
structures may end up targeting cross-subsidies on the nonpoor 
(for example, because the nonpoor may have smaller families or 
may be able afford to use water-saving appliances, compared to 
the poor), not penalizing the wasteful users. 
Poorer areas have the worst WSS services (figure 3.8).3. 
A fee of 70 LE–100 LE per feddan/year is estimated to be adequate 4. 
to meet the full O&M costs for irrigation services. This amount 
would be an average reduction in farm incomes of 5 percent, a 
percentage likely to be affordable to big and medium holders. In 
the absence of targeting, subsidies are benefiting the richer farm-
ers, who use the most water.
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Source: MOF annual data on the debt repayment by, versus loans to, the irrigation and 
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Figure 3.9  Cumulative Debts of WSS and Irrigation 
Subsectors
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Responding to Challenges: GOE Policy Actions Taken
The government’s vision for sustainable financing for the water sector 
is to (a) explore alternative cost-sharing arrangements with decentral-
ized service delivery institutions, (b) progressively turn over financial 
responsibility for O&M to water utilities or water user organizations, 
and (c) establish full cost-recovery arrangements between the govern-
ment and farmers/investors in the new lands.
GOE proposes to encourage public-private partnerships (PPP) in 
the financing, operation, and management of irrigation and water sup-
ply infrastructure. Recently established holding companies are being 
encouraged to seek out private partners who can share capital and 
O&M costs for both the expanded irrigation network in Toshka and 
El-Salam canal, and for the WSS subsectors. 
Irrigation
The Water Boards Project is testing ways to transfer water management 
responsibilities at the secondary level of the irrigation system from MWRI 
to user organizations. This transfer would reduce the government’s con-
tribution to O&M costs by approximately 50 percent. The extra burden 
on farmers is expected to be partially compensated by exempting them 
from paying land taxes to local governments. The IIIMP will be testing 
new organizational arrangements that link the MWRI’s investment and 
operational functions to user organizations’ responsibility for operating 
and maintaining the irrigation network below the branch canal level.
Water Supply
While GOE’s efforts at WSS decentralization have focused on changing 
the institutional arrangements, the latter have not as yet adequately 
addressed service efficiency concerns: 
Increased WSS tariff collection responsibilities at the governorate N
level very well could end up simply topping-up employee wages, 
unless the latter are made contingent on either increased labor 
productivity or improved O&M services. 
There are as yet no policies for penalizing nonpaying customers. N
Government and public sector institutions often are exempted 
from paying water bills. 
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The cost of water treatment and distribution has not been fully N
borne by industrial users because government subsidies support-
ing O&M costs benefit all users (for both water and wastewater 
treatment). On average, for example, industries are billed 1 LE /m3 
for water, which is often substantially below the costs of delivering 
the service. 
There also is a pronounced regional bias in WSS services that N
favors major cities in the Nile Delta and along the Suez Canal. 
Even though rural population densities are high in the delta, there 
is almost no sewerage in Upper Egypt or generally in rural areas. 
Sanitation has been defined as an urban public service, and no 
institution/agency has adopted providing sanitation to the rural 
areas (figure 3.8). 
Recommended Policy Orientations
Increase Recovery of Recurrent Costs
Egypt’s hydraulic infrastructure has been constructed over several 
millennia and is dependent on a storage, distribution, and collection 
system around a single river. The public-good aspect of a significant 
part of MWRI expenditures (headworks and main canal systems) 
always will remain. However, significant budgetary savings could be 
accomplished by devolving irrigation and WSS service functions to 
locally accountable institutions. To this end, holding companies should 
be vested with wider authorities to raise tariffs and recruit employees. 
These companies also should be entrusted with more proactive roles 
beyond O&M and undertake new investments. Concerning WSS 
services, the medium-term policy should focus on recovering O&M 
and amortization costs from the users. Increased private sector inter-
est will take place only when there is clear evidence of reliable cash 
flow from users. 
Over recent decades, public f inance of irrigation expansion in 
the “new lands” has taken place over vast expanses of the desert 
around the Nile River system. Mega projects such as Toshka in 
southwest Egypt, and El-Salam Canal east of the Nile Delta and 
Sinai have been implemented. These decisions have been based on 
economic, social, and political considerations that include developing 
agroindustrial communities and investment zones outside the Nile 
Valley to decongest the valley system. However, there are significant 
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opportunity costs of these investments, which have absorbed bil-
lions of dollars of scarce public resources. Future investments could 
follow two criteria: 
Maximize “crop value per drop,” meaning that the revenues gen-1.  
erated from irrigated agriculture should focus on high-value crops 
that generate income and employment opportunities.3
Cost-recovery through volumetric pricing of water services.2.  
Use a Part of Recurrent Cost Savings to Leverage Investments That 
Focus on Low-Income Communities and Urgent Environmental 
Expenditures
The recurrent cost savings could be used to leverage donor financing 
to support a nationwide targeted program aimed at improving water 
and sanitation services in low-income communities. For water supply, 
the focus could be on the low-income communities of Upper Egypt 
through national budgetary finance. Concerning water quality, one 
subregion’s untreated wastewater becomes the downstream com-
munity’s pollution problem. Moreover, the financing requirements to 
tackle the costs of environmental degradation are enormous and require 
significant long-term donor concessional commitments.4
Establish Criteria to Ensure That New Public Investments  
Do Not Substitute for the Maintenance of Existing Hydraulic 
Infrastructure Assets
Until the above reforms are instituted, public expenditures will continue 
to be the main sources of maintaining existing assets. In this case, 
developing new assets financed through public appropriations5 should 
not substitute for public appropriations to maintain existing assets.6 
  The “old lands” in the Nile Valley are restricted by heavy soils, very small ten-3
ures, and traditional farming systems dating back thousands of years. Each of these 
restrictions impedes fostering a cropping pattern that maximizes net exports. 
  See Shawky and others, ““Assessing the Efficiency and Equity of Water Subsidies: 4
Spending Less for Better Services” in this volume.
  Chapters 3 and 4 of the budget (according to the budget structure of the Ministry 5
of Finance in 2005).
  Chapter 2 of the budget for regular/preventive maintenance and chapter 3 for 6
occasional/major rehabilitation.
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Decentralize
Decentralization of governmental responsibilities and community 
participation in service planning and delivery must be deepened. It 
requires the participation of water user groups in the planning, design, 
implementation, and O&M of water works; in setting and adminis-
tering tariffs; and in supervision and quality control. Decentralization 
also intends to eliminate government involvement in routine O&M/
rehabilitation of irrigation systems. In the WSS sector, utilities need 
to be accountable to local users and elected bodies, such as municipal 
councils. Meaningful participation cannot be achieved unless there is 
greater transfer of responsibility, authority, and resources to grassroots 
user groups. 
Deal with Debt
Most of the water sector’s domestic debts have short maturity and 
therefore are not appropriate instruments to finance this type of long-
term investment. Furthermore, as the domestic debt is not actually 
repaid through revenues from water tariffs, its write-off by the gov-
ernment becomes inevitable.
As in the Philippines (box 3.1), the long-run success of decentral-
ization requires the resolution of the debt overhang. 
A possible solution is to link debt relief with the accomplishment 
of the key institutional reform milestones: improving financial and op-
erational efficiency. For example, the WSS holding company’s debts 
could be written off after the accomplishment of milestones linked to 
Box 3.1 Water Management in the Philippines 
In the Philippines, after the law devolved O&M responsibilities from the National Irriga-
tion Administration (NIA) to the local governments/communities, local governments/ 
communities have been reluctant to take over the O&M of communal irrigation systems. In 
addition to the lack of capacity at the local level, reluctance was due to the debt overhang 
that also was to be passed from NIA to the local governments/communities. Eventu-
ally, national legislation was necessary to write off most of the debt. NIA also offered 
a pilot program in which a considerable part of the debt is waived if local governments/
communities contribute immediate equity through fostering local private investment in 
irrigation and raising user fees.
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financial and operational efficiency. Performance could be monitored 
through five key indicators, such as debt service ratio, unaccounted-
for-water (UFW) percent,7 number of staff per 1,000 connections, 
total number of connections, and 100 percent metering of all water 
connections/subscriptions.8 External support through a sector-wide 
approach (SWAp) operation or debt restructuring could improve ser-
vice performance.
Address Procurement Inefficiencies 
One glaring example of procurement inefficiencies is the lack of trans-
parency. Inappropriate procurement practices can be controlled if 
oversight of the tendering process explicitly involves the participation 
of beneficiary communities. Current procurement practices are designed 
to safeguard the integrity of public spending but often end up creat-
ing the opposite effect. Delays in awarding contracts and in honoring 
government payment commitments to contractors result in the lack 
of interest among highly competent Egyptian companies in bidding 
for government contracts. Overstaffing in departments has resulted 
in unnecessary procedures and paperwork, often as “make-work” 
assignments for government staff. Furthermore, the practice of retain-
ing retirees as senior management advisors/consultants demotivates 
middle-level staff.
Ensure Appropriate Design of Water Facilities and Choice  
of Technologies 
The technologies selected in providing water services often are oversized 
and not cost-effective, and increase O&M costs to users. An example from 
the irrigation subsector at the tertiary-canal level is pumping facilities 
(pump set and pump house) and pipelines that have been oversized to 
“guarantee” reliable irrigation deliveries. A cost-effective alternative 
would be to involve the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation 
(MALR) in improving extension services and MWRI in improving the abil-
ity of a farmer to receive water on demand, that is, through continuous 
  Unaccounted-for-water (UFW) includes leaks and water supplied to illegal 7
connections.
  See example on Egypt’s WSS benchmarking indicators in chapter 4 by Shawky 8
and others. 
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flow. These concepts are being 
tested in the IIIMP.9 
Rather than being unilaterally 
imposed by one agency solely to 
meet engineering/technical crite-
ria, technology choice should be 
based on comprehensive (multi-
agency) and cost-effective plans. 
These comprehensive plans 
should be coordinated jointly 
by MoF, Ministry of Planning, 
NOPWASD, Egyptian Environ-
mental Affairs Agency (EEAA), 
MWRI, Ministry of Health and 
Population (MoHP), and Ministry of Local Development (MoLD). 
Therefore, sequential and prioritized spatial coverage of services and 
adoption of low-cost technologies should be sought.
In figure 3.10, actual public expenditure10 (light blue) vs. needs 
(orange plus blue) show that savings from expenditure rationalization 
can be reallocated to meet the unfunded needs. 
Savings from the public expenditure can largely be achieved 
through: 
The aforementioned policy orientations 1 and 2: financing recurrent N
expenditure through targeted end-user fees will free some public 
funds that then can be spent on public-like needs, such as water 
quality. This is an example of an “allocative” efficiency. 
The aforementioned policy orientations 6 on procurement efficiency N
and 7 on “right-sizing” the works. These are technical efficiencies 
Rationalize the Institutional Architecture
There is room for cost-saving toward through reducing overhead costs. 
The WSS subsector has begun to reduce overheads through establishing 
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Figure 3.10  Actual Expenditures vs. Needs (M LE/yr)
  See in this volume the chapter entitled “Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile 9
Delta” by Jose Simas and others, in which the W-10 pilot has tackled this oversizing 
issue (albeit on a demonstration scale).  
  Summation of the long-term capital investments “annualized” for 2004, plus 10
recurrent expenditure actually spent in 2004.  
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the holding company described above. In the irrigation subsector, MWRI 
is piloting programs to reduce overheads within the governorate level, 
namely, at the water directorates and water districts levels. Supported by 
a USAID project and IIIMP, MWRI is piloting Integrated Water Manage-
ment Districts (IWMDs), which assume the O&M roles. The IWMDs 
are entities integrated at the district level based on hydrological rather 
than administrative boundaries. To remedy the current fragmented 
structure, in the IWMDs, all MWRI departments are represented in 
one organization. This structure is expected to reduce O&M transac-
tion costs as well as to improve O&M at the district level. The next 
step is to pilot Integrated Water Management Directorates, which assume 
design and construction roles. The lessons from these pilots will be used 
to scale up the concept throughout Egypt. 
It is advisable to change the accounting practices by posting all 
water-related costs under one account within the general state budget. 
This change could unify the present fragmentation among different 
institutions.
Form Partnerships with the Private Sector 
Beyond the adoption of holding companies, more advanced PPP mod-
els in irrigation and WSS need to be piloted. The depth and mode of 
private participation will depend critically upon measures taken to 
improve cost-recovery.
Recommended Immediate Actions
The short-term policy recommendations drawn from this PER analysis 
are:
a.1.   Amend Law 12/1984. Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) 
to water user associations/groups is envisaged to reduce the fis-
cal burden on the government, while improving local irrigation 
services. These groups need the authority to collect, retain, and 
administer user fees. There is an enforceable legal basis for WUAs 
to raise (land) taxes to recover O&M costs of the tertiary canals, 
because these canals are privately owned by farmers. However, 
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branch canals are public assets, and there is no legal basis for WUAs 
and Water Boards to recover O&M costs. Unless Law 12/1984 is 
amended, the suggested reforms cannot be effected.
b. 2.  Put in place a subsectoral investment and restructuring program 
in WSS. By virtue of two presidential decrees,11 a legal basis has 
been initiated for the WSS holding company and its affiliated com-
panies to raise tariffs and achieve financial autonomy. However, 
these utilities face a difficult organizational challenge. The basic 
infrastructure, such as universal metering, is not in place; users are 
skeptical of their capacity to improve services; the debt overhang 
restricts the flexibility of financial management; and the organiza-
tions are heavily overstaffed. 
What is required is a wide-ranging investment and restructuring 
program to simultaneously improve service quality and the financial 
autonomy of WSS companies.
References
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 In 2004, two Presidential Decrees were issued that regulated the WSS subsector 11
under the responsibility of the MHUNC. The first decree, 135 for 2004, is concerned 
with the creation of a Holding Company for Drinking Water and Sanitation and its 
affiliated companies that include the General Economic Authorities for Drinking 
Water and Sanitation operating in the governorates. The second Presidential Decree, 
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Sanitation Sector, and Protection of the Consumer. This decree aims at regulating and 
monitoring for quality control and consumer-price control.
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Assessing the Efficiency and 
Equity of Water Subsidies: 
Spending Less for Better Services
Ahmed Shawky Mohamed, Alexander Kremer, 
and Manish Kumar
Background and Objective
This chapter is a sequel to chapter 3 on water sector issues and expen-
diture patterns in Egypt.1 This chapter identifies how public expenditure 
could be reallocated to improve equity and productivity.
Water Has Public and Private Features
A public good is “nonexcludable” because it is costly or unrealistic to 
link end-user charges to usage. A public good is also “nonsubtractable”: 
one person’s use of the infrastructure or the service does not detract 
from another person’s use. Trunk water infrastructure2—multipurpose 
dams/barrages, multipurpose conveyance canals, flood control infra-
structures, and major water/wastewater treatment plants—are public 
goods. They may be efficiently funded by flat charges or general/
sovereign revenues, and there is no reason to link end-user payments 
to their usage. 
However, when water reaches the end-user, it becomes a pri-
vate good. A private good is subtractable, meaning that one person’s 
use subtracts from another’s; and excludable, meaning that one can 
1 This chapter originated as Water Policy Note 2 (World Bank 2005b), the sec-
ond on Egypt’s water sector, as part of the analytical work supporting the Public 
Expenditure Review (PER) in Egypt, a collaboration between the Government of 
Egypt and the World Bank. The aim was to inform government decisionmaking on 
increasing the value added from water and curbing the socioeconomic costs of water 
pollution, while reducing the burden on the government budget.
2 This is true for the infrastructure although not, of course, for the water resource 
base.
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Figure 4.1  Breakdown of Capital Spending between Public 
and Private Goods
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stop nonpayers from using it. In other words, it is efficient to charge 
the user and earmark user charges to cover the costs of the service. 
Charging can help to ensure that the good is not over-consumed. One 
example of a private good is “on-farm” water, the water flowing into 
tertiary/quaternary canals of the irrigation network. Another example 
is household water supply and sanitation connections. 
Government Spends  
on Private Goods
Egypt’s capital spending on irriga-
tion is primarily for public goods, 
but the Egyptian government 
also makes a major allocation to 
private goods (figure 4.1). The 
message in f igure 4.2 is more 
dramatic: public recurrent expen-
diture has been almost entirely 
on private-good aspects of water 
delivery.
This observation can be cou-
pled with the observations of 
chapter 3 (first published as World 
Bank 2005a). Egypt’s water infra-
structure is suffering from inad-
equate maintenance. Increased 
user charges for downstream 
operations and maintenance 
(O&M) could release public re-
sources for priority maintenance 
of deteriorating upstream infra-
structure. These resources, in turn, would reduce the need for public 
funding of infrastructure rehabilitation. They also would release public 
resources for under-funded public priorities such as wastewater collec-
tion and treatment.
Potential Efficiency Gains
One can measure the potential for improved efficiency by benchmark-
ing institutions’ performance. 
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Figure 4.3  Seasonal Irrigation Water Supply per Unit 
Agricultural Area
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Source: Agriculture and Rural Development Department (ARD), World Bank, 
communicated by Safwat Abdel Dayem, former World Bank Drainage Advisor.
Figure 4.4  On-Farm Water Demand/Supply Ratio 
(Ratios Exceeding 1 Indicate Shortage; Less than 1, Excess)  
Source: Agriculture and Rural Development Department (ARD), World Bank, 
communicated by Safwat Abdel Dayem, former World Bank Drainage Advisor.
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Water for Irrigation
Performance benchmarking 
in irrigation and agricultural 
drainage
The three common types of 
irrigation benchmarking indica-
tors are3:
a. Service reliability indicators. 
These indicators may include 
(1) the intra-farm uniformity 
of water application, mea-
sured at the root zone and (2) the adequacy and reliability of irriga-
tion delivery, assessed against engineering/technical benchmarks. 
b. Internal indicators. These compare system outputs with inputs. The 
indicators may include (1) assessing the ratio of the water usage 
to the water actually delivered at various levels of the system and 
(2) economic efficiency (cost-benefit ratio). 
c. Comparative indicators. These indicators assess impacts of irrigated 
agriculture across compa-
rable irrigation systems and/
or through time. An example 
would be to assess productiv-
ity as the actual production 
per unit of water divided by 
the norm.
The performance bench-
marking undertaken below for 
the irrigation subsector tends 
toward the internal and com-
parative types. 
Better use of water and efficient irrigation practices 
The analysis supported by figures 4.3–4.11 draws from a 2002–03 
dataset, which may not be representative of the current nationwide 
3 See International Programme for Technology and Research in Irrigation and 
Drainage, www.fao.org/iptrid/ 
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Figure 4.5  Canal-System Efficiency of Water Delivery
(Water Supply at Canal Level vs. Farm Level) (%)
Source: Agriculture and Rural Development Department (ARD), World Bank, 
communicated by Safwat Abdel Dayem, former World Bank Drainage Advisor.
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Figure 4.6  Annual Irrigation Supply per Unit Irrigated Area 
(m3/ha)
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context. Therefore, the results 
and the argumentation drawn 
may not apply to all irrigation 
schemes in Egypt. The inten-
tion was more to make a case 
for scaling up the benchmarking 
exercise (when more ample data 
sets are available), as part of the 
IWRM ASSESSMENT exercise 
advocated in this volume. 
Figures 4.3–4.5 compare the 
irrigation technical efficiency of 
6 branch-canal command areas 
in Egypt. They show that some 
regions use water much more productively than others. Figure 4.3 
compares seasonal water supply per hectare; figure 4.4 compares the 
on-farm water supply-demand ratios; and figure 4.5 compares the 
canal-system efficiency of water delivery. 
The branch canal level is the secondary level in the Egyptian irriga-
tion delivery system, below the trunk/main canal level. Being under 
public ownership, the branch canal level is managed and financed by 
the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI). However, 
the MWRI piloted various programs to hand over its management 
to Water Boards (World Bank 
2005). The rationale was that the 
canal-drainage system is a private 
good from the branch-canal level 
downward. 
The data in figures 4.3–4.54 
depict a significant disparity in 
performance among the 6 com-
mand areas. MWRI distributes 
water among command areas 
in proportion to crop water re-
quirements, adjusted for cropping 
area. Therefore, any variation in 
water availability per unit area at 
4 Figures 4.4 and 4.5 lack 2 of the 6 observations of figure 4.3 due to lack of data. 
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Figure 4.7  Cost-Recovery Ratio
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Figure 4.8  Average Depth to Shallow Water (m)
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Figure 4.9  Average Production Value per Unit of Irrigation 
Supply (US$/m3/annum)
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the field level can be attributed 
only to water management in-
efficiencies downstream of the 
allocation point, namely, at the 
secondary level and below. 
Figures 4.6–4.8 compare 
the technical and operation-
al performance of Balaqtar, a 
representative canal in Egypt, 
with comparable canals in In-
dia (Sriramsagar), Mexico (Rio 
Yaqui), and Kenya (Malindi) 
(World Bank 2003). The compar-
ison reveals a significant potential 
for improving the operational and 
managerial performance of the 
feeder level of Balaqtar.
The data in figures 4.3–4.8 
support the argument for trans-
ferring the management and 
f inance of the nonheadwork 
canal systems to water user 
organizations (with temporary 
technical backstopping from 
MWRI). This would not only 
reduce public spending but also 
ensure more efficient irrigation 
practices (World Bank 2005). 
Economic efficiency of irrigation
Figure 4.9 compares the eco-
nomic efficiency of irrigation in 
Egypt and other countries. The 
monetary value of agricultural 
production per unit of water is 
used as an indicator of economic 
efficiency. Although the crop-
yield-per-unit-area in Egypt is 
quite high (particularly with rice), 
figure 4.9 clearly suggests that 
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Figure 4.10  Production Value per Unit Irrigation Supply 
(US$/m3/season)
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the economic returns to irrigation 
water in Egypt are lower than 
international norms. 
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 (World 
Bank 2003) support this argument 
by comparing the performance 
of Balaqtar Canal with com-
parable canals in India, Kenya, 
and Mexico.
The causes of the low socio-
economic returns to irrigation 
water are twofold: 
Inefficiency in agricultural production and supply chains. Even a. 
though this is outside the water sector, it reduces the return on 
irrigation sector investment.
Low technical efficiency at the canal/farm level.b. 
Potable Water and Sanitation 
Robust indicators for the WSS 
subsector have been established 
and used world-wide. Cost-
recovery in Egypt is very low 
(table 4.1).
Unaccounted-for Water (UFW) 
Is High
Unaccounted-for water (UFW) is 
one of the most important indica-
tors of efficiency in the WSS sub-
sector. UFW is defined as water that is not metered or billed to customers. 
It is calculated by subtracting the metered consumption from the total 
amount of water supplied to the water system. UFW comprises: 
Apparent water loss arising from meter inaccuracies and improper 1. 
accounting of water used in filling new mains, connections, and 
service reservoirs, and for flushing the water distribution system 
during maintenance.
Figure 4.11  Production Value per Unit Irrigated Area, 
Including Multiple Cropping (US$/ha)
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Actual water loss due to leaks and theft.2. 
In Egypt, quality UFW data is scarce. Studies on specific areas 
show UFW values from 50 percent–67 percent. This percentage is 
usually higher for smaller municipalities. A data set for 15 governorates 
shows a UFW range among governorates of 15 (Cairo) to 56 percent 
(Fayoum), with a weighted average for the 15 governorates of 30 
percent. 
In developed countries, UFW usually ranges from less than 10 
percent for new systems to 25 percent for older systems. However, 
some Eastern European and African countries regularly reach 40 to 
50 percent, or even 60 percent. 
Comparing the indicators for Egypt with those observed from the 
comparable international norms, one can conclude: 
A number of staff per 1,000 population served well above 5, indi-N
cating heavy overstaffing
Table 4.1  Benchmarking Water and Sanitation Subsector
Governorate/ indicator
Capital cost-
recovery ratio (%)
Consumption 
(liter/capita/day) 
Debt service 
ratio (%) No. staff/1000 connection
Benchmark (norm)
 
50
 
80 rural/150 urban  1 to 3
Water Wastewater
Aswan 3 108 –383 NA 10
Alexandria Water 4 351 –16 14 DNA
Alexandria Wastewater 32 NA 41 4 NA
Beheira 14 85 111 8 NA
Beni Suef 6 52 –8 7 20
Cairo Water 3 252 –192 NA 14
Cairo Wastewater 9 NA –450 14 NA
Dakahlia 6 DNA –4 6 6
Damietta 14 DNA 0 7 DNA
Fayoum 8 102 –15 4 DNA
Gharbia 5 81 –3 7 17
Kafr El Sheikh 12 124 0 7 15
Minia 6 DNA 0 9 DNA
Sharqeya 7 100 –4 6 10
Source: Personal communication with USAID.
Notes: NA = Not applicable; DNA = Data not available.
1. Capital cost-recovery ratio = Revenues/total net fixed assets.
2. Debt service ratio = Debt service/operating profit (loss) before depreciation.
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Very low cost-recovery ratios and debt service ratiosN
Accurate UFW percentages not known, but probably at typical N
developing-country levels (30 percent–50 percent)
Large disparities in liter/capita/day usage rates across country.N
Government policy is that water utilities should be financially au-
tonomous. However, because of low end-user tariffs, the government 
inevitably bails out loss-making utilities with grants from the Ministry of 
Finance and loans from the National Investment Bank (NIB). Higher 
rates would help GOE to achieve its goal of financial autonomy for water 
utilities. Rate increases also would enable and encourage the utilities to 
improve technical efficiency (unit service per unit expenditure). 
In conclusion, Egypt’s water and sanitation services are less finan-
cially sustainable than the developing-country norm. Regarding water 
management efficiency, the country’s services are possibly on a par 
with utilities in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Improved Wastewater Disposal Will Benefit the Entire Nation 
We have shown above that a disproportionate volume of public spending 
is allocated to private goods. At the same time, there are great unre-
alized opportunities for public spending on public goods. Wastewater 
disposal is a case in point.
As part of the Country Environmental Analysis of Egypt (World 
Bank 2005), a study was undertaken to estimate the socioeconomic 
cost of the disposal of maltreated or untreated wastewater. Three 
policy options were compared:
Business as Usual (BAU), the status quo1. 
Government-led centralized actions including those executed2.  in 
urban and suburban areas, as proposed by the National Plan for 
the Protection of the Water Resources of Egypt (2003)
Option b plus community-based and hygiene measures to control 3. 
the unsafe disposal of rural sewage. 
The study has estimated that the socioeconomic cost of maltreated/
untreated wastewater is higher than LE 9 billion, or 2 percent of GDP 
(figure 4.12). These costs represent the harm caused to human health, 
agriculture, and fisheries.
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Figure 4.12  Cost-Bene#t Analysis of Improving 
Wastewater Disposal
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Better wastewater disposal 
is a classic case of a public good 
because it would benef it the 
entire nation, particularly those 
downstream who cannot easily 
protect themselves. By imple-
menting the measures cited in 
the 2003 National Plan for the 
Protection of Water Resources, 
Egypt could achieve a net benefit 
of LE 2 billion. The addition of 
community-based and self-f i-
nanced sanitation programs could 
produce an extra net benefit of 
LE 1 billion. See details in appendix 2 and in chapter 3 (World Bank 
Policy Note 2005). 
Do Water Subsidies  
Support Incomes  
of Poorer Households? 
As argued above, downstream O&M expenditures provide private 
goods and should be covered by user charges. Switching to user charges 
would release public expenditures for priority public needs, such as 
wastewater treatment.
However, one possible justification for public subsidies to downstream 
O&M is that it is an efficient way to support the incomes of poorer 
households. According to this argument, water subsidies would play the 
role of a social welfare transfer from the taxpayer to the poor.
The methodology of Benefit Incidence Assessment (BIA) can test 
whether water subsidies are an effective social welfare transfer. BIA 
studies the distributional impact of public expenditures and whether 
it is pro-poor. A subsidy is defined as progressive if the absolute value 
of the benefit is greater for a poor household than for a rich one. The 
information acquired can be a useful input for policymakers concerned 
with the improved targeting of programs and subsidies.
This BIA analyzes whether the current irrigation subsidy is progres-
sive (appendix A4.1). The analysis is run for two samples of agricultural 
households from the western areas of the Delta region
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Figure 4.13  Farmer Land and Income Distribution 
Land and income distribution
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There are inherent difficulties with BIA of the irrigation sector. BIAs 
for education or health services utilize the difference in participation by 
the poor vis-a-vis the rich. However, this methodology is inadequate 
for irrigation because households use irrigation to different degrees. 
Therefore, the study attempts to differentiate the level of participation 
among households. Ideally, this differentiation would be achieved by 
measuring water utilized on each household’s farm, but it is difficult to 
measure water utilized on a farm. In fact, in Egypt, irrigation water is 
not metered at canal-to-farm turnouts. Irrigation water utilization is a 
function of area cultivated, crop type, soil type, climate, and on-farm 
irrigation technology.
Two samples were taken at different times and in zones with 
different socioeconomic characteristics. Sample A was taken from 
districts in three governorates and used landholding as a proxy for 
water use. Sample B was drawn from 7 villages in 1 governorate and 
included water-use data collected by interviewing a random sample 
of rural householders. 
Findings
Sample A
Figure 4.13 shows the relationship 
between households’ landholdings 
and incomes. Households in the 
richest income decile own on av-
erage 10.8 acres, compared with 
1.4 acres in the poorest decile.
On the assumption that wa-
ter use and subsidies are pro-
portional to landholdings, there 
is a strong correlation between 
a household’s income and its 
benefit from water subsidies. The richer households benefit most. 
According to the data in this sample, exactly 75 percent of the water 
subsidy benefits the richest 50 percent of households, whereas only 25 
percent benefits the poorest 50 percent. Only 9.7 percent of the total 
public subsidy is received by the poorest 25 percent of households.
These findings indicate that irrigation subsidies are not justified as 
a policy instrument for the redistribution of income. The main benefi-
ciaries of subsidies are the rich, not the poor.
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Figure 4.14  Irrigation Subsidy as Share of Income 
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The average value of the irrigation subsidy is LE 137/acre. Using 
this figure, it is possible to (1) calculate the importance of the irriga-
tion subsidy as a percentage of total household income for richer and 
poorer households and (2) see whether removing the subsidy would 
have a disproportionately severe impact on the livelihoods of poor 
households.
The irrigation subsidy is 
worth 2.5 percent–4 percent of 
the income of rural households 
of all income classes (figure 4.14). 
There is no clear correlation 
between household income and 
the importance of the irrigation 
subsidy as a share of income. The 
irrigation subsidy is therefore not 
a major contributor to household 
income for the poor. 
The delegation of the man-
agement and financing of down-
stream irrigation systems to water user associations (WUAs) would 
involve an increase in water charges to farmers. Delegation also would 
help farmers improve their crop yields through better water manage-
ment. Therefore, it is useful to calculate the irrigation subsidy as a per-
centage share of farmers’ crop income. This method would show the 
increase of crop income needed (as a result of better water management) 
to compensate farmers when the irrigation subsidy is withdrawn.
The required increase in crop income to compensate farmers for 
losing the irrigation subsidy would range from 6 percent–11 percent. 
The required increase in crop production is higher for poorer farm-
ers than for richer farmers. The reason is that richer farmers achieve 
higher levels of crop income per acre, so the subsidy is lower as a share 
of their crop incomes. However, even for poorer farmers, the yield 
increases required are well within the range that is expected to result 
from improved water management.
Sample B
Sample B represents 60 farms (not households) in the Western Delta 
area. This zone of newly developed land is characterized by larger, more 
commercial operations specializing in high-value cropping. Thus, it is 
not representative of Egyptian farming as a whole. For Sample B, farm 
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Figure 4.15  Mean Water Use by Crop Income Quintile
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Figure 4.16  Use of Water-Saving Systems 
by Crop Income Quintile
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Figure 4.17  Water Use per Cropped Area 
by Crop Income Quintile
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crop income—not household 
income—has been the measure 
according to which the income 
quintiles are established.
As noted above, the dataset 
for Sample B includes estimates 
of water use in irrigation by farm. 
Thus, it is possible to do without 
the assumption that water use 
is proportional to landholding. 
Indeed, water use per unit area 
is significantly different among 
farmers of different income 
groups. 
Figure 4.15 plots the benefit 
incidence by income quintiles. 
Again, the allocation of the 
subsidy is regressive, meaning 
that most of it is captured by 
high-income farms. In this case, 
the 50 percent of farms with the 
lowest incomes receive only 36 
percent of the subsidy, and the 25 
percent of farms with the lowest 
incomes receive only 13 percent 
of the subsidy. 
The reason that the subsidy 
distribution in Sample B is less 
regressive than that in Sample 
A is that the larger farms in 
Sample B are more likely to use 
water-saving irrigation equip-
ment (drip and/or sprinkler), 
instead of furrow irrigation. For 
this reason, even though the land 
area is significantly larger, the 
volume of water used per farm 
is slightly lower in the fourth and 
fifth income quintiles than in the third. Rates of usage of water-saving 
equipment are illustrated in figure 4.16. Investment in such systems is 
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a characteristic of the high-value commercial farming practiced in the 
Western Delta region, from which Sample B is drawn. 
However, it is likely that the analysis above understates the regres-
sivity of the water subsidy. According to the data from Sample B, the 
volume of water used per cropped feddan in the fifth quintile is ap-
proximately a one-tenth of that in the other 4 (lower-income) quintiles 
(figure 4.17). While part of this difference may be attributable to the 
use of water-saving systems, the differential is too great to be cred-
ible. It is possible that the larger farmer operations have understated 
their levels of water consumption, leading to an underestimation of the 
regressivity of the water subsidy. 
Conclusions from the Benefit Incidence Assessment
Water use by the poorest 25 percent in Sample A was 9.7 percent of 
the total, implying that 90 percent of the irrigation subsidy is being cap-
tured by the non-poor. The annual subsidy in the irrigation subsector 
(recurrent plus amortized capital expenditures spent on quasiprivate 
goods/services) is approximately LE 1.8 billion. Thus, approximately 
LE 1.6 billion annually, or approximately 0.3 percent of Egypt’s GDP, 
could be being spent on irrigation subsidies for the non-poor. 
Targeting this money at the poorest would significantly reduce 
poverty rates. If the irrigation subsidy received by the richest 75 percent 
in Sample A instead were allocated to the poorest 25 percent, it would 
raise their total household incomes by as much as 30 percent. 
Conclusions 
The findings of this analysis are:
There is a pressing need for additional state expenditure on waste-N
water collection and treatment, a public good that could add at 
least 1 percent to GDP.
A disproportionate volume of public expenditure on water is on “pri-N
vate” (nonheadwork/trunk) water infrastructure and services.
When benchmarked against established performance norms, this N
expenditure is inefficient.
There is no equity justification for public irrigation spending on N
private water benefits because most of these benefits are captured 
by the better-off farmers.
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These findings provide a quantitative foundation for the recom-
mendations proposed in chapter 3 in this volume, namely, the gradual 
transfer of the finance and management of downstream infrastructure 
and services from public agencies to WUAs and autonomous utilities. 
Responsibilities to be delegated to water user organizations would in-
clude water allocations and the assessment and collection of charges. 
Such reforms would release funding for priority expenditures on public 
goods such as upstream maintenance and wastewater management. 
These reforms also would improve the equity of water-financing 
by ensuring that farmers’ contributions are more proportionate to 
their benefits.
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Appendix A4.1  Data Used in the Benefit Incidence Assessment
The B/A analysis is based on two separate surveys, Sample A and 
Sample, B. They were conducted by local consultants over different 
periods and followed different methodologies. Besides other variables, 
the first survey has data on area used for cultivation; the second includes 
actual irrigation water used. Finally, the sample sizes were different; 
and the survey data represent 2 distinct rural compositions. 
Sample A was drawn from a random sampling survey conducted 
over 8 counties in 3 governorates of Egypt’s West Delta region. These 
governorates and the counties are listed below, with the number of 
samples from each region in parentheses: 
Beheira Governorate: Zarcoon (45), Depono (65), Barseeq (40)1. 
Alexandria Governorate: Mohagrein (20), Abu-Sombel (27), 2. 
El-Basrah (27)
Matrouh Governorate: El Ola (30), El-Tanmiah (30).3. 
The Sample A survey collected data at the household level for 
2003–04 on the following:
Land owned by the household (net area cultivated)1. 
Gross income from the farm2. 
O&M cost for water management on the farm3. 
Net income from livestock4. 
Net income from off-farm activities5. 
Total net income (net farm, net livestock, and net off-farm income)6. 
Number of family members.7. 
The per-unit irrigation subsidy was computed using the expen-
diture of MWRI for the corresponding year. The figures were taken 
from Egypt Public Expenditure Review, May 2005, table 1 (World 
Bank 2005). The review note states that in 2003–04 approximately 
LE 4.09 billion was spent on water infrastructure by the irrigation and 
agriculture subsector, of which nearly 79 percent was spent on new 
investments. Table 1 of the review also gives MWRI expenditure as 
LE 1.2 billion, which includes 0.04 billion collected as user fees. The 
total irrigated land in Egypt is 8.45 million acres. The per-unit irrigation 
subsidy therefore is computed as follows:
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Unit subsidy = (1.2–0.04)/0.00845 = LE 137 per acre (approx.).
Sample B collected data from the following villages in the Western 
Delta area:
El Hussain1. 
Bostan2. 
Nobaria3. 
Bangar Souker/Banger Elsokar4. 
Rowaisat5. 
El Fekra Station6. 
El Omayed.7. 
Sample B was undertaken over a short period and is representative 
of the rural area constituted by the villages above. Consequently, the 
result of this analysis is not generalized for the country. However, the 
survey provides insight into the differential subsidy allocation within 
the sample range.
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Appendix A4.2  Assessing the Social Benefits of Sanitation
As part of the Country Environmental Analysis of Egypt (World Bank 
2005), one study evaluated the full social and economic costs and ben-
efits of the country’s water use and disposal. The study put particular 
emphasis on rural water and sanitation. Three policy options were 
analyzed: (1) Business as usual (BAU); (2) centrally planned actions, as 
of the National Plan for the Protection of the Water Resources of Egypt; 
and (3) the latter plus controlling rural water pollution (assuming both 
partial and full coverage). 
The study factored in: 
Three key at-recipientN  parameters: Fecal coliforms (combined with 
“exposure-risk” parameters)5 to infer health benefits, dissolved 
oxygen (DO) for fishery production benefits, and total dissolved 
solids (TDS) for crop production benefits.
Corresponding “dose-response” for estimating the fishery/crop losses, N
and corresponding “exposure-risk” for estimating the disease inci-
dences; translation of the forgone benefits into monetary values.
Weighing the discounted forgone benefits against the discounted N
expenses regarding each of the three inaction/action options.
For the BAU option, the damage cost assessment undertaken for 
water pollution included two types of forgone benefits:
5 Agricultural damages were estimated at the “Consumer and Producer Surplus,” 
forgone as a result of the high TDS concentration (using FAO yield-to-salinity pro-
duction functions). Health damages were based on relating the diarrhea incidence 
rates to the risk factors associated with the level of “water, sanitation and hygiene,” 
as these factors are determined by the following transmission pathways:
a. Transmission through ingestion of water
b. Transmission caused by lack of water linked to inadequate personal hygiene
c. Transmission caused by poor personal, domestic, or agricultural hygiene
d. Transmission through contact (through bathing or wading) in water containing 
organisms such as Schistosoma 
e. To a certain extent, transmission through vectors proliferating in water reservoirs 
or other stagnant water or certain agricultural practices
f. Transmission through contaminated aerosols from poorly managed water sys-
tems.
Thereof, six exposure scenarios were considered. Each is associated with a combina-
tion of different levels of water supply, sanitation, and hygiene. Thus, each scenario 
reflects a different fecal-oral pathogen exposure. Populations were grouped according 
to their level of water and sanitation access, and each group was attributed a differ-
ent relative risk (obtained from the literature) of contacting the disease. Hence, the 
total respective incidence rates of diarrhea were estimated.
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Income losses from the use of polluted waterN  (for example, crop/
fishery/livestock production losses due to salinity and toxicity), as 
well as well-being losses, for example, from water-related diseases, 
food chain contamination, and occupational health impacts.
Cost of avoiding the use of polluted waterN  such as (1) added cost 
of pumping groundwater when surface drainage water was too 
polluted to be reused and (2) forgone benefits when (a) farmers 
unofficially reused highly saline water from secondary drains, and 
(b) official reuse from main drains was halted because of pollution 
by untreated sewage. The study included the additional costs of the 
erected hydraulic, mechanical, and electrical facilities that became 
idle due to the halting of a number of drainage reuse schemes.
Results of the Study
The study estimated the total cost of forgone benefits as approximately 
LE 5.35 billion in 2003, or 1.8 percent of GDP (World Bank 2005, 
figure 7). In 2014, factoring in population growth and if no additional ac-
tions are taken, the forgone benefits will reach as high as LE 9.5 billion/yr 
or 3.2 percent of national GDP. On average, from 2003–14, the costs 
of inaction would average 7.4 billion LE/year (undiscounted). 
On the other hand, if taken, the intervention corresponding to 
the National Plan for the Protection of the Water Resources of Egypt 
(Central Action) would cost approximately 1 billion LE/year. However, 
in 2014 the plan would reduce the damages to only 6.7 billion LE/yr, 
or a decrease of 30 percent. 
An alternative intervention corresponding to the national plan 
but adapted to include community-driven-and-financed, low-cost/
unconventional remedies for rural areas (central plus decentralized 
actions, including improved hygiene) could be carried out for a total 
cost of 2.0–2.5 billion LE/yr. Using this option, in 2014 the value of the 
damages avoided would be reduced by an additional LE 2.5 billion/yr, 
or by a total of LE 5.3 billion/year (9.5-6.7+2.5) billion.
The above results suggest that the best option is the latter. It would 
comprise government central/sectoral plans for the urban/district areas 
augmented by community-driven-and-financed unconventional plans 
for controlling rural water pollution. 
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Applications of Latest Technologies 
and Hydrological Models in 
Water Resource Management 
and Planning in MNA Region
Bekele Debele Negewo, Julia Bucknall, and 
Ahmed Shawky Mohamed
Water Resource Management (WRM): A New Approach  
for Monitoring Water Use
The Introduction to this volume suggests that the management of 
water resources in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) region 
is likely to become far more challenging in the rest of this century 
because of increased variability in rainfall and increased demands on 
the resource from rapidly growing populations. These new challenges 
require investing much greater effort in monitoring the use of water 
by various sectors of the economy than in the past—particularly on 
whether this resource is being put to its most beneficial use. For ex-
ample, consumptive use through irrigation could have a sizeable non-
beneficial component if either water from open canals and reservoirs 
is lost through evaporation, or profitable plants (such as bananas) use 
up considerably more water through transpiration than other less 
water-intensive plants. Under these circumstances, evapotranspiration 
(ET) rates become a key benchmark of efficient water use. Similarly, 
concerning nonconsumptive water use, despite increased urbanization, 
with the appropriate investments in treatment, a growing proportion 
of wastewater is recoverable for beneficial use.
This chapter suggests the need to develop new approaches that 
comprehensively monitor the water balance as a means of managing 
variations in water supply as well as demand. Such an approach basically 
improves understanding of the sources and sinks of water by collecting 
better quality datasets and by employing state-of-the art models to 
advise water regulators, policymakers, and communities on the state 
of a country’s water resources at a given point in time.
5
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Applications of New Technologies to Collect and Process  
Water-Related Data
An understanding of the availability and quality of water resources 
as well as current and future uses of these resources is necessary for 
sound water decisionmaking. Furthermore, clear, undisputed informa-
tion on water availability and consumption is a critical component of 
improving governance and accountability in the sector. 
Nevertheless, developing and disseminating good information on 
water remains a challenge in MNA for a number of reasons. First, 
data collection and analysis are costly. Second, countries lack data 
management systems. Third, neither definitions nor data management 
is standard across countries. Fourth, communities and policymakers 
(outside the narrow group of WRM specialists) are still not fully aware 
of the benefits of investing in reliable data on water usage. 
On the supply side, technological developments are beginning to 
enable scientists to combine traditional water data systems with models 
and remote sensing (RS) information in ways that greatly reduce the 
cost of collecting data and increase its accuracy. These advances include 
a combination of the use of geographic information systems (GIS), 
RS, data assimilation, and modeling techniques. Figure 5.1 provides a 
detailed illustration of (1) how the latest technologies help collate both 
dynamic and static characteristics of the land, vegetation, and climate; 
and (2) how to combine these datasets with the latest hydrological 
modeling capabilities to produce outputs that facilitate making critical 
water resources decisions in wa-
ter supply and sanitation (WSS) 
and irrigation.
Use of Geographic Information 
System (GIS)
Advances in GIS technology have 
revolutionized the way that spa-
tially distributed water resources 
data are managed (ESRI 2008). 
GIS captures, visualizes, and 
correlates spatial data. Not too 
long ago, it was practically un-
thinkable to spatially represent all 
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Figure  5.1  Latest Technologies in Water Resources 
Data Collection, Assimilation, and Modeling to Improve 
Decisionmaking 
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variables that directly or indirectly dictate the movement and availability 
of water resources in a basin to the extent that can be done today. 
This array of variables includes topography and land use/land cover at 
as low as 30m resolution; and soils, soil moisture content, and climate 
data at sub-km resolution. Thanks to advances in computer capacity 
and GIS technology, resource managers can better mimic the reality 
on the ground. Today, if one has the primary data and model structure 
at any spatial scale, computer capacity and GIS technology support 
the analyses to provide water resource managers and decisionmakers 
with the decision tools needed at the scale of interest.
Advances in GIS technology become especially important when 
dealing with complex river basins whose climate, soils, and land use/
land cover distributions vary significantly with space. GIS technology 
is equally important in addressing a basin being used and managed by 
multiple actors. In this case, to facilitate optimal joint resources man-
agement and development decisions, one needs to spatially identify 
the sources and sinks of water and associated pollutants. GIS tools 
will help identify hotspots within a given basin whose WRM needs to 
be the focus, and for which the 
maximum dividend is expected 
from implementation of some 
best management practices. 
Figure 5.2 depicts a sample ap-
plication of GIS in organizing and 
assimilating physiographic data 
(topography, land use/land cover, 
soils) and climate data (precipita-
tion, temperature, wind) for use 
in one of the complex hydro-
logical models (Soil and Water 
Assessment Tool, or SWAT) in 
WRM. 
Applications of GIS technol-
ogy are extremely diverse: from 
epidemiology (monitoring disease 
outbreaks) to analyzing the vulnerability of water resources to point 
or nonpoint source pollution. In water resource management, GIS 
facilitates the manipulation of spatial data that otherwise are difficult 
(if not impossible) to handle. The manipulation includes storing, que-
rying, displaying, integrating, and analyzing spatial water-related data 
Figure  5.2  Sample Applications of GIS (ArcVIEW) 
in SWAT Model Use
Source: DiLuzio and others 2002.
Note: SWAT is a complex hydrological model designed to assess the impacts of land 
management on water resources.
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in a complex basin. For example, using GIS, one can overlay the map 
of land use/land cover with a soils map to generate a unique map of 
hydrologic response unit (HRU), the smallest unit of water balance 
computation in some hydrological models (figure 5.2). Similarly, GIS 
is used to generate hydrographic maps from topographic maps (digital 
elevation maps, or DEM) (figure 5.2). Such hydrographic maps docu-
ment stream networks in a given basin that drain water from one end 
of a basin to the basin outlet. The same GIS can help to determine 
stream orders, lengths, and slopes—all of which are critical factors in 
the computation of hydrological variables such as runoff and soil ero-
sion. Finally, given its rich selection of colors and ability to designate 
each item with a different color, GIS is an extremely helpful tool in 
creating pleasing and easily accessible figures and tables.
Applications of Remote Sensing Technologies in WRM
Advances in RS technology in recent years have given water resource 
managers and decisionmakers the ability to capture—from a distance—
the detailed characteristics of physiographic and natural resources 
(surface and groundwater, vegetation, soils, topography) and climate 
variables (temperature, precipitation, solar radiation). For example, the 
technology of remote sensing is such that one can now measure the 
amount of precipitable moisture in the atmosphere, air temperature, 
evaporation and transpiration (ET), soil, moisture content, and aqui-
fer storage of the soil, without putting a sensor close to the objects of 
measurement. Table 5.1 depicts a partial list of variables that can be 
measured/estimated by remote sensing.
In WRM, given the need to capture the variability of resources 
distribution across space and time, RS technology also should offer 
such capability. Whereas some state variables can be assumed to be 
stable over a certain period (topography, geology, soil texture), others 
change very frequently (weather conditions, vegetation growth, soil 
moisture) By the same token, some variables can be assumed to be 
stable over a given swath of area (air temperature1) whereas others 
are not (soil properties, elevation, precipitation). 
1 Air temperature can be assumed stable over a good-sized field unless the field 
has a sharp rise in elevation over a short distance, in which case the elevation lapse 
rate comes into play.
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In general, however, most state variables in water resources vary 
both spatially and temporally. Therefore, it is imperative to select the 
most appropriate remote sensing technique (and data) to address a given 
water resource issue. For example, a satellite that provides observations 
every week may not be appropriate to study water resources issues on 
a daily basis. Similarly, a RS technique that provides observations at 
100-km pixel would not be appropriate to analyze the water resources 
issue at plot-scale level, that is, a 10-km by 10-km area.
Table 5.1 also provides the spatial scope of a suite of satellite (mission 
names) in measuring/estimating water-related variables. Common links 
to water-resource-related datasets also are provided in appendix A5.1. 
Table 5.1  Summary of Spatial Data Availability from Remote Sensing
No. Data type Spatial scale Satellite name/mission name
1 Rainfall 3 to 25 km TRMM (25km); GOES; NEXRAD; METEOSAT; IRS; ESA
2 Skin soil moisture 25 km AMSR-E
3 Root zone soil moisture 30 m to 1 km Nimbus SSM/I (25km);
4 Air temperature 1 km AVHRR
5 Solar radiation 1 km AVHRR
6 Leaf Area Index 30 m to 1 km MODIS; LANDSAT
7 Biomass production 30 m to 1 km LANDSAT; MODIS
8 Snow cover and snow accumulation 30 m to 1 km GOES
9 Land use/land cover 30 m to 1 km MODIS; LANDSAT
10 Crop types, surface albedo, vegetation fraction 30 m MODIS; SPOT-4
11 Crop yield 30 m MODIS; LANDSAT
Secondary spatial data
12 Air humidity 1 km NASA’s UARS
13 Wind speed and direction 1 km LIDAR
14 Water depletion by land cover 1 km MODIS
15 Water productivity 30 m MODIS
16 Stream flow and water quality 1 km LANDSAT; MODIS
17 Groundwater recharge/abstraction; terrestrial 
water storage
30 m to 1 km GRACE
18 Irrigation water demand, irrigation intensity, 
and irrigation efficiency
30 m to 1 km MODIS; LANDSAT
19 Carbon sequestration 30 m to 1 km MODIS
20 Topography, geology 30 m to 250 km ASTER; RADARSAT
21 ET (based on, e.g., SEBAL and METRIC 
approaches)
30 m to 1 km MODIS (30 m to 1 km); LANDSAT
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Figure 5.3 depicts the availability 
of various RS data sources at dif-
ferent spatial resolutions and sea-
sonal coverage (percent). Figure 
5.3 provides a menu of options for 
water-related data sources to be 
used under a range of data needs 
(small plot scale, river basin scale, 
national scale).
Sample applications of RS
Remote sensing has been utilized 
for different purposes, from 
monitoring deforestation and 
predicting the effects of climate 
change on glaciers in the Arctic and Antarctic to estimating the amount 
of water in the clouds. Some use RS to capture distributions of climate 
variables such as thunder storms, hurricanes, and floods in real time. 
Others use RS for early warning—including for flood and drought. 
Still others also use RS to monitor changes in land use/land cover and 
soil moisture content. Some also use RS to estimate the amount of 
water lost to ET. 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 depict sample applications of RS technology in 
WRM. In both figures, RS is used to gather relevant data to estimate 
water productivity in irrigated 
agriculture to guide WRM deci-
sions. In figure 5.4, RS was used 
to analyze the productivity of 
water to spatially evaluate where 
water was being productively 
used. Such information can be 
used to make decisions to real-
locate water among different 
users, leading to improved total 
water productivity. In contrast, 
in f igure 5.5, RS was used to 
estimate the amount (liters) of 
water used to produce a liter 
of wine. As can be seen from 
both figures, water productivity 
Figure  5.3  Availability of Remote Sensing Data at Various 
Spatial and Temporal Coverage
Source: Droogers 2006.
Figure  5.4  Where Is Water Not Used Productively?
Data from Sacramento, CA
Source: Bastiaanssen 2007. 
Note: Legend depicts a water productivity range of 50%–175% of the average water 
productivity in the Sacramento Valley, implying a wider range of water productivity.
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is not uniform across the Sacra-
mento Valley. Figure 5.5 clearly 
shows that farmers in the north-
ern parts of the valley use more 
water to produce the same 
amount of wine than do their 
southern counterparts. Such 
data are very important for 
WRM, particularly in making 
decisions on water allocation 
and pricing.
RS also can be used to aug-
ment available data and to fill 
data gaps, including in areas in 
which collecting data through 
traditional means is constrained. 
For example, since 2003, the 
World Bank has been using RS 
techniques to supervise the im-
plementation of Bank-supported 
irrigation projects in Iraq, in 
which ground accessibility has 
been limited for security reasons 
(figure 5.6). As can be seen from 
figure 5.6, differences between 
areas served by the Wazzak Ca-
nal before and after the canal rehabilitation are notable. In contrast, 
incremental productivity (project outcomes) has been validated through 
low-resolution satellite images. The impact evaluation for the incremen-
tal outcomes can be performed through either of two approaches: 
Comparing the before-project and the after-project cases (thus 1. 
comparing over time, which was the approach followed in Iraq 
(figure 5.6)
Comparing the without-project and the with-project cases (thus 2. 
comparing in space, that is, comparing with an adjacent command 
area outside the project’s command borders).
The Bank is assisting several MNA governments to obtain more 
accurate and up-to-date water-related RS data in the water-stressed 
Figure  5.5  Water Productivity in Sacramento, CA: 
Liters of Water Needed to Produce 1 Liter of Wine
Source: Bastiaanssen 2007. 
Note: Legend depicts the amount (liters) of water needed to produce one liter of wine 
across the Sacramento Valley.
Before rehab (FY06)                             After rehab (FY07)
Figure  5.6  Agricultural Lands Served by “Mazzak” Canal in 
Wasit Governorate before and after Project Implementation
Source: World Bank 2006. 
Note: The red rectangles on the “After” map show areas that were put under cultivation 
after rehabilitation of the canal systems.
86  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
areas (Egypt, Gaza, Morocco, West Bank, and Yemen). As a result 
of coordination among the Arab Water Council, NASA, USAID, and 
the World Bank, a new regional initiative is being launched to help 
MNA make better WRM decisions and share comparable data across 
member countries. Such coordination envisages developing a set of 
tools that, taking advantage of the latest technologies, will provide 
regular, accurate, and standardized information on the availability and 
consumption of water resources in the Arab world.
Cautionary note: The latest RS technologies have enabled water 
resources decisionmakers to use easily accessible information to make 
better decisions. Nonetheless, to ensure a reality check, it is very 
important to calibrate the data collected through RS techniques against 
those collected on the ground. RS technology changes rapidly. To keep 
up with such rapid advances, one needs to continually compare the 
quality of data derived from each generation of techniques with those 
obtained on the ground. 
Moreover, satellites lack the ability to take measurements over 
small footprints (smaller spatial resolution). Similarly, satellites cur-
rently are unable to have “active” systems that can penetrate the soil 
below a certain depth. For now, the final word is that, in the foresee-
able future, RS will not replace ground measurements. However, RS 
measurements can provide important augmentations to other data to 
improve the quality and spatial coverage of existing data.
Data-sharing also is cost-sharing and obtaining better data. In many 
MNA countries, multiple agencies collect similar data, often not knowing 
that the other agencies are collecting the same data. Moreover, when 
one agency/country wants to do an assessment, it often starts from 
the beginning without first talking to the other agencies/countries to 
find out what data they already have. The amount of wasted resources 
expended in this way cannot be underestimated. Agencies should instead 
first identify what already has been done, then document and improve 
upon the data already present. To this end, data-sharing among agen-
cies and/or countries is a prerequisite.
Applications of Hydrological Models in WRM 
Need for Hydrology
For any realistic implementation of WRM at a basin scale, a better 
and fuller understanding of the hydrology of the basin is crucial. For 
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example, the quantity and quality of runoff measured at a basin/sub-
basin outlet are a collective signal of the characteristics of the whole 
basin/sub-basin, in the same way that pathological tests can tell much 
about the well-being of a person. Therefore, WRM requires a good 
hydrology dataset to provide an accurate basis for water accounting.
Hydrological Models
In parallel with the advances in GIS and RS, there have been many 
improvements in the understanding of the physical processes and 
interrelationships between climate-soils and ecosystem response. 
A large number of mathematical equations have been developed to 
mimic the understanding of these interrelationships—from simple 
black-box empirical models to more sophisticated, physically based 
and distributed parameter models. As a result, the number of hydro-
logical models today is so large that many users spend a great deal 
of time selecting the most appropriate model for the problem(s) at 
hand. The fundamental principle of any hydrological model emanates 
from closing the mass, energy, and momentum balances. All hydrologi-
cal models should respect at least one fundamental principle: a mass 
balance signifying continuity.
Equation 1 (Eq. 1) provides the general continuity equation of hy-
drological balance, which dictates that the summation of all inflows
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(Eq. 1)
where m and n are the different categories of outputs (extracts) from 
the system and inputs (additions) to the system, respectively. For most 
common hydrological models, Eq. 1 is rewritten by expanding the water 
balance components (figure 5.7) as in Eq. 2 below. 
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PCP ET Runoff R Sdeep< + +( ) =  (Eq. 2)
where PCP = total precipitation (snowfall + rainfall); ET = amount of 
water lost to evapotranspiration; Runoff = total net water amount that 
leaves the system as surface and subsurface runoff (this is a net figure 
after subtracting inflow to the system from adjacent basins—runon, 
return flows, and inter-basin transfer); Rdeep = is the net water amount 
lost to deep aquifer (this is a net figure after subtracting extractions 
from deep aquifer); and 6S is the change in water storage of the system 
over a given period of time—the same period over which total inflow 
and outflow are computed.
Equation 2 above could equally be subdivided into water consump-
tive uses and losses as described in the Introduction (figure 1.1). For 
example, the ET in Eq. (2) could be subdivided into beneficial and 
nonbeneficial ET based on where in the basin the water is lost to ET. 
Runoff from the system could be subdivided into recoverable fraction 
and nonrecoverable fraction based on where the water that is lost to 
runoff is destined. In a similar way, the amount of water that is per-
colating to deep aquifer and stored in the upper soil horizon could be 
subdivided into recoverable and 
nonrecoverable components 
based on their accessibility for 
further use. In this case, whereas 
it is feasible to further divide the 
water balance components into 
consumable/nonconsumable 
and recoverable/nonrecoverable 
for water accounting purposes, 
keeping Eq. (2) above intact is 
still very important, especially 
for hydrological analysis in the 
upland watershed.
Similarly, for the energy 
balance, the summation of all 
incoming energies 
Einco g i
i
r
min
=
•
1
minus the summation of all outgoing energies 
Figure  5.7  Major Components of the Hydrological Balance
Source: Toll 2008.
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within the system (Eq. 3).
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where r and s are the different incoming and outgoing energy categories, 
respectively. More complex and physically based models account for 
more than one physical principle (for instance, mass and momentum, 
mass and energy, or a combination of all balances). 
Another very important issue to consider when dealing with hydro-
logical models is the spatial scale to be incorporated in the model and 
how much physical detail should be included. Figure 5.8 illustrates the 
negative correlation between the physical detail of the model applied 
and the spatial scale of application. Figure 5.8 also depicts the position 
of some commonly used hydrological models in this continuum. 
Application of Hydrological 
Modeling and Its Classification
Hydrological models commonly 
are categorized based on their 
physical detail (physically based 
models, empirical models), spa-
tial coverage (spatially distrib-
uted models, lumped parameter 
models), and temporal coverage 
(event-based models, continuous 
time models). Hydrological mod-
els also can be grouped based on 
their uses, such as for water quantity and/or quality assessment, water 
allocation among different users (riparian countries, sectors), evaluation 
of policy impacts on water resources, or payment for environmental 
services or assessment of climate change impacts. Whereas some 
models are multipurpose in their applications, others are developed 
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Figure  5.8  Most Commonly Used Hydrological Models and 
Their Suitability in Both Physical and Spatial Scale
Source: Debele 2008 modi!ed from Droogers 2006.
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to tackle specific water-related problems. The following are the main 
reasons that most people use hydrological models.
Models are economically more feasible than monitoring (M&E).
Once a model is calibrated against available data and the state of the 
system as a whole, and the causal relationship is established, the model 
can be used as a tool to monitor the implications of changes in inputs or 
outputs, instead of collecting primary input and output data at every 
time interval. These models provide additional benefits, such as running 
scenario analyses to guide decisionmaking in WRM. Scenario analysis 
could be done without having access to observed input data. This is 
a very powerful advantage of models: they help not only to monitor but 
also to guide any future decisions.
With the help of the latest technologies in RS and GIS to collect 
and process/assimilate data, models also could be used for monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) of water projects. As indicated in the previous 
section, the Bank’s use of RS data to (1) monitor project implementa-
tion progress in Iraq and (2) estimate water productivity using a com-
bination of hydrological model and RS tools are good examples of how 
models can be used as an M&E tool. For example, in the case of water 
productivity monitoring in the Sacramento Valley, a hydrological model 
(in combination with SEBAL2) was used to determine crop water con-
sumption. Alternatively, a METRIC3 approach could equally be used to 
determine the amount of water consumed by crops. Hydrological models 
have also been successfully used to monitor and evaluate the impacts 
of best management practices on in-situ soil and water conservation, 
and management of groundwater recharge and diffuse pollution.
Models advance scientific understanding in water resources and help 
identify knowledge gaps. 
Some models also are tools to further understand the linkages among 
different variables and how each factor dictates overall water movement 
in and above the soil surface. Models that come under this category 
include the physically based and spatially distributed models that simu-
late the interrelationships among soils, climate, and vegetation response 
in the ecosystem. Models under this category usually are developed 
2 SEBAL stands for Surface Energy Balance Algorithm of Land.
3 METRIC stands for Mapping Evapo-Transpiration with High Resolution and 
Internalized Calibration.
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from mathematical equations that fulfill the continuity, momentum, 
and energy balances in all relevant dimensions. Such models are used 
primarily to deepen one’s understanding of the processes involved in 
water resources movement and storage. All other models are derived 
from models under this category by simplifying one or another param-
eter, or combining a few parameters.
Models enable good decisionmaking and guide policy options.
Models are tools best suited for guiding decisionmaking at various 
levels. This function ranges from identifying what datasets to collect 
for what sets of decisions to make to achieve certain goals in an inte-
grated water resource management (IWRM) setup. Similarly, models 
are used to guide the selection of policy choices in the water sector. 
For example, one can employ a combined hydrological and economic 
model to assess the implications of various water allocation measures/
policies on different sectors that are competing for shares of the same 
water. In a similar fashion, one can use hydrological models (especially 
those that are physically based and spatially distributed) to assess the 
implications of different best management practices on improving in-
situ soil moisture and groundwater recharge, and reducing nonpoint 
source pollution. Such an exercise can be done either before project 
implementation to see the implications of various “IF” scenarios, or 
after project implementation to monitor and evaluate the impacts of 
such interventions on the end results.
In an IWRM setting, models are useful to identify the optimum ob-
jectives that take into account the social, economic, and environmental 
issues in a given basin, including interests of its upstream and down-
stream riparian users. For example, many models have been developed 
to identify the optimum number and locations of water projects and 
compensation mechanisms (payment for environmental services, or 
PES). One very good (win/win) example of models’ applications in PES 
is the New York City (NYC) water supply. The NYC Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) uses hydrological models to identify 
areas that are hotspots in the watershed to bargain (to support onsite 
land management and/or provide cash for easements) with farmers 
who own the lands to implement best management practices that will 
reduce diffuse pollution. In this way, the city benefits by preserving 
the pristine water quality of NYC (instead of spending billions of dol-
lars to treat its water supply to the EPA standards, as required by the 
US government). The farmers also benefit by obtaining funds (PES) 
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from NYC to protect their lands, and hence protect the NYC water 
supply watersheds. 
Another equally important but less known application of such 
models is in the implementation of the PES initiative in Costa Rica. The 
purpose is to reduce deforestation to (a) sequester carbon dioxide and 
(b) improve the water quality of groundwater for mineral water pro-
duction industries. The authorities used hydrological models to identify 
areas in the watersheds in which groundwater recharge is significant 
and pay farmers accordingly for the environmental services that their 
lands provide. This initiative is very successful in reducing the rate of 
both deforestation and groundwater contamination.
As indicated earlier, the latest advances in GIS and RS technolo-
gies have improved the application of hydrological models to assess the 
implications of different water projects on overall water resources avail-
ability. For example, the World Bank has supported the government of 
Tunisia in its assessment of the implications of water-saving investments 
in Tunisian agriculture (World Bank 2008). Over the last decade, the 
Tunisian government has been implementing modern irrigation schemes, 
including sprinkler and drip irrigation, to better manage its agricultural 
water resources. The study used remotely sensed data to determine 
the water balance in its irrigated areas. It disaggregated the water bal-
ance into its components (precipitation, ET, soil storage, and runoff) 
and was able to evaluate the impacts of water-saving investments on 
the country’s overall water resources availability. 
The study concluded that although implementation of water-
saving investments is very important, equally essential is the need to 
properly manage the saved water. For example, investing in modern 
irrigation schemes may reduce the amount of water that is applied to 
a given farm land. However, if one decides to use the saved water to 
increase irrigation intensity and/or horizontally expand the area of 
irrigated land, in the end, the amount of water saved at a basin scale 
might be none or even become negative (more water withdrawn than 
previously under traditional irrigation schemes). Therefore, one needs 
to approach water resource management from a comprehensive water 
balance perspective and at a basin scale.
To date, in the Arab region, regional integration and inter-regional 
collaboration on development and management of shared resources 
have been weak. For this reason, a combination of objective water-
related data and decision-aiding hydrological models would be very 
useful in the use and management of their shared water resources. 
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Moreover, even at a country/basin level, optimal allocation of limited 
water among various competing needs/sectors can be addressed using 
a combination of hydrological and economic/social models.
Conclusions
This chapter discusses the use of the latest technologies, such as GIS, 
RS, and hydrological models, in the WRM of the MNA Region. It 
highlights the applications of such technologies to capture, store, and 
process most datasets needed for making water resources decisions. The 
chapter also explores the many types of hydrological models available 
and their very useful and flexible applications to guide decisionmaking 
and balance the demands of different uses. 
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Appendix A5.1 URLs for Water-Resources-Related Datasets
Real-time Heavy Rain Maps (updated every 3 hours) N
http://trmm.gsfc.nasa.gov
Hydrology for the Environment, Life and Policy  N
http://www.unesco.org/water/ihp/help
Regional Visualization and Monitoring System (“SERVIR”)N   
http://servir.msfc.nasa.gov/ 
Global Hazard System (Floods) Quasi-global Runoff Model N
Running in Real-Time 
http://trmm.gsfc.nasa.gov/publications_dir/potential_flood_
hydro.html 
Stream flow Monitoring and the Dartmouth Flood ObservatoryN  
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~floods/ 
Remote Sensing Application In Irrigation N
http://www.sage.wisc.edu
ET EstimationN  
http://www.kimberly.uidaho.edu/ref-et/ 
http://www.cimis.water.ca.gov 
http://www.sebal.nl/
Real-time Precipitation Forecast and Other Remote Sensing N
Products 
http://chrs.web.uci.edu/
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Water Resource Assessment in 
the Arab World: New Analytical 
Tools for New Challenges
Christopher J. Perry and Julia Bucknall
This chapter examines how, over millennia, societies in Arab countries developed arrangements for water management that reflected the region’s conditions of extreme water scarcity. It 
notes that these traditional arrangements have been undermined by 
growing imbalances between demand and supply, exacerbated by new 
technologies that disturb stable traditional systems. The first step toward 
putting replacement arrangements in place, especially as climate change 
exacerbates the imbalances, is to build a shared understanding of the 
hydrology of the system in which one is working.1 This chapter shows 
the role of hydrological information as a basic element of establishing 
sustainable water management. The chapter concludes by showing 
how remote sensing (RS) applications can contribute to knowledge 
of the status and trends in hydrological data.
With very limited exceptions, the Arab countries are water short, 
and supplies are highly variable from year to year.2 Definitions of water 
availability are not always consistent, which can lead to confusion when 
different source materials are quoted. However, UNESCO (2002) used 
the FAO-AQUASTAT database and FAOSTAT population data to rank 
180 countries on the basis of water availability. Of the Arab countries, 
only Sudan ranked above the bottom quartile. The majority of Arab 
countries—including Bahrain, Gaza, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen—were in the bottom 10 percent. 
Even within this select group of water-short countries, the disparities 
in endowment were enormous. The most water plentiful of this group, 
1 Throughout this chapter, “hydrology” is used to include both surface and ground-
water.
2 Based on a background paper prepared by the authors for the Arab Water Council 
for the Fifth World Water Forum, Istanbul, 2009. 
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Tunisia, has less than 25 percent of the availability of Sudan. The least 
plentiful, Kuwait, has less than 0.5 percent of the availability of Sudan.
The basic human needs for drinking and sanitation are rather small. 
Gleick (1996) researched actual water use in various scenarios and 
climates and estimated the following ranges of water needs (in liters 
per capita per day):
Table 6.1  Ranges of Human Domestic Water Needs (1/cap/day)
Drinking water 2–5
Sanitation 0–75
Bathing 5–70
Cooking/kitchen 10–50
Average total 50 (= 18 m3/year)
Thus, 1 m3 of water supplies the various needs of 1 individual for 
20 days, or the absolutely fundamental need for drinking water for as 
much as 1 year.
According to these data, only Kuwait (10 m3/cap/year) has less 
than the total human requirement. In striking contrast, Yemen—widely 
identified as one of the most seriously water-short countries in the 
world—is endowed with more than 200 m3/cap/year. (Of course, the 
timing and location of supply may be quite different from the timing 
and location of demand.)
The problem, the competition, and the scarcity arise when irrigated 
agriculture is significant: the same 1 m3 of water that provides drinking 
water for 1 person for 1 year produces only 1 kg of food grain when 
used for irrigation in a dry climate. Thus, Singapore, with less water 
per capita than Yemen, is not considered water scarce because the 
water is used almost exclusively for residential and industrial needs. 
In contrast, the demand for water for irrigated agriculture in Yemen 
creates a situation of extreme scarcity.
In the Arab world, irrigated agriculture is the dominant user of 
water and is thus the primary topic of this chapter. Scarcity of water 
in the Arab countries is not a new phenomenon—although population 
growth and economic development exacerbate the scarcity. Therefore, 
it is useful to examine how the problem has been dealt with during 
millennia of experience in the Arab world.
Historically, countries (at the national, local and individual levels) 
have developed indigenous approaches to cope with water scarcity. 
Four examples with several millennia of experience are:
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1. Inundation canals in Egypt diverted the Nile’s annual floods 
onto farmers’ lands via below-grade channels, from which 
the farmers, usually operating in groups, would pump water 
by animal-powered sakias.3
2. Spate irrigation systems have been significant in a number of Arab 
countries since the early 1990s (table 6.2). They account for ap-
proximately 20 percent of the irrigated area in Algeria and Yemen. 
These systems consist of dams—often temporary—that divert 
water from fast-flowing ephemeral streams onto farmers’ fields 
after heavy rain.
Table 6.2  Spate Irrigation in Arab Countries, 1989–1995
Country Data (yr) Spate irrigation (ha) Total irrigation (ha) Spate (%)
Algeria 1992 110,000 555,500 19.8
Morocco 1989 165,000 1,258,200 13.1
Sudan 1995 46,200 1,946,200 2.4
Tunisia 1991 30,000 385,000 7.8
Yemen Rep. 1994 98,320 481,520 20.4
3. Qanats (also variously known as kareez, foggara, aflaj) are found in 
many Arab countries, probably after originating in Iran. Certainly, 
in the early part of the last millennium, the Moors took the tech-
nology to Spain (where some are still functioning). The Spanish, 
in turn, took the technology to Mexico, and qanats are now found 
in Peru and Chile as well. A 
qanat consists of a tunnel 
that starts at ground level in 
foothills and is cut into the 
hill, sloping upward at a lesser 
angle than the ground so that 
the tunnel becomes progres-
sively deeper, eventually 
intersecting the water table 
in the hillside (f igure 6.1). 
Qanats are essentially man-
made springs that provide a route for infiltration from higher areas 
to flow out at a single point. The vertical shafts allow access during 
bedrock
farm
Figure 6.1  Cross-Section of a Qanat 
Source: Livius.Org, with permission
 3 Sakia is also known as the “Persian wheel.” It is an effective technology for lifting 
water from canals with animal or mechanical power to irrigate farmlands.
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construction. Some qanats are kilometers long. One example in 
Jordan exceeds 90km. 
4. Shallow wells are found everywhere that the groundwater table 
is relatively near the surface. Historically, wells had to be shallow 
due to the limits of suction lift pumps (approximately 10 meters).
These are four quite different technical approaches to enhance local 
water availability: exploitation by inundation of the regular heavy Nile 
River floods; diversion of irregular flash-foods in wadis; exploitation 
of infiltration into hillsides; and exploitation of shallow water tables. 
Nevertheless, they have a number of important similarities that offer 
important insights into how scarce water has been managed success-
fully, productively, and sustainably by irrigators in the Arab world. 
Each approach exploits natural flows. Each approach, therefore, is 
limited by actual rainfall and the resulting runoff. These restrictions, in 
turn, mean that over-exploitation is not possible (unless shallow wells 
are over 10 meters in depth). 
Experience over the years has given water users a clear idea of 
how much water to expect—on average—in a wet year and in a dry 
year. This knowledge has provided the basis for them to decide how 
the water should be allocated. Where farmers had collectively built 
the infrastructure (as in the case of qanats and spate systems, and 
sometimes in the case of wells), the beneficiary group was already 
clear. However, contributions might not have been equal. Differences 
in cropping patterns might require nonuniform allocation of water, or 
priority to domestic or livestock use. In Egypt, for example, by the time 
that flood irrigation had evolved millennia ago, the scale of the system 
was already such that there were at least two levels of management: 
one for the major diversion structures and one for the local distribution 
of water among users at the sakia. 
For qanats, Mehraby (undated) describes the distribution process 
as follows:
“Since ancient times, there have been laws as to how to distribute 
water fairly among various small and large villages on the kariz routes 
to prevent any disagreements resulting in consequent disorder, clashes 
or disturbance.
“The distribution of the water of a kariz route is based on time as 
determined by the users through their representatives. If the flow of 
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a kariz is considerably high and the users of the water are numerous, 
the distribution of the water has to be under a trustworthy official 
known as mirab who is chosen by the joint users or the government 
and is paid a certain salary.”
Mehraby’s brief summary delineates three elements:
The principles for allocation of the water among users have been 1. 
agreed. 
There are rules implementing the allocation (“based on time”).2. 
A management structure to oversee the operation may be 3. 
necessary.
The nature of the rules and 
how they are implemented will 
vary among these different tech-
nologies. In Yemeni spate sys-
tems, for example, it is reported 
that the farmer is entitled to take 
water until the depth reaches his 
knee. The signal that the next 
irrigator should divert the water 
to his field is for the first farmer 
to fire a gun into the air.4 While 
this may seem crude, it ideally 
suits the need in a spate system 
to share a very uncertain quan-
tity on the basis of simple rules 
and quick communication. The 
outcome is an apparently rather 
uniform distribution of water 
among users in a wadi (figure 
6.2).
The infrastructure of all of these systems provides the capacity 
to deliver the service that the other elements—how much water is 
available, priorities for sharing, rules, and management arrangements—
combine to define. In addition to the channel or diversion structures 
that deliver the water, the infrastructure also may comprise facilities 
Figure 6.2  Spate System in Yemen
Photo: Gerhardt Lichtenthaeler.
 4 Charles Abernethy, personal communication.
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to assist in allocation. Figure 6.3 
shows a water-dividing structure 
in a foggara in Algeria. 
Abdullah Al-Ghafri and oth-
ers (undated) describe various 
timing devices, ranging from 
pots with holes in the bottom 
that provide a measure of time 
while slowly sinking, to complex, 
seasonally adjusted sundials. 
These techniques are de-
signed to enable water shares, 
first divided among user groups 
by structures such as shown in 
figure 6.3, and then subdivided by time among individual farmers.
This brief review of the successful and sustainable local approaches 
that have developed in the Middle East to deal with water scarcity sup-
ports some significant, generalizable conclusions. These are described 
in the Introduction to this volume as the ABCDE approach.5 
Current Challenges
Thus, we know the ingredients of sustainable and productive water 
resource management. Moreover, the Arab countries have developed 
successful approaches that have been exported to, and implemented 
in, Europe and South America. We can assume that farmers receiving 
scarce but well-defined water supplies will use these as productively 
as circumstances such as market opportunities and input availability 
permit. Overall production may be lower because water availability 
will be lower, but the expertise exists in the region to make the best 
of whatever is available. So what is the problem?
The central problem is that variations in availability have surpassed 
the “typical” range to which “traditional” operations were adapted. Water 
management systems are now out of tune with water availability pat-
terns, requiring changes in the associated processes to determine which 
5 A = Assessment, B = Bargaining, C = Codification, D = Delegation, and E = 
Engineering. Such features are identifiable worldwide in successful systems. For 
example, see Trawick (2003) for a sociologist’s perspective, derived largely from 
experience in the Andes, which reached similar—certainly compatible—conclusions; 
and Frederiksen and Vissia (1998) for an engineering viewpoint.
Figure 6.3  Water-Dividing Structure in a Foggara, Algeria
Photo: Gerhardt Lichtenthaeler.
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sectors or users will suffer and by how much. These changes require 
the political bargaining process to be reopened, may change the rules 
of operation, and require new or revised institutional responsibilities. 
Infrastructure also may require modification.
Four important challenges to “traditional” water management 
systems can be identified: 
1. Unsustainable, “Individualized” Withdrawals
Over recent decades, for many countries, the most important develop-
ment has been the break of the “natural” link between the renewable 
supply and the level of use. In the past, as noted, rainfall generated 
runoff and infiltration supplied the traditional water systems. If rainfall 
was low, availability was low, and utilization was low. 
Then, in the 1970s, cheap pumps and tubewell technology arrived. 
They enabled farmers to withdraw water from any source at much 
higher rates than with animal power and to tap deep aquifers by us-
ing submersible pumps. Their advent has had three profound negative 
consequences:
Specifically in the case of groundwater, a. users can and now do “mine” 
aquifers. The logic of the “tragedy of the commons” provides an 
incentive for the individual to derive benefits as extensively and 
quickly as possible.
  Aquifers are complex and difficult to observe—especially deep 
aquifers. Recharge may be vertical from rainfall; or lateral, as 
rainfall on surrounding hills moves down to the valleys and plains. 
Geological structures can constrain or redirect recharge. Thus, 
understanding how much water is actually available in total or on 
a renewable basis is extremely difficult. In many areas, the assess-
ment of availability is partial and unreliable.
As water sources have become individually owned and operated, b. 
the amount of water actually being abstracted has become difficult 
to measure. Controlling such use is even more difficult. The indi-
vidual farmer who has invested in the pump or well feels entitled 
to exploit it. Setting the rules (codification) and enforcing them 
(delegation) is extremely difficult.6
6 Indeed, to the authors’ knowledge, there are few if any examples of successful 
control of dispersed groundwater exploitation anywhere in the world. There are, 
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The effects of over-exploitation go beyond the direct users. Falling c. 
water tables reduce flows to qanats. Excessive pumping from one 
reach of a river or canal affects all other users. For example, it is 
reported that the qanats serving palmeries around Marrakech dried 
up in the 1970s so wells are now the main source of water. 
2. Increased Variability and Reduction in Rainfall 
Adding to this problem of unsustainable water use, IPCC projections 
imply increased variability and reduced river flows in areas that rely 
on surface storage in reservoirs. This situation already is a reality in 
parts of the Arab region. For example, in Morocco, due to reduced 
annual precipitation, dams constructed over the last three decades 
have been able to store, on average, only approximately half of their 
design capacity. As a consequence, farmers have become acutely aware 
of the uncertain nature of their access to water. Irrigation agencies in 
the command areas struggle to ration uncertain water supplies to the 
politically important farmer constituency.
Variability has local and regional implications. For the individual 
farmer, investing in the inputs for high-value crops is less attractive if 
there is a possibility of water shortage affecting yields. At the regional 
level, the relationship between rainfall and runoff is not linear. Runoff 
typically declines much more sharply than precipitation. Thus, variability 
is concentrated in the downstream areas. Therefore, the foundation 
for current allocation priorities, rules, institutional arrangements, and 
infrastructure is in doubt.
3. Political Uncertainty of Cooperation with Upstream Riparians 
The Arab countries are dependent for some two-thirds of their water 
supplies on transboundary water. Egypt is the most extreme case, 
with some 95 percent of its water coming from the Nile. Apart from 
natural variability, investments in hydraulic infrastructure by upstream 
riparians change water availability to downstream users. For example, 
the Greater Anatolia Project affects water availability in Syria and Iraq. 
The Israeli water utility affects the availability of water in Palestine and 
however, many examples of uncontrolled depletion: much of India, Mexico, Paki-
stan, US, and Yemen. An ongoing collective effort in Andhra Pradesh, India shows 
considerable early promise.
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Jordan. Dams constructed in Ethiopia and Sudan affect the calculus 
of Egyptian water planners.
4. Deteriorating Water Quality
A fourth factor has been the political and economic pressure on 
decisionmakers to focus more on water quality. An IWMI survey of 
government irrigation officials in Egypt in 1995 produced the surpris-
ing result that many ranked pollution as the most important problem 
facing the sector.
For example, in the congested rural settlements along the Nile 
River Delta, residents and farmers have become an important lobby-
ing group. They have been demanding that municipal and agricultural 
pollution be cleaned out of their canals and rivers. Among farmers, 
exporters of high-value farm products have been concerned that the 
marketability of their products is affected by water pollution. 
Similarly, along the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts, many 
countries are benefiting from tourism to historic and seaside resorts. 
However, development of other high potential areas—such as the 
coastline of the Nile Delta—is constrained by beach contamination 
from polluted Nile waters. Tour operators and resort owners are pow-
erful interest groups who have thus joined environmentalists and farm 
exporters to lobby for enhanced water quality management. 
A problem facing many countries in which groundwater is overused 
is the deterioration in quality that occurs as water tables fall. Deterio-
ration is caused either from saline water that flows laterally into the 
depleted zone (especially near coasts); or from the deeper layers of 
water, which are more saline.
Understanding the Present: Traditional and New Data Sources
To recapitulate, climate change is likely to increase the imbalance be-
tween supply and demand for water in the Arab countries. However, 
there is ample evidence that scarcity has been successfully managed in 
the Arab world for centuries. The components required to manage scarcity 
are information on resource availability; a bargaining process among the 
users to determine how water should be allocated, resulting in rules and 
responsibilities; and infrastructure to deliver the service. Although their 
details vary, similar patterns have been common across many MNA 
countries for centuries. However, traditional processes increasingly are 
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under threat from ever-growing demand and new technologies that 
upset the “traditional” balance between availability and utilization. 
Climate change is adding to the strain.
The process that will be induced by declining availability, more un-
certainty and variability, and declining quality will be multidisciplinary. 
It will draw in hydrologists, engineers, economists, agriculturalists, law-
yers, and institutional specialists—just as the ABCDE process does. 
Success will depend, among many factors, on (1) the ability of 
the participants in the process to communicate as effectively and 
unambiguously as possible across disciplines—that is, it will depend 
on developing a common terminology—and (2) placing the analysis of 
options in a basin context.
Terminology for Water Accounting
Before discussing how water management can adjust to reflect the 
new context of declining availability and increased demand, we need 
to clarify our terminology. Without agreement over the definitions of 
concepts such as “efficiency” and “consumption,” it is not possible to 
have a consistent view of what constitutes a successful water man-
agement policy.
Consider, for example, how a different viewpoint on the water 
resource gives a different understanding of efficiency in water man-
agement:
For a water supply and sanitation engineer, one design objective 
often is to recover, treat, and return to the hydrological system in 
good condition as much as possible (perhaps 95 percent) of the water 
withdrawn. A poorly functioning system would return a much smaller 
percentage and with a heavy pollution load. 
In contrast, for an irrigation engineer, the design objective is to 
return as little as possible (perhaps 10 percent) of withdrawals to the 
system, preferably including all of the salts that were in the original 
abstraction. 
Individual cases will vary, but a downstream environmental “wa-
ter user” might be puzzled to find that, when urban water efficiency 
improves, s/he gets more and cleaner water. The same downstream 
user would find that improvements in irrigation efficiency reduce water 
availability and perhaps increase the salt load. 
The source of this paradox is simple. Irrigation engineers have, 
quite rationally, designed irrigation systems to maximize the amount 
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of water that reaches the crop, and is then consumed in transpiration. 
This is the purpose of an irrigation system, and understanding how 
much water arrives at its destination is central to operational planning 
and designing cropping patterns.
For irrigation, water allocations usually are defined in terms of 
right to withdraw water (either as a volume per season; or a rate of 
withdrawal, or an irrigation “turn”). A common irrigation performance 
indicator is “how much area did we irrigate per unit of water with-
drawn.” Improving on this indicator (by lining canals, or using modern 
irrigation technology) is a valid objective at the project level, or for 
the individual irrigator with a well. Improvements often will lead to 
substantial increases in the area irrigated (and hence consumption of 
water by crops) for the same quantity withdrawn. 
However, this “local” perspective is unhelpful, even misleading, 
when water is scarce at the wider basin or aquifer scale. From this 
perspective, the question of where the “losses” actually were going 
is critical. Certainly, if the irrigated area is increased, transpiration is 
greater and, to that extent, return flows will be reduced. Return flows 
to rivers may contribute to downstream human, agricultural, or natu-
ral demands. Infiltration to aquifers from leaking canals or excessive 
irrigation applications contributes to groundwater recharge. Thus, an 
improvement as observed at one location may have a negative impact 
elsewhere.
In response to this problem, the International Commission on 
Irrigation and Drainage (ICID) recently published a review of the lit-
erature on irrigation efficiency (Perry 2007) and recommended terms 
that were suitable for application in all water sectors. The draft was 
for reviewed by all of ICID’s relevant national committees and work-
ing groups, and thereby represents a wide consensus. Other writers 
and organizations have similar views. The American Society of Civil 
Engineers (ASCE) is debating a change in terminology. The California 
Department of Water Resources makes no mention of efficiency in 
its regular accounts of water allocation and use in the state. Recent 
research publications take the same view (Ward and Pulido-Vasquez 
2008). The recommendations have been summarized in terms of 
water consumed by users (irrigation, water supply, and industries) and 
nonconsumed water (usually in the form of environmental flows or as 
groundwater stock).
This approach to water sector terminology has a number of im-
portant features:
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It closely follows hydrological concepts (conservation of mass. The 1. 
fractions add up to unity at any given level of aggregation).
It differentiates between consumptive and nonconsumptive uses 2. 
(so that the water supply and sanitation sector is characterized 
quite differently from irrigation).
Consumption we 3. want (transpiration by irrigated crops) is dis-
tinguished from unwanted consumption (such as transpiration by 
weeds and evaporation from wet soil).
Outflows that are recoverable are distinguished from those that 4. 
are not. 
In water-short environments, these terms enable sectoral spe-5. 
cialists to communicate unambiguously to point directly to the 
priorities that will deliver more benefits from the same—or 
less—water: 
Reducing nonbeneficial consumption a. 
Minimizing nonrecoverable flowsb. 
Recovering as much as possible of the recoverable flows.c. 
The use of these terms greatly clarifies the discussion of interventions. 
When these terms are not used carefully, the ambiguity can generate 
misconceptions. For example, respected authorities can quote data 
suggesting that production can be substantially increased while water 
use is cut by 50 percent–75 percent (Brown 2008). This wording could 
indicate this outcome without clarifying that the “saving” is in water 
applied, not water consumed, and that crop water transpiration is 
linearly related to crop production—so that, in reality, beneficial water 
consumption will increase with crop production.
One conventional response to scarcity is to introduce “water-
saving” technologies. Most MNA countries are pursuing such inter-
ventions (either government sponsored or farmer initiated). Typically, 
the expectation is that crop production will be increased, and water 
will be saved. However, normally, the water-saving indicator does 
not signify water consumed in the irrigation process but, rather, water 
applied to the process.
In the framework proposed by ICID, such interventions must be 
very carefully evaluated: 
To the extent that transpiration is increased, the consumptive use N
of water is proportionately increased. The source of water for that 
increase then must be traced.
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If the impact is to shift nonbeneficial evaporation into beneficial N
transpiration, then production is increased at no incremental 
water cost. However, the literature suggests that, once irrigation 
practices are reasonable, the proportion of applied water going to 
evaporation is rather small. 
However, if the impact of the intervention is to reduce runoff or N
infiltration, the ultimate destination of that excess must be identi-
fied. If the water is fully or partially recovered, the actual saving is 
proportionately reduced.
The impact of improved irrigation “eff iciency” and irrigation 
management always will be somewhere between two extremes on a 
spectrum of possible impacts:
At one extreme, water that otherwise would have been un-1. 
productive makes a full contribution to crop transpiration and 
hence production. The resource cost is zero; the outcome fully 
positive.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, incremental water consump-2. 
tion as a result of improved irrigation technology in one location 
takes water away from a more productive alternative use in an-
other location—future domestic consumption, for example—so 
the impact is strongly negative.
River Basin Context
For each part of a river basin, a water balance can be constructed 
comprising precipitation and surface inflows as sources; and evapo-
ration, transpiration, runoff, and changes to storage as end uses (or 
destinations). The uses can further be classified into the ICID benefi-
cial/nonbeneficial, recoverable/nonrecoverable flow categories. Some 
areas are “sources” of water, that is, precipitation exceeds local use 
and the excess goes to runoff or groundwater recharge. Other areas 
—including wetlands, irrigated areas, and saline sinks—are “sinks”in 
which consumption exceeds precipitation. The balance is met by natural 
inflows, managed diversions, or pumping.
Table 6.3 provides a schematic, with completely notional data, of 
how basin accounts can be represented in accordance with this ap-
proach. As is discussed later, models are available that enable various 
data types to be integrated into this format.
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The first row of table 6.3 defines the major categories of land and 
water use. Some are essentially natural and “unmanaged.” Others 
consist of managed land use. The third is managed water use. In the 
next row, typical classes within these categories and the percentage 
of the area under each class are specified.
Sources of water consist of rainfall and any committed inflows (in this 
case, restricted to the requirement for irrigation). The rainfall is distributed 
across land classes—here, for simplicity, in proportion to area.
The remaining lines correspond to the ICID classification of uses. 
The data in each column—which correspond to a water balance for 
that use class—then can be estimated, calculated, or modeled for each 
cell (elaborated below). 
What is deemed “nonbeneficial” is, in large measure, a political 
decision. Clearly, water that is consumed by weeds among irrigated 
crops is nonbeneficial, as is water that evaporates from bare soil (after 
rainfall or during poorly managed irrigation). However, water evapo-
rated and transpired from wetlands, riparian vegetation, and natural 
forests often may be considered as environmentally useful, hence a 
beneficial use.
This basin-scale overview would be complemented by more de-
tailed analyses of specific areas of interest. For example, the estimated 
overall net groundwater recharge of 45 units (recoverable recharge = 
145 units, transfers to irrigation = 100 units) may well disguise areas in 
which recharge is substantially positive or negative. 
As mentioned, the data in the table are invented, but the advan-
tages for a country of creating such a data set are considerable. The 
set clarifies the most significant water sources and uses: 
Natural forest is the most significant source of stream flow, so N
changes in this land use class should be monitored carefully.
Nonbeneficial use in irrigated areas is significant. Thus, better N
management or technologies offer scope for significant increases 
in beneficial use, hence crop production, without negative impacts 
on downstream areas.
Recoverable river flows (209 units) are entirely utilized. Additional N
use of surface water would require either transfers from one sec-
tor to another, or construction of facilities to capture more of the 
currently nonrecoverable flows.
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Rainfed agricultural areas contribute substantial recharge, so in N
these areas there could be scope to develop groundwater and thus 
increase agricultural production.
This framework forces recognition of the linkages among the 
components of a basin, which is an essential basis for understanding 
and analysis. 
The output from models is, at best, only as good as the data we 
put in to them. Remote sensing (RS) now offers important additional 
sources of information, from rainfall through evapotranspiration (ET) 
(with the potential to distinguish between the beneficial and nonben-
eficial components), to stream flow, lake levels, and groundwater 
storage. Each of these data types—especially when combined with 
ground-truthed observations—now can be estimated at various scales 
through RS technologies.
Information from Remote Sensing
This section summarizes the potential contribution of RS information 
to the various information needs identified in table 6.3.
Land-Use Classes
One of the earliest uses of RS data was to classify land use. Initially, 
classification was little more than visual identification. However, in 
the past decade or so, more and more characteristics have become 
observable with different sensors and the data can be processed in 
computers. Thus, it has become possible to identify more classes with 
greater precision and at higher resolution. 
Rainfall
The Tropical Rainfall Measurement Mission, launched in 1997, provides 
real-time estimates of rainfall derived from microwave data at 1 degree 
resolution. More recently, data from this and other sources have been 
integrated through the PERSIANN (Precipitation Estimation from 
Remotely Sensed Information Using Artificial Neural Networks) algo-
rithm to generate rainfall data at a resolution of 0.25 degrees (25km) 
at the equator, at 3-hour intervals.
Water Resource Assessment in the Arab World  N  113
Evaporation and Transpiration
One of the most active areas of research in the interpretation of RS 
data in the last decade has been evapotranspiration (ET). The Surface 
Energy Balance for Land (SEBAL) (Bastiaanssen and others 1998) has 
been applied successfully in a large number of countries. It provides 
spatial estimates of ET at resolutions from a few meters to several 
kilometers, depending on the source data. The METRIC algorithm 
(Allen and others 2007) is computationally similar to SEBAL. Anderson 
and others (1997) use an approach that does not rely on ground-based 
information. It generates frequent estimates of ET at a resolution of 
5km–10km. Integration of these data with finer resolution sources 
enables downscaling the ET estimates. 
Table 6.3 disaggregates ET into beneficial and nonbeneficial com-
ponents. This separation is important, but not easy to make. Some 
nonbeneficial ET is evaporation from wet soil and can be identified 
because it occurs in the absence of vegetation. Similarly, ET occurs 
from nonbeneficial vegetation. Whether a given vegetation type is con-
sidered beneficial or not is essentially a political decision. Perhaps most 
importantly for irrigation managers, there is nonbeneficial evaporation 
when irrigation deliveries are excessive or poorly managed at the farm 
level. Estimates of the distribution of ET between E and T also can be 
made based on known crop characteristics. The potential T is known, 
so if ET exceeds this figure, the excess must be evaporation.
Runoff and Recharge
Once precipitation and evapotranspiration are mapped, the total 
runoff and recharge for a given area can be estimated as the differ-
ence between these two. Partitioning further between runoff and 
recharge generally requires ground data, and/or further modeling. RS 
data also is beginning to make a contribution in this area. The GRACE 
project, sponsored by NASA, measures variations in the water stored 
in the soil and underlying aquifers. To date, the resolution of these 
data is coarse (approximately 100km), making it hard to interpret lo-
cal changes. However, already such information provides a degree of 
independent confirmation of other observations or modeling results. 
Thus, it can be anticipated that, in future, estimates at finer resolution 
will be possible.
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Information from Conventional Measurements
The information sources outlined above provide important clues to how 
a basin is operating. Additional, more traditional sources of informa-
tion are essential to complement and confirm such data. They include 
streamflows, releases from reservoirs, water table information, cropping 
patterns and planting dates, land cover, and meteorological data.
Integrating Information and Scenario Analysis: Hydrological 
and WEAP Models
An appropriate model can greatly facilitate the process of organizing the 
analysis, linking components of the system, and, especially, exploring 
the impact of future scenarios. The main challenge is not to try to build 
in all the processes that we can model, but to identify the most relevant 
processes. Models can address either very narrow issues in great detail—
for example, how stomata react to salt—or much broader issues at a 
lower level of detail. For the type of analysis relevant to the issues of 
concern here, hydrological models are most relevant.
Table 6.3 makes clear that RS data can contribute extensively to 
identify the main “sources and uses” (rainfall and ET) components as 
well as to understand recharge. These data sets are basic to the for-
mulation of a hydrological model. This model then adds the capacity 
to define the interactions between storing and diverting runoff, and 
pumping groundwater. These interactions are susceptible to managed 
interventions.
A gargantuan number of hydrological models exist, and applications 
are growing rapidly. The number of online pages that include the words, 
“hydrological model.” is over 1.2 million (Google January 2007). Using 
the same search engine to find “water resources model” came up with 
86 million pages. Therefore, a critical question for hydrological model 
studies relates to the selection of the most appropriate model. One of the 
most important issues to consider is the spatial scale to be incorporated 
in the study and how much physical detail is to be included. 
WEAP (Water Evaluation and Planning System) is well suited 
to integrate the types of data described above to produce a practi-
cal “accounting framework” for planners and decisionmakers. It was 
created in 1988 to be a flexible, integrated, and transparent planning 
tool to evaluate the sustainability of current water demand and supply 
patterns and to explore alternative long-range scenarios (SEI 1997). 
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WEAP is freely available to academic, governmental, and nonprofit 
organizations in developing countries.
WEAP follows an integrated approach to water development 
that places water projects in the context of multisectoral, prioritized 
demands; water quality; and ecosystem preservation and protection. 
WEAP also is distinguished by its integrated approach to simulating 
both the natural (rainfall, evapotranspirative demands, runoff, base-
flow) and engineered components (reservoirs, diversions, groundwater 
pumping) of water systems. This holistic approach gives the planner 
access to a comprehensive view of the broad range of factors that 
must be considered in managing water resources. WEAP, thus, is 
an effective tool for examining alternative water development and 
management options.
WEAP operates on the basic principles of a water balance. Using 
this tool, the analyst can represent all of the system’s complexities: 
supply sources (rainfall, rivers, creeks, groundwater, and reservoirs), 
withdrawal, transmission and wastewater treatment facilities, eco-
system requirements, water demands, and pollution generation. The 
data structure and level of detail easily can be customized to meet the 
requirements of a particular analysis and to reflect the limits imposed 
by available data.
Operating on these basic principles, WEAP is applicable to many 
scales; municipal and agricultural systems, single catchments, or complex 
transboundary river systems. WEAP incorporates not only water al-
location but also, if required, water quality and ecosystem preservation 
modules, making this model suitable for simulating many of the fresh-
water problems that exist in the world. SEI 2005 and Droogers 2008 
explain more about the WEAP model and present an example—loosely 
based on a known basin—with guidance for operating and modifying 
the model to explore future scenarios.
However, the most important aspect of choosing a model is its 
capacity to explore different scenarios. Scenarios may be driven 
either by exogenous factors such as population growth and climate 
change (Droogers and Aerts 2005) or by management decisions (res-
ervoir operation rules, water allocation among sectors, investment in 
infras-tructure such as water treatment or desalinization plants, and 
agricultural irrigation practices). Understanding how changes in one 
part of the basin are likely to impact on other areas and, indeed, which 
linkages are the most important are very powerful features of an ap-
propriate modeling system.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The water situation facing most Arab countries is difficult: water sup-
plies are scarce, and the demand for water is high. 
These conditions have existed for millennia so a variety of ap-
proaches evolved to ensure that whatever water is available is produc-
tively and sustainably used. Water management arrangements vary in 
scale, complexity, technology, and purpose. However, they also have 
important common features: the group sharing the water had a clearly 
defined water source; agreed priorities for allocating the water formed 
the basis of formal or informal rules; responsibilities for administering 
the rules were assigned; and the appropriate infrastructure to deliver 
the service is implied by this entire process. 
In fact, the elements that provide for stability are clearly identifiable 
across a wide range of countries and techniques. They comprise an 
understanding of availability (assessment); a political bargaining process 
to establish priorities for allocation; codification of the results of this 
process into laws and rules; delegation of powers to institutions and 
governmental and nongovernment agencies: and engineering works 
suitable to deliver the water to the users (ABCDE).
However, in many countries, the precarious balance that developed 
over centuries to manage naturally available water supplies has been 
disturbed in many countries by the pressures of economic development 
and demographics as well as the introduction of new technologies that 
made over-exploitation for irrigation purposes easier to practice and 
harder to control. The outcome is often chaotic competition, inequi-
table distribution, and over-exploitation. 
Climate change is an additional destabilizing factor. Sharp declines 
in water availability are projected over the coming century. Increasing 
temperature and aridity will increase crop-water demand, thus ac-
centuating the deficit between supply and demand.
Addressing these issues must be a multidisciplinary effort. Con-
sequently, communication among the participants in unambiguous 
terminology about the nature of water use will be essential—to dis-
tinguish between consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of water; as 
well as to carefully identify which return flows are already exploited 
elsewhere and which are genuine losses to the system. Hydrology pro-
vides the scientific framework within which solutions must be found.
Presenting hydrological information to policymakers and planners is 
not always easy. However, the combination of modern analytical tools, 
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new sources of spatial data, and diligent measurements of key “ground” 
data provide a proven base. Integrating these data sources will enable 
sectors, regions, and countries to better understand how these data 
interrelate and will enable the inevitable disputes about allocation to be 
based, as far as possible, on facts rather than assertions. 
Furthermore, well-formulated models enable exploration of possible 
scenarios that can reflect management options, technical options, and 
investment options in the context of projected climate scenarios.
The potential contribution of new RS techniques to these efforts is 
substantial. Through different types of satellites and analysis, RS can 
provide historical time series as well as near-real-time data about the 
major components of the hydrological cycle: rainfall, land use, irrigated 
areas, ET, and changes in groundwater. 
Restoring hydrological equilibrium in the Arab world is critical 
for sustainability, productivity, and equity between generations. 
However, carrying it out will be difficult. It will require restoration 
of the historic linkages among assessment of availability, bargaining, 
codification, delegation, and engineering (ABCDE). Information about 
availability is the foundation for this structure, and new technologies, 
especially RS techniques, offer powerful ways to improve knowledge 
for all concerned.
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Egypt Case Study
Energy Efficiency CDM Program: 
Irrigation and Drainage  
Pumping Sector
Abdulhamid Azad
In 1992 over 180 countries adopted the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a framework convention aimed at stabilizing climate-altering greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.†
The Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted under the UNFCCC and 
entered into force on February 2005, commits industrialized countries 
to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by an average of 5.2 
percent below their 1990 levels by 2012. To meet these commitments 
in the most cost-effective manner, the Protocol contains provisions al-
lowing industrialized countries some flexibility to meet their obligations 
through projects generating emission reductions (ERs) elsewhere. The 
most important instrument permitting industrialized countries to finance 
emissions-avoiding projects in developing countries and receive credit for 
doing so is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) proposed under 
article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. The main purpose of this mechanism is 
to assist host countries with sustainable development through the transfer 
of cleaner technology and financial resources for specific projects, while 
contributing to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
Despite the rapid growth of global carbon finance transactions, en-
ergy efficiency improvements of irrigation and drainage pumping stations 
are still being bypassed due to lack of operational policy frameworks 
and pilot projects. Moreover, most of the pumping stations also are 
suffering from an overall lack of investments in the energy efficiency 
improvements. The result is that even the potentially most attractive, 
† This chapter was prepared on the basis of project documents in the recently com-
pleted World-Bank-financed Egypt Pumps III Project and the preparatory work for a 
proposed operation with Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) engagement.
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low-cost carbon mitigation proj-
ects encounter signif icant dif-
ficulties obtaining funding (box 
7.1).
This case study presents 
analytical issues related to CDM 
projects for the irrigation and 
drainage sector such as base-
line def initions, project idea 
note preparation, which CDM 
methodology is to be used for 
the pumping sector, benefits, and yearly emission reductions resulting 
from energy savings.
Irrigation and Drainage Sector
Egypt has no significant rainfall and is dependent on its 55.5 billion 
cubic meters (m3) per annum share of Nile water. The country 
therefore must improve returns from its available water resources in 
an environmentally sound and sustainable manner, which includes 
adopting energy-efficient technologies. The energy-intensive Egyp-
tian irrigation and drainage sector plays a vital part in food produc-
tion and in maintaining the rural economy. Agriculture accounts for 
20 percent of GDP and 35 percent of the labor force. The success 
of irrigated agriculture depends to a large extent on the effective 
operation and maintenance (O&M) of the irrigation and drainage 
system to maintain the quality of the level of irrigation and drainage 
services (table 7.1). 
Box 7.1  Need for a New Approach to Emission 
Reductions
Energy efficiency potentially could account for N
more than half of energy-related greenhouse 
gas reductions achievable over the next 20–40 
years.
Energy-efficient projects account for less than N
10 percent of the current market.
Table 7.1  Irrigation and Drainage Service Quality Indicators 
Service quality Irrigation Drainage
Adequacy Ability to meet water demand for optimal 
plant growth
Ability to dispose excess water in minimal 
time to prevent damage
Reliability Confidence in supply of water Confidence in ability to dispose excess water
Equity Fair distribution of share of water shortage 
risks and minimize the head and tail equities 
(poverty aspect)
Fair distribution of risks
Flexibility Ability to choose the frequency, rate, and 
duration of supply
Ability to choose the time, rate, and duration 
of drainage water disposal
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Given the very flat topography in most parts of the country, water in 
open conveyance channels needs to be lifted at certain critical points to 
provide irrigation, while drainage water needs to be pumped out. As a con-
sequence, there are over 743 pumping stations that are of vital importance 
for Egypt’s agriculture in the Nile Valley and Delta. By world standards, 
most of these pumping stations are large, with pumping capacities ranging 
from 2 m3/s to 75 m3/s. They command large irrigated and drainage areas 
with a high cropping intensity ranging from 180 percent–200 percent. 
Pumping heights range from 5 meters–50 meters. Pumping drainage water 
also is needed to control groundwater levels and salinity to preserve crop 
yields. Approximately half of these stations have very old pumping units 
operating inefficiently and incurring high energy costs (70 percent of total 
operating costs). The allocation of funds to maintenance activities is small, 
and the pumping stations are subject to contingency repairs. Given this 
system’s strategic importance to the country, financing is made available 
from the government’s budget. However, there is generally no serious 
questioning of either the economics or the technological choices made, 
such as energy efficiency aspects.
In water-scarce regions such as in Egypt, declines in reliable water 
supplies for irrigation will dampen the increase in cereals yield that poli-
cymakers expect as a result of improving irrigation infrastructure and 
techniques. By 2025, reduced reliability is expected to reduce yields in 
the Nile River basins by 11 percent. There is evidence that temperatures 
already have increased in the last two decades, and that drought epi-
sodes have intensified. International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
climate models predict additional increases in temperature. Climate 
models also predict an increase in amplitude and frequency of extreme 
weather events such as droughts, floods, and storms. The expected rise 
in temperature will increase evaporation, while a rise in the seawater 
level will cause salt-water intrusion in coastal groundwater reservoirs. 
Given such scenarios in the face of growing demand, overall water 
availability for irrigation and other uses will decrease. At the same 
time, water availability will become more erratic and thus harder to 
manage. In the Nile Delta, drainage pumping stations will need to be 
redesigned to “climate-proof ” the investment so that they can help to 
counter the effect of the expected seawater intrusion. Redesign also 
would enable the continuation of rice cultivation in the Nile Delta, 
which would help combat seawater intrusion.
In a context of increasing water scarcity, climate change will exac-
erbate the current supply-demand imbalance. Major investments will 
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be needed to (a) modernize irrigation and drainage pumping stations 
and (b) improve on-farm irrigation efficiency. Adaptation may require 
switches in cropping patterns to new crops or varieties more tolerant 
of water scarcity. To avoid the harmful effects on crops of irrigation 
and drainage pump failures and reduce the O&M cost of the pumping 
stations, the government has set up a long-term program to rehabili-
tate the irrigation and drainage pumping network of the Nile Water 
Resource Management System. 
GHG Emissions Characteristics
The aggregate national GHG emissions without the impacts of land-use 
changes were estimated at over 116 million tons of CO2 equivalent in the 
baseline year 1990–91. The relative contributions of greenhouse gases 
in 1990–91 to the total emissions, by sector, are presented in table 7.2. 
The agriculture sector was the second largest GHG source, mainly 
from enteric fermentation and rice cultivation, followed by the non- 
combustion-related industrial 
emissions of CO2, mainly from the 
steel and cement industries 
(EEAA 1999). 
Selling Emission Reductions 
under the Kyoto Protocol  
to Support Program 
Implementation
To register a CDM program such 
as this with the CDM Executive 
Board, an approved methodology 
Table 7.2   GHG Emissions as Reported to UNFCCC, 1990 (million t CO2)
Sector CO2 emissions (mil, t) Total emissions (%)
All energy 82.72 71
Industry (other than energy) 10.27 9
Agriculture 17.93 15
Wastes 5.69 5
Total 116.60 100
Source: Egypt National Greenhouse Gases Inventory 1990–91. www.eeaa.gov.eg
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Figure 7.1  GHG Projections for All Sectors, 1990–2017
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must exist. In this case, an approved methodology exists, namely, 
AM0020, “Monitoring Methodology for Water Pumping Efficiency 
Improvements.” 
In brief, how does the CDM work in the case of this project? En-
ergy savings resulting from energy efficiency improvements reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. To meet their agreed emission reductions 
targets, OECD countries that have agreed to reduce their emissions of 
GHG then can purchase these emission reductions from such projects 
located in developing countries, which are not obliged to reduce their 
GHG emissions.
Pumping stations that, in principle, are eligible to participate in this 
CDM program will need to meet the following criteria: 
Age of the equipment exceeds 20 years.N
Average operating hours per unit exceed 100,000.N
Capacity is inadequate, or there is no stand-by unit. N
Drainage and static head requirements have changed.N
Building is in very poor condition, including major structural defi-N
ciencies.
There are problems with switch gear, gear boxes, and corrosion.N
New pumps will be installed if the cost of rehabilitation exceeds N
70 percent of the cost of new pumps. 
Most of the project investments will relate to electromechanical 
equipment for the pumping stations. Efforts will be directed toward 
establishing better linkages among the Irrigation Department, Drain-
age Authority, and the Ministry of Electricity and Energy. The last is 
implementing Energy Efficiency Programs including auditing energy 
consumption. These programs have had some success with domestic 
water supply and wastewater treatment pumping stations.
Table 7.3 Change in Energy Use
Type of intervention
Pumping station
Annual energy savings
(US$)
Irrigation 
(%)
Drainage
(%)
Complete rehabilitation –22 –10 624,637
Partial replacement –13 –5 1,376,690
Provision of spare parts –9 –7 1,054,593
Total 3,055,920
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The recent pumping station rehabilitation project analyzed the overall 
impact on energy use by rehabilitation alone (table 7.3). Rehabilitation 
increased the operational efficiency of motors and pumps and reduced 
the amount of maintenance required, resulting in immediate cost sav-
ings. Annual savings in maintenance costs were estimated at 5 percent 
of the capital costs of rehabilitation and 1 percent of spare parts. 
CDM Program of Activities Design Document
A CDM program will be implemented through what is termed a Pro-
gram of Activities, for which a Program of Activities Design Document 
(PoA DD) will need to be prepared and registered with the CDM 
Executive Board. The PoA DD will describe the overall program. 
The proposed CDM Program Activity Design Document (CPA) will 
describe all the energy efficiency measures to be implemented in a 
specific pumping station(s). The energy efficiency measures will be 
based on energy audits of the pumping stations and will include:
Electricity demand-side managementN
Power subscription adjustmentN
Power factor improvementN
Changing mismatched pumpsN
Impellers adjustmentsN
High-efficiency motorsN
Preventive pump maintenanceN
Energy efficiency monitoring and evaluation.N
In the absence of the program activity, the pumping stations will 
continue to be operated at the same energy performance level or 
worse. The electricity consumption of the pumping stations will stay 
at the current order of 1,500 GWh/year or will increase. The program 
activity will improve the energy performance of the pumping stations 
and will save electricity, reducing GHG emissions. The program’s emis-
sion reductions correspond to GHG emissions that would have been 
produced in the absence of the program activities.
The current operational conditions and performance of the pump-
ing stations will be documented and organized in a database that will 
be used as a reference for the future emissions reductions evaluation. 
A comprehensive Management Information System (MIS) has been 
developed for this database.
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Additionality
The program’s additionality can be justified by the following barrier 
arguments:
There is no regulation or incentive scheme in place covering the a. 
program’s activities.
The program faces significant financial barriers and possibly will b. 
have to be supported by a World Bank loan. 
Electricity tariffs are low in Egypt so the energy bill savings are not c. 
sufficiently motivating for program implementation.
CDM Methodology to Be Used
The AM0020 methodology is applicable to project activities that:
Seek to reduce GHG emissions by explicitly reducing the amount N
of energy required to deliver a unit of water to end-users in mu-
nicipal water utilities.
Improve energy efficiency in overall water pumping, including re-N
ducing technical losses and leaks, as well as the energy efficiency of 
the pumping scheme that consumes electricity from the electricity 
grid, in which
The existing efficiency (of water and energy) L is being improved, 
or
A new scheme is being developed to replace completely the L
old scheme. This methodology will apply to the new scheme 
only up to the measured delivery capacity (annual amount of 
delivered water) of the old scheme. 
The AM0020 methodology is not applicable to cases in which the 
project activities consist of building entirely new schemes to augment 
existing capacity. This requirement will ensure that only emissions re-
ductions up to the existing capacity of the system will be considered.
The CDM monitoring re-
quirements are defined in the Ap-
proved Monitoring Methodology 
AM0020, “Monitoring Methodol-
ogy for Water Pumping Efficiency 
Improvements” (figure 7.2). 
Figure 7.2  AM0020, 2005 
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This methodology requires the following monitoring arrangements:
Water from the entire scheme entering in the water system post-N
project must be metered and the total numbers adjusted to make 
sure that increases in water supply from the new scheme are not 
counted.
Energy consumption in the form of kWh required to move the N
water within the boundaries of the system must be calculated.
The carbon content of the electricity employed by the water system N
must be calculated using the combined margin approach outlined 
in the “Tool to Calculate the Emission Factor for an Electricity 
System.”1 In other words, if the water pumps are linked to the na-
tional energy grid, the CO2 output per Mw or kW/h of electricity 
will need to be calculated and monitored. This information generally 
is made available by the authorities each year. An amendment to 
the methodology will be required to accommodate off-grid pumps. 
If the water pumps operate from off-grid sources such as diesel 
generators, the annual consumption of related diesel fuel will need 
to be calculated. Default values for the carbon content of the diesel 
will be used for this calculation. 
The program also supports and maintains the improvement of 
energy efficiency of the pumping stations through energy audits, en-
ergy management programs, efficiency measurement and control, and 
preventive pumps maintenance. The technology employed is widely 
used and commercially available. Most of the program activities concern 
water demand management and best practices for energy efficiency 
improvement and pumping stations and canals maintenance. However, 
these activities are not widely practiced in Egypt. 
GHG Emissions Reductions
Electricity savings resulting from energy efficiency improvement will re- 
duce the emissions of GHG associated with power generation in Egypt. 
The main GHG targeted is CO2. The expected emissions reductions 
associated with the CDM program activities are evaluated in table 7.4. 
1 http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/Tools/EB35_repan12_Tool_grid_emission.
pdf
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Table 7.4  Yearly Emission Reduction Resulting from Energy Savings,  
2010–18 (%)
Activity start date 2010
EE program implementation period 2010–18 (%)
2010 6.25
2011 6.25
2012 12.5
2013 12.5
2014 12.5
2015 12.5
2016 12.5
2017 12.5
2018 12.5
Year of start of crediting period 2012 
Emission reductions t CO2
Year 1 2012 29,070.6
Year 2 2013 58,141.3
Year 3 2014 87,211.9
Year 4 2015 116,282.5
Year 5 2016 145,353.1
Year 6 2017 174,423.8
Year 7 2018 203,494.4
Year 8 2019 232,565.0
Year 9 2020 232,565.0
Year 10 2021 232,565.0
Year 11 2022 232,565.0
Year 12 2023 232,565.0
Year 13 2024 232,565.0
Year 14 2025 232,565.0
Year 15 2026 232,565.0
Year 16 2027 232,565.0
Year 17 2028 232,565.0
Year 18 2029 232,565.0
Year 19 2030 232,565.0
Year 20 2031 232,565.0
Year 21 2032 232,565.0
Year 22 2033 203,494.4
Year 23 2034 174,423.8
Year 24 2035 145,353.1
Year 25 2036 116,282.5
Year 26 2037 87,211.9
Year 27 2038 58,141.3
Year 28 2039 29,070.6
Total t CO2 4,883,865.4
Average t CO2/year 174,423.8
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They are derived from the total annual electricity bill of the pumping sta-
tions and the assumed current and target pumping station efficiencies. 
CDM Implementation Cost
The estimated cost of the irrigation and drainage pumping stations 
modernization program will be detailed in the project concept design 
document. The additional CDM pre-operational development costs 
(feasibility assessment, project design document, registration, validation) 
are estimated at US$150,000, excluding the Designated Operational 
Entity (DNA fee). In Egypt, this fee is fixed at 3 percent of the Certified 
Emissions Reductions (CERs) for energy efficiency projects.
The required CDM monitoring plan will be integrated in the moni-
toring and reporting procedures of the pump modernization program 
so the additional costs for CDM monitoring will be minimal. However, 
an additional budget for the CDM project operational phase should be 
foreseen for CER verification and issuance.2 
Benefits of the CDM Program
Besides the expected additional revenues that the CDM can gener-
ate, the implementation of a CDM program for the pumping stations 
modernization project offers multiple advantages: 
GOE will need to provide fewer irrigation subsidies and energy sub-N
sidies and can reallocate the reduced expenditures elsewhere.
The program contributes to CDM development in Egypt and helps N
ensure the sustainable development of the country.
It reinforces the CDM capacity of the concerned stakeholders. N
It demonstrates Egypt’s efforts to reduce GHG emissions and to N
reinforce its sustainable development strategy. 
It helps to build a viable PPP scheme and thereby facilitates the trans-N
fer of the O&M of the pumping stations to the private sector.
It reduces electricity consumption and helps preserve the country’s N
fossil fuel resources. 
Training and education of pumping stations operators will create N
awareness of the efficient use of electricity and proper energy 
management’s positive effect on the environment.
3 Estimated at US$30,000/year.
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The project will encourage a greater investment and will provide N
more resources to reduce water losses through fixing leaks and 
faulty pumps. 
The project supports the overall financial performance by reducing N
the unit cost of supplying water. 
It provides employment during the implementation and monitoring N
phases of the project activity.
The expected revenues from the CDM program depend greatly 
on the commercial carbon credits selling terms and the risk-taking of 
transaction costs and ERs certification. The carbon price can vary 
from US$8–16 per ton eq. CO2. Accordingly, the CDM program could 
generate US$40–100 million during its 28-year lifespan.4 
Program Risks 
As part of the pumping station modernization project, the CDM pro-
gram will share in the risks of project implementation.
However, besides the intrinsic project risks, the specific CDM risks 
can be summarized as:
Registration risks associated with the CDM program’s N
additionality5
Uncertainty of the future of CDM beyond 2012N
Higher transaction costs N
Relevant stakeholders’ insufficient motivation and awareness N
of CDM benefits. 
On the positive side, the program provides opportunities for policy-
makers to introduce, through energy efficiency measures, modernized 
management of this important sector.
4 This is a rough estimate of the CDM potential revenues. In fact, their amount will 
depend on the project implementation and the energy performance reached and, 
predominantly, on the post-2012 CDM status and future market.
5 Egypt’s low electricity prices facilitate the justification of the CDM additionality 
of energy efficiency projects.
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Accountable Water and 
Sanitation Governance:  
Japan’s Experience
Satoru Ueda and Mohammed Benouahi
External accountability is considered a key foundation for well-functioning water and sanitation utilities. Japan has succeeded in achieving the highest standards of service through a combination 
of sound institutional regulations, a strong work ethic, and the use of 
technology. Although Japan’s social and economic contexts are very 
different from MNA’s, many aspects of Japanese water and sanitation 
governance would interest MNA policymakers.
Japan has adequate rainfall (1600 millimeters (mm)/year). At the 
opposite extreme of countries that are battling desertification, Japan is 
vulnerable to too much water, notably destructive typhoons and floods. 
As the country’s rivers are short and fast flowing, a large network of 
reservoir storage and well-managed regulation of flows has ensured 
reliable water services (figure 8.1). Also, due to very high concentra-
tion of population in some major 
metropolitan areas, such as To-
kyo, and high seasonal variation 
in rainfall, water resources had 
to be developed rapidly in the 
1960s–1980s. Particularly in To-
kyo in the 1960s, when economic 
development was booming along 
with the hosting of the Tokyo 
Olympic Games in 1964, Tokyo 
was called “Tokyo Desert” due 
to intensive and repeated water 
cutoff in rotation lasting for sev-
eral months. 
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Figure 8.1  Historical Changes of Water Sources: 
Increasing Dam Storage Water, 1970–2005
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This chapter briefly describes the institutional set-up in Japan, 
reviews the performance of its water and sewerage utilities, and draws 
some lessons for the Middle East and North Africa region. The findings 
are based on an August 2007 2-week study tour by the authors.
Legislative and Institutional Framework
The Japanese government operates at three levels: (1) the national 
government, which comprises the prime minister’s office and 11 min-
istries; (2) 47 prefectural governments; and (3) municipalities (cities, 
towns, and villages). As part of the governmental system reform, the 
number of municipalities has been greatly decreasing, from 3,232 in 
March 1999 to 1,804 in September 2007. 
Japan has a comprehensive system of water laws and regulations. 
The main water-related legislation includes:
Public utility management: Local Public Enterprise Law (1952) and N
Local Government Autonomy Law
Water resources development and management: River Law, Water N
Resources Development Promotion Law, specified multipurpose 
dam law
Drinking water supply: Waterworks Law (1957)N
Industrial water supply: Industrial Water Supply LawN
Irrigation water: Land Improvement LawN
Sewage management: Sewerage Law (1958), City Planning LawN
Water quality and environment: Fundamental Environment Law N
and Water Pollution Control Law.
Water supply and sanitation (WSS) services are delegated by 
law to the lowest appropriate level. Thus, WSS services are princi-
pally the responsibility of local governments, such as prefectures and 
municipalities. Local governments can organize and delegate their 
functions to autonomous semigovernmental enterprises. These utility 
entities carry out local governmental mandates and management of 
daily operations, and report to mayors and/or municipal councils. In 
principle, all recurrent expenses of utility services are required to be 
fully covered by tariffs. 
At the national level, multiple entities are responsible for the water 
supply: the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare; the Health Bu-
reau; the Water Supply Division; the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
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Communication (MIAC); and Local Public Financial Bureaus. For 
sewerage services, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Trans-
portation, the City and Regional Development Bureau, the Sewerage 
Department, and MIAC are in charge. National ministries establish the 
regulations and guidelines for technical and service standards. They 
also review and approve utilities’ business plans regarding their basic 
scope, design, and investment schedule. Finally, under the terms of the 
Waterworks Law and the Sewerage Law, the Ministry of Health, Labor 
and Welfare and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transporta-
tion subsidize prioritized infrastructure construction. 
These ministries are not involved in operational aspects of water 
supply and sewerage utilities. They do not approve, but are merely 
informed of, changes in tariff levels. 
Regulations for Providing Water Supply Services 
From the institutional perspective, the Local Public Enterprise Law 
(1952) is the most important.1 This legislation requires water utilities 
to supply water to improve public welfare, while operating economi-
cally as independent and autonomous business entities/public enter-
prises. The utilities are to collect revenues from customers to cover 
recurrent costs. This arrangement has required the development of a 
well-developed accounting system so that water supply assets can be 
separated from other municipal accounts and charged specifically to 
the water supply operation.
Most water utilities are established to serve the population/area 
within a single municipality, and their main offices are housed in the 
municipality’s office buildings. An independent commissioner is ap-
pointed, usually by the mayor, as the head of the utility and approved 
by the municipal council. The commissioner reports to the owners/
regulators, namely, municipal councils, on key business decisions, such 
as annual investment/operation plans, tariff increases, and auditing.
Water utilities also are required to follow the technical, operational, 
and service standards stipulated in the 1957 Waterworks Law, which 
is administered by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. The 
1 The standard translation of the Japanese law uses “Enterprise” instead of “Cor-
poration.” Therefore, when referring to water and sewerage utilities, this chapter 
uses “enterprise” instead of “corporation” for those that adopt corporate financing 
procedures according to the Local Public Enterprise Law’s financial clauses. 
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Waterworks Law stipulates the basic management of waterworks, 
such as licensing for drinking-water-supply utilities establishment and 
operations; drinking-water quality standards; construction and admin-
istration of water supply systems; subsidies for investment schemes 
for planned improvement of facilities, such as major treatment plants 
and pipelines construction; and the responsibilities of utilities commis-
sioners and personnel. 
In 2006, 2,334 water supply utilities existed, of which 1,469 were 
established as statutory entities under the Local Public Enterprise 
Law. The remaining 885 small-scale utilities were not subject to this 
law. However, all of these utilities are subject to the Waterworks Law, 
which does not distinguish between urban and rural water.2
Regulations for wastewater service management 
In general, sewerage management is handled separately from water 
supply. Some exceptions exist, such as Kyoto City. As opposed to 
water supply utilities, most sewerage utility offices are established as 
internal departments or divisions within local governments (prefectures 
or municipalities). Thus, almost all sewerage utility offices are accom-
modated within local governments’ office buildings, and the heads of 
sewerage departments/divisions are civil servants. 
The user-pays principle is also applied to wastewater collection and 
treatment. Thus, in principle, recurrent expenses are fully covered by 
user charges. The sewage tariff is billed and collected together with the 
water tariff by water supply utilities and transferred to the sewerage 
department based on prior agreement. 
Regarding stormwater discharge, given its public-good nature, all 
construction and operating and maintenance (O&M) costs are covered 
by municipal general revenue. Stormwater discharge operations are 
clearly separated from sewage collection and treatment operations. 
For combined sewerage systems, local governments have established 
standard formulas to apportion costs, including staff costs, between 
sewage and stormwater operations. Costs are divided between sewage 
treatment and urban drainage. The former is considered a private good 
and is recovered through user fees, whereas the latter is considered a 
public good and therefore charged to general tax revenues.
2 As in other parts of the world, utilities in small towns and villages are better man-
aged by local communities.
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Sewerage utilities are required to meet the technical, operational, 
and service standards stipulated in the Sewerage Law (1958), which 
is governed by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transporta-
tion. The Sewerage Law stipulates the planning, design, and opera-
tional aspects of sewerage systems (including networks and treatment 
plants), licensing for construction and operational plans, subsidies for 
investment schemes, water quality standards for outflows from treat-
ment plants, the maximum pollution level of discharges from factories/
plants, regulatory/monitoring/sanction measures, and the responsibili-
ties of sewerage utilities’ managers and staff. According to the clauses 
of the Fundamental Environment Law and Water Pollution Control 
Law, sewerage utilities/departments also are required to coordinate 
with the environment departments of prefectures and municipalities 
regarding the quality and quantity of effluent discharges into rivers 
and lake basins. 
In 2005 the number of sewerage utilities was 3,699. Of these, 213 
sewerage utilities apply the corporate accounting system under the 
Local Public Enterprise Law, while 3,486 utilities apply the general 
government accounting system. The number of the sewerage utilities 
under this law is still small but is increasing for large cities. Among 
sewerage offices visited by the authors, Tokyo, Kyoto, Fukuoka, and 
Sapporo adopt independent corporate accounting systems under the 
Local Public Enterprise Law, whereas Shiga prefecture employs a 
general governmental accounting system as a part of the prefectural 
government mandates. 
Performance Assessment
Water Supply
In 2005 water supply utilities served 97.1 percent of Japan’s 129 million 
population,3 up from 26 percent in 1946. Water supply coverage in-
creased significantly after the passage of the Waterworks Law in 1957. 
As water supply coverage expanded, waterborne diseases and infant 
mortality have dropped dramatically to almost nil (figure 8.2). Table 
8.1 shows the main features of some major water supply utilities as 
well as the average data for all of Japan.
3 Table 8.1 indicates 96.1% for water utilities, excluding small-scale utilities. 
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Average daily water consumption per capita is approximately 314 
liters. It increased from 169 liters in 1965 to 322 liters in 1995. However, 
thereafter, thanks to improved water-saving equipment and public 
information campaigns, consumption has been decreasing slightly to 
approximately 314 liters. If heavy 
water users such as hotels and 
public baths are excluded, the 
average per capita daily water 
consumption rate of households in 
Tokyo is estimated at 244 liters.
Wastewater Services 
In 1958 expansion of coverage 
was accelerated by the passage 
of the Sewerage Law. In 1961 
wastewater services coverage 
was only 6 percent. By 2006 
coverage reached 82.4 percent of the population.4 Table 8.2 presents 
the main features of the sewerage utilities studied by the authors, as 
well as the average of all utilities in Japan. 
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4 The 82.4% represents the population coverage by the national-government-
authorized schemes, of which 73.3% is covered by sewerage collection and treatment 
systems under the Sewerage Law. The remaining 9.1% is covered by community/
individual household septic systems approved and subsidized by the Ministry of 
Environment. However, most of the remaining areas also are covered by individual 
onsite sanitation facilities, and the households are equipped with flush toilets. 
Table 8.1  Main Features of Visited Water Utilities and Japan, Average Year
 Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka Japan average
Population served 12,246,087 1,873,794 1,420,707 1,354,215 124,085,625a
Service coverage (%) 100.0 99.8 99.0 99.0 96.1
Average daily water supply (m3/day) 4,427,100 546,925 590,151 406,393 57,644
Unaccounted for water (%) 5.8 9.1 13.9 5.1 8.5
No. of employees 4,563 713 909 403 58,733a
No. of employees per 1000 connections 0.87 0.89 1.50 0.64 1.19
Water tariff (USD/m3) 1.74 1.90 1.37 2.01 1.33
Working ratio (%) 63 57 54 46 49
Note:
a  The numbers of populations and employees are not the average of water utilities, but total in Japan.
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Table 8.2  Main Features of Visited Sewerage Utilities and Japan Average
       Enterprise Nonenterprise 
  Tokyo 23     national  national 
 wards Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka Shiga average average
Population served 8,566,594 a  1,858,081  1,419,262  1,359,091  1,900,358 b  46,336,506 c  86,726,940 d
Population coverage (%) 99.9 99.5 99.3 99.4 94.9 96.6 87.4
Sewerage treatment capacity 6,244,000  1,173,800  1,384,000  671,050  747,260  28,879,213  31,037,290  
    (m3/day) 
Unaccounted for sewage (%) 9 30 27 20 6 18 12
Sewage tariff ($/m3) 1.20  0.84  1.14  1.58  1.92  1.17  1.13
Working ratio (Maint. costs/ 41 52 35 38 62 42 67 
    tariff) (%)
No. of employees 3,238  582  637  304  285  16,102  21,516
No. of employees 0.88  0.74  1.05  0.48  0.38  0.87  0.62  
    per 1,000 connections
Notes:
a  The column indicated the information only for 23 wards of Tokyo excluding Tama Wester Municipalities.
b  The data of Shiga Prefecture is the average of Shiga Prefacture Government (regional integrated sewerage system) and 19 municipalities (regular 
sewerage) within the area of Shiga Prefecture.
c  The average of sanitation utilities employing corporate accounting under the Local Public Enterprise Law. 
d Represents the sanitation utilities employing general governmental accounting.
All wastewater collected by public sewers is treated at secondary-
level treatment plants. Approximately 15 percent—all effluents dis-
charged into closed water bodies, such as Biwa Lake, Tokyo Bay and 
Osaka Bay—are further treated to the tertiary level. Japan’s discharged 
effluent quality, even from secondary-level treatment, is remarkably 
good. In general, the measured effluents’ biological oxygen demand 
(BOD) is 3 mg/l–10 mg/l, which is well below the national effluent 
standard of 20 mg/l.
Lessons for MNA Water Utilities
The Japanese model is highly relevant to MNA countries. Its key fea-
tures of interest for MNA are the semipublic corporate institutional 
framework under the Local Public Enterprise Law on the one hand, 
and the central regulation of operational and technical standards by 
the Waterworks Law and the Sewerage Law on the other. The legal 
framework balances the strong public ownership and oversight functions 
with the private sector’s financial autonomy and operational economic 
efficiency. Thanks to their semiprivate status and obligation to recover 
costs, the utilities enjoy considerable autonomy for their daily opera-
tions and are relatively insulated from political issues. Building the trust 
138  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
and confidence between the utilities and service users has been one of the 
bedrock principles of Japan’s utility management.
The Japanese model is thereby able to deliver :
Enhanced public welfare though a stable water supply and sanita-a. 
tion service
Financial autonomy achieved through tariffs and a sound manage-b. 
ment system
Large-scale investment in infrastructure development according c. 
to a long-term plan
Excellent goodwill among water customers d. 
Municipality-based utilities tailored to unique local settings. e. 
In the following sections, this chapter details key strategies and achieve-
ments of the Japanese water and sanitation system (WSS). They are:
Legislating and regulating for cost recoverya. 
Keeping unaccounted-for water (UFW) very low in both water b. 
and sewerage utilities
Maintaining clarity in accounting between recurrent and capital c. 
costs 
Making available several investment-financing options for water d. 
and sewerage utilities
Legislating/regulating effective governance and accountability e. 
mechanisms 
Effectively managing human resourcesf. 
Outsourcing wherever possible g. 
Focusing on total water quality managementh. 
Managing river water rights and discharge permits.i. 
Legislating and Regulating for Cost Recovery 
Under the Local Public Enterprise Law, water utilities are required to 
make annual financial statements by processing separately (1) an income 
statement in the current year, (2) a balance sheet, and (3) documenta-
tion of the source and application of funds.5
5 Some of Japan’s larger urban wastewater utilities adopt the corporate financing 
system under the Public Enterprise Law; others adopt the governmental financial 
system. Except for a few (1% of total) very small ones, water utilities employ the 
corporate financing system.
Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience  N  139
The WSS utilities generate healthy operating surpluses. The working 
ratio is the relationship of operating expenses to operating revenues. 
Japan’s national average working ratio of water and sewerage utilities 
ranges between 0.4 and 0.6. The higher the ratio, the less contribution 
margin is available to cover nonoperating costs, such as depreciation 
and financial charges. The working ratio is one of the important indica-
tors of operational efficiency and the profitability of utilities. Table 8.3 
Table 8.4  Average User Tariff (US$/m3)
Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka Japan average Damascus Jedda Tunisia Egypt
2.9 2.7 2.5 3.6 2.5 0.08 0.01 0.7 0.9
      Campinas Guanajuato  
London Brussels Istanbul Johannesburg Singapore Philadelphia Brazil Mexico
3.2 2.8 1.8 0.7 1.3 1.9 0.3 0.4
Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan); Tunisia, London, Berlin, Brussels, 
Damascus, and Jedda (counry reports); Singapore (estimate by the PUB website tariff table); Other Countries (Water Supply and Sanitation Working 
Notes No. 9, May 2006).
Notes: The average tariff of Singapore is estimated on the tariff structure on the PUB website. The tariffs of Japanese water and wastewater are combined 
for international comparison with some assumptions. 
Table 8.3  Japan’s and International Water and Sewerage Utilities Working Ratios
    Japan      Campinas Guanajuato 
Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka average Singapore Philadelphia Tunisia Johannesburg Brazil Mexico
0.54 0.56 0.46 0.43 0.51 0.58 0.67 0.98 0.53 (water)  0.79 0.77 
        1.5 (sewage)
Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan), UK data on OFWAT annual report 
(2005), Tunisia (Country Report), Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes No. 9, May 2006.
Note: The working ratio of the Japanese water and wastewater utilties are combined for international comparison with some assumptions.
compares the combined working ratio of water and sewerage utilities 
of Japanese and international cases. 
Even though they cover operating and nonoperating costs, tariffs 
are affordable to households and compare well with those of other 
high-income countries. When measured against one HH’s total ex-
penditures, the combined water and sewage tariffs of US$2.50 per 
cubic meter (m3) account for approximately 1 percent of the average 
HH income. This figure compares with approximately 3 percent and 
2 percent for electricity and gas bills, respectively. Table 8.4 compares 
the combined water and sewage tariff between the Japanese and 
international cases. 
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Utilities do not have the authority to raise tariffs without approval 
from municipal councils. However, they can put forward proposals 
for tariff increases based on their overall revenue requirements. As in 
other countries, the decision to raise tariffs sometimes gets delayed 
or even reversed due to political considerations. Nevertheless, most 
utilities have been able to achieve financial balance through periodic 
tariff increases (every 3–4 years). Furthermore, Japan’s negative infla-
tion rate—which changed from –0.9 percent in 2003 to –0.3 percent 
in 2006—also meant that, even in situations in which tariffs did not 
increase, the overall financial performance of water and sewerage 
utilities did not significantly deteriorate. 
Keeping Unaccounted-for Water Very Low in Both Water  
and Sewerage Utilities 
Water utilities and unaccounted-for water 
Almost a ll  water supply uti l it ies have achieved very low 
unaccounted-for water (UFW). The national UFW average is 8.5 
percent. The most competent utilities, such as Tokyo and Fukuoka, 
have attained approximately 5 percent. This low percentage of UFW 
is highly significant compared to losses in the range of 15 percent–40 
percent for water utilities in many countries globally, including devel-
oped countries. Table 8.5 compares water utilities’ UFW in Japan 
and other countries. 
Table 8.5  Unaccounted-for Water (%)
    Japan     Shiraz  Campinas Guanajuato  
Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka average Singapore UK Philadelphia Tunisia Iran Johannesburg Brazil Mexico
5.8 9.1 13.9 5.1 8.5 4.8 15.0 32.0 20.2 35.0 35.0 26.0 37.0
Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan); UK data from OFWAT Annual Report 
(2005); Iran (county report); Other Countries (Water Supply and Sanitation Working Notes No. 9, May 2006).
Procedures are in place to minimize physical losses. Water utilities 
generally repair surface leakage on the same day that a problem is de-
tected on a 24-hour operational basis. They regularly detect potential 
underground leakage by electronic and correlation-type detectors. They 
also have been upgrading distribution pipes from cast iron to ductile 
iron, and service pipes from lead to stainless steel. 
Thanks to Japan’s high operational standards and customer service, 
most water utilities maintain their administrative UFW at almost nil. In 
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2006 the nationwide average was 1.5 percent. If required, the utilities 
easily can exert their authority to cut off water supply to defaulters. 
However, disconnection is very rarely required, because customers pay 
their bills. Defaulting customers are automatically disconnected.
The Tokyo Metropolitan Water Bureau is perhaps one of the best-run 
utilities in the world. UFW stands at approximately 5.8 percent with 
100 percent coverage of a population of approximately 12 million. The 
average daily water supply volume is approximately 4.4 million m3, and 
the total length of distribution pipes is 24,782 kilometers (km). 
Sewerage utilities and unaccounted-for water
All sewerage utilities/departments measure the amount of treated 
wastewater and compare it to the amount of sewerage for which 
treatment fees are collected. They calculate the UFW using a con-
cept similar to that used for water supply. No collected wastewater is 
discharged without treatment. The national average UFW is 17 percent 
and 12 percent, respectively, for enterprise utilities and nonenterprise 
utilities. Tokyo’s UFW is approximately 9 percent, whereas Sapporo’s 
is close to 30 percent. The higher UFW of the latter may be attributed 
to underground water leakage into sewer networks or erroneous con-
nection of rain sewers to sewage sewers. Very few other countries 
conduct this level of UFW measurement in sewerage systems. 
Clarity in Accounting for Recurrent and Capital Costs  
Water supply services
Water supply utilities’ accounting systems are a powerful management 
tool. Table 8.6 breaks down the O&M costs of several water supply 
utilities and the national total. The costs are clearly distinguished be-
tween (1) operational costs and (2) capital costs, including depreciation 
costs and bond interest costs. 
The relationship between costs and revenues is immediately ap-
parent. While Tokyo’s water tariff (approximately US$2.6 billion) fully 
covers operational costs, the tariff of the 3 other visited cities and the 
national average do not fully cover capital costs (see Cost Recovery 
section below). The balance of approximately 5 percent is covered 
by the investments and subsidies from the municipalities’ general 
accounts.
Table 8.7 shows the 2006 unit operational and capital costs of water 
production in comparison with the water tariff. The national average tariff 
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was US$1.33/m3, while the average production cost was US$1.37/m3. 
These figures show that the cost recovery ratio (including capital por-
tion) was approximately 97 percent. 
Sewerage services 
As for water supply, sewerage utilities’ accounting systems provide a 
powerful management tool, enabling the comparison of costs and rev-
enues. Table 8.8 breaks down O&M costs of several water sewerage 
Table 8.6  Income Statement of Water Supply Utilities, March 31, 2006 (US$ mil.)
Cities Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka National total
Personnel expenses 385 66 76 29 4,158
Energy expenses 77 3 6 4 871
Repair expenses 510 43 19 17 1,686
Chemicals/materials  66 14 10 3 519
Outsource fee 238 40 9 40 1,735
Bulk water purchase 0 0 0 19 1,415
Others 377 31 17 19 2,060
Operation costs 1,655 199 139 131 12,444
Bond 195 67 52 47 3,759
Depreciation costs 609 97 81 73 7,261
Capital costs for bulk water  0 0 0 42 2,440
Capital costs 804 164 133 163 13,460
Total 2,458 363 272 294 25,904
Water tariff 2,641 346 254 283 24,987
General & other accounts 213 28 19 6 1,357
Miscellaneous 93 5 1 20 1,347
Total 2,947 378 275 310 27,691
Surplus/deficit 489 16 3 15 1,788
Note: The exchange rate was US$ = JPY115 during the August 2007 mission.   
Table 8.7  Water Cost Recovery: Unit Production Cost and Tariff, March 31, 2007 (US$ per m3)
Cities Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka Japan Average
Unit production costs 1.62  2.00  1.47  2.09  1.37
    Unit operation costs 1.09  1.09  0.75  0.93  0.65
    Unit capital costs  0.53  0.90  0.72  1.16  0.72
Unit average tariff 1.74  1.90  1.37  2.01  1.33
Notes: US$ = JPY 115 in August 2007.
Unit production costs = Unit operation costs + unit capital costs (depreciation and bond interests).
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utilities. For sewerage utilities that adopted the corporate financing 
system under the Local Public Enterprise Law, costs are clearly dis-
tinguished between (1) running costs and (2) capital costs, including 
depreciation costs and bond interest costs.
The management accounting framework makes it possible for cost-
sharing schemes to be established for wastewater-and-stormwater-
combined operations. While the wastewater collection and treatment 
portion is fully covered by the sewage tariff, the stormwater portion 
is covered by the municipal general budget. The sewage tariff covers 
on average 53 percent of sewerage running and capital costs at the 
national level. An additional 35 percent of the budget is supplemented 
by the local government general accounts. 
Table 8.9 breaks down sources of investment funds for four major 
utilities and the national total in Japan’s FY05 budget. The national 
average bond share was 48 percent, which was higher than that for 
water supply. The national average subsidy share was 38 percent for 
Table 8.8  Income Statement of Sewerage Utilities, March 31, 2006 (US$ mil.)
 Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka National enterprise total
Personnel expenses 248a 41 50 13 1,058
Energy expenses 90 13 11 9 348
Repair expenses 211 14 6 9 481
Chemicals/materials  13 7 4 4 120
Outsource fee 238 56 36 65 1,058
Others 116 9 22 32 755
Total operation costs 915 140 129 131 3,821
Bond interests 700 104 158 150 3,697
Depreciation costs 989 137 163 140 4,250
Total capital costs 1,690 241 320 290 7,947
Grant total costs 2,604 381 450 420 11,768
Sewerage service tariff 1,487 176 230 233 6,280
Rain storm discharge feeb 1,215 187 177 148 4,073
Other operation revenue 57 2 7 6 209
General accounts subsidy  59 12 41 31 1,504
Miscellaneous 20 1 1 2 119
Total revenue 2,837 378 456 420 12,185
Surplus/deficit 233 –3 6 0 417
Notes: US$ = JPY115 in August 2006.
a  Tokyo figures refer to 23 wards only. 
b Rain storm discharge fee is paid by cities’ general accounts.
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sewerage—also much higher than that for water supply. The balance 
was covered by the municipal general account. The reliance on bonds 
and subsidies was a result of the delayed development of the sewerage 
systems. 
Table 8.10 shows unit sewerage running costs and capital costs, as 
compared with the sewage tariff. Table 8.10 deals only with wastewater 
collection and treatment costs, since stormwater discharge costs are 
fully covered by the municipal general account. 
Table 8.9  Construction and Improvement Budget Sources of Sewerage Works, March 31, 2006 (US$ mil.)
      National Enterprise Nonenterprise  
 Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka total national total national total
Enterprise bonds 478a 106 106 139 9,950b 3,000 6,950
National subsidies 314 62 63 79 7,944 1,992 5,953
Other works/beneficiaries share 68 11 5 4 1,344 266 1,078
General accounts support  
    and other revenue 317 6 11 21 2,205 894 1,310
Total investment budget 1,177 185 185 243 21,443 6,152 15,291
Notes: US$ = JPY115 in August 2007.
a Tokyo figures refer to 23 wards only.
b National total is the sum of (a) enterprise national total and (b) nonenterprise national total.
Table 8.10  Wastewater Cost Recover: Unit Operation Cost and Tariff (US$/m3)
 Tokyo     Enterprise Nonenterprise  
Unit costs 23 wards Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka Shiga national average national average
Unit production costs 1.02 0.81 1.00 1.76 3.33 1.29 2.42
    Unit operation costs 0.49 0.44 0.40 0.60 1.19 0.49 0.76
    Unit capital costs  0.54 0.37 0.61 1.15 2.14 0.80 1.66
Unit average tariff 1.20 0.84 1.14 1.58 1.92 1.17 1.13
Notes: US$ = JPY 115 in August 2007.
Unit production costs = Unit operation costs + unit capital costs (depreciation costs and bond interests).
The sewage tariff ranges between US$0.8/m3–1.9/m3. The national 
average total cost is approximately US$1.3/m3 for enterprise utilities and 
US$2.4/m3 for nonenterprise utilities. Based on these, the national aver-
age cost recovery rate (including capital costs) is 91 percent for enterprise 
utilities and 47 percent for nonenterprise utilities. Recurrent costs are fully 
covered by all utilities. The working ratios are 0.42 and 0.67, respectively, 
for enterprise and nonenterprise utilities. In general, large cities, such as 
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Tokyo, can recover all costs, including the capital portion, through the 
sewage tariff. In contrast, in rural areas, such as Shiga, and many other 
nonenterprise areas, it is not easy to collect an adequate level of sewage 
tariff to fully meet costs. Their unit costs, particularly capital costs, are 
much higher than those of urban areas. The difference reflects the fact 
that these rural utilities developed their systems in much more scattered 
areas with smaller economies of scale and, in recent years, without a 
historically developed infrastructure stock.
The sewage tariff is generally set lower than the water tariff, 
despite the fact that sewerage system development costs are higher 
than those of water supply systems. This differential reflects the pub-
lic’s willingness to pay. People are more willing to pay a higher tariff for 
drinking water than for wastewater. In these circumstances, some rural 
sewerage utilities become very dependent on funds from the municipal 
general account. This dependency is negatively affecting municipalities’ 
financial status and their ability to provide other public services.
Making Available Several Investment-Financing Options for Water 
and Sewerage Utilities 
Most water supply and sewerage utilities mobilize external funds in 
addition to internal funds. Three major external financing sources are 
available. 
Bonds
Utilities issue bonds with the authorization of and backed by municipal 
governments. Some wealthy municipalities’ financial standing is very 
good. The Tokyo Metropolitan Office’s credit rating is AAA. Although 
utilities do not issue bonds on their own credentials, some strong utili-
ties would be able to secure funds on their own financial credentials 
if allowed to do so. 
National subsidy
The national ministries subsidize investment for large-scale infrastruc-
ture. For waterworks, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
subsidizes up to one-third of investment costs for large-scale systems 
development and renovation as well as to introduce advanced treat-
ment systems. For sewerage works, the Ministry of Land, Infrastruc-
ture and Transportation subsidizes 55 percent of the construction of 
treatment plants and 50 percent of pipe-networks development. For 
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integrated basin-level sewerage systems, which collect sewage from 
more than 2 municipalities, the subsidy rate increases to 60 percent 
of the construction of treatment plants. As noted earlier, the total 
allocated amount of national subsidies is much higher for sewerage 
systems than for water supply systems. 
National tax allocation to local governments
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication allocates block 
grants from national taxes to local governments. This national tax 
allocation to local governments is designed to ensure the national 
minimum standards of public services, particularly for smaller rural 
municipalities that have few other sources of revenue. Among the 
many parameters of the allocation criteria, the value of municipality 
bonds issued for infrastructure development, including water and 
wastewater systems, is taken into account. The grant is not allocated 
directly to water and sewerage utilities’ accounts but to the general 
accounts of local governments. Nonetheless, the grant works as an 
incentive for local governments to issue bonds for infrastructure 
development. 
Good Sector Governance and Accountability Mechanisms 
Japanese water utilities have established accountability mechanisms 
that combine the merits of both private and public entities: (1) the 
high economic efficiency and financial autonomy of the private sec-
tor and (2) the oversight functions of the public sector. Most utilities 
in Japan set well-defined targets for key performance indicators. For 
water utilities, they typically include total revenue, water production, 
drinking-water quality, customer service, financial performance, water 
consumption, and new connections. Water supply utility commission-
ers are accountable to the municipal councils for achieving the targets. 
The directors general of sewerage utilities/departments report to the 
heads of municipalities, such as mayors. 
Japan has a strong tradition of utilities being accountable to local 
elected officials and of transparent information-sharing. The munici-
pal councils or mayors are kept informed of the utility’s operations by 
the commissioner or director general and review its annual/quarterly 
operational reports. However, they do not interfere in the daily opera-
tions. Most municipalities have established strong reporting frameworks, 
including financial audits and annual and periodic performance status 
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reports. All of these reports are incorporated in the annual reports and 
are made available at public offices and on websites. 
To ensure competitive prices and flexibility in purchasing, the utilities 
generally follow public procurement regulations. To enhance account-
ability, utilities are subject to technical and operational audits, not just 
financial audits, and have active internal audit departments.
Use of nationwide benchmarking to ensure accountability
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication administers the 
Local Public Enterprise Law. The ministry leads an annual standardized 
national benchmarking exercise for all water supply and wastewater utili-
ties. The benchmark database of all utilities for every year is published on 
the website of the ministry and municipalities. The benchmarking items 
total more than 100. They include service quality, financial efficiency, 
water losses, energy costs, revenue collection, financial performance, 
and other operational efficiency and performance indicators. 
The national benchmark exercise provides an opportunity for 
municipalities and utilities to monitor their own performance status 
as well as improvements across the country. The exercise thus makes 
them more accountable to their constituents because comparative 
results can be made regularly available to the public. This chapter has 
benefited from the national benchmark database in addition to the 
information collected directly from visited utility offices. 
Customer service ingrained as a key part of utility culture
Although Japan’s water supply and sewerage utilities are monopolistic 
service providers, they are very responsive to their customers. Important 
aspects of customer orientation include friendliness of the customer bill-
ing and collection system, orientation toward seeking customers’ opinions, 
timely information to customers on water service disruptions/changes, and 
response to customers’ complaints. Many utilities operate a one-stop call 
center for customers to take care of water service disruptions, reloca-
tion, new subscriptions, and payment. Some utilities open customer 
windows for extended times, for example, to 8:00 p.m. on weekdays 
as well as Saturday hours. The utilities also establish water repair 
squads to conduct emergency repair and interrupted service recovery 
within 24 hours. 
As described earlier, water utilities usually offer multiple options 
by which their customers can pay their water and sewage bills. The 
options include electronic funds transfer and payment at commercial 
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banks, postal offices, and convenience stores. Customers can make 
service requests on the utility’s website. 
Effective Management of Human Resources
Personnel management is highly meritocratic. The commissioners or 
directors general of utilities are appointed by the mayors of municipali-
ties on the basis of expertise and experience. Some are selected from 
among respected in-house career officials. Staff salary and promo-
tions are based on performance, academic credentials, and seniority 
reflecting overall experience. The third criterion provides incentives 
for staff to stay with the same utility. The average service duration of 
career staff of water and sewerage utilities is approximately 25 years. 
Staff are rotated within each organization to enable them to obtain 
wider experience. Those who display high potential are groomed for 
promotion. Staff turnover is very low and is due mostly to mandatory 
retirement. 
Staff skills and employee innovation are regarded as critical inputs to 
improve performance. Most utilities provide ample career development 
and training opportunities to their staff, which also keep turnover 
low. An extensive training plan covers professional skills development 
and corporate culture. The utilities provide various kinds of training 
programs for their staff as part of their annual performance review. 
The emphasis is on frontline staff who come into direct contact with 
customers and/or contractors. 
Innovation and knowledge-creation are important features of the 
water sector’s corporate culture. Some utilities plan technology develop-
ment projects on a pilot scale and even obtain patents for successful 
pilots. Other utilities have built their own training facilities and field 
stations. Furthermore, the government-affiliated agencies and as-
sociations, such as Japan Waterworks Association, Japan Sewerage 
Works Agency, and Japan Sewerage Association, have contributed 
studies for developing new technologies and disseminating technical 
guidelines and manuals. These publications are particularly useful for 
smaller utilities in rural areas that do not posses adequate numbers 
of technical staff.
As a result, staff productivity is high. For water supply and sewer-
age utilities combined, the average is 2 staff per 1,000 connections. 
Each utility maintains the staff level of 1 per 1,000 connections. This 
rate is much smaller than that of utility companies in other advanced 
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countries. Table 8.11 compares the water utility staff level per 1,000 
connections between Japan and other countries.
Table 8.12  Outsource Ratio of Operational Expenditures (%)
     Japan    Campinas Guanajuato  
Types Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka average Type Singapore Johannesburg Brazil Mexico
Water 14 20 7 30 14 
Combined 25 10 21 20
Wastewater 26 40 28 49 28
Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan); Water Supply and Sanitation Working 
Notes No. 9, May 2006.
Note: The Japanese average of wastewater is based on local autonomous enterprise entities by law.
Table 8.11  Number of Employees per 1,000 Connections
    Japan      Campinas Guanajuato 
Tokyo Sapporo Kyoto Fukuoka average Singapore Philadelphia Tunisia Johannesburg Brazil Mexico
1.7 1.6 2.5 1.1 1.9 2.9 4.4 8.0 4.7 4.1 8.0
Sources: Local Public Enterprise Database (March 2006, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan); Tunisia (Country Report); Other Countries 
(Water Supply & Sanitation Working Notes No.9, May 2006).
Note: The number of Japanese water and wastewater utilities staff are combined for international comparison. The household connections are counted 
as 1 for both water supply and sanitation although they can physically counted as 2, i.e., one for water supply and another for wastewater. The number 
of outsouced workers are not included as the number of regular staff for the Japanese utilities.
Use of Outsourcing Wherever Possible 
While most utilities keep core business functions in-house, they have 
engaged private contractors whenever necessary. Typically, outsourcing 
takes place for (1) routine O&M of treatment plants and network pipes, 
(2) checking and executing repair works, (3) engineering design and con-
struction supervision, (4) information and telecommunication technology 
services, and (5) metering and billing. The average outsourcing ratio for 
water supply utilities is approximately 15 percent; that of sewerage utili-
ties is approximately 30 percent. The utilities gradually are increasing 
the outsource percentage through natural attrition of in-house career 
staff. Table 8.12 compares the outsourcing percentage of operational 
expenditures between the Japanese and international cases.
The 1999 Private Finance Initiative Law encouraged public and 
semipublic entities to test private sector participation. Several utilities 
have begun trials of privatization and market testing. Some utilities 
are piloting innovative large-scale privatization schemes to build and 
operate specialized facilities, such as cogeneration power plants and 
sludge treatment and recycling plants. However, private funding of 
major investments remains the exception.
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Other semipublic supporting agencies and associations
Some semi-public agencies support utilities. Based on prefectural or 
municipal utilities’ requests, the Japan Sewerage Works Agency provides 
technical support for construction, maintenance, and management of 
main facilities, such as wastewater treatment plants and pumping stations. 
The agency also conducts experiments, research, and training sessions. 
These activities are particularly important for small municipalities, as 
they do not have enough staff with the requisite management and 
technical skills. 
The Japan Waterworks Association and the Japan Sewerage Works 
Association carry out surveys and research related to water and sew-
erage systems. They also help raise public awareness and disseminate 
information. In particular, the Japan Waterworks Association serves as 
the think-tank for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 
and municipalities by preparing technical design manuals and guidelines, 
and organizing technical conferences and workshops. 
Focus on Total Water Quality Management
Japan’s combination of central government regulation and corporate gov-
ernance ensures attention to quality in all aspects of water management.
Drinking water quality management
Tap water is safe to drink anywhere in Japan. To maintain strict drinking 
quality standards, water utilities prepare and execute water quality 
examination plans. Each plan specifies the parameters to be analyzed 
and the frequency of analysis. The analyzed results are disclosed in the 
utility’s annual report and/or regularly posted on the internet.
Water utilities in some areas adopt advanced water treatment 
methods, such as ozone treatment and biologically activated carbon-
absorbing treatment, to eliminate odor, trihalomethane precursor, and 
other particulates that cannot be sufficiently removed by conventional 
treatment processes such as rapid sand filtration. Water utilities have 
installed automatic quality-monitoring devices at various points in wa-
ter supply areas to continuously monitor residual chlorine. In addition, 
regular water quality analysis is conducted at rivers and reservoirs. 
Water distribution optimization and leak detection 
Most utilities have developed extensive water distribution pipe net-
works. The water supply system is monitored around the clock at the 
Accountable Water and Sanitation Governance: Japan’s Experience  N  151
operations center to adjust to changing water demands. The utilities 
use operations systems, such as water distribution planning support 
systems, and dam inflow simulation and reservoir operation optimiza-
tion systems.
Water utilities typically develop water supply operational plans 
that consist of a (1) water intake plan, (2) water main networks op-
eration plan, and (3) pumps operation plan. The utilities also have 
developed water demand forecast programs with parameters such 
as weather conditions, time, day of the week, and holidays. These 
plans apply to both ordinary days and emergencies, accidents, and 
drought periods. 
Some advanced utilities, such those as Fukuoka and Tokyo, have 
developed more advanced water distribution systems to regulate 
pressure and flow in distribution pipes. Such regulation promotes the 
effective use of water and minimizes water leaks. This system uses 
pressure gauges and flow meters that have been installed throughout the 
city. These measuring devices enable the Water Distribution Control 
Center to monitor conditions within the pipes on a 24-hour basis via 
telephone lines. Based on the information obtained from the gauges 
and meters, the motorized valves can be opened and closed remotely 
to regulate water pressure and flow. The system can automatically 
detect pipe bursts by checking the rate of flow and pressure changes 
and their correlation. If the abnormality continues above set thresholds, 
the system warns the operations center and site offices. 
Seismic design and preparedness
Japan is prone to earthquakes. Water utilities have taken various mea-
sures to ensure the best possible water supply for citizens immediately 
after earthquakes. Utilities have set high antiseismic design criteria for 
physical infrastructure and established emergency operation systems. 
They also have built auxiliary power plants and emergency water supply 
basins and tanks to secure water supply during emergencies. 
Wastewater treatment standards
The water quality of discharged effluent from sewerage treatment 
plants is regulated by the Sewerage Law. Among many parameters, 
the limit for the BOD of effluents is set at 20 mg/l. For most sewer-
age treatment plants, the BOD of treated effluents outflow is below 
5 mg/l—much lower than the regulatory limits. The BOD of inflowing 
raw effluents typically ranges between 100 mg–200 mg/liter. 
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Basin-wide water quality control plan
The Water Pollution Control Law requires local governments to set 
environmental quality standards for each control point of rivers and 
lakes to meet the water quality requirements for the environment and 
human health. A comprehensive basin-wide water quality manage-
ment approach is employed to reduce pollution and meet the required 
water quality level. Based on the required amount of pollution load 
reduction, local prefectural governments prepare a Comprehensive 
Basin-wide Sewerage System Development Plan. This plan specifies 
the basic parameters of sewerage collection and treatment systems in 
the basin. Sewerage utilities and environment departments coordinate 
closely to prepare the plan and monitor water quality. 
Industrial pollution control
The Sewerage Law also stipulates water quality standards for effluents 
discharged by specified industrial factories/plants into sewerage treat-
ment plants. In most cases, the maximum values of BOD and suspended 
solid (SS) are set at 600 mg/l, and heavy metals are strictly controlled. 
The specified factories and other commercial facilities, such as hotels, 
livestock farms, and cleaning businesses, are required to install onsite 
pollution control facilities to meet the quality standards. 
The Sewerage Law and the Water Pollution Control Law require local 
governments to conduct onsite inspections and compliance monitoring 
without notice and, if required, to provide administrative guidance and 
improvement orders. The owners could face imprisonment of up to 6 
months and/or be fined up to $2,500 if they do not follow the improve-
ment orders, such as installation of pollution treatment facilities at the 
plant. As noted earlier, local governments provide grant subsidies and 
interest-free loans to the owners 
to install required pollution control 
facilities/equipment.
One of the most important 
factors in reducing industrial 
pollution loads is to significantly 
increase the internal water recy-
cling of plants and factories. Dur-
ing the past 40 years, the average 
internal water recycling rate 
increased from approximately 
20 percent to 80 percent (figure 
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8.3). From the 1960s through the 1980s, Japan’s rivers and lakes were 
heavily polluted by rapid economic development. Over the past 20 
years, however, water quality has been significantly improved thanks 
to the increase in industrial water recycling and the rapid development 
of sewerage management systems. 
Treated wastewater recycling
The direct recycling rate of sewage effluent is very low (approximately 
1.4 percent), except for toilet-flushing water and environmental flow 
augmentation in small rivers and canals in some urban districts. How-
ever, in most urban areas, indirect recycling through river systems is 
quite common. Treated sewage effluent discharged to rivers is quite 
important for augmenting river environmental flows and thus for 
maintaining the ecology and scenic environment of rivers. Treated 
effluent is also important for supplying water to downstream water 
users. Historically, many cities and towns have been developed along 
rivers and rely on the natural water recycling system between the 
upstream and downstream of rivers. In some urban rivers, more than 
50 percent of river water flow originates from treated effluents from 
sewerage treatment plants upstream.
Sludge treatment
Most sludge from treatment plants is dehydrated and incinerated to 
ashes, reducing the volume to approximately 1/40–1/50 of the original. 
In 2003, on average nationally, sludge was used for (1) landfill after 
incineration (approximately 40 percent), (2) construction materials 
after melting of incinerated ashes to sludge (approximately 40 percent), 
and (3) farmland improvement materials after dehydration of sludge. 
These operations are subsidized by government for environmental 
reasons.
Stormwater discharge
One of the important roles of a sewerage system is to prevent floods. A 
comprehensive flood-prevention master plan is prepared to define the 
required flood runoff and storage capacity. In some flood-prone areas, 
underground stormwater storage pipes and reservoirs are constructed 
under roads. Shield tunneling is used to build large tunnels and storm-
water pipes. Permeable road pavements, onsite storage, and retarding 
ponds at schools and parks also are constructed to reduce flood peak 
volume. Technical coordination is established for urban flood control 
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between sewerage utilities and river administrators to ensure the proper 
operation of drainage pumps and other flood control facilities. 
The operations of treatment plants and pumping stations are based 
on information from rainfall radar and telemetry water-monitoring 
systems. Citizens can access the same information on the utilities’ 
websites.
By March 2005, of a total of 1,896 systems, Japan had 23 combined 
wastewater/stormwater systems and 1,873 separate systems. Combined 
systems sometimes allow untreated wastewater to be discharged to 
public water bodies during flood periods. They therefore need to be 
upgraded to reduce heavy pollution loads from the first flush of flood 
water by building flood-storage facilities. 
Electronic sewer registration database
Some advanced utilities have established computerized asset manage-
ment systems. Tokyo Sewerage Utility has developed an electronic 
sewer mapping system at 1/500 scale indicating all sewer locations, 
depths, diameters, and types. All users can access this information on 
the Internet. This online data is useful in coordinating with other under-
ground utility lines and assisting contractors’ designs and scheduling 
Water resource management
Effective coordination among institutions underpins the success of Japan’s 
water resource management.
Despite the country’s high rainfall, water resource management 
is an important challenge in Japan. Some Japanese regions are faced 
with water scarcity due to high population density. For example, the 
renewable water resource of the Kanto area, which includes the Tokyo 
metropolitan area, is only 905 m3 per year per capita, which is equivalent 
to that of Egypt. In the early 1960s, Tokyo faced chronic water short-
ages and had to cut approximately 45 percent of water supply to up 
to nearly 1 million households. During the scarcity, people used to call 
the city the “Tokyo Desert.” Moreover, because of steep terrain/river 
bed slope and a high fluctuation of rainfall among different seasons, 
river flows and water resources are difficult to regulate and manage 
without storage dams in the upstream reaches of rivers. 
Dams thus have played an increasing role in ensuring Japan’s water sup-
ply. The share of water resources from dams increased from 19 percent 
in 1970 to 45 percent in 2005. In 2005 the number of dams with a height 
of more than 15 meters was 2,897, of which 627 were dams whose 
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functions included storing water for drinking. Other dams were used for 
flood control, irrigation water supply, and hydropower generation.
River Management: Water Rights and Discharge Permits 
The River Bureau of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Trans-
portation plays a pivotal role in water resource management. The River 
Law covers (1) flood control, (2) water use, and (3) water environment. 
The River Law designates the ministry’s regional river bureaus and river 
management offices as “river administrators.”6 The law requires them 
to issue water rights and discharge permits based on the current and 
future water balance of river basins. The river administrators also are 
responsible for issuing permits for the installment/construction of any 
hydraulic structures and land use in rivers. 
Comprehensive water resources development
The Specified Multipurpose Dams Law and Water Resources Develop-
ment Promotion Law were legislated in 1957 and 1961, respectively. The 
former law stipulates the procedure for the execution of multipurpose 
dam projects, including cost allocation among participating parties. The 
latter law requires the preparation of comprehensive water resources 
development master plans for 5 (then 6) major basins, including Tokyo, 
Kyoto/Osaka, Nagoya, and Fukuoka. In 1962 it also established the 
Public Water Resources Development Corporation to execute major 
multipurpose dam projects in the designated basins. In 1973 the Dam 
Reservoir Resettlement Area Special Measures Act was enacted to 
provide stronger financial and technical support for the residents in 
upper watersheds who were to be relocated due to dam reservoir 
inundation. 
Conclusions and Lessons
Japan has achieved the highest standards of water and sanitation service 
through a combination of sound institutional regulations, a strong work 
ethic, and the use of technology. From the evidence presented, the 
6 The River Law was enacted in 1896 with an emphasis on flood control. It was 
amended in 1964 to fully address water use and allocation, and again in 1997 to 
address the environmental aspects of rivers. The 1997 amendment requires river 
administrators to establish multistakeholder river councils and, through the council 
meetings and public hearings, to develop basin management plans for all rivers. 
156  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
reader can observe that the performance of Japan’s utilities benchmark 
with the best in the world. 
Does Japan’s experience provide any lessons for the MNA region’s 
utilities? There are clearly many factors that are different, notably, the 
homogeneous nature of Japanese society, the availability of adequate 
public financing in this second-largest economy in the world, and a 
unique work ethic. 
Nevertheless, several lessons could be relevant to MNA in the 
sense that water supply and sanitation policies have combined sound 
principles of public finance with local political and cultural institutions. 
To summarize, these lessons are:
Clarity in roles and responsibilities, which leads to a very high 1. 
degree of external and internal accountability (chapter 2 of this 
volume). 
Clear distinction between the public good and private good aspect, 2. 
so that the financing burden is shared among the national govern-
ment, local governments, and users. 
Use of standard technical and financial indicators of utility per-3. 
formance that creates “peer pressure” among utilities to improve 
their performance. 
Completely nonideological use of public-private partnerships 4. 
through outsourcing contracts. 
Last but not least, maintaining excellent links between the service 5. 
provision aspect and the resource management aspect through an 
integrated planning process that fully respects the ABCDE principles 
described in the Introduction to this volume. 
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Tunisia’s Experience in Water 
Resource Mobilization 
and Management
Mohamed El Hedi Louati and Julia Bucknall 
Introduction 
Water is scarce, and its availability is also highly variable. In addition 
to its long history of earthquakes, hailstorms, and plagues of locusts, 
Tunisia has always suffered from droughts and floods. They are hard to 
predict as they do not follow any clear cyclical pattern. For more than 
a century (1640–1758), Tunisia had no droughts, whereas in modern 
times, it has had approximately 30. Over the centuries, the successive 
civilizations who have lived in Tunisia have developed management 
systems to cope with the risks of floods and droughts. They were not 
always successful. A series of severe droughts in the area that is now 
Tunisia lasted for approximately a decade from 870 CE. By the end 
of these droughts, the local administrator wrote that prices of wheat 
had increased steeply; and food had become so scarce that people had 
resorted to cannibalism (Talbit 1985, 112). 
Managing this scarce and variable water supply is critical for Tunisia’s 
development. The country engages in extensive political debate and 
strategizing, and the government has invested heavily in measuring, 
mobilizing, and managing resources. This chapter highlights Tunisia’s 
progress in managing water, showing the evolution from traditional 
practices to large government-led investments to store and transfer 
water (which could be characterized as “physical engineering”). The 
latter led to a third stage, beginning around the turn of the millennium, 
which continues physical investment but increases the emphasis on 
water management (and therefore could be characterized as “insti-
tutional engineering”). Many aspects of Tunisia’s experience could be 
158  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
improved, but, on the whole, this chapter suggests that Tunisia is an 
example of good planning and management. 
Availability of Water Resources
Tunisia is one of the countries in the Mediterranean basin least well-
endowed with water resources. The potential volume of available water, 
4,836 Mm3 per year, is less than 500 m3 per inhabitant per year. This 
ratio will decline to 360 m3 by 2030, when the population will have 
grown to approximately 13 million. 
To manage variable supplies, Tunisia balances surface and ground-
water stocks and flows within and between years. It uses dams and 
groundwater reserves to store surplus water in wet years and uses 
these stocks in dry years. 
It also must distribute the water between different parts of the 
country. Maintaining a regional balance has been and will remain an 
essential element in Tunisia’s water supply planning and management. 
The population is concentrated along the coasts, where cities, industry, 
and tourism are well developed. Agriculture is the largest water user 
and is located throughout the country except in the southern desert. 
However, the country’s water supplies come mainly from the north 
and the interior of the country. Water transfers, therefore, have been 
a salient feature of Tunisia’s long history from the Roman aqueduct at 
Zaghouan (built in 72 AD) to the modern-day Mejerda-Cap Bon Canal 
(1982), whose distribution networks go all the way to Sfax. 
On a national scale, water resources are distributed unequally. 
Table 9.1 illustrates the geographic distribution of different categories 
of water in Tunisia. Eighty-one percent of the country’s resources 
are in the north, 11 percent in the center, and only 8 percent in the 
south. 
Table 9.1  Spatial Distribution of Water Resources in Tunisia (Mm3/yr)
Far North North Center South Country total
Supply of surface water (Mm3/yr) 960 1230 320 190 2700
Groundwater (Mm3/yr) 395 216 108 719
Deep groundwater (Mm3/yr) 269 326 822 1417
Total potential resource (Mm3/yr) 2854 862 1120 4836
% 59 18 23 100
Source: DGRE 1995.
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Tunisia shares international surface water in the form of some riv-
ers along the western border with Algeria. The two countries have 
reached agreements on how to mobilize and use this water, including 
agreeing the annual volume available in the relevant basins and how 
to distribute it between the two countries. These countries also have 
established a monitoring system, which enables both countries to track 
pollution as well as water volumes for the main international river, the 
Mejerda. 
In addition, the country has a considerable volume of international 
groundwater, located in the 
Djeffara coastal basin shared 
between Libya and Tunisia and, 
most importantly, in the North-
west Saharan Aquifer System, 
shared between Algeria, Libya, 
and Tunisia. The latter has more 
than one Mkm3 of water with 
very limited recharge, of which 
some 80,000 km3 are in Tunisia. 
Three countries have estab-
lished a commission to monitor 
this aquifer and have agreed to 
cooperate on its management to 
minimize cross-border impacts. 
This is 1 of only 2 such agreements in the world. Tunisia uses water from 
this aquifer to irrigate greenhouse vegetables and dates (figure 9.1). 
Tunisia’s water policy aims to contribute to sustainable socioeco-
nomic development while balancing two conflicting facts:
Limited water supplies and increasing cost to generate or store and 1. 
transfer additional resources 
Growing demand for water. 2. 
The variability in water availability between years is huge. Dur-
ing the past few decades, the maximum potential volume of surface 
water was 11 billion m3 in 1969–70, and the minimum was 780 Mm3 in 
1993–94. Variability is high everywhere but much higher in the South. 
In the North, the wettest year was nine times wetter than the driest 
year. In the South, 180 times more water was available in the wettest 
year than in the driest.
Figure 9.1  Cooling Tower Bringing Geothermal Water from the 
Sahara Down to a Temperature Usable in Irrigation 
Photo: Julia Bucknall.
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This highly irregular supply affects the country in the form of floods 
and shortages of varying seriousness. However, the infrastructure 
available in recent decades has enabled Tunisia to store and transfer 
water, thus reducing the impacts of both flood and drought.
As monitoring has improved, and particularly as hydrogeologists 
have discovered larger volumes of groundwater available, the estimates 
of the amount of water potentially available in Tunisia grew substantially 
between 1968 and 2007 (table 9.2). 
Despite the increase in known resources, estimated water availability 
per capita is declining (table 9.3). For groundwater, the calculation of 
water available refers to the maximum volume of water that can be 
extracted annually from the country’s groundwater resources under 
prevailing technical and economic conditions without leading to the 
long-term exhaustion of the underground resource base. For surface 
water resources, the calculation takes into account resources available 
for annual extraction in 95 percent of years.
Tunisia has water quality problems in addition. Less than half of the 
country’s resources have less than 1.5 g/l of salt and therefore meet 
health and agronomic standards. Of this water with reasonable salinity 
Table 9.2  Tunisia: Estimates of Potential Water Supplies, 1968–2007 (Mm3/yr)
1968 1972 1980 1985 1990 1996 2000 2005 2007
Surface water 2000 2000 2580 2630 2700 2700 2700 2700 2700
Groundwater 160 230 490 590 670 720 737 745 745
Deep groundwater 600 900 1030 1100 1170 1250 1399 1419 1419
Total 2760 3130 4100 4320 4540 4670 4836 4864 4864
Sources: DGRE-MARH.
Table 9.3  Tunisia: Change in Estimated Per Capita Long-term Water Availability, 1995–2005 (Mm3/yr) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Surface water (Mm3/yr) 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2200
Groundwater (Mm3/yr) 720 720 720 720 720 737 737 737 737 737 745
Deep groundwater (Mm3/yr) 1211 1217 1217 1225 1377 1399 1403 1403 1397 1411 1420
Total resources (Mm3/yr) 4031 4037 4037 4045 4197 4236 4240 4240 4234 4248 4365
Population (mil.) 8.957 9.089 9.215 9.333 9.456 9.563 9.65 9.75 9.84 9.93 10.03
Availability by inhabitant  
(m3/inhabitant/year )
450 444 438 433 444 443 439 435 430 428 435
Source: INS and MARH.
Tunisia’s Experience in Water Resource Mobilization and Management  N  161
levels, 72 percent is surface water, 20 percent deep groundwater, and 
scarcely 8 percent groundwater (tables 9.4 and 9.5). Surface water 
thus is used both for direct consumption and to improve the quality 
of other categories of water.
As difficult as it is to manage Tunisia’s water resources now, the 
job will only get harder in the future. Studies show that Tunisia can 
expect an increase in average annual temperature (2 degrees C on av-
erage), a modest fall in average precipitation (approximately 5 percent 
by 2030), and increased variability.1 In particular, extreme phenomena 
(droughts, floods, and strong winds) will increase in both frequency 
and intensity, with very dry years likely to occur more often. These 
changes will have serious consequences for water resources, ecosys-
tems, and agriculture; for urban dwellers; and therefore for the entire 
economy and society.
Investments to Store and Transfer Water in Tunisia 
For the past three decades, Tunisia’s water resource management policy 
has been based on mobilizing water resources. Thematic strategies 
Table 9.4  Breakdown of Salinity of Water Resources (%)
Salinity<1,5g/l 1,5<Salinity>3g/l Salinity>3g/l Total
Surface water 72 22 6 100
Groundwater 8 32 60 100
Deep groundwater 20 57 23 100
Total 47 34 19 100
Source: Mamou 1993.
Table 9.5  Breakdown of Water Resources Regarding Salinity in Relation to Total Potential Resources (Mm3)
Salinity<1,5g/l 1,5<Salinity>3g/l Salinity>3g/l Total
Surface water 1944 594 162 2700
Groundwater 58 230 431 719
Deep groundwater 283 808 326 1417
Total 2285 1632 919 4836
% 47 34 19 100
Source: Mamou 1993.
1 MInistry of Agriculture and Water Resources 2006.
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have been drawn up for agricultural water, rural and urban drinking 
water, urban sanitation, and the reuse of treated wastewater for ag-
ricultural purposes. 
The Tunisian Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources 
(MARH) has developed a model to help operate the country’s water 
systems and manage the risks associated with both droughts and 
floods. It compares available resources with expected needs under 
various planning scenarios including estimates of when different major 
infrastructure investments will begin operation. This model simulates 
all foreseeable demands to enable the government to ensure that needs 
are met and to plan infrastructure needs well in advance. The tools 
used to create the simulations are constantly updated and enhanced 
to account for variables related to demand levels, the performance of 
modern technology, and perverse effects of reality. 
The MARH’s model consists of a number of separate information 
systems: 
The first is the Optimal Water Resource Management model (known 
by its French acronym, G.E.O.R.E.) The idea of developing integrated 
water information systems was first proposed in a study that the gov-
ernment had developed over 1990–95. This study, “Water Economy 
2000,” was intended to enable the country to respond to water demand 
on a national level over the coming decades (first to 2010, then 2030). It 
collected, analyzed, and synthesized a wealth of data and information 
pertaining to water resources and requirements, both qualitative and 
quantitative. In this way, relational databases covering resources and 
supply were established. All the country’s water resources (conventional 
and nonconventional) were identified at both the regional and national 
levels. For the first time in this type of study in Tunisia, a geographic 
information system (GIS) was used to identify where water resources 
were located and used. The GIS was connected to numerical databases 
and simulation and optimization models. Thus, it enabled a review of the 
water management system under diverse planning scenarios and over 
different geographic areas. The optimization models, based on dynamic 
stochastic programming, enabled the assessment of the performance 
of the existing and projected future water system. The models calcu-
lated fluctuations in both resources and consumption at varying scales 
and using various assumptions. By combining the relational database 
with the GIS assessments of the supply/demand balance, models were 
drawn up to determine the likely instances of over- and undersupply 
going forward in time and on a regional basis. Based on these results 
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and on statistical analysis, a critical load scenario was developed to 
serve as the basis for determining future measures to be taken. From 
there, measures were defined that would enable identified shortfalls to 
be made up or reduced and their economic costs and environmental 
impacts to be evaluated. The specified measures were organized by 
timing and location in the form of a set of alternative strategies from 
which a national water management strategy could be derived.
The second information system is the agricultural map of the coun-
try, completed in 2004. This map is in fact a series of regional maps. 
They give an overview of the agricultural area of each governorate, 
its resources, development potential, strengths, and weaknesses. The 
agricultural database was compiled into a GIS, comprising close to 50 
layers of geographic data. The maps have the following objectives:
 
To ascertain in a reliable and dynamic manner the status of a par-N
ticular location regarding natural resources (land, water, forests), 
basic infrastructure (water, transport), and economics (processing, 
refining, and harvesting facilities for agricultural products)
To ascertain the land allocation status N
To identify the gap between current and optimal land use by com-N
paring the land use map with the agro-economic potential map
To simulate and spatially visualize decisionmaking scenarios based N
on the modification of specific parameters, such as cost of entry, 
production prices, yields, and incentives.
The third information system is the National Water Information 
System, known by its French acronym as SINEAU. It is being completed 
and is expected to be publicly available. It combines three different 
water information systems: one on ground and surface water, one on 
water pollution. and one on soil quality. The SINEAU links these three 
using a horizontal system of reference and unified spatial references. 
It will establish standards for describing data and sharing it with dif-
ferent stakeholders as well as a system for managing and referencing 
the relevant data. 
Over the past three decades, Tunisia has developed significant 
water infrastructure aimed at meeting its ever-increasing demand. This 
infrastructure network had two purposes: to respond to different usage 
priorities and to enable flexible management. Decisions regarding the 
type and size of these storage and transfer facilities and the manner 
of their use were guided by a number of key constraints:
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Geological nature of the landscape.N  This constraint led decisionmak-
ers to deploy different types of facilities (multiple-arch concrete 
dams, buttressed dams, single-arch dams, gravity dams, compressed 
rolled concrete dams).
Lithology of the landscapeN  through which the water flows naturally 
guided the design of certain facilities and the way in which they 
are managed. In the Mejerda Basin (the largest basin in northern 
Tunisia), several Triassic outcrops are largely responsible for the 
water’s increased salinity. These outcrops exist exactly on the sites 
chosen for the dams (which have the best topographical features). 
Thus, the outcrops have influenced decisions regarding the height 
of the dam and, as a result, the volume of water held behind it. 
(Sidi Salem is a case in point.)
Location of demand. N Most water consumption is far from the source 
of supply, making transfer systems inevitable. 
Hydrological analysisN . Hydrological analysis of the country’s different 
catchment areas shows a high level of heterogeneity from the point 
of view of both water quality and regularity of natural supply.
To ensure that water quantity is available in the place and at the 
time required, and to improve water quality through dilution, the in-
frastructure was planned using three guiding principles:
Allowing inter-annual storage to enable supplies to be regularized 1. 
from year to year, taking into account the historical frequency of 
drought (including repeated droughts)
Creating interconnected dams situated in the same catchment 2. 
areas so that the system can capture any overflows of the dams 
in wet years 
Allowing water to be transferred from dams in one catchment to 3. 
dams in another both to balance stock levels in periods of regional 
drought and to improve water quality in particular reservoirs.
From a hydrological point of view, the initial design of the detailed 
Northern Water Plan was based on 34 years of monthly supply ob-
servations. The average supply figure served as a reference point for 
deciding the size of the facilities. 
After these water facilities had been in operation for a number of 
years, several complementary steps presented themselves as potentially 
useful for improving the system’s performance: 
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Minimize the effect of cyclical droughtsN . To take advantage of the 
years of excess rainfall, 11 other sites for medium-sized dams were 
identified and earmarked for construction in the medium term. 
These facilities will fill up primarily during rainy years. These 
medium-sized structures also will safeguard the large dams from 
excessive silting. The water supply from these 11 dams was taken 
into account when the earlier dams were designed,
Raise the height of specific existing facilitiesN  to increase their storage 
capacity and to offset the effects of silting.
Create local water subsystemsN , as part of a national strategy of wa-
ter mobilization via hillside dams (structures fewer than 10 meters 
high with a storage capacity of fewer than 5 Mm3). These facilities 
lengthen the active life of the major water facilities and enable the 
creation of smaller local development centers. Currently, 225 such 
units are in place, providing approximately 200 Mm3 of water.
Extend the geographic range of the transfer systemsN . This extension 
was a key component of the second phase of the national water 
usage strategy. It enabled the establishment of an integrated WRM 
structure (covering the use of both surface and groundwater 
resources).
The hydraulic system for surface water in Tunisia was conceived 
essentially for the northern part of the country. In the system, 13 linked 
dams already are in place, and an additional 14 should be online by 2015, 
for a total of 27 interconnected dams. Their configuration is based 
on the fact that water demand can be divided into two basic demand 
categories, depending on the number and type of reservoirs that sup-
ply it: “local” or “shared.” Local demand sources its water from one 
specific reservoir, whereas shared demand is supplied by more than one 
reservoir. Tables 9.6, 9.7, and 9.8 give details of the reservoirs and the 
areas that use the water from them as well as of the transfer schemes. 
Dams that serve more than one area are shown in table 9.6.
Table 9.6  Tunisia’s Reservoirs and Number of Areas Served
Dam
Bou- 
heurtma
Ben 
Metir Joumine Kasseb Lakhmess Mellegue Rmil
Sidi El 
Barrak Sejnane Siliana
Sidi 
Salem Zerga Zouitina
No. of 
areas 
served
5 3 7 1 1 3 1 2 6 1 18 1 2
Source: Louati 2005.
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Table 9.7  Tunisia’s Reservoirs that Serve Multiple Uses 
Sejnane Joumine Ben Metir Mellegue Bouheurtma Kasseb Sidi Salem
Ben Arous and 
Nabeul (irrigation)
X X X
Bizerte (drinking 
water)
X X
AG02 X X
Grand Tunis 
(drinking water)
X X X X X
Cap Bon (drinking 
water)
X X X X
Sahel and Sfax 
(drinking water)
X X X
Source: Louati 2005.
Table 9.8  Tunisia’s Main Water Transfer Systems and Their Characteristics 
Name of structure Length (km) Flow (m3/s) Diameter (mm)
Pipelines from Sidi El Barrak-Sejnane 18 km over 2 lines 4–4.6 m3/s per line 1800 mm
Pipelines from Sejnane to Taref station 13 km over 2 lines 12 m3/s 1800 mm
Pipelines from Taref station to Sidi 
M’barek
23 km over 3 lines 12 m3/s 1800 mm
Piplelines M’barek-Bejaoua 47 km over 3 lines 12 m3/s 1800 mm
Mejerda Cap Bon canal 120 Km 16–8.8 m3/s
Ben Metir pipeline 135 km 1.3–1.1 m3/s 1250 mm
Kasseb pipeline 121 km  1.1–09 m3/s 1190–1250 mm
Belly-Sahel pipeline: 
    Belly-Sousse
    Sousse-Sfax 
96 km (2 files) 
118 km 
1.5–2.3 m3/s (1st file)
3.6 m3/s (2nd file) 
1.35 m3/s
1400–1200 mm
1600 mm 
1400–1000 mm 
Jilma-Sfax pipeline
Sbeitla-Sfax pipeline 
151 km 
148 km
0.73 m3/s
0.3 m3/s
1100–600 mm 
600–325 mm 
Pipelines from Kairouanais 
    Sidi Saad dam 
    El Haoureb dam
    El Houareb 
    S.Saad (projected)
18 km right bank
10 km left bank
12 km 
24.8 km
1.935–1.5 m3/s
0.5–0.335 m3/s
1.0 m3/s
1.0 m3/s 
1600–1250 mm
600–400 mm 
1000–300 mm 
1100 mm
Nebhana pipeline 126 km 2.1–0.350 1400–600 mm
Source:
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To supplement its scarce natural supplies, Tunisia has a long experi-
ence of generating nonconventional water and of innovative investments. 
Its experience in reuse of treated wastewater, desalination of salt and 
brackish water, and artificial recharge of aquifers is instructive and 
indicates a concern for integrated management of the water cycle. 
Since the 1970s, Tunisia has been formally reusing treated wastewater 
in agriculture and now has one of the world’s highest rates of reuse. 
Almost all of Tunisia’s 194 Mm3 per year urban wastewater generated 
is treated to adequate standards (ONAS 2004). Approximately 30 
percent of it is reused in agriculture supplying approximately 7,000 ha of 
fruit trees and fodder, following strict sanitary standards. The country 
plans to invest in significantly increasing that share over the next decade 
(figure 9.2). Experience indicates difficulties ensuring cost-recovery for 
wastewater reuse. At present, the service is subsidized. In addition, 
Tunisia uses treated wastewater for environmental purposes, in one 
case, to ensure flows to an ecologically important wetland. 
Despite being a country not 
endowed with energy resources, 
Tunisia has experience with de-
salination of brackish and saline 
water. Desalination began in 
1983 in Tunisia. The national 
agency responsible for drinking 
water, SONEDE, has capacity 
of 58,800 m3 per day (table 9.9). 
Private operators have an ad-
ditional capacity of 44.000 m3/
day, mostly for tourism, although 
with some capacity in industrial 
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Figure 9.2  Growth in Treated Wastewater Used in Agriculture, 
Tunisia, 1990–2001 (ha)
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Table 9.9  Desalination Capacity in Tunisia, 1983–2000 
Station Capacity (m3/day)
Year operation 
started Technology
Feed water 
salinity (g/l)
Number of 
membranes
Kerkenah 3300 1983 Reverse osmosis 3.6 144
Gabes 25500 1995 Reverse osmosis 3.2 1188
Zarzis 15000 1999 Reverse osmosis 3.2 1188
Jerba 15000 2000 Reverse osmosis 6.0 756
Total 58800 2844
Source: SONEDE, MARH 2004.
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enterprises and high-value agriculture. In the South, the authorities 
have been able to use reverse osmosis technology to convert brackish 
groundwater into drinking water. 
The government subsidizes the private sector to invest in desalina-
tion and considers this technology a key part of the long-term water 
management strategy for the country. It plans to increase public sector 
installed capacity to 50 Mm3 day by 2030.
In addition, the country has long experience of artificial ground-
water recharge. This is a way of storing surplus water from one season 
for use during dry periods. The program of construction of small 
dams described above also included spate irrigation infrastructure 
to channel flood water. In addition to helping manage surface water 
f lows, these two types of in-
vestment had a major impact 
on aquifer recharge (figure 9.3). 
Furthermore, Tunisia has proj-
ects using quarries, old wells, 
and direct injection to increase 
aquifer recharge, in some cases 
including recharge with treated 
wastewater. To avoid potential 
contamination, these schemes 
usually are toward the mouth of 
the aquifers. One trial scheme 
uses treated wastewater at the 
mouth of the aquifer to protect 
against saline intrusion. The government plans to increase the volumes 
of artificial aquifer recharge to more than 200 Mm3 per year in 2030 
through small dams, check dams, and soil and water conservation 
investments in upper watersheds.
Use of Water Resources
The irrigation sector consumes close to 80 percent of Tunisia’s extracted 
water. Tunisia has approximately 420,000 ha of land that could be ir-
rigated through both public and private schemes. Of this, 400,000 ha 
are actually irrigated. The government’s strategy aims to serve these 
lands with water, assuming that water is available, by 2010. The sector 
now uses approximately 2 billion m3 per year. Demand should stabilize 
at 2.1 billion m3 by 2010. 
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Groundwater extraction has increased continuously since 1997, 
rising from 2,161 Mm3 to 2,638 Mm3 in 2006—an increase of ap-
proximately 26 percent over 15 years (table 9.10). Yet, withdrawals 
are becoming unsustainable, while exploitation of deep groundwater 
is increasing slowly. On the positive side, there is potential for more 
or better use of surface water. In the last decade, overall usage rates 
of surface water have been low. 
The lack of good-quality water is becoming increasingly acute in 
the wake of unpredictable climate patterns. Thus, the country needs to 
find a way to improve the value-added from the water allocated to the 
agricultural sector. A technical, economic, organizational, institutional, 
and legislative framework has been set up to maximize the country’s 
irrigation potential as efficiently as possible. Water conservation con-
stitutes a key component of this strategy. Since the end of the 1980s, 
with the introduction of conservation measures in irrigated areas, con-
sumption per ha has begun to decline sharply, falling from 6,200 m3/ha 
in 1990 to approximately 5,500 m3/ha in 2005.
In 1995 Tunisia’s water administration adopted a National Program 
of Irrigation Water Conservation (PNEEI). Its purpose was to ratio-
nalize the use of water to ensure that the maximum economic value 
is derived from irrigation and to keep water demand at a sustainable 
level. The PNEEI has the following broad goals:
Strengthen knowledge of appropriate technologies to ensure op-N
timal water use 
Ensure that regional departments have a better grasp of tech-N
niques and methods to conserve irrigation water suited to local 
conditions 
Encourage consumers to adopt water conservation techniquesN
Table 9.10  Tunisia’s Evolution of Water Consumption, 1997–2005 (Mm3) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Surface water 399 361 445 499 248 561 510 464 688
Groundwater 757 764 771 778 778 778 778 778 807
Deep groundwater 1005 1014 1031 1078 1119 1135 1109 1127 1143
Total 2161 2139 2247 2355 2145 2474 2397 2369 2638
Sources: DGRE 2007a, 2007b.
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Make available to citizens the knowledge and technical support N
required for them to put these techniques into practice
Rapidly extend the introduction of on-farm water-saving equip-N
ment; transfer public irrigated areas (PPI) to agricultural develop-
ment groups (GDA) under appropriate operating conditions.
The program provides a 
40 percent–60 percent subsidy 
for efficient on-farm irrigation 
equipment, (upgraded gravity 
irrigation, sprinkler irrigation, and 
drip systems) with the exact rate 
depending on the category of ag-
riculture. The program aimed to 
install efficient on-farm irrigation 
equipment on 90 percent of Tuni-
sia’s 400,000 ha of irrigated land 
by 2006 and to improve irrigation 
efficiency to a level of at least 75 
percent by the end of 2006. As 
of June 2006, the irrigated area 
with qualifying conservation 
systems in place covered close 
to 310,000 ha, or 75 percent of 
the irrigated area. The imple-
mentation rate has been running 
at 15,000–25,000 ha per year. 
Figure 9.4 shows the take-up of 
the irrigation systems. Figure 9.5 
shows how water allocations per 
ha have been changing. 
The breakdown of the area 
under irrigation is:
98,000 ha of drip irrigation (or 21.6 percent of the total irrigable N
area)
106,000 ha of sprinkler irrigation (26.7 percent)N
106,000 ha of upgraded gravity irrigation (25 percent).N
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Figure 9.5  Evolution of Mean Water Allocations per Irrigated 
Hectare, 1990–2030 (m3/ha)
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Drip irrigation accounts for close to 25 percent of the total irrigable 
area, whereas it accounted for just 3 percent in 1995.
Regional action plans have been put in place by the Regional Agricul-
tural Development Commissions with a goal of covering 100 percent of 
the irrigated area by 2009. The implementation of the water conserva-
tion program in irrigated areas is expected to bring water consumption 
per hectare down to approximately 4,000 m3/ha by 2030.
The National Authority for Water Exploitation and Distribution 
(SONEDE), the body tasked with producing and distributing drinking 
water, has set up a strategy to ensure efficient water use. The changes 
in water allocated to SONEDE are shown in table 9.11 below. 
Irrigation water tariffs cover some O&M costs, but not the costs 
of capital investment, operation of bulk infrastructure, or value of the 
water itself. Tariffs for drinking water gradually are moving to a point 
at which they will completely cover running and financing costs, plus 
a significant portion of equipment costs. The current coverage is ap-
proximately 87 percent. 
Policy Measures
Regulatory Measures
Water sector legislation related to water conservation covers investment 
incentives, investment regulation, and the rationalization of the water 
management system. The Water Code was promulgated in 1975. Its 
articles 12, 15, 16, 86, 102, 106, 90, and 96 relating to resources, planning 
and development, tariff rates, and the reuse and conservation of water 
were modified and completed by new laws in 1987, 1988, and 2001. 
Table 9.11  Trends in Production and Consumption of Drinking Water, 1996–2007 (Mm3) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Production of drinking water 309 317 326 337 346 373 373 394 403 420 439 453
Consumption of drinking water 230 247 258 272 285 301 297 306 315 339 340 348
Specific consumption (liters 
consumed and billed/day/ 
inhabitant connected to the system)
65 68 69 71 73 75 75 75 76 78 80 82
Source: SONEDE 2008: Statistics on SONEDE’s water production since 1994, databases.
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Technical Measures
Initiatives to improve the efficiency of communal irrigation and drinking 
water networks have been set in motion. The main results of these 
initiatives are:
Water conservation project in small- and medium-sized water-consum-1. 
ing areas in central Tunisia. It aims to restore and modernize public 
networks, promote on-farm water-saving equipment, and transfer 
the management of these operations to farmer groups (known by 
their French acronym as GICs). This project covers 11,000 ha of 
irrigated land at a cost of 24 Mdinars.
Project to improve irrigated areas in the southern oases, covering 23,000 2. 
ha. Project aims to make the distribution system more watertight 
by constructing concrete canals or laying underground PVC pip-
ing, and to install a drainage system to remove excess water and 
leach salts.
Modernization project in the old irrigated areas of the Lower Mejerda 3. 
Valley. Underway, this. project aims to modernize a 4,300-ha por-
tion of the old irrigated areas, which cover 27,000 ha in total.
Water conservation program for public drinking water networks and 4. 
facilities. Its components include installing new equipment for 
metering and regulation, tracing leaks, renovating old meters and 
connections, and regulating pressure in the system.
Measuring the volume of water produced and distributed plays a 
key role in water management. The government’s strategy is to equip 
every water system with an appropriate means of measurement and to 
divide networks into sections through the installation of local metering 
systems. This thorough deployment of meters will ensure an effective 
mechanism for tracing leaks. As of 2007, all of the reservoirs produc-
ing drinking water were equipped with either meters or other means 
of measuring outflows.
The government intends to equip all drinking water supply systems 
with appropriate regulation equipment. By 2007, 96.6 percent of supply 
systems (gravity and reverse-flow) had been fitted. 
Metering policy is centered on three key initiatives:
Replacing jammed meters to reduce or eliminate the need to issue 1. 
pro-rata bills; then replacing unclassified meters. 
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Rehabilitating worn-out connections and networks by replacing 2. 
pipes and fittings to reduce leaks. In 1998 SONEDE began inven-
torying these connections (329,000 in total) and scheduled their 
replacement within 10 years. The proportion of water consumers 
served by worn-out connections fell from 24 percent in 1998 to 6 
percent in 2007. 
Resizing meters to bring them up to the necessary capacity. Regula-3. 
tion at the water system level consists of equipping drinking water 
supply systems (gravitational or reversed-flow) with appropriate 
means of regulation (cut-off valves, ballcocks, altimetric water 
gates, and pilot lines, radios) to avoid wasting water through 
overflows and leaks. Leak detection uses either correlation or the 
acoustic method. Part of this detection work is done in-house; part 
is subcontracted. During 2007, some 8,300 km of the distribution 
network were inspected, and 2,011 leaks or broken pipes were 
detected—equivalent to 1 leak or breakage every 3.3 km. Table 
9.12 shows the scale of investments in improving leak detection 
and metering for drinking water. 
Institutional Measures
Tunisia’s experience of self-managed communal water systems goes 
back to the early 1900s, when user-owner associations were created. 
Among these associations were the irrigation syndicates created be-
tween 1901 and 1906 to use the water of the wadis in central Tunisia. 
Examples are the irrigation syndicate at the Sbiba Wadi, created in 
1901, and the irrigation syndicates at the Zroud and Marguellil Wadis, 
which were created in 1906.
Between 1912 and 1919, associations were created to develop the 
southern Tunisian oases. In 1987 these associations were converted 
into communal interest groups. Their function was to develop public 
water resources; construct, maintain, and use public water works; 
Table 9.12  Number of Water Supply Meters Replaced or Improved, 2004–2007 (m)
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number of jammed meters repaired or replaced 41,134 37,586 34,267 51,082
Number of worn-out meters replaced 71,232 40,727 16,349 9,611
Number of meters resized 1,419 1,671 578 316
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irrigate and decontaminate farmland; and develop drinking water 
supply systems. 
Regional committees to assess and ensure the implementation of 
the water conservation program were set up in March 1992 at the 
regional administrative level (Regional Offices for Agriculture Develop-
ment, known by their French acronyms as CRDAs). The inauguration 
of the committees coincided with the launch of a program of training 
and promotion of water conservation in the irrigation sector. Regional 
strategies and a water conservation assessment and implementation 
system at a national level have been in place since 1993.
In 1987 the management of all drinking water supply systems and 
borehole irrigation on public land was transferred to the GICs. In 1988 
the GIC program was extended to large dam irrigation systems on pub-
lic land. The purpose was to ensure that areas irrigated by boreholes 
and large dams were under the same management arrangements. By 
the end of 2005, 75,000 ha of public land serviced by large dams were 
under GIC management. 
In 2001 the PISEAU (Water Sector Investment Project) began to 
transfer the management of irrigation land to farmer groups (whose 
name had changed to agricultural development groups, known by their 
French acronym as GDAs). The project financed 10 technical assis-
tance initiatives in 8 governorates to transfer management of 31,000 ha 
irrigated by large dams to GDAs and to reinforce GDAs’ capacity 
where they were already in place (16,000 ha). 
Separately, a technical assistance project for the GDAs in areas 
irrigated by boreholes was implemented, again to encourage water 
conservation in Tunisia’s small and medium-sized irrigated areas. This 
7-year project (1999–2006) involved approximately 60 GDAs and cost 
roughly `1 million. Two additional TA projects were put in place to 
strengthen the technical capacity of the regional departments and 
GDAs involved in the supply of drinking water. The first to be launched 
began in 1997 and ended in 2008. It covered approximately 800 drinking 
water GICs in 8 governorates. The second initiative (2006–10) aims 
to boost the technical capacity of 160 drinking water GICs located in 
an additional 17 governorates. 
Performance Indicators
Indicators have been adopted to evaluate water resource mobilization 
and management programs. 
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The effectiveness of dams in regulating flow is measured by a 
Regulation Index (table 9.13). This indicator is defined for any specific 
year as the ratio between the volume of regularized flows in that year 
and the average annual irregular water flow.
The development of water resources is evaluated according to an 
index that measures the ratio between annual withdrawals of water 
and conventional, renewable, natural freshwater resources (table 9.14). 
Annual withdrawals of conventional, renewable natural water include 
losses incurred when the water is transported. 
The rate of groundwater exploitation is consistently above 100 
percent. For deep groundwater, exploitation also is on the increase, 
and is at approximately 80 percent. 
Table 9.13  Evolution of Effectiveness of Dams at Regulating Irregular Flows, 1997–2006 (Mm3)
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Average annual 
    irregular flows (Mm3)
2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100
Regularizable irregular 
   flows (Mm3)
1,342 1,342 1,342 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,652 1,660 1,682
Regularized irregular 
    flows (Mm3)
1,030 1,228 1,221 1,316 1,292 1,300 1,465 1,521 1,601 1,587
Regulation index (%) 49.05 58.48 58.14 62.67 61.52 61.90 69.76 72.43 76.24 75.57
Source: Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development 2007.
Table 9.14  Evolution of Rate of Exploitation of Water Resources in Tunisia, 1997–2004 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Withdrawals of renewable 
    underground water (Mm3)
1,098 1,117 1,137 1,184 1,206 1,230 1,207 1,216
Withdrawals of surface water 
    (Mm3)
399 361 445 499 248 561 510 464
Available renewable 
    underground resources
    (Mm3)
1,273 1,284 1,432 1,423 1,408 1,408 1,430 1,498
Available surface resources
    (Mm3)
1,030 1,228 1,221 1,316 1,292 1,300 1,465 1,521
Index of total exploitation of 
    renewable resources (%)
65.00 58.84 59.63 61.45 53.85 66.14 59.31 55.65
Sources: National Statistics Institute and Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources.
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The system for evaluating and monitoring water conservation, 
along with a land survey carried out in 2001, has enabled a mid-term 
assessment of the National Water Conservation Program. The results 
confirmed that the program was both effective and economically vi-
able in the agricultural sector. In particular, the evaluation shows that 
an extremely dynamic response from stakeholders led to a significant 
increase in the area of land equipped with water conservation systems. 
Promotional campaigns using a variety of means of communication 
have contributed greatly to water conservation in irrigation.
Table 9.15 tracks the evolution of average yields for drinking water 
systems between 1997 and 2007, calculated as the ratio of consumed 
volume, plant volume, and briny water volume to plant entry volume. 
The overall network yield slipped from 78.2 percent in 2006 to 77.3 
percent in 2007. This fall resulted from a 0.5-point drop in yields from 
conveyance (92.2 percent in 2007 and 92.7 percent in 2006) and a 
0.6-point drop in yields from distribution networks (83.4 percent in 
2007 vs. 84 percent in 2006).
To gauge the efficiency of transfer networks, the transfer network 
yield is calculated. In 2007 this yield figure reached 99.5, compared to 
92.2 for the conveyance networks and 83.4 for distribution networks.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The unavoidable reality facing Tunisia is the necessity to conserve and 
derive maximum benefit from its limited water resources. Conservation 
Table 9.15  Evolution of Average Yields for Drinking Water Systems in Tunisia, 1997–2007 (Mm3)
Designation 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Volume consumed 246.7 256.9 271.6 285.1 301.3 297.4 305.8 313.9 327.3 340.1 348.1
Service plant volume   
    (VSS)
0.8 0.169 0.705 1.665 1.65 1.537 1.142 1.062 1.785 2.486 3.492
Conveyance plant  
    volume (VSA)
1.6 0.026
Volume of briny water  
    (VSM)
1.9 2.324 3.597 5.328 5.08 5.058 5.561 5.9186 5.3 5.9 6.9196
Plant entry volume (VES) 321.7 329.67 342.95 357.25 380.13 380.01 400.52 410.03 427.1 447.59 463.78
Overall network yield  
    (Rg) (%)
77.5 78.7 80.4 81.7 81.0 80.0 78.0 78.3 78.3 78.2 77.3
Source: SONEDE 2008: Statistics on SONEDE’s water production since 1994, databases.
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will be far more productive than looking for ways to secure new reserves. 
The substantial future savings that are needed will have to come from 
the major water-using sectors, especially agriculture, which consumes 
almost 80 percent of Tunisia’s available water resources.
Tunisia must expect a future of water shortages exacerbated by 
more frequent droughts and climate change. Water supply manage-
ment therefore must improve the operation of water infrastructure 
and harness technology to make optimal use of existing resources. 
The rationale for creating new irrigated areas should be examined in 
light of future water demands. Implementing a demand-based water 
management strategy will strengthen the case for a realignment of water 
sector institutions.
Studies of Tunisia’s water management system often highlight 
gaps or weak points in the system, particularly in the relationship with 
private water users. The political trend is toward participatory man-
agement. Thus, all levels of the administration have made great efforts 
to help local organizations (GICs/GDAs) to take control of operating 
and maintaining their water distribution facilities. It is important that 
regulatory texts reflect this trend toward greater participation by the 
beneficiaries/stakeholders. With increased involvement of users, water 
planning and implementation will see improved performance.
In this regard, serious thought needs to be given to the ways in 
which these water users can be brought in to participate in defining 
Tunisia’s water management policy and strategy. New mechanisms need 
to be created to institutionalize the participation of different users at key 
stages of planning and operation.
Increasing users’ participation in the water management system should 
enable projects to be planned and managed based on genuine knowledge 
of the needs and constraints of both parties—the state, which holds the 
resources and guarantees their continuity; and user groups, who are 
responsible for the viability and sustainability of their own activities.
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Lessons from the  
Rehabilitation of the  
Water Supply and Sanitation 
Sector in Post-War Iraq
Sana Agha Al Nimer
This chapter describes Iraq’s current water supply issues, government strategy, and key lessons for post-conflict countries 
In post-conflict countries, societies face distinctive challenges. 
They are immediate and urgent recovery along with the long-term 
objective of economic recovery, as well as social and political cohe-
sion. One of the key challenges facing Iraqis is to develop credible and 
inclusive institutions that will lead to stability and sustainable economic 
prosperity. In the post-conflict context, rehabilitating and improving 
basic services such as water supply and sanitation are essential for 
improving the living conditions of the people. International experience 
in reconstruction efforts in post-conflict countries has shown that well-
targeted expenditures on municipal services, especially water supply 
and sanitation (WSS), are especially important to alleviate suffering 
and to reduce the risk of further conflict.
Sector Background
Before the 1991 Gulf War, the population of Iraq enjoyed a relatively 
high level of water supply and sanitation services. The sector operated 
efficiently and utilized then-current technologies. Over 95 percent of the 
urban population and over 75 percent of the rural population had access 
to safe potable water. Water quality was satisfactory. Approximately 
218 water treatment plants and approximately 1200 compact water 
treatment units were operating throughout the country. Sanitation 
services covered approximately 75 percent of the urban communities. 
Twenty-five percent of these communities were connected to sewer-
age systems, and 50 percent had on-site septic tanks. 
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Since 1991, the WSS sector has experienced a steady decline. Aging 
infrastructure, poorly maintained equipment, leaking water and sewer 
networks, and low technical capacity and morale are key problems of 
the sector. Today, most Iraqis have limited access to WSS, and to other 
basic services such as electricity and solid waste collection. 
The level of water supply coverage is approximately 73 percent for 
urban areas and 43 percent in rural areas. A high percentage of water 
produced does not meet the World Health Organization’s (WHO) 
water quality standards. In addition, the efficiency of service delivery is 
low due to the deteriorating condition of the water supply and waste-
water facilities and electrical power cuts of up to 16 hours per day.
Wastewater collection and treatment facilities are available in 
only few large cities. These facilities are in dire need of rehabilitation. 
Wastewater treatment covers approximately only 8 percent of the 
population in the 15 governorates. The remaining waste from more 
than 20 million people is discharged directly into the environment (river 
system or on-site septic tanks).
Serious environmental and health risks associated with lack of basic 
services, contaminated water supplies, and poor disposal of sewage 
overburden the already stressed health system. Diseases associated with 
poor sanitation, unsafe water, and unhygienic practices have increased 
to alarming rates. These conditions have accounted for an estimated 
one-quarter of recent child mortalities. It is estimated that 40 percent 
of children who visit health centers suffer from gastrointestinal diseases 
due to the lack of safe drinking water.
In the capital city of Baghdad, water supply and sewerage systems have 
fallen into disrepair from years of neglect and lack of maintenance, recent 
war damage, subsequent looting, and disruptions in electricity supply. 
Water production capacity is approximately 2.1 million cubic meters (m3) 
per day, which is far below the country’s basic demand of approximately 
3.4 million m3 per day. The situation is exacerbated by a water loss rate of 
50 percent–60 percent from leaking distribution networks and frequent 
pipe ruptures. Newly developed areas in city suburbs are not served with 
any potable water. The population depends entirely on raw water of low 
quality provided by private vendors. In addition, Baghdad’s three sewage 
treatment plants are inoperative. They discharge partially or untreated 
effluent into the Tigris River, the city’s main water source.
One reason that operations and maintenance (O&M) are un-
derfunded is the lack of cost recovery. Water tariffs for all Iraqi gov-
ernorates, excluding the northern region, range from 0.0013US$/m³ 
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to 0.0133US$/m³ per month for domestic customers.1 In most gover-
norates, the level of metering is low. Nonrevenue water (NRW) has 
increased due to 20 years of wars and sanctions. Lack of maintenance 
as well as damaged networks and infrastructure explain the NRW level 
of approximately 57 percent. Accurate estimates are difficult, because 
fewer than 10 percent of the connections are metered.
Financial management systems are weak. Cash accounting is still 
used. The accounting makes no clear separation between operational 
and capital expenditures, and cash-flow statements are not prepared. 
Generally, the recorded water revenues are not the amounts billed but 
the revenue collected. Unpaid 
billings are not recorded sepa-
rately from formal accounts. 
Depreciation is charged, but 
the assets are not periodically 
re-valued in line with inflation.
Iraq also faces the rene-
gotiation of the allocation and 
distribution of the resource with 
its upstream states, Syria and 
Turkey (figure 10.1). Since the 
majority of Iraq’s water origi-
nates outside of its international 
borders, these negotiations 
add a level of complexity and 
urgency to the management of 
the sector.
Government Strategy
WSS is one of the key priorities of the Government of Iraq. The 
government’s immediate strategy is to ensure the safe provision of 
services, increase coverage through rehabilitation and reconstruction, 
and allocate sufficient resources for O&M.
The strategy includes:
1 Substantially lower than the costs of production in well run water utilities with 
full cost recovery (see Ueda and Benouahi’s description of Japanese water utilities 
in this volume).
Figure 10.1  Map of Iraq 
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Continued rehabilitation and construction of water supply and N
sewerage infrastructure 
Improvements to the quality of water supply servicesN
Capacity building and training of sector staff N
Provision of sufficient water resources for all regions in IraqN
Crash maintenance programs of the existing infrastructure, that is, N
pumping stations and water supply and sewerage networks 
Appropriate monitoring of environmental issues N
Development of realistic timetables for project implementationN
Critical review of present subsidy policies and development of a plan N
for the gradual increase in tariffs and elimination of cross-subsidies
Public-private partnerships for water demand management. N
Water Supply and Sanitation Investment Program
Iraq’s Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works (MMPW) has devel-
oped a Water and Sanitation Investment Program (2007–20). It identi-
fies approximately 575 projects consisting of 85 technical assistance 
(TA), 309 water supply, and 181 wastewater projects. The total cost 
for the investment program is an estimated US$30 billion. 
Due to the extensive needs in the sector, priority projects for the 
investment plan were identified based on six selection criteria. They 
were (1) additional population served by the project, (2) present water 
deficit, (3) environment and public health, (4) capital cost per capita, 
(5) project completion time, and (6) economic rate of return (ERR). 
Donor coordination
Duplication of efforts is a risk as more donors become active in Iraq. 
A significant number of projects remain unfinanced.
Pilot private sector involvement
The private sector has not played a key role in financing large investments. 
However, some projects may be attractive to the private sector in the long 
term. With the prevailing set of political, economic, and security risks, a 
feasible option is to pilot management contracts (in addition to ongoing 
service contracts for construction, operations, and maintenance). 
Capacity building
MMPW has received extensive support from the World Bank and other 
institutions for capacity building for all aspects of its work.
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Key Lessons for Post-Conflict Countries
The Iraq experience reveals valuable lessons for other post-conflict 
situations. These lessons are summarized in a set of priority steps:
Actively coordinate donors1. 
Identify urgent investments2. 
Restore water supply3. 
Identify upgrades or replacement of critical equipment4. 
Develop an implementation strategy5. 
Ensure security in work and living areas 6. 
Involve the private sector at the appropriate time7. 
Follow adequate implementation and procurement procedures.8. 
Donor Coordination
Donors active in Iraq include USAID, United Nations, World Bank, 
and bilateral donors. They have financed a total of approximately 
US$750 million targeting 33 identified projects, which has been dis-
bursed since 2003.
In the immediate post-conflict environment, speed of response and thor-
oughness of initial assessment are essential. Donor coordination is critical to 
avoid duplication and maximize the impact of scarce resources. A key goal 
is to ensure that financing and assistance are targeted equitably throughout 
the country. Equity requires a damage assessment as well as awareness 
of the ethnic sensitivities of a post-conflict country. It is important to 
identify all relevant stakeholders, including community and civil society 
structures, and to include them in reconciliation and reconstruction.
Following the 2003 conflict, the international community was quick 
to recognize the need for a multilateral approach to Iraq’s reconstruc-
tion and development. At the request of the international community, 
the World Bank and the United Nations Development Group worked 
closely to assess Iraq’s reconstruction needs. 
In October 2003, the United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs 
Assessment estimated the total needs for 2004–07 to be US$55 billion. 
This amount comprised US$35.8 billion for the 14 sectors covered by 
the Needs Assessment, and US$19.4 billion estimated by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) for other sectors, including security and 
oil. The joint needs assessment served as a basis for various interna-
tional donors’ conferences. The World Bank and the UN designed 
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an International Reconstruction 
Fund Facility for Iraq. 
As a result, the distribution of 
projects has been reasonably bal-
anced throughout the country. 
The Baghdad Governorate has 
the most projects followed by 
Mayoralty of Baghdad, Maysan, 
Muthana, Erbil, Kerbala, Qadis-
siyah, and Dhi Qar. 
Identification of Urgent 
Investments 
It is essential to identify areas that 
most urgently need assistance. 
Key investment projects, even if 
small, can be crucial in restoring services. It is important to note that 
not all infrastructure destroyed by conflict is suitable for restoration 
or is critical to the immediate needs of the population. Some areas in 
Iraq faced neglect from years of lack of services, and had high popu-
lation densities. The World Bank Iraq Trust Fund project financing 
targeted a number of these areas, including Sadr City in Baghdad and 
Badawa in Erbil (figures 10.2–10.4). The impact on the population was 
significant. 
It is important to identify the 
local technicians and sector staff 
who are the best equipped to 
identify priority projects. Unfor-
tunately, most Iraqi technicians 
have either migrated, are reluc-
tant to work in the public sector, 
or perished in the conflict. 
External staff will also play a 
part in local recovery and recon-
struction of infrastructure. To 
address issues more sensitively, 
these staff should be briefed 
adequately and have sufficient 
understanding of local conditions, 
Figure 10.2  Drainage Problems in Sadr City 
Figure 10.3  Badawa: A Polluted Urban Environment
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history, geography, and culture of 
the country.
Timely Rehabilitation of 
Water Supply Service
Water supply systems are often 
damaged in war, and sometimes 
deliberately targeted. Rehabilitation 
of water supply systems offers one 
of the greatest levels of development 
impact in a post-conflict setting. 
Emergency water supply systems 
consist of temporary tanks used to 
store clean water, which is trans-
ported by tankers. In spite of the evidence, these systems generally are 
overlooked in favor of treatment works and pumping stations. 
In Iraq, water supply comes mainly from surface water. Therefore, 
to tackle the existing drinking water crises in major cities, temporary 
water treatments using unsophisticated technologies have been widely 
used as stop-gaps. These technologies include flocculation, chlorina-
tion, and possibly simple sand filters (compact units with a life span of 
five years). Regarding the restoration of urban public supplies, issues 
to be considered include cross-contamination between sewers and 
water distributors, and lack of O&M and spare parts. 
Where they existed, sewerage systems in Iraq were less likely to 
have been targeted during the war. However, given the long period of 
inadequate maintenance and failure of power supplies, their conditions 
are generally very poor. Malfunctioning sewer systems are likely to 
pose health hazards by contaminating potable water supplies. Clean-
ing sewers requires costly equipment and usually is a priority that gets 
addressed after clean water supplies have been restored. Until then, 
public authorities need to prioritize disseminating appropriate public 
education so that the public will take the essential health measures, 
such as boiling or chlorinating drinking water.
Identify Upgrades or Replace Critical Equipment 
Post-conflict states often have under-resourced, poorly maintained, 
and out-of-date services infrastructure. Rehabilitation involves updating 
Figure 10.4  Badawa after Completion of Rehabilitation Works 
Source: Authors from Quarterly Progress Reports.
188  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
the system, catching up on maintenance, refurbishing plants, and car-
rying out much needed repairs.
After identifying the immediate needs as well as budgeting for the 
medium and long-term needs, the government has to prepare a budget 
to identify and estimate required costs. Generally, funds are limited, 
so prioritization becomes necessary. To avoid prejudice against any 
particular group, determining the priorities should involve as many lo-
cal stakeholders as possible. Locals will have very high expectations, 
so addressing unrealistic local aspirations should be discussed openly 
by the complement of various stakeholders.
Develop an Implementation Strategy
An implementation strategy should be developed that reflects the 
needs of service users, local skills, construction security, the mix 
of local and external inputs, budget flows, and overall program 
management capacity. Local participation must be engaged. Early 
involvement of local people who are familiar with the technical and 
system backgrounds can help in setting realistic investment and 
implementation targets. 
The re-establishment of local contractors should be encouraged 
by developing small contracts, with external support to strengthen 
management skills where necessary. The skills mix of local and expa-
triate staff and contractors in rebuilding has two benefits. It results in 
local employment and income. It also ensures a project’s sustainability 
through community buy-in and creating a culture of maintenance for 
the project. In scheduling, lengthy or overly bureaucratic procurement 
methods need to be anticipated.
If possible, funding should be managed independently from gov-
ernment systems. One option is to use a separate local bank account. 
The project management team would countersign payment checks 
with the local government officers. 
Payment currencies and systems for local contractors/suppliers/
consultants also must be planned ahead to prevent stoppages. When 
payments for salaries and goods are delayed, so is implementation. In 
Iraq, payments in US dollars are far easier to process than those in 
the local currency, which involve a particularly cumbersome process 
in the local banking system. 
Lessons from the Rehabilitation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in Post-War Iraq  N  189
Security in Work and Living Areas
Even after a conflict, insecurity and danger may continue. It still is not 
safe enough for the international community to visit Iraq. Infrastructure 
contractors may be reluctant to undertake development work in insecure 
areas, which are often the very areas that most require development. 
The inability of international workers to work in the country increases 
the frustration of the local population toward external donors, con-
tractors, and other outsiders. In the absence of a strong economy or 
currency, payments to local contractors may involve the added risks 
of storing and transporting cash payments. 
In prioritizing tasks and activities, donors and service providers should 
consider improving security as a key priority. In some areas, security ser-
vices provision adds 30 percent to 50 percent to investment costs.
Involve the Private Sector at Appropriate Time 
Major private investment is likely to be appropriate only after a period 
of some stability, or where appropriate guarantees can be made that 
offset the risks. Private investors are likely to be wary of investing before 
the conflict is fully resolved. Even then, investors may be discouraged 
by the weakness of government’s administrative capacity and the dif-
ficulty of enforcing payment for services. 
However, some private organizations may come forward to fill 
important gaps for which the entry cost is relatively low and returns are 
rapid. An example is the provision of telecommunications immediately 
after conflict. The use of donor-funded guarantees and co-financing 
can facilitate private/public partnerships.
Phased arrangements may be considered, including a planned pro-
gression from modest forms of private participation in infrastructure, 
such as service or management contracts, to leases or long-term conces-
sions. In Iraq, for the foreseeable future, pilot management contracts 
will be the most appropriate, with the government owning major assets 
and assuming a large proportion of the commercial risks.
Appropriate Implementation and Procurement Procedures
Post-conflict situations usually result in immediate and large financing 
needs on emergency projects. Procurement in a post-conflict situa-
tion raises the risk of corruption and conflict over access to contracts, 
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employment, and services. It is critical to have a strategy in place for 
managing this risk. Sufficient training in procurement for all levels of 
government is very important and should be provided as soon as pos-
sible. Through their requirements for procuring goods and equipment, 
the government benefits from advice from the donor agencies in the 
timely and transparent delivery of services.2
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Governance in Yemen’s Water 
Sector: Lessons from the Design 
of an Anticorruption Action Plan
Maher Abu-Taleb and Richard Calkins
This chapter summarizes the key lessons learned while dealing with governance and corruption (GAC) issues in Yemen, and is based on the recent design of a water sector operation. Specifi-
cally, the chapter presents a diagnostic of governance and corruption 
issues in Yemen’s water sector, the application of “smart project design” 
to improve governance at the sector level, and the development of an 
Anticorruption Action Plan (ACAP) to help ensure that the water 
sector project funds are used for the intended purposes.
While the World Bank has been working on the broader issues 
of good governance at the country level for many years, with a few 
exceptions, the focus on sector- and project-related governance and 
corruption issues is relatively recent. In 2007–08, a team of World 
Bank and Yemeni government sector specialists were presented with 
the opportunity to design a water sector investment operation as part 
of a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). At that time, a strategic decision 
was made to make resources available to diagnose the governance is-
sues in the sector, identify the vulnerabilities and potentials of ongoing 
reforms, and build consensus around a sector governance program. 
The project under discussion supports the Yemeni government’s 
US$1.5 billion 5-year National Water Sector Strategy and Investment 
Program (NWSSIP). More specifically, this project will support the 
Yemeni Government’s US$381 million Water Sector Support Program. 
It comprises US$141 million in counterpart financing from the govern-
ment budget and the remainder from other development partners.1 The 
1 Details available in World Bank, Yemen Water Sector Support Project Appraisal 
Document, 2009.
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SWAp framework builds on country-level governance and anticorrup-
tion initiatives. The framework has piloted the design of the first specific 
Anticorruption Action Plan in the Middle East North Africa Region 
(MNA), to be implemented for the entire water sector as part of the 
Water Sector Support Programme (WSSP). 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, the brief overview gives 
the context for this work along with definitions to acquaint the reader 
with the relevant concepts. The overview is followed by a summary of 
the governance agenda at the country level. Next, an assessment of 
governance and corruption risks is presented along with the planned 
mitigation measures and the details of the Anticorruption Action Plan. 
Finally, a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework is outlined. As 
with any new initiative, the plan needs to be implementable to work as 
intended and ensure that benefits of enhanced development effective-
ness actually exceed the costs.
Context
By world standards, Yemen is a country poorly endowed with water 
resources. Groundwater is being over-exploited. Consequently, the 
large part of the rural economy dependent on groundwater is under 
threat. In addition, both urban and rural settlements are poorly provided 
with safe water and sanitation services. Government has been aware 
of these reform challenges for decades and, over the last 15 years, has 
taken significant institutional steps. 
The government’s decision to prepare an update of its national 
water strategy that would run from 2009–15 provided an opportunity 
to incorporate institutional design elements that would improve gover-
nance. The strategy update’s objective was to incorporate changes in 
light of the experiences of the past five years and to provide a basis for 
a sector-wide approach (SWaP) to financing. Under the supervision 
of an Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee of five ministers, a highly 
participatory process was adopted to evaluate experience to date and 
to prepare the updated national water strategy. 
The water sector project supports implementation of Yemen’s 
National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (NWSSIP). 
The strategy is intended to (1) strengthen institutions for sustainable 
water resource management, (2) improve community-based water 
resource management, (3) increase access to water supply and 
sanitation services, (4) increase returns to agricultural water use, and 
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(5) stabilize and reduce groundwater abstraction for agricultural use 
from critical water basins. 
The project is being prepared based on fundamental reforms re-
lated to implementation efficiency, coordinated donor harmonization, 
and improved water sector governance. All three of these bases are 
prerequisites for poverty alleviation and agricultural income growth. 
Some major water sector donors in Yemen (the World Bank and aid 
agencies of the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and United 
Kingdom) have provided technical assistance to the government to 
harmonize and align efforts to support its national water strategy. 
Meanwhile, they are building local institutional capacity by progressively 
entrusting implementation to mandated national agencies. The project 
design includes a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that 
defines the obligations of the partners under a SWAp with common 
rules for coordinated support. In addition to the governance improve-
ment built into the project design, specific anticorruption measures 
have been incorporated in the Anticorruption Action Plan, which will 
be implemented as part of the project. 
Before continuing, some definitions are presented below:
Good governance is the exercise of power in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development. Good gov-
ernance is associated with faster, private sector-led growth and with 
pro-poor development outcomes. Poor governance has the opposite 
effects and provides greater latitude for corruption. The World Bank’s 
new strategy to address governance and corruption issues emphasizes 
three key principles—referred to as the TAP Framework:
Transparency1. 
Accountability,2. 
Participation (TAP) (box 11.1). 3. 
Corruption involves the use of public office for private gain. It occurs 
at all levels, from petty corruption to administrative corruption to 
grand corruption (including “state capture”). It is a symptom of poor 
governance and reduces development effectiveness.
Smart Project Design is intended to help ensure that development 
objectives are achieved and that Bank/IDA funds are protected. It is 
country specific and reflects what has been learned about risks and 
risk mitigation in a particular country. While the definition of Smart 
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Project Design is evolving, experience suggests six relatively standard 
elements:
Pursuit of sector-level governance issues through a combination 1. 
of project-specific and “parallel track” initiatives
Focus project design on reducing the negative impact of governance 2. 
and corruption on successful development outcomes
Strengthen internal accountability and the project’s “control 3. 
environment” (procurement, financial management, auditing, 
information availability)
Strengthen external accountability—responsiveness to the “demand 4. 
side” (consultations with affected communities, participation of 
beneficiaries in project design and implementation, and strength-
ened community voice)
Box 11.1  Three Key Principles of Good Governance
A review of the literature on good governance suggests that practitioners should pay 
particular attention to three highly complementary and mutually reinforcing principles: 
transparency, accountability, and participation (TAP). 
1. Transparency implies openness and visibility, which should apply to almost all aspects of 
the conduct of governmental affairs. It is the foundation on which both accountability and 
participation are built. Information in the public domain is the “currency” of transparency 
and, together with open and visible decisionmaking processes, signals that there is really 
nothing to hide. Transparency facilitates good governance. Its absence provides cover 
for conflicts of interest, self-serving deals, bribery, and other forms of corruption.
2. Accountability has many dimensions, both internal and external. Internal account-
ability implies proper management of resources. External accountability refers to the 
responsiveness of political leaders to the needs and aspirations of the citizens. Ac-
countability, of course, implies that the institutions—including the civil service—have 
the capacity to be responsive to the demands of the citizens and that salary levels 
and other incentives are consistent with those expectations. 
3. Participation—or, as some have referred to it, inclusion—is important not just on 
principle but in practical terms. It represents the “demand side” of good governance. 
The benefits of participation are well documented on a global scale in most aspects 
of public governance. Participation of civil society organizations (CSOs), consumer 
groups, project beneficiaries, and affected communities in all stages of Bank-financed 
projects simultaneously can improve development outcomes and reduce opportunities 
for fraud and corruption. 
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Ensure that project design builds in effective oversight by imple-5. 
menting agencies (possibly involving third-party oversight) and 
allows for effective supervision by the Bank/IDA
Develop and implement a well-thought-out communications 6. 
plan designed to consistently send the right signals to all parties 
concerned. 
Anticorruption Action Plans (ACAPs) may be used to formalize some 
or all of the elements of Smart Project Design. ACAPs generally are not 
required for Bank/IDA projects. However, they have been mandated 
in some situations, such as when lessons from findings of the World 
Bank’s Department of Institutional Integrity (INT) investigations and 
Detailed Implementation Reviews (DIRs) appear applicable.2 In other 
cases, ACAPs have been at the initiative of the relevant ministry as 
a way to increase the visibility and impact of its governance and anti-
corruption efforts. The latter is the case for the Yemen Water Sector 
Support Project. 
Governance Agenda at the Country Level
Over the past two years, Yemen has made significant progress in several 
areas of governance. While it continues to lag the MNA Region and 
other low-income economies, the 
country appears to have strength-
ened its rankings in areas such as 
control of corruption, regulatory 
quality, and rule of law (figure 11.1). 
The main challenges remain low 
government effectiveness and ac-
countability as well as very low 
political stability. Despite improve-
ments in its control institutions, per-
ceptions about corruption in Yemen 
remain unfavorable. Regarding voice 
and accountability, however, Yemen 
2 DIRs, or Detailed Implementation Reviews, are carried out by INT (the Bank’s 
Department of Institutional Integrity) in response to multiple allegations of fraud and 
corruption in Bank/IDA projects in a given country, or at the request of the country 
team concerned—generally in connection with a review of corruption concerns 
within a given sector or country.  
Voice and accountability
Political stability
Government effectiveness
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Control of corruption
o 25 50 75 100
Sources: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2008: Governance Matters VII: 
Governance Indicators for 1996–2007.
Yemen
Country’s percentile rank (0–100)
Figure  11.1  Comparison with Regional Average 
(Middle East & North Africa) (lower bar)
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scores better than other more developed nations of the region: Egypt, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia. 
Recent Governance Accomplishments 
With strong support from the donor community, Yemen has made prog-
ress on its governance agenda in a number of critical areas. Examples 
are the new procurement law, development of the High Tender Board 
policies and capacity, completion of the procurement laws implement-
ing regulations, development of the proposed procurement database 
in key agencies, and staff training and development. 
In addition, progress has been achieved in the Cabinet-approved 
comprehensive financial management reform strategy. Areas of im-
provement include budget execution; cash management and internal 
controls; internal and external auditing; financial reporting; and the 
role of oversight bodies such as the supreme audit agency, the Central 
Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA).
In 2007 the Government of Yemen (GOY) also finalized the 
Anticorruption Law. It will support enhanced information disclosure 
as a part of greater transparency and accountability, and as a pre-
requisite for the wider participation of civil society, especially project 
beneficiaries. 
On a parallel track, the Bank and other donors have supported civil 
service reform and capacity building intended to help GOY achieve a 
more professional, competent, and merit-based government service. 
Others in the donor community have supported legal and judicial 
reforms—critical to strengthen the rule of law. 
As part of the 2007 Anticorruption Law, the Supreme National 
Agency for the Control of Corruption (SNACC) was created. The 
Bank is supporting the development of this new anticorruption agency 
through a program of technical assistance (TA). 
Governance and Corruption Issues in the Water Sector and 
Mitigation Measures in WSSP
Water Challenges in Yemen
Yemen has one of the lowest rates of per capita freshwater availability 
in the world (135 m3/cap/year), compared to the almost 10 times higher 
regional average, 1,250 m3/cap/year. The country has no perennial 
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rivers. Its water comes from rainfall, springs, seasonal spate flows, 
runoff, and groundwater. In the last decades, a massive and persistent 
problem of unsustainable groundwater extraction in both highland and 
coastal areas has arisen, threatening the agricultural economy, urban 
growth, and industrial development. In urban areas, approximately only 
56 percent of the population has access to network water supply and 
only 31 percent to sewerage. In rural areas, approximately 45 percent 
of the population has access to safe water and only 21 percent to 
adequate sanitation. Water scarcity has created competing demands 
for its services, and these have greatly complicated the challenges of 
governance.
GOY created the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) 
to implement an integrated approach to water management. In 2002 
a water law was enacted, and in 2003 the Ministry of Water and 
Environment (MWE) was established. Thereafter, MWE prepared 
a consolidated strategy, action plan, and investment program for the 
water sector as a whole. The National Water Sector Strategy and In-
vestment Program 2005–09 (NWSSIP) was adopted and published by 
GOY in 2004.
NWSSIP aimed at recovering control of the groundwater resource 
and moving Yemen toward the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
targets for water supply and sanitation. In late 2007, GOY decided to 
prepare an update of NWSSIP to run from 2009–15. The objective 
was to incorporate changes in the light of experiences and to provide 
a basis for a sector-wide approach (SWAp) to financing. 
Overall, the NWSSIP process has brought significant advantages 
to water sector management: (1) a common framework for planning, 
financing, implementation, and monitoring; (2) a point of reference and 
a forum for stakeholders to maintain continuous dialogue through the 
Joint Annual Reviews; (3) a basis for an integrated intersectoral ap-
proach to water resource management through pooled/joint financing; 
and (4) benchmarks to measure performance.
Governance and Corruption Risks in the Water Sector
Table 11.1 lists the 4 major issues identified in the assessment of gover-
nance and corruption risks in the water sector. Corresponding mitigation 
measures also are presented and are elaborated below, as part of the 
Anticorruption Action Plan. 
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Issue 1
Nonoptimality in selection of specific investment projects, including inter-
ference by “influential persons” in decisionmaking at the national level, 
in some instances combined with an absence of feasibility studies and 
inflated cost estimates, which provide opportunities for excess profits 
and/or payment of bribes and kickbacks.
Mitigation measures. Development of the National Water Sector 
Strategy and Investment Plan (NWSSIP), which clarifies the poli-
cies for achieving sustainable use of water as a natural resource and 
specifies the corresponding investment priorities. NWISSIP will be 
supplemented by the elaboration of a Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) for the water sector—a three-year rolling public 
sector budget document.3 In addition, under WSSP, investments to be 
supported by the pooled donor funding mechanism must meet specific 
investment criteria. These criteria will vary by subsector. They will 
include minimum internal rate of return (IRRs), maximum unit costs 
per capita or per hectare (ha), or financial rates of return (as for local 
utility companies). 
Table 11.1  Key GAC Issues and Mitigation Measures
Issue
Mitigation measures
Sector-level Project-level
Nonoptimality in selection of 
investment projects
NWSSIP, MTEF Development of NWSSIP with clarified 
investment policies, elaboration of MTEF 
for water sector, development of specific 
investment criteria by subsector
Lack of transparency in procurement 
process
Adoption of new procurement law and 
enforcement of reforms
Development of standard bidding 
documents, MIS system, e-procurement 
pilot, and Anticorruption Hot Line
Short-changing investment projects 
by contractors, suppliers, and 
consultants during implementation
Enhanced public disclosure Anticorruption Hot Line, expanded use of 
technical and/or “value for money” audits
“Elite capture” of project benefits after 
completion of project
Stakeholder participation in project design 
and implementation
Improved information disclosure and 
Anticorruption Hot Line program
3 An MTEF is a consolidated financial document that links (1) public expenditures; 
(2) financing plan for those expenditures; and (3) outputs or “deliverables” that will 
be produced. The Water MTEF is timely because government and donors have de-
cided to bring most financing of the water sector within a “SWAp” framework. The 
Water MTEF will provide the medium-term expenditure and financing framework 
within which the WSSP will be integrated
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Issue 2
Lack of transparency in the procurement process, lack of good practices 
in public sector procurement, and shortages of experienced procurement 
professionals within implementation agencies. These three factors pro-
vide opportunities for interference by “influential persons,” conflicts 
of interest, collusion among bidders, and irregular payments by bidders 
to influence outcomes.
Mitigation measures. Adoption of the new national Procurement Law, 
which incorporates global “best practice” in processes and procedures; 
reform of the High Tender Board—including greater independence in 
decisionmaking and development of standard bidding documents for 
the procurement of goods, civil works, and consultant services. These 
reforms will be supplemented by the development of implementing regu-
lations, staff training and development, and establishment of a MIS to 
support the new procurement procedures. In addition, ACAP includes a 
provision to improve information disclosure, pilot “e-procurement,” and 
develop an Anticorruption Hot Line Program to increase the probability 
that inappropriate interference in procurement will be reported. 
Issue 3
Short-changing investment projects by contractors, suppliers, and consultants 
during implementation. Means include irregular payments to supervi-
sors to “look the other way,” submission and acceptance of fraudulent 
documentation (certificates of delivery or completion of work that do 
not accord with contract specifications), and irregular payments for the 
release of project funds or to secure the payment of invoices. 
Mitigation measures. Under WSSP, ACAP provides for enhanced 
disclosure of information about investment plans in the water sector, 
and participation of project beneficiaries and affected communities 
in project design and implementation. These initiatives will help com-
munities to understand what should be done under WSSP projects, 
thus enabling them to monitor ongoing implementation activities. The 
Anticorruption Hot Line will provide a mechanism for community 
members to report suspicious activities. In addition, under the finan-
cial management component of ACAP, WSSP will expand the use of 
technical and/or “value for money” audits that will help to identify any 
shortcomings in the performance of contractors and suppliers, and 
inconsistencies between certificates of delivery and completion and 
what actually exists “on the ground.” The communications program 
under ACAP will alert the contractors, suppliers, and consultants to 
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these initiatives, putting them on notice that short-changing projects 
during implementation is more likely to be discovered. 
Issue 4
“Elite capture” of project benefits after completion of the project. This term 
refers to diverting the benefits to groups other than the intended ben-
eficiaries or for unintended purposes (for example, qat production).4
Mitigation measures. The emphasis given by WSSP to participation 
by beneficiaries and affected communities in project design and imple-
mentation significantly reduces the opportunities for subsequent “elite 
capture.” In addition, the ACAP Anticorruption Hot Line will provide 
a channel for citizens to report any diversion of project benefits.
Anticorruption Action Plan
The Anticorruption Action Plan (ACAP), developed as part of project 
design, is an innovative step in MNA operations, building on the progress 
achieved in the country-level governance and anticorruption agenda. 
It also complements the reform program of the water sector.
The components of ACAP respond to the assessment of GAC 
risks in development projects in the water sector. Broader applicability 
to other sectors is being considered by the government. 
ACAP includes both “supply-side” components, which focus on 
strengthening country systems and the associated control environment 
within which investment projects are implemented; and “demand-side” 
components, which focus on enhancing external accountability through 
community voice and participation—including project oversight. A sum-
mary is presented in box 11.2, and details of each component follow.
Detailed Elements of an Anticorruption Action Plan
Procurement reform and capacity development
This element builds on the work done at the country level in procure-
ment reform, described earlier. While the procurement component of 
the project focuses on the implementation of those reforms, ACAP 
provides additional funding to pilot special initiatives—such as the 
4 Qat is a locally produced plant, the leaves of which are chewed as a stimulant. 
Consumption in Yemen is widespread and extensive.  Excessive qat consumption at 
the national level accelerates drawing on water resources. 
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introduction of e-procurement. Progress in implementing the reform 
program will be critical to achieve the longer-term vision of the WSSP 
in moving toward reliance on country systems. 
Financial management reform and capacity development
As in the case of procurement reforms, this element builds on the 
work done at the country level in the area of financial management 
and audit reform. Here also, the financial management component of 
the project will support the implementation of these reforms, including 
the introduction of an internal audit function. As part of the ACAP, 
particular attention will be given to the use of technical and/or per-
formance audits to ensure that contractors, suppliers, and consultants 
are delivering on their contractual obligations. These special audits will 
be carried out in collaboration with the new internal audit function. 
Progress in these areas also is critical in moving toward reliance on 
country systems.
Box 11.2  Overview of Anticorruption Action Plan
Supply-side components include:
Procurement reform and capacity development, supporting the implementation of N
the new (international best practice) procurement law through training programs and 
innovative pilot initiatives at the sector and project levels 
Financial management reform and capacity development, supporting the implementa-N
tion of the Cabinet-approved comprehensive public financial reform strategy covering 
budget preparation and execution, internal controls and audits, financial reporting, 
and improved oversight by the supreme audit agency 
Enhanced information disclosure, building on the 2007 Anticorruption Law, and tak-N
ing full advantage of new technology to put information into the public domain and 
to support the scaling up of “best practice” cases of information disclosure within 
the water sector.  
Demand-side components include:
Community participation and consultation, building on “best practice” models already N
being implemented in some water sector projects
Education and awareness program, to be carried out in cooperation with Supreme N
National Agency for Combating Corruption (SNACC), as part of the water sector 
SWAp Program’s communications program
Anticorruption Hot Line Program, to be implemented within the water sector, as N
part of the “detection” program. 
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Enhanced information disclosure 
This element builds on the information disclosure provisions of the 2007 
Anticorruption Law. The intention is to take full advantage of new 
technology (web pages, public terminal displays) to put information 
into the public domain and to support the expansion of “best practice” 
disclosure.5 In addition to annual investment and procurement plans, 
tender opportunities and outcomes, status of project implementation, 
and results, Yemen is looking at capturing and publishing relevant unit 
cost factors, results of various audits, and outcomes of “consumer 
surveys”/citizen report cards.
Community participation and consultation 
To enhance the demand for greater transparency, accountability, and 
fairness, ACAP will pay particular attention to the use of consumer 
surveys. Examples are those completed recently in the rural water 
supply subsector and Poverty and Social Impact Assessments (PSIAs), 
such as in the urban subsector. Support also will be given to follow up 
consultations in selected localities; and, for urban centers, with the 
local corporations.
Education and awareness 
This element, in cooperation with SNACC, is an education and aware-
ness program. The intention is to pilot communications initiatives in 
the water sector toward applying them to other sectors in future. 
The target audiences are government staff in implementing agencies; 
private sector firms and individuals (contractors, suppliers, and con-
sultants); and civil society, especially project beneficiaries in affected 
communities. The key messages are that GOY is giving new priority 
to reducing corruption and that all will have a role to play in this effort. 
Those involved will be reminded of their obligation to perform with 
professional integrity and the consequences of failing to do so. They also 
will be informed of the ACAP initiatives being introduced to prevent, 
detect, and deter fraud and corruption in water sector projects.
Anticorruption hot line program 
This element supports the design and development of a Hot Line 
Program to increase the probability that fraud and corruption will be 
5 Such as those developed by the General Authority for Rural Water Supply Proj-
ects (GARWSP).
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detected. To be operated by an independent third party, this program 
will include a hot line phone staffed every day of the year, fax line, 
web page, email address, and post office box—all for the receipt of 
complaints and allegations of fraud and corruption. After a prelimi-
nary screening to sort out irrelevant complaints, the valid cases will 
be forwarded to the ACAP Advisor for referral to the appropriate 
authorities (SNACC, COCA, the implementing agency if more in-
formation is needed).
Monitoring and Evaluation
Given ACAP’s innovative nature, monitoring how it is doing is essential, 
so as to learn from experience and adjust its approach accordingly. 
Features of the monitoring system include:
Adopting a “learning by doing” approach that recognizes the ex-N
perimental nature of many of the activities that will be attempted 
in this new area.
For whatever initiatives are undertaken, defining clear objectives N
for desired improvements in development outcomes or reductions 
in fraud and corruption.
Selecting a limited number of monitorable indicators that will enable N
tracking progress toward these objectives over time.
Establishing baseline numbers for these indicators, wherever fea-N
sible, and setting up monitoring systems that will report regularly 
on the direction of progress.
Monitoring and evaluating the results and assessing the factors N
that aided or hindered the effectiveness of the activities that were 
undertaken.
Where the evaluation indicates that the activities were successful, N
consider scaling up, as appropriate—in that sector at a minimum, 
and possibly in other sectors in the country.
Where the evaluation indicates that the activities have not been N
successful, suspending them until the conditions needed for suc-
cess are attained. If total suspension is not practical, discontinue 
the activities and try a new approach.
Using the mid-term review and end-of-project impact assessment N
to evaluate all of the activities, and extract the lessons learned for 
future reference. 
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While all of the above sound simple, the unfortunate reality is that 
they are far more complicated than they sound. Some indicators of 
development outcomes are relatively straightforward; others are not. 
The results chain—from objectives to inputs, activities, outputs, and 
outcomes—may not lend itself to precise measurement, especially when 
the objective involves reducing fraud and corruption. For example, 
there is not likely to be a meaningful “baseline” number for fraud and 
corruption. Moreover, the number of cases of fraud or corruption ac-
tually should increase with improvements in detection measures such 
as expanded audits and the availability of complaints lines. 
For these reasons, a special effort will be required to define mean-
ingful progress indicators—even if these are surrogates for what can-
not be measured directly. It also will be necessary to develop M&E 
systems that will enable GOY and the Bank to track progress of key 
indicators at the country, sector, and project levels. For the reasons 
cited above, these indicators are foreseen to be reviewed in the initial 
phases of the project.
Summary and Lessons Learned
ACAP as a Learning Exercise
The process of designing and implementing ACAP should be seen as a 
learning process for everyone involved, especially since this is the first 
such initiative in Yemen at the sector and project levels. Many of the 
components involve pilot projects to test the effectiveness of a particular 
approach. Every component will need to be monitored and evaluated 
carefully during implementation. If a particular element is not working 
as intended, it should be fixed or dropped and alternative approaches 
tried. If a particular element is working especially well, consideration 
should be given to adopting it on a wider scale, as appropriate. 
Supervising the Anticorruption Action Plan
Overall, for projects that include an ACAP, it is vital to pay close atten-
tion to how well this plan is being implemented and the extent to which 
it is meeting its objectives. Some of the key components of the plan are 
likely to involve new or pilot activities. These pilots should be approached 
with high hopes but modest expectations. The plan itself should be seen 
as a “work in progress” that is subject to review and modification as 
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needed, and as a learning experience for everyone involved. The plan 
should be treated as an important component of the overall project. 
It will be important to ensure adequate funding for supervision, avail-
ability of the right skills and experience to guide the effort, and careful 
planning to optimize the use of supervision resources overall. 
The four key steps in the supervision process of ACAP are to:
Establish a regular review of progress for each component, includ-1. 
ing an assessment of what is going well, what is not going well, 
and why. 
Discuss and agree with government on adjustments needed to 2. 
enhance effectiveness. 
Record findings and required follow-up in supervision documents, 3. 
both to keep management informed of progress and as an aid to 
subsequent “lessons learned.”
Include an impact assessment as part of the mid-term review of the 4. 
project and as part of the final evaluation of project outcomes. 
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Appendix A1. Improving Governance and Reducing Corruption 
through Public Disclosure of Information
The World Bank desired to support the development of an Anticorrup-
tion Action Plan (ACAP) for the Yemen Water Sector Sector-Wide 
Approach (SWAp) Program. To do so, the Bank examined the role of 
public disclosure of information and the prospects for improving gov-
ernance and reducing corruption by enhancing the amount and type 
of information available to the public. One of the conclusions reached 
is that measures can and should be taken to collect and disseminate 
a variety of information about activities in the water sector and that 
these measures should feature prominently in the Anticorruption Ac-
tion Plan.
This conclusion is consistent with the three basic and inter-
related principles of good governance: transparency, accountability, 
and participation (TAP). Transparency has to do with both more open 
decisionmaking processes and greater availability of information in the 
public domain; and is the foundation for both accountability and partici-
pation. Fortunately, a number of initiatives to improve transparency 
by improving the availability of information already are underway in 
Yemen’s water sector. The Bank’s intention is to build on these initia-
tives by supporting the spread of “best practice” disclosure methods 
in a number of critical areas. 
This appendix provides an overview of the kinds of information that 
should be disclosed, target audiences for different types of information, 
various methods to disclose information, and benefits expected from 
these initiatives.
Information to Be Disclosed
The current water sector strategy and investment plan have been 
updated. The next step will be the development of the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The details of the updated invest-
ment program, MTEF (when it is available), and annual budget alloca-
tions then should be published to make them available to the public. 
These disclosures should occur for each of the four key subsectors: 
urban water and sanitation, rural water and sanitation, irrigation, and 
integrated water resource management at the basin level. 
Similarly, at the project level, annual procurement plans should be 
published, followed by advertisement of specific tender opportunities. 
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Within the procurement process, information should be disclosed con-
sistent with international best practice, including the announcement of 
winning bidders and prices. The ACAP for the SWAp Program also 
proposes piloting e-procurement for some of the largest contracts. In 
addition, ACAP will support the collection and publishing of pricing 
data from each of the four subsectors on selected, comparable unit 
costs. Unit costs will include pumps of various standard sizes, pipes of 
various composition and sizes, concrete storage tanks of various sizes, 
and trenching for various types of soil and terrain conditions. The data 
will be collected and published quarterly. 
Under the financial management component of ACAP, the propos-
als include strengthening the capacity of internal and external audits 
and the extension of audit terms of reference (TOR) to include, on a 
selective basis, performance and/or technical audits. The Bank also will 
encourage implementing authorities to publish the audit reports.
Engaging the community in project identification and design and 
establishing WUGs (water user groups)/WUAs obviously require an 
information campaign by project management to inform potential 
beneficiaries of the existence of the project, eligibility rules, procedures 
for application submission and approval, and the requirements for 
establishing WUGs and WUAs.
 A related “demand-side” initiative under the ACAP is the proposal 
for consumer satisfaction surveys and citizen report cards. The inten-
tion is to disclose how well service providers are actually delivering 
their services.
Given all of these areas in which information disclosure is critical for 
improved governance, ACAP includes a separate component focused 
specifically on enhancing information disclosure. Funding will be pro-
vided for the launch of new pilot initiatives (such as e-procurement), 
identification of existing “best practice” disclosure activities, and scaling 
up “best practice” wherever feasible.
Relevant Target Audiences
Obviously, the target audience for information disclosure depends on 
the nature and purpose of the information. Given the critical nature 
of the water sector and the unsustainable water use practices in the 
country, the sector strategy and investment plans should be of interest 
to a fairly wide audience. The MTEF will be of interest to oversight 
agencies (including Parliament), those working in the sector agencies, 
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local governments, and civil society. Annual budgets, annual procure-
ment plans, and specific tendering opportunities will be of primary 
interest to those engaged in program and project implementation, 
including private sector contractors, suppliers, and consultants. 
Unit cost data should be of interest to both implementing and 
oversight agencies, as well as to the business community. The results 
of internal and external audits— especially the results of performance 
and technical audits—will be particularly interesting to oversight agen-
cies, but also to civil society, including the increasing number of CSOs 
that are focusing on governance and anticorruption. 
Information about project opportunities and eligibility criteria will be 
of obvious interest to potential project beneficiaries. Reports of consumer 
satisfaction and citizen report cards will be of interest to consumers, 
service providers, and relevant levels of government—particularly the 
oversight and regulatory agencies. 
Methods of Information Disclosure
The most appropriate methods of disclosure depend on both the 
nature of the information or data to be disclosed and the characteris-
tics of the target audience. At one end of the spectrum, “high-tech” 
disclosure methods may be appropriate, including through web pages 
and internet links (as for e-procurement). Of particular interest is the 
procurement MIS system that has been developed in the rural water 
supply and sanitation (WSS) sector under GARWSP with financial 
support from the Netherlands. This system is computer based, with 
terminals available in the lobby of GARWSP headquarters and branch 
offices, and makes available information on all stages of the project 
cycle. These ongoing updates enable project beneficiaries, contractors, 
suppliers and consultants, and GARWSP management and staff to see 
at a glance the status of project approval, procurement processes, and 
status of implementation (including the tracking of invoice submission, 
review, approval, and payment). These running updates are one of the 
“best practice” disclosure models that will be considered for “scaling 
up” under ACAP.
In the mid-range of the spectrum, newspaper advertisements may 
be appropriate for notifying potential bidders of a tender opportunity. 
However, at the community level, printed word literacy cannot be as-
sumed, let alone technical literacy. Consequently, radio and television 
may be the more appropriate channels for information dissemination. 
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These could be supported by community meetings and/or focus groups 
in which information is presented by project sponsors and discussed 
in a public forum. At the village level, community meetings may be 
supplemented by simple written materials posted on bulletin boards. 
Expected Benefits of Enhanced Information Disclosure
Greater transparency and information disclosure in public procurement 
are important to reduce corruption and control costs. A key element 
of ACAP will be the analysis of unit costs across projects, subsectors, 
and areas of the country. In addition to publishing the data quarterly, 
the availability of these data will (a) enable the analysis of possible 
anomalies or unexplained differences in prices for comparable items 
and (b) provide a base-line (which does not now exist) to track move-
ments in unit costs over time. Ideally, if other elements of ACAP are 
successful, there even could be a reduction in unit costs as a result of 
greater attention being paid to those costs. 
Regarding development effectiveness and the sustainability of 
project investments, the evidence is clear and compelling. Projects initi-
ated without community participation (1) are less likely to meet the needs 
of the intended beneficiaries and (2) are unlikely to be maintained. The 
second is due to both the lack of ownership by the affected community 
and the absence of a community-based organization (CBO) tasked 
with managing and maintaining the relevant assets. In fact, many of 
the projects in the current water sector portfolio involve rehabilitation of 
earlier projects that failed due to a lack of participation. 
Finally, carrying out consumer surveys and citizen report card 
exercises and publicly disclosing the results should go a long way to 
strengthen the community demand for accountability and responsive-
ness by service providers. 
Taken together, the proposed enhancements to the availability of 
information in the public domain should have a noticeable and positive 
impact on development effectiveness in Yemen’s water sector. 
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Water Allocation Conflict 
Management: Case Study  
of Bitit, Morocco
Rachid Abdellaoui
The Bitit irrigation perimeter is a small-scale irrigation system built in Morocco at the start of the twentieth century by farmers and managed by them. † The system lies at the foot of the Atlas 
Mountains at an average altitude of 600 meters above sea level, midway 
between the cities of Fes and Meknes. As farmers have put land and 
water to productive use, there naturally have been conflictual situations. 
An interesting dimension has been the emergence of markets for water 
rights as a means to bring transparency to bargaining for water. Water 
rights have mitigated conflicts over water for two constituencies:
Among Bitit irrigation water users N
Between these irrigators and the water utility, RADEM, which N
supplies water to Meknes. 
The Irrigation System and Its Evolution 
State of Water Resources
The Bitit irrigation perimeter is fed by three perennial springs (table 
12.1).
In the early 1980s, Morocco experienced a series of severe drought 
years. The government created 3 boreholes in the Bitit area to extract 
approximately 120 liters of water per second (l/s) to serve potable wa-
ter needs. As a result, the perennial springs have witnessed lowered 
discharges. 
† Adapted by the editors from a background paper prepared for the “MNA Devel-
opment Report on Water: Water Conflicts and Their Management Mechanisms in 
Morocco,” CEDARE Cairo, 2005.
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Appropriation of Land and Water
At the start of the last century, land and water were exploited col-
lectively by the Bitit area’s population, mainly as rangeland. The 
resources were plentiful, and each household had more land than it 
could exploit. Excess water discharges from the springs fed into the 
adjoining marshlands, causing malaria to become a common health 
problem in the Bitit community.
However, by the 1920s, through both natural population growth 
and the growth of commercialization, pressures on land and water 
resources began to increase. The French colonial administration had 
two goals. On the political side, it intended to keep the peasants from 
joining the nationalists, who had become very active in both Fes and 
Meknes. On the economic side, the French meant to encourage market 
linkages for these rural communities. 
In the mid-1910s, the French had promulgated laws to place water 
resources in the public domain unless they had been regulated by spe-
cific pre-existing water rights. Regarding Bitit, these laws established 
equal sharing of water between upstream (politically active Ait Oual-
lal) and downstream (less politically active Ait Ayach) communities. 
Later, group and individual water rights were recognized and recorded. 
Both land and water then became private property that could be sold 
to both nationals and French private settlers.
However, the nearby city of Meknes had growing demand for 
water and the local farmers resisted attempts to expropriate their 
rights. In 1949 a special decree fixed the share of the Public Domain 
of Bitit waters at 60 percent of availability, leaving only 40 percent of 
the water to the farmers. There was strong opposition from the latter. 
As compensation, the French offered to construct the main canal of 
Bitit, to reduce infiltration rates in the existing earthen canals (thus 
“justifying” the 60 percent reduction in water rights), and to improve 
Table 12.1  Three Perennial Springs That Feed Bitit (l/s)
Spring name Estimated discharge during summer , 1974–79 (l/s) Estimated discharge during summer, 2005 (l/s)
Sidi Tahar 1850 1450
Si L’Mir 120 0
Sbâa 600 400
Total 2570 1850
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public health by reducing malarial mosquitoes. The canal was con-
structed by 1954, after which 400 l/s were diverted for the potable 
water needs of Meknes.
By the 1970s, Morocco was an independent country, but govern-
ment decisions continued to respond to urban needs. Meknes needed 
more water, and water available in the public domain was estimated 
to be 1800 l/s (in peak irrigation season). However, there was still a 
need to avoid social unrest in the countryside. To justify the diversion 
of just an additional 400 l/s, the government undertook a rehabilitation 
project by which many more kilometers of earthen irrigation canals 
(seguias) were lined to reduce water infiltration losses, and thus com-
pensate beneficiaries for the additional water diversion. By August 
2005, although the municipal water demand had drastically increased, 
the overall water sharing had not changed. Meknes continues to divert 
800 l/s, leaving the rest of the water resources with the farmers for 
three reasons, one political and two technical: 
On the political side, farmers’ opposition to further diversion of 1. 
water to which they considered they had water rights
On the technical side, (a) the Office National de l’Eau Potable’s 2. 
(ONEP) using better drilling technology to enhance Meknes’ water 
supply with approximately 1200 l/s, and (b) higher treatment costs 
for the spring waters during the rainy season when they had high 
quantities of suspended matter.
Table 12.2 summarizes this evolution of water allocations.
Irrigation Canal Network and Water Shares
The main canal, constructed in 1953, starts at the spring of Sidi Tahar. 
The canal feeds five large main seguias and several smaller ones before 
discharging downstream in Ait Ayach lands. All main seguias were lined 
in the 1980s. The subsequent rehabilitation of the irrigation network 
necessitated two developments:
Construction of proper diversion and discharge partitioning struc-1. 
tures
Fixation of the seguia on which individual water rights could be 2. 
exercised led to the computation of the design discharge of the 
seguias. 
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Table 12.2  Evolution of Water Allocations in Morocco, 1920s–2005
Period
Groups of 
shareholders
No. of 
shares
Total  
discharge 
(%)
Water right 
discharge  
(l/s)
Discharge  
actually  
diverted (l/s) Important event/comments
Early 
1920’s
 
 
 
Béni M’tir (Ait 
Ouallal) 
48  2,420 2,420
Start of appropriation (by peasants) of waters 
and land previously collective
Chorfa et 
Regraga
8  403 403
Intensive pressure on land and water by French 
settlers
Caid 3.5  176 176  
Total 59.5 100 3,000 3,000  
Around 
1925
 
 
 
 
Ait Ouallal 24  1,210 1,210
Laws of 1919 and 1924 related to water and 
definition of water domain
Ait Ayache 24  1,210 1,210 Ait Aiyache—downstream users of Béni M’tir
Chorfa et 
Regraga
8  403 403 Individual appropriation of land and water
Caid 3.5  176 176  
Total 59.5 100 3,000 3,000  
1949
 
 
 
 
 
Ait Ouallal 24  484 1,210  
Ait Ayache 24  484 1,210
Ait Ayache being downstream, they are 
probably not diverting all their right
Chorfa et 
Regraga
8  161 403  
Caid 3.5  71 176  
Total 59.5 40 1,200 3,000  
Public domain  60 1,800 0
Vizirial decree of November 23, 1994 (Official 
Bulletin of 30 December 1949)
1953–54
 
 
 
 
 
Ait Ouallal 24  484 1,049
Construction of main canal to compensate for 
the water appropriated by the public domain
Ait Ayache 24  484 1,049  
Chorfa et 
Regraga
8  161 350  
Caid 3.5  71 153  
Total 59.5 40 1,200 2,600  
Public domain  60 1,800 400 Water is effectively diverted to Meknes
1983–88
 
 
 
 
 
Ait Ouallal 24  415 714
Rehabilitation of irrigation system consisting 
essentially of lining main seguias to 
compensate for additional 400 l/s diversion
Ait Ayache 24  415 714
With creation of modern discharge partitioning 
structures
Chorfa et 
Regraga
8  138 238 Small reduction of spring discharge
Caid 3.5  60 104  
Total 59.5 40 1,028 1,770  
Public domain  60 1,542 800
Diversion to Meknes of an additional discharge 
of 400 l/s
2005
 
 
 
 
 
Ait Ouallal 24  298 424 Large reduction of discharge of various springs
Ait Ayache 24  298 424  
Chorfa et 
Regraga
8  99 141
3 tube wells with total discharge of 120 l/s are 
created. 
Caid 3.5  44 62  
Total 59.5 40 740 1,050  
Public domain  60 1,110 800  
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Actual measurements con-
ducted after the rehabilitation 
project showed that water losses 
in irrigation canals effectively 
dropped from approximately 
1.21 l/s/100 meters to 0.9 l/s/100 
meters of the seguia. The farm-
ers immediately recognized the 
benefits of lining the seguias, 
particularly as the overall net-
work was very long. They also 
recognized the importance of 
concrete diversion structures 
that prevent water theft.
Figure 12.1 is an approximate 
drawing of the irrigation network 
with seguia names. 
Table 12.3 gives the break-
down of shareholders’ water 
rights by group of shareholders 
and by main seguia. The shares indicated in table 12.3 assume continuous 
water discharge of a water modulus.1 The modulus varies depending 
on the spring discharge and thus the season.
Field measurements conducted in 1987 indicated a variation of the 
water modulus ranging from 25 l/s to 35 l/s with an average of 30 l/s 
depending on the seguia and the precision of the flow-partitioning 
device on the main canal. Presently, farmers estimate that the water 
modulus is only approximately 20 l/s, which correlates perfectly with 
the reduction in spring discharge since then. In 1987 the total available 
discharge to peasants was approximately 1770 l/s, which, divided by 
59.5 shares, equaled a water modulus of 29.75 l/s. In 2005 the figures 
were 1050 l/s and 17.65 l/s, respectively (table 12.2). For example, 
Seguia Boufadma carries 9 water modulus (which summed to ap-
proximately 270 l/s in 1987, but now sums to only 160 l/s in peak-use 
periods) (table 12.3).
S. ghellafa
S. Tahar
S. Kherichfa
Si L’Mir
S. bâa
N
main
canal
S. ichniouine S. Mouloua
S. boufadma
Figure 12.1  Bitit Irrigation Network with Seguia Names 
Source: Author.
Note: Scale = 1: 70,000. 
1 The bulk elastic properties of a material determine how much it will compress 
under a given amount of external pressure. The ratio of the change in pressure to 
the fractional volume compression is called the bulk modulus of the material. http://
hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/permot3.html
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Table 12.3  Water Shareholder Groups and Shares of Ait Ouallal by Main Seguia
Group of 
shareholders
No. of 
shares Guellafa Boufadma Kherichfa Moulouya Tichniouine Roz Batbatia Taoujdate Tighza Total
Ait Moussa 
Hammi + Ait 
Akka
8  4   3 1    8
Ait Rbaa 4  2   2     4
Ait Ali 
Boubker
4 4         4
Ait Brahim 4   1 2     1 4
Ait Ammar 4   2 2      4
Chorfa et 
Regraga
8 4 1     2 1  8
Caid 3.5 1.5 2        3.5
Total shares 
(water 
modulus)
35.5 9.5 9 3 4 5 1 2 1 1 35.5
The irrigation turn duration originally was computed for each 
shareholder to receive the total water discharge of the seguia during 
a full day. For example, the households of Ait Moussa Hammi and Ait 
Akka villages originally numbered 52. Thus, their irrigation rotation 
on Boufadma followed a 52-day cycle, and each household received 
a 4 water modulus, totaling a discharge of 120 l/s every 52 days. As 
the water rights process fragmented due to population growth and 
demand grew because of crop intensification (as with the introduc-
tion of summer vegetable crops), the irrigation frequency had to be 
increased. Consequently, over time, the water turn duration was 
reduced (table 12.4).
To avoid having 6.5 days of irrigation turn and facilitate water 
distribution by making the rotation weekly, in 1990 rights were recom-
puted proportionally. Presently, farmers’ water rights are expressed in 
Table 12.4  Evolution of Irrigation Turn Duration over Time (Ait Moussa Hammi and Ait 
Hakka), 1940s–1990s
Period Length of irrigation turn (days)
Until late 1940s 52
Until late 1960s 26
Until late 1980s 13
Since early 1990s 7
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hours: In 2005 a farmer who owned 1 hour of water actually possessed 
3600 seconds * 20 liters/second, that is, 72 m3 every irrigation turn (= 
rotation) of 7 days. 
Cropping Pattern
In the early 1980s, the total useful area of the Bitit irrigation system 
was estimated at 5000 hectares (ha). Of these, approximately 2000 ha 
were irrigable (900 ha during the summer + 1100 ha during winter). 
Since then, following many stone-clearing operations, the arable land 
has greatly increased. 
The preferred winter crops are cereals (primarily wheat planted 
in November and harvested in June), which receive supplemental ir-
rigation if necessary. Ninety percent of summer crops are vegetables 
and tobacco. Orchards (mainly apples) have been abandoned due to 
low water availability.
Tobacco acreage has decreased, and tobacco is kept only as an 
alternative crop to reduce farmers’ risk. Potato acreage also has de-
creased. Some farmers switched from summer production of potatoes 
(planting in March, harvesting in August) to seed production of F1 and 
F2 generations (planting by mid-August, harvesting in January at the 
latest).2 Onions are a popular crop. They are planted in March and 
harvested by mid-August, followed by seed potatoes. These crops 
appear to be the best combination that matches seasonal demand for 
water with existing market conditions.
Irrigation System Management
Traditional organization to manage conflicting interests
Bitit’s irrigation system is managed by traditional organizations at the 
main seguia level. Before the start of each cropping season, after Friday 
prayers (which time was chosen to ensure maximum attendance), the 
shareholders of the seguia gather in a general assembly to take deci-
sions to reduce potential conflicts among members:
Shareholders elect a certain number of a. waqqaf (type of ditch rider) 
members. This task has the highest priority.
2 F1 and F2 refer to foundation seeds for potatoes of good quality.
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After this vote, and with the expert assistance of the waqqaf, b. 
shareholders establish the Jrida of the seguia. This is a full list of the 
individual shareholders and their irrigation time durations, together 
with the exact location of the fields that each shareholder would 
like to irrigate in the forthcoming season.
Last, the shareholders agree on the water distribution sequence c. 
during each irrigation turn. 
The number of waqqafs will depend on the number of sharehold-
ers, the length of the seguia, and the degree to which irrigation land is 
dispersed along the seguia. In 1987, 5 waqqafs were elected to manage 
Seguia Boufadma (270 l/s at that time). 
The waqqaf members are required to live in the village, have an 
extensive knowledge of field locations and water rights, and fully un-
derstand the spatial and temporal water distribution logic of the seguia. 
These persons therefore allocate their time to irrigation management 
and also are available at any time day or night. An implication is that 
waqqaf members tend to own little land and usually have either none 
or very few water rights. In 1987 each irrigator in the villages paid each 
waqqaf 300 DH/year for 24 hours of water rights, which corresponds 
to 12.5 DH/year/hour of water right. 
The first task of the waqqaf is to help to establish the Jrida during 
the general assembly and to work on it later until it is complete and 
exact. This process usually takes time as: 
The number of shareholders is very large. Therefore, it is not feasible a. 
to list all of them during one two-hour general assembly.
Many of the small shareholding farmers often are not at the assem-b. 
bly, requiring the waqqaf to contact them later at their homes.
Some transactions on water rights are not resolved immediately. Ad-c. 
ditional time is needed to make sure that no mistakes are made.
The Jrida is of paramount importance because it is the basic manage-
ment framework through which water allocation and distribution rules 
are established. Although the process of establishing/operationalizing 
the Jrida may seem to be and is challenging, the waqqaf usually is able 
to complete the process before irrigation season begins. 
The waqqaf uses local knowledge to simplify the Jrida. Irrigation 
quarters of variable acreage and limits are defined, to which one ir-
rigation modulus ( fess, literally “a hand of water”) is allocated. Usually, 
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this process requires defining turns among the various field intakes. 
Topography, water rights, cropping patterns, and conflict reduction 
are the key criteria in determining the rules. 
The Jrida system is very flexible. It fully incorporates irrigators’ 
concerns by ensuring that allocation rules for each quarter are trans-
parent for that irrigation season, including after crops are progressively 
harvested. Once the Jrida is established and the first irrigation turn is 
executed, the waqqaf’s responsibilities are reduced. The waqqaf has 
made every farmer aware of who his predecessors and successors are 
in the rotation process. Because the irrigation turn is exactly one week 
in length, the rotation is perfectly fixed. Each field receives the water 
on a given day at a given time for a given duration. 
However, problems do arise during the irrigation process that require 
waqqaf intervention. For example, while transplanting onions, farmers 
need low discharges (half of the water modulus) and can irrigate only 
during daylight hours. They often seek the waqqaf’s help with these 
specifics. Besides the irrigation management responsibilities, the waqqaf 
must manage conflicts among irrigators, particularly accusations of 
water stealing by irrigators.
Modern WUAs continue to work according to traditional norms
In December 1990, Law 2/84 (published in May 1992) established the 
rules by which water user associations (WUAs) (Associations des 
Usagers des Eaux Agricoles, or AUEA) are to be created and man-
aged. The law also listed the benefits that WUAs could be expected 
to receive from government policies aimed at irrigation system reha-
bilitation/improvement.
In 2005, there were 5 WUAs in Bitit (1 for each of the 5 main 
seguias). All of them were created under the framework of Law 2/84. 
Nevertheless, old practices of the traditional organizations continue to 
dominate. While previously the waqqaf was earning 13 x 24 x 12.5 DH 
= 3900 DH/year, it now earns 7 x 24 x 30 DH = 5040 DH/year. When 
adjusted for inflation, the amount probably is very similar. Moreover, 
if the rotations are more frequent, they also are shorter.
Conflicts over Water
Conflicts over water among farmers
Water conflicts are very rare because both traditional and legal water 
allocation and distribution rules are perfectly clear and well established 
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in writing. In addition, concrete discharge partitioning structures leave 
very little space for arguments.
According to Ait Ouallal farmers, conflicts arise primarily when 
irrigators resort to water theft. For example, at the start of an irrigation 
season, water is relatively abundant, and farmers may overestimate 
the acreage of summer crops that they may be able to irrigate satis-
factorily. Later, climatic conditions change, particularly when very hot 
and dry easterly winds known as chergui raise temperatures for several 
consecutive days during the peak growing months of July and August. 
Under these circumstances, to save their crops, irrigators may resort 
to water theft. The role of the waqqaf is to watch for such transgres-
sions and enforce penalties on these irrigators. 
Tubewells play an important role in supplementary irrigation. 
Through tube wells, irrigators can meet any unexpected demand 
for irrigation water during the peak crop demand period without re-
sorting to water theft. The farmers usually buy tubewell water on a 
volumetric basis. 
A recent proposal by a mineral water bottling company to pur-
chase water rights (see further developments in this text) has caused 
disagreement among farmers. They all want to sell their water to the 
bottling company but cannot agree on how much water each one 
would be allowed to sell.
Conflicts over water between farmers and the municipal water agency  
of Meknes
The Régie Autonome de Distribution d’Eau de Meknes (RADEM) 
is the municipal water management agency of Meknes. Ait Ouallal 
farmers complain about the way that RADEM handles the diversion of 
the 800 l/s directly from the Sidi Taher Spring. The spring is protected 
by a concrete structure with a metallic door that has a single key kept 
by 2 guards hired by RADEM. Farmers are forbidden from verifying 
the discharge that is effectively diverted. The diversion takes place 
literally behind closed doors, and no flow measuring device is installed 
other than an imprecise concrete weir with a height that can easily 
be modified. 
Ait Ouallal farmers allege that RADEM is diverting more than its 
share, particularly during the peak summer season. Ait Ouallal farmers 
insist they will not accept further diversion of “their” water, whether 
or not authorities consider it part of the public domain. The farmers 
are adamant that RADEM should purchase water from them. 
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Effects of Water Markets on Women
In Morocco, women can inherit property rights. The fact that water is 
a marketable good has been a factor in promoting the status of female 
household heads, because women without access to enough labor for 
irrigated farming can sell their water. Farmers sell the usage of water 
for one irrigation season if they need money or if they do not have the 
resources (labor and/or money) to grow irrigated crops themselves. 
While property owners are attached to land and sell it only as a last 
resort, there is much greater willingness to sell water rights, because 
they are a renewable resource. 
Water market in Bitit 
In Bitit, water has been a freely marketable good since the early 1930s. 
More importantly, water rights can be sold independently of land. 
Farmers like to say that water is “single,” that is, it is not “married” to 
the land it irrigates. Water is a free good that can travel to any field 
provided it does not move to a main seguia other than that on which 
the water right is registered. In other words, water rights are tied to 
a given main seguia. This customary law does not pose a constraint 
because there is much more land than water, and seguias are designed 
to transport their full discharge over their total length. As discussed 
below, water prices become a good mechanism to allocate resources 
efficiently and minimize conflicts.
Water prices
The price of water can give a good idea of the efficiency of its use.
Annual rights
In 1987 the price of 24 hours of water right was 5000 dirhams (DH)/
year. In 2005 the price of 1 hour of water right skyrocketed to 1400 
DH/year. Water is valuable only from mid-March to mid-October 
Table 12.5  Price of Water, 1987 and 2005 (DH/m3)
Year
Price of 1 hr 
of water 
(DH)
Actual water 
modulus  (l/s)
Corresponding vol. 
every irrigation 
turn (m3)
Turn  
duration (days)
Length of 
irrigation 
season (days)
Total  
seasonal 
volume (m3)
Price of 
water  
(DH/m3)
1987 208 30 108 13 210 1745 0.12
2005 1400 20 72 7 210 2160 0.65
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(7 months). The prices of a cubic meter (m3) of water in 1987 and 2005 
have been computed in table 12.5. 
The price of water over the past 18 years thus has been multiplied 
by a factor of 5.4. The computations in table 12.5 assume that water 
is plentiful during the winter season (mid-October to mid-March). If, 
however, the rains have become less plentiful—as they have—and the 
irrigation season longer, then the increase in the price of water is not 
as great as shown in table 12.5.
The official average annual inflation rate in Morocco during the 
last 18 years has been approximately 3 percent. Accordingly, prices 
should have increased by a factor of approximately 1.7 during the 
period 1987–2004/05. In comparison, from 1969–2005, the water 
tariff in the Tadla large-scale irrigation system varied as shown in 
table 12.6.
While the water prices in Tadla and Bitit were similar in 1987 
(0.1 DH/m3 and 0.12 DH/m3, respectively), in 2004–05 they differed 
substantially (0.22 DH/m3 and 0.65 DH/m3, respectively). The price 
increase in Tadla from 1987 to 2004 was substantially below the increase 
observed in Bitit. One could conclude that the free water market of 
Bitit enabled taking into account the greater scarcity of water over 
time and consequently its higher value.
Tubewell water also can be purchased from AUEA for 40 DH/h of 
20 l/s. The corresponding price is thus 0.55 DH/m3, slightly less than 
the surface water price. 
Who sells/buys water? 
Annual rights
Farmers think that the water right they own is never sufficient because 
this resource, rather than the land, is the binding constraint on produc-
tion. Usually, those who possess 2–4 hours sell their water. Those who 
possess more than 4 hours either sell their water or buy more water 
to extend their farming operations. Thus, selling and buying water is 
very common practice.
Table 12.6  Comparison of Water Tariff in Tadla Irrigation System, 1969–2004 (DH/m3)
Year 1969 1972 1980 1984 1985 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2004
DH/m3 0.024 0.024 0.048 0.079 0.090 0.100 0.100 0.120 0.120 0.150 0.160 0.170 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.200 0.220
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Permanent rights
Selling permanent water rights is still quite rare. Each year, only 
50–60 hours of permanent water rights are sold, and usually by 
those who own very small time shares—so small (usually 10–30 
minutes) that it is not profitable to retain the right. Rarely does 
anyone owning more than 3 hours sells his/her water right. 
Few shareholders buy water rights. Their strategy is to look for 
small shareholders and progressively concentrate water property by 
hourly purchases. The advantages of concentrating water property 
are reflected in prices; the smaller the share, the lower the price per 
hour. Ten minutes can be purchased at less than 7000 DH/h (half the 
normal price). Thirty minutes costs 10,000 DH/h.
In this way, one powerful farmer has accumulated 100 hours of water 
rights. To ensure a reliable cash flow, he can profitably sell 50 hours for 
70,000 DH/season. He himself can use the remaining 50 hours.
Net benefits from a cubic meter of irrigation water to grow onions
According to Ait Ouallal farmers, 1 ha of onions necessitates a water 
right of 10 hours for at least 4 months (April–July). This purchase 
amounts to 10 h * 3600 s/h * 20 l/s / 1000 l/m3 = 720 m3 every irrigation 
turn of 7 days. Over 4 months (17 turns), the crop water requirement 
is 12,340 m3. Apart from irrigated water, it costs on average of 30,000 
DH/ha to produce onions. The average yield is 50 metric tons/ha.
The onion selling price is highly variable (table 12.7). Farmers 
remember an exceptionally good year (1992) when onions sold for 5 
DH/kg! 
One bad selling year, the farmers had to feed onions to their cattle 
because the price was too low. The milk ended up smelling of onions! 
With the benefit of irrigation, farmers estimate that, on average, the 
net benefit (receipts minus expenses) from onions is 30,000 DH/ha. 
This net profit corresponds to a water productivity of 30,000/12,340 
= 2.43 DH/m3 of water, and a profit of 2.34-0.65 
= 1.78 DH/m3 net of the price of water. Farmers 
remark that 1.78 DH/m3 is higher than the lowest 
price that potable water is sold for in Meknes.
If risk were not an issue, Bitit farmers should 
plant as many onions as possible because they look 
very profitable on average. However, in case of 
over-production, farmers risk losing profitability. 
In addition, the quantity of water used to produce 
Table 12.7  Onion Price, 2000–05
Year DH/kg
2005 2.5
2004 0.2
2003 3.0
2002 3.5
2001 1.5
2000 1.5
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onions is very high. Logically, farmers should switch to a more efficient, 
on-farm water application type of irrigation, that is, from surface to drip 
irrigation. Farmers recognize that, under drip irrigation, onion yields 
double, while water consumption is almost halved. The water saved 
could be either sold or used to increase the irrigated acreage.
These arguments are not convincing to farmers because they are 
particularly afraid of onion over-production. They prefer to cope with 
price variability by reducing risks and balancing their cropping pattern. 
Farmers have developed specific strategies such as, “If March is dry, 
the onion season will be good.” 
It would be very interesting to further study this question. Never-
theless, the price of water at 0.65 DH/m3 appears affordable compared 
to its productivity (2.43 DH/m3). 
Alternative Markets for Water
Municipal water
The municipal water market is one alternative. According to farmers, so 
far the municipal water agency of Meknes (RADEM) does not appear 
interested in buying water from them as long as its water needs (ap-
proximately 120,000 m3/day) are covered by the 800 l/s of spring water 
plus the additional tubewell water it buys from the Office National de 
l’Eau Potable (ONEP) at approximately 3 DH/m3. However, population 
growth is expanding demand for municipal water. Moreover, supply 
alternatives are becoming limited. Finally, aquifer levels fall every year 
while pumping costs increase. Farmers think this ever-growing demand 
may influence RADEM to enter into negotiations with them.
To date, the balance of power is with RADEM. Farmers accuse 
RADEM of inefficient management, specifically, of having very low 
water efficiency in its conveyance and distribution to urban consumers. 
According to the farmers, a large water leak can be observed close to 
the municipal water intake from Si Tahar spring. Farmers believe that 
RADEM does not sell municipal water in Meknes at a high enough 
price to create incentives for efficient use.
Farmers’ feelings are a mix, first, of apprehension of RADEM 
trying to appropriate more water from the springs, and, second, of 
hope that RADEM will buy water from them at a market price. If the 
Vizirial decree of November 23, 1924 is invoked, their apprehension of 
additional water diversion by RADEM is not unwarranted. 
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Mineral water
Recently, in 2004, a mineral water bottling company proposed to buy 
water from Bitit farmers at 40 DH/m3. In the first stage, the factory 
would treat 40 l/s, which will be doubled in a later stage. This deal is 
seen as exceptionally good since a 1-hour water right corresponds to 
a monthly revenue of approximately 7,000 DH. However, farmers 
face two challenges.
Securing the authorization from the Sebou River Basin Agency to 1. 
finalize the deal. Securing this authorization is not straightforward. 
Article 9 of the Law 10-95 of August 16, 1995 indicates that 
“…irrigation water rights can be sold with, and for the benefit, 
of the land it irrigates, or independently from the land but only 
under the express condition that the buyer owns land to which 
the water rights will be linked.” 
  Bitit farmers believe that their water rights are not linked to any 
agricultural use of waters and that they are free to sell their water 
to consumers willing to pay the acceptable price. From their point of 
view, Law 10-95 is prohibiting maximization of water productivity 
and should be revised or better interpreted.
Securing an agreement among farmers on how to work out a group 2. 
contract since every shareholder wants to sell his or her water right 
to the company. 
At present, farmers have almost stopped selling irrigation wa-
ter rights among themselves because they believe that much better 
prices could be obtained from RADEM, or perhaps a mineral water 
company
Conclusions
Three important lessons from the Bitit irrigation system are of relevance 
to those who manage large-scale irrigation systems and to others who 
are in charge of water resource management in Morocco and even 
throughout the MNA Region:
A 1. clear water allocation rule, internalized at the farmer level, is the 
basis for any good water management practice. Transparency in as-
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signing water appropriation rights to farmers is the simplest water 
allocation rule to reduce conflicts. 
The 2. free water market of Bitit has contributed to keep water rights 
updated. Small water shares could be sold or hired, and consequently 
put to their highest economic use. Similarly, a free water market 
is the most effective way of keeping a clear water allocation rule 
updated. This rule is the cement that links the water users and keep-
ing their association alive and active. What might have happened 
over time if water rights were not a marketable good? 
Free water market is certainly equally contributing to the search 3. 
for increasing productivity of water. A water price of 0.65 DH/m3 
is a good indicator. It is as much as 3 times the tariff of water in 
large-scale systems (Tadla, for instance). A net benefit of approxi-
mately 2.63 DH/m3 also is higher than the more modest values 
encountered in large-scale systems. However, application efficiency 
of water remains very low in Bitit. Why farmers are not improving 
their water application efficiency is a question that remains to be 
tackled. One would expect a rapid development of trickle systems, 
especially because they are heavily subsidized by government. 
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How Did a Small, Poor, and 
Remote Rural Village in Djibouti 
Recently Become a Government 
Priority to Receive Water Supply 
and Sanitation?
Sarah Houssein, in collaboration with Julia 
Bucknall and Nathalie Abu-Ata
The case of Goubeto village in rural Djibouti illustrates the impor-tant role of local and traditional authorities, in the absence of state intervention, in solving conflicts through negotiations over 
the allocation of scarce water resources among community members.†
Moreover, as a consequence of the severe and worsening water supply 
and sanitation crisis, progressive loss of traditional values, and rise of 
the previously marginalized voices of youth and women, an inclusive 
and participatory new structure was able to emerge and make water 
for their village a priority for the central government.
Goubeto was established in 1910, first as a maintenance facility for 
the railway under construction between Djibouti and Ethiopia, and later 
as a train station depot. The village is not connected to the national 
road network and, except for Djibouti city, is far from any major cities. 
Goubeto is 71 km from the city of Ali-Sabieh, which is the district capital. 
Primarily former railway workers and their families, along with settled 
nomads, inhabit Goubeto. The climate is arid and hot, and the village 
is poorly endowed with water resources. Goubeto’s water reservoir 
has a maximum storage capacity of 200m3 per month. The reservoir’s 
capacity is dependent on the regular provision of fuel for pumping, 
which is subject to a quota and is delivered from Ali-Sabieh. 
Until the early 1980s, villagers received potable water from Djibouti 
city, and trucks supplied the precious resource twice a week. Accord-
† Background Paper for 2007 “MNA Development Report on Water.”
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ing to the villagers, at that time, there were no major conflicts over 
the allocation of water. Attracted by the reliable water supply and the 
availability of basic social infrastructure, nomads, who had lost their 
livestock as a result of severe and frequent droughts, progressively 
settled in the village. The settlement of nomads was further encour-
aged by the construction of a well in 1980, which supplied Goubeto 
with a certain amount of bulk water once a month. Water thus played 
a critical role in the growth and expansion of the village.
However, beginning in the mid-1980s, water supply in Goubeto 
became erratic and scarce, in particular during the hot summer sea-
sons, due to population growth and the lack of proper maintenance of 
water infrastructure. As a result, conflicts over water allocation flared 
on occasion between the settled populations and the nomads as well 
as among settlers themselves. For example, nomads would tamper 
with the water reservoirs and canals and collect the water without 
prior agreement with local villagers. 
Traditional authorities, such as the village chief or the community 
of elders (Conseil des Sages), played a critical role in efforts to mediate 
and solve these conflicts. The Conseil des Sages also oversaw repairs 
of tampered water infrastructure and made decisions on water al-
location. However, because of its physical remoteness, the village of 
Goubeto was never a priority for the central government. Techni-
cians were rarely sent from the central government to Goubeto to 
perform routine maintenance on water infrastructure. In spite of the 
involvement of traditional authorities in solving conflicts over the use 
of water, the community of Goubeto lacked the knowledge, financial 
capacity, and political connections to find a long-term solution to its 
intermittent water supply.
In the late 1990s, as a result of worsening water quality, poor sani-
tation and hygiene, recurrent droughts, and malnutrition, an epidemic 
of diarrhea broke out, killing 12 people. The deteriorating water quality 
clearly posed a serious environmental threat to the residents. Some of 
the villagers decided to take action and lobby the central government 
to obtain public assistance and funding to improve the water supply and 
sanitation systems. The fact that the villagers supported the political op-
position provided another incentive for the government to react quickly 
to the rapidly deteriorating environmental health situation in Goubeto. 
As a result of the above developments, a water association was 
created in 2004. It serves as the interface between the central gov-
ernment and the various communities in the village. The association 
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includes a broad representation of local stakehold-
ers, including elders and delegates from youth and 
women groups. A project to drill a new well 1 km 
from Goubeto is underway, and it will be powered 
by a solar energy system. 
Goubeto offers a useful case study that illus-
trates how traditional authorities can play a criti-
cal role in providing water to local communities. 
However, because of the physical remoteness and political seclusion of 
the village vis-à-vis the central government, the traditional authorities 
were unable to significantly influence decisionmakers, nor could they 
count on the availability of decentralized local water institutions. This 
dynamic changed with the lobbying pressure imposed by the villagers 
and with the consequent establishment of a new village water associa-
tion. Empowered by an externally funded project on environmental 
health, the villagers were successful in initiating the necessary links 
between the communities and the State.
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Water Conflict in Yemen: The 
Case for Strengthening Local 
Resolution Mechanisms
Christopher Ward
Yemen has one of the world’s lowest rates of per capita fresh-water availability (135 m3/cap/year) in the world.†1 The climate is largely semi-arid or arid. Rainfall is abundant only in the 
southern uplands. Rainfed agriculture is also possible in the central 
highlands and escarpments, usually with supplementary water manage-
ment techniques. Annual rainfall is as low as 100 mm–300 mm in most 
of the north and east and in the coastal plains. There are no perennial 
rivers. Water comes from springs, seasonal spate flows, runoff, and 
groundwater. 
Historically, Yemenis have been adept at managing their water. 
They have used elaborate systems of terracing and runoff manage-
ment, spate diversion, and shallow groundwater management, ac-
cording to the nature of the resource and the local social organization. 
Elaborately negotiated systems of rules and organization accompanied 
the development and management of each water resource. Even so, 
frequent disputes arose. These were resolved by force of arms, local 
reconciliation procedures, or traditional judgment.
† Background paper prepared for the “MNA Development Report on Water,” 
2007.
1 This chapter draws on a background chapter prepared by Said Al-Shaybani and 
Abdul Salaam Al-Zubayri, “Water Conflicts: Taiz and Tuban Case Study,” as well 
as on previous work of, and conversations with, numerous colleagues including Said 
Al-Shaybani, Gerhard Lichtenthaler, H.E. Professor Mohammad Al-Eryani (Min-
ster of Water and Environment, Republic of Yemen), Daniel Varisco, Nina Scherg 
(GTZ), and Robin Madrid (NDI). Thanks are also due to Jonathan Puddifoot, 
Gareth Richards, and Adam Taylor-Awny of CARE. The author is grateful for the 
guidance and comments of Khaled Abu Zeid and Amr Abdel-Megeed of CEDARE, 
Cairo; and of Julia Bucknall, Nathalie Abu-Ata, and Mesky Brhane of the World 
Bank, Washington, DC.
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In the latter half of the twentieth century, outside forces began to 
influence these water management customs. These included supply-
side forces such as innovations in spate irrigation technology and the 
irruption of the diesel-powered tubewell. New demand-side forces 
included the rapid development of market-driven agriculture, an in-
creased consumption of water by households and industry, and a very 
fast rate of population growth.
For years, government policies encouraged development of the re-
source. Now, virtually all of Yemen’s water resources are in use. This 
rapid development has brought considerable growth to Yemen, particu-
larly to the agricultural sector (box 14.1), which uses some 90 percent of 
the total available water resource. However, water demand is still rising; 
nonrenewable groundwater is being mined; and competition is inten-
sifying among users at the local level and between town and country. 
Yemen’s central governmental structures are weak and uncertain. The 
decentralized traditional governance frameworks are facing novel prob-
lems. For these reasons, competition has translated into conflict. This 
chapter examines the nature of this conflict and investigates the ability 
of Yemeni society to contain it (Ward 2000; World Bank 2005).
Supply and Demand
Societies developing their water resource have a range of supply and 
demand management solutions that can be deployed. In Yemen, the 
supply-side solutions have been largely exhausted, and the only addi-
tional developments being made are of meager and marginal resources. 
For example, wastewater reuse is locally important for periurban pro-
duction around the few towns that have sewerage plants. However, 
quantities of wastewater are very small so it is unlikely to be a major 
source of additional usable water. Numerous small dams are being built 
with government money to control seasonal wadi flows. However, this 
program is socially contentious because of the inevitable redistribution 
of water among communities within the basin. Moreover, this program 
is of uncertain economic benefit due to its high evaporation rates and 
sometimes little evidence of improvement in water availability and con-
trol, or of incomes (Iskander and Ueda 1999; Lichtenthaler 1999, 10).
As water becomes scarcer, the economics of water harvesting have 
improved slightly. For example, restoration of terraces can be profitable 
if qat is grown. Other examples are the revival of runoff and cistern 
and tank systems, often for potable water, as groundwater sources 
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dwindle. Some communities are resorting to increasingly marginal 
systems such as fog harvesting. On the supply side, interbasin water 
transfer, extraction of very deep groundwater (over 1 mile down), 
and desalination are the last—and hugely costly—solutions available. 
However, in such a poor country, these are a planner’s pipe dream.
Despite being faced with growing water constraints, Yemen has 
done little to contain demand. In recent years, the government has 
reduced the economic incentives for water development. However, 
Box 14.1  Scarcity, Conflict, and Adaptation in the Sa’ada Basin
Over the past 30 years, the already very dry Sa’ada Basin in Northern Yemen has experi-
enced a huge population explosion. In 1975, 40,000 people lived n the basin; by 1997 there 
were 180,000. The population increase was due to natural growth, returning migrant 
workers, and internal in-migration in response to economic opportunity
Much of this opportunity has been in agriculture. Interest in it initially was sharpened 
by the government crackdown on smuggling (previously a major income source) after the 
unification of the country. Returnees from the Gulf 1 brought capital in search of invest-
ment opportunities, and investment in the land suited the traditional values of this tribal 
region. Government improved agricultural profitability with a fruit import ban, so that 
orange and pomegranate farming looked to be an attractive investment. More recently, 
soaring qat demand has made this crop very attractive to farmers.2
Profitable growth of agriculture was based on the rapid development of groundwater. 
In Sa’ada, until the 1970s, most land was communally owned grazing land. However, 
the runoff rights from this land belonged to individual proprietors in the bottom lands. 
Agriculture was not allowed on the grazing lands because it would impair the runoff. 
Therefore, tubewell irrigation could not develop on the slopes. However, a deal was ne-
gotiated that allowed the tribal owners of the pasture rights to convert half of the slope 
land to agriculture on condition that the owner of the runoff rights was compensated 
with the same right on the other half. In 1976 a local cleric promulgated this as a fatwa, 
and the rule change has been followed ever since.
With the growing profitability of agriculture and the availability of remittance capital, 
this proposition was attractive. Many tribal communities privatized their common lands 
and distributed these lands to each household. Private tubewell development took off.
These changes in the economic incentives and institutional framework for farming 
have driven very rapid economic and social change in the Sa’ada area. A new elite of com-
mercial farmers has emerged. Land and water resources have been widely redistributed 
by market forces. Qat (previously scorned by proud tribesmen as “the tree of the devil”) 
is being planted on a wide scale.
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the government has shied away from strict application of economic 
measures to manage demand, such as energy and water pricing or 
the development of water markets. The 2003 Water Law introduced 
a range of regulatory demand management measures, such as water 
rights, licensing, and regulatory control.2 However, for the present, 
these are generally beyond the capability of the Yemeni administra-
tion to implement. 
Technical solutions to reduce demand also are available. Some, 
such as PVC piping, have attained wide currency through the market. 
Government is promoting others, such as drip and bubbler micro-
irrigation, through cost-sharing programs. Farmers have eagerly 
switched to higher value crops, including citrus, mangoes, and qat. 
Further intensification, for example, through greenhouse technology, 
is possible, but market profitability is not assured. In some areas, only 
qat provides high enough returns to justify additional investment in 
expensive water saving (Bazza 1999; Katariya 1999). 
As a result, the water table has plummeted, and springs have dried up. Conflicts over 
water and land have become more bitter. These tensions may be spilling over into the 
growing fundamentalist sectarianism and civil strife in the region.
The Sa’ada story is a remarkable example of economic growth, aided by the capacity 
to adapt to market opportunities by changing the rules about farming the slopes.  How-
ever, communities in the region have not yet shown a comparable “downside” capacity 
to adapt to scarcity. There is growing awareness of the problem but little expectation of 
equitable or tribal solutions. “Tribal communities and villages are not yet addressing the 
groundwater problem cooperatively.” (Lichtenthaler)
Source: Lichtenthaler 1999.
Notes: 
1. “The potential effects of the expulsion of over a million Yemeni workers from Gulf Cooperation Council 
states in retribution for Yemen’s support of Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War immediately increased Yemen’s 
population by 9 percent” (Millich and Al-Sabbry 1995, 1).
2. “Because the qat (Catha edulis) plant produces alkaloid stimulants, perhaps 75 percent of Yemeni adults chew 
qat leaves each afternoon, for a period lasting at least five hours. People spend about 25 percent–34 percent 
of their cash income on qat (Weir 1985). …The wealth generated by qat for its cultivators has undoubtedly 
stabilized the rate of rural-to-urban migration at around a 7 percent annual growth rate since 1970 (World 
Bank 1993)” (Milich and Al-Sabbry 1995, 1).
Box 14.1  Scarcity, Conflict, and Adaptation in the Sa’ada Basin (continued)
2 For details on water laws and regulations in Yemen, see chapter on comparative 
water laws in this volume. 
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Scarcity
Not surprisingly, Yemen shows proof of water scarcity. The rapid 
depletion of groundwater is well documented. Many wells have dried 
up, and groundwater salinization and pollution are worsening as aqui-
fers are exhausted. In many areas, drawing down groundwater dried 
up the springs.
Changes in water and land use have affected historical patterns 
of wadi flows and groundwater recharge. Many downstream com-
munities now have less spate flow and groundwater than they had a 
few years ago.
With less water available, many farmers and communities feel 
the pain. The economic and social impacts of scarcity are unevenly 
distributed. The process of “resource capture” involved in uncontrolled 
drilling and extraction of groundwater and in the “race to the bottom” 
of the aquifer has led to the economic marginalization of those unable 
to compete in power and money. Small farmers, poor downstream 
communities, and women and children bear the brunt of scarcity 
(Lichtenthaler 1999, 7; Al-Shaybani 2005, 10).
Some farmers’ responses to scarcity were mentioned above. Econo-
mizing through intensification is their typical first response (Moench 
1997, 10). Some farmers turn to purchasing water or return to traditional 
water harvesting, as in the Sana’a Basin (Lichtenthaler 2003, 54). At a 
certain point, leaving the farm is the only option. In the Sa’ada Basin, 
many farmers who lived where groundwater levels had fallen more 
than 50 m have abandoned their farms. Some have sold the rights to 
the sand under their farms to building contractors (Lichtenthaler 1999, 
10). Sometimes whole communities have disappeared: a village in Jabal 
Eial Yazeed district was abandoned due to lack of water. There are 
reports of villages in Abyan and Lahej disappearing and of a steady 
rhythm of depopulation in Hajja (Al-Zubayri 2005a).
Conflict and Adaptation
Managing conflict is crucial for Yemen. Conflict, the subject of this 
chapter, is only one of a range of responses to water scarcity and the 
most disruptive. With increasing reports of conflict (Ward 2005), water 
scarcity in Yemen is reaching a critical point at which it might not only 
constrain economic development but also threaten social stability. Thus, 
an examination of how conflicts are resolved is important. 
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However, conflict is a symptom, not the issue. Finding long-run 
economic and institutional solutions to the underlying problems is the 
key to both avoiding and resolving conflicts. 
Turton (1999) sees responses to scarcity and conflictual situations 
as a test of “adaptive capacity”: the ability of a society to accommodate 
change by adjusting rules. Some observers have traced evidence of adap-
tive capacity in Yemen. Turton and Lichtenthaler (2002) found that
“…there is a vibrant indigenous culture (in Yemen) embracing a tra-
ditional value system…. . …adaptive capacity [may be] present in a 
form…capable of resisting resource capture if correctly harnessed.”
Certainly, Yemen has a long history of conflict and of subsequent 
accommodation of change. In 1970, the early period of modern ground-
water development, the tubewell was bursting into the finely balanced 
water economy of Wadi Dahr close to Sana’a. Wadi Dahr had a long, 
well-documented history of managing its water resource (box 14.2). 
A downstream community in the wadi complained to the court that 
upstream motor pumps had reduced the stream flow and disturbed 
“laws and customs…by which we have been guided for thousands of 
years” (Mundy 1995). 
However, this rhetoric was disingenuous. As Mundy (1995) amply 
records, the history of water management in the Wadi Dahr has been 
marked by conflict and contentious judgments, which have progres-
sively crystallized into “established tradition” (Mundy 1995, 110). Wadi 
Dahl’s conflict also got resolved—but not by the courts. The rich and 
Box 14.2  For Centuries, Strict Rules Have Governed Water Management in 
Yemen’s Wadi Dahr
In the tenth century CE, the geographer al-Hamden wrote:
“In the irrigation system of Wadi Dahr, the fields are irrigated one after the other. 
Once, some of the guards of the Sultan diverted the stream to the Sultan’s vine-
yards without the knowledge of the irrigation turn keeper (daily). The daily then 
destroyed all the vines, but the damage to the property of the Sultan did not dis-
honor the daily. Indeed, if the da’il was not just in his duties, he was hanged.”
Source: Mundy 1989, 99.
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influential downstream farmers simply invested in the new pump 
technology themselves. “The stream dwindled and died, but no one 
with influence any longer cared.” A new equilibrium emerged: assets 
were rebalanced and concentrated a little more in the hands of the 
richer. The conflict was resolved—even if not fairly—and a new 
“established tradition” emerged (Mundy 1995, 116).
Rules Governing Water
Government as a Rule Maker
The capacity of the Yemeni government to affect outcomes in the 
water sector is restricted by its weak technical, administrative, and 
enforcement capacity. Nevertheless, the government has played a 
critical role in setting the economic rules for water development and 
management. These economic rules have changed over time.
During the early period of the modern state (up to 1990), government 
was able to promote development of water supply by setting the price 
of diesel, credit, and other inputs low; and by directing public and donor 
investment into rapid development of the water resource. A permissive 
attitude toward qat and the ban on fruit and vegetable imports increased 
farming profitability. Government thus was able to achieve three major 
objectives: expanding irrigation and thereby legitimizing itself, raising 
farmer incomes, and consolidating its alliances with many important 
power groups. By contrast, these same public policies penalized the 
traditional water harvesting and rainfed systems of the poor.
In a second period (to 2000), signs of water scarcity were beginning 
to emerge. Government responded to these with at least five demand 
management measures: increases in the diesel price (that rapidly were 
overtaken by inflation); elimination of credit subsidies for agriculture; 
modification of the fruit and vegetable import ban; regulation and 
taxation of groundwater equipment; and projects to support increased 
water productivity in agriculture.
Since 2000, it has been clear that measures taken to date are 
inadequate to deal with the problem of water scarcity. Reluctant to 
use the levers such as diesel pricing3 that could really influence out-
3 In the 4th quarter of 2007, before the fuel price increases of 2008, the domestic 
price of diesel in Yemen was 20% of the free market benchmark price (World Bank 
2009).
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comes, government increasingly has turned to promoting water use 
efficiency through projects and to regulatory approaches. The 2003 
Water Law defined water rights and instituted a system of licensing. 
The National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) was empowered 
to work with basin committees, local authorities, and local communi-
ties on regulatory and self-regulation approaches. So far, the impact of 
both the projects and NWRA’s outreach programs has been limited. 
One bright spot is that the case studies discussed below show that in 
some areas, particularly nontribal areas, NWRA may be called in to 
arbitrate disputes. 
Local Rules for Water Management
Over millennia, every community in Yemen has evolved rules for water 
management. Archaeology attests to rules for spate management in 
the pre-Islamic period that are recognizable today. Some water rules 
of today were documented in medieval times (Breton 1999, Al-Eryani 
and others 1998). These customary rules—‘urf—are generally consis-
tent with the Shari’a. Al-Shaybani (2003, 23) records a Document of 
Seventy Rules drafted and signed by sheikhs three centuries ago to 
codify common understanding of customary rules. Historically (but 
much less so today), religious authorities were important in setting 
rules and determining disputes. Some principles of the Shari’a affecting 
water are generally accepted throughout Yemen:
Water is N mubah, or “the property of no one.” However, the usufruct 
can be appropriated by those who develop it.
Upstream riparians have priority: N al ‘ala fa al ‘ala.
Water may not be alienatedN  from the land. 
Wells must be spaced a certain distance apart, outside a “protection N
zone,” or harim (Rule 58 in the Document of Seventy Rules).
No one can deny a person drinking water—“the right of thirst.”N
The specific rules attached to each water source vary across the 
country. In spate irrigation, priority is given to upstream diversion 
structures. In most systems, the water channeled off at the diversion 
structure flows down from field to field. The water is released from 
the higher field when that field has “drunk”—this may be when the 
water has filled the field up to the height of a man’s knee or higher 
(Maktari 1971). In subsequent floods, the round may start with the 
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last field left unwatered previously, as in Wadi Zabid (box 14.3). In 
some schemes, canals may carry the water to farther fields. When 
the canal crosses the fields of others, a fee is payable. Additional 
diversion structures downstream may receive water only when the 
upstream structure is breached, which in the case of traditional 
structures is a regular occurrence. Alternatively, there may be rules 
that a proportion of each flood must pass down (Al-Shaybani 2005), 
or that the water in different periods is allocated to downstream 
diversion structures (as at Wadi Zabid, box 14.3). In Wadi al Jawf, 
the spring spate is allocated to one bank and the summer spate to 
the other. 
Box 14.3  Wadi Zabid Downstream Farmers Conflict with Upstreamers
Water in Wadi Zabid’s spate system is managed according to rules devised over six centu-
ries ago by the Moslem scholar, Sheikh Gebrati. The rules are based on “upstream first”: 
al ‘ala fa al ‘ala. The rules divide the waters among three “regions.” In the dry season, 
there are base flows only. They go to the upper region. In the rainy season, when the 
floods come, the spate is divided among:
Upper region: First 97 daysN
Middle region: Next 20 daysN
Lower region: Last 35 days.N
The channel master allocates water to plots and decides which plot will get irrigated 
first by the next flow. The rule is: “Not twice in 14 days.” The channel master collects 
charges proportional to the irrigated area. The rate is lower in the middle area, and neg-
ligible in the lower area.
Prior to 1973, many conflicts over water distribution were recorded. The conflicts 
claimed several lives each year. When a World-Bank-financed project modernized the 
system in 1973, the situation became better for all. Water control improved, and the state 
enforced water discipline.
After 1985, matters deteriorated. The fruit import ban changed incentives, and the 
upstream farmers planted bananas, which needed irrigation every five days. There was 
also some expansion of the irrigated area upstream. Even some lands in the upper region 
no longer got base flow due to the demands of the bananas and to illegal diversions by 
big landowners. “Daily conflicts over water” were reported. Small farmers lower down 
were forced to sell and to become sharecroppers.
Source: Al-Eryani and others 1998.
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Clearly, the rules for spate are highly evolved and locally dif-
ferentiated. Al-Shaybani (2005, 25) lists 18 different rules that may 
govern spate water distribution in different systems. However, it also 
is clear that the unpredictability of spate events, progressive changes 
in wadi morphology, and information asymmetry between upstream 
and downstream rightholders create a rich arena for misunderstand-
ing and dispute (box 14.4) (Dresch 1993; Maktari 1971; Varisco and 
others 2005).
In springs, which have more stable flow regimes, rights normally are 
attached to the land. The rights are denominated in time-shares, for 
example, a certain number of hours once a fortnight. In Wadi Dahr, 
rights to spring water were divided exactly between lower and upper 
communities: 15 days each (until the springs dried up). These block 
allocations then were further divided within each community according 
to time-share ownership rights. These rights could be exchanged with 
other users to suit farming needs. Water distribution was overseen 
by local irrigation supervisors, not sheikhs, although sheikhs ruled in 
disputes (box 14.5) (Mundy 1995, 23, 62).
Box 14.4  Bloody Conflict between Traditional Wadi Al Jawf Spate Rules and 
Modernization
In the 1980s, the World Bank financed a project to develop farming in wadi al Jawf, a 
border province with an historical centrifugal tendency and characterized by strong tribal 
values.
The major component was to improve spate irrigation in the wadi. Traditionally, the 
first spate season (seif ) was allocated to the tribe on one bank, and the second season 
(kharif ) to the tribe on the other bank. However, maintaining this distribution would have 
made for a very expensive project, as very large canals would have been needed on either 
bank. Instead, an agreement was made with the relevant tribes that, in future, each spate 
flow would be divided 60:40, roughly the historic ratios of the spring to the summer flood. 
The World Bank appraisal mission got confirmation of this agreement from the tribal 
sheikhs, and the project went ahead. A contract was let and the contractor mobilized.
However, the tribe that was to receive the lesser share changed its mind. The first 
night after the contractor had mobilized, the tribe brought up guns and shelled the con-
tractor’s camp. The contractor demobilized at once; the contract was cancelled; and the 
project quickly ended with minimal disbursement.
Source: Ward 1994.
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Runoff rights are assigned from specific slopes to parcels of bot-
tom land in a proportion—sometimes up to 20 times the area of 
bottomland—adequate to grow a crop on the run-on land. These 
runoff rights are very important. It is claimed that, in Sa’adah, houses 
have no cisterns for domestic water because the cisterns would infringe 
the runoff rights of others (Lichtenthaler 2003, 51).
Every landowner has the right to abstract groundwater by digging 
under owned land. There are some traditional rules over access, for 
example, harim well-spacing rules. However, no traditional rules ex-
ist for quantities extracted or water charges (Al-Shaybani 2005, 3). 
In parts of Northern Yemen, shared wells are common. Each group 
of irrigators works out its own rules for sharing capital and operating 
costs and for taking water turns—usually a time-share. Rules govern-
ing water sales are unclear. In some localities, water sales between 
farmers are common. In other locales water may be sold to outsid-
ers, and become a business. Many wells near cities, including Ta’iz 
and Sana’a (which gets two-thirds of its water from private wells), 
are wholly or partly converted to urban water supply for profit (box 
14.6) (Moench 1997).
Factors Underlying Conflict
Conflict over water in Yemen is nothing new. Lichtenthaler (1997, 73) 
records that “until the mid 1970s water scarcity in Sa’ada was at the 
heart of most tribal conflict.” In fact, groundwater seemed to offer a 
way out of old patterns of conflict. Groundwater freed farmers from 
tedious and risky cooperation for a very limited, fixed resource by 
offering an apparently unlimited new source. Ironically, it is this very 
freedom that is driving a new generation of conflicts (Al-Shaybani 
2005; Lichtenthaler 2003).
Box 14.5  Sheikhs Adjudicate a Water Dispute in Wadi Dahr
A farmer was accused of moving a stone and deflecting the water flow of the spate course. 
The case was solved by traditional judicial means. Guarantors for each side agreed to 
hold their parties to any agreement. The sheikhs, assisted by the amin (legal clerk) and 
a surveyor, found that the claimant was in the right. The settlement was accepted by all 
parties (Mundy 1995, 64).
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Types of Competition
Fast-rising demand and no new supply are creating intense competi-
tion characteristic of scarcity. This section discusses some types of 
competition for scarce water.
A classic form—upstream/downstream competition—has taken on 
a new form as upstreamers have employed new technology to capture 
more water (box 14.7). For example, the very poor farmers in the 
Tehama Plain have seen not only surface water but also groundwater 
recharge diminish, as spate-fed and pump-fed schemes have been de-
veloped (Dresch 2000, 138; van Steenbergen 1997, 106). Similarly the 
many small dams now being constructed throughout the highlands are 
changing the upstream/downstream distribution of water (Katariya 
1999; personal communication from Gerhard Lichtenthaler).
The advent of the tubewell intensified competition for groundwater. 
Apart from local restrictions on well spacing, groundwater in Yemen is 
an open-access resource. To establish ownership, it is enough to drill a 
Box 14.6  Growing Water Sales around Ta’iz Raise Equity Questions
In the Ta’iz area, a widespread response to water scarcity has been the emergence of 
informal water markets. Local farmers needing water may purchase it from adjacent 
well owners, or purchase tankers from farther afield to apply it sparingly to the highest 
value crops such as qat. The cost is huge, and farmers are charged more—more than 
$1/m3—if the crop is qat.
For Ta’iz city, a large fleet of private tankers lines up at the wells around the city 
that have converted from agriculture to water supply, generally because of these wells’ 
proximity to the road. Domestic and industrial consumers or the numerous bottling shops 
around town then pay the tanker owners for supplies delivered to their door.
Although doing so seems to run against Islamic principles, these water sales underline 
that water has become an economic commodity in the area.  However, the fact that well 
owners sell at low prices to neighbors for agriculture and at much higher prices for the 
tanker market does seem to reflect the recognition of the traditional principles of local 
cooperation over water. 
As water sales become more common with the growing water scarcity, communities 
and government are giving thought to how water markets could be made equitable and 
less opportunistic.
Source: Moench 1997.
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well. Thereafter, the incentives are competitive exploitation and the 
“race to the bottom.” Farmers are only now coming to understand 
that, depending on the shape of the aquifer and the gradients and rates 
of flow, over-pumped tubewells will dry up one another and also may 
dry up hand-dug shallow wells (Dresch 2000, 165–67).
There also is competition between groundwater and surface water. 
Hydrological connectivity means that overuse of groundwater can 
deplete springs. This fact has been documented for many areas of the 
highlands and for the southern uplands. Conversely, upstream diver-
sion of surface water or runoff can reduce infiltration of groundwater 
for downstream users. 
With the effective privatization of the entire water resource, com-
petition between well owners and the rest of the community is growing. 
The well owners get the benefit of groundwater from the aquifers, but 
the whole community must pay in terms of water scarcity and rising 
costs. Particular tension is emerging between farmers and community 
drinking water needs. The drying up of wells is reimposing on women 
and children the corvée of the daily trudge to and from more distant 
wells for drinking water. In some places, water shortage is constrain-
ing certain crafts including tanning and leather working (Varisco and 
others 2005,11).
All of Yemen’s growing towns are desperately short of water. Fierce 
rural-urban competition has taken hold over water resources in the 
urban environs, often becoming violent. Water in the periurban zone 
Box 14.7 Upstream Prospers but Downstream Area Desolate in Wadi Bani Khawlan
The upper part of Wadi Bani Khawlan in Ta’iz Governorate is covered with crops and lush 
fruit trees. The lower area of the wadi, once also a rich agricultural zone, is now desolate. 
Dry wells dot the fields. In some areas, pipes still cross the ground ready to transport wa-
ter to waiting fields, should water somehow return to the wells. In most areas, however, 
the pipes have been removed—sold since they no longer serve any purpose. Where wells 
still operate in the lower wadi (mostly at points at which minor side wadis enter the main 
one), women wait for 6–7 hours daily to fill up plastic containers of water for domestic 
use. Most men have migrated in search of work. A few remain, spending their time and 
the remittance money sent by others in the small dusty stores that are remnants of more 
prosperous days in the valley.
Source: Moench 1997.
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increasingly is a commodity for sale to towns. The same is true for the 
wells in al Dhabab that supply Ta’iz. In some villages, land and water 
sales have been prevented by community action. Generally, however, 
as is recorded for Sa’ada, well owners “form a dominant coalition that 
prevents others from blocking their sales” (Lichtenthaler 1999).
How Competition under Scarcity Turns into Conflict
As discussed above, conflict is only one possible outcome of scarcity 
and the pace of change. Under what conditions is scarcity likely to 
cause conflict?
Varisco (1983) argued that predictability of the water flow influences 
the level of conflict. Unpredictable flows such as spate give rise to 
intense stresses and conflict. Predictable flows such as spring waters 
do not—once the ownership and management rules are agreed. Va-
risco’s argument corresponds to the historical facts. Far more conflict 
Box 14.8  Urban Water Tactics Dry up and Pauperize Al Haima
Twenty-five years ago, lower Al Haima wadi was a vibrant agricultural community. Local 
inhabitants grew high-value fruit, vegetables, and qat.  The Department of Agriculture 
ran a small horticultural station. 
Now the area is dry. Dead trees surround the deserted agricultural extension office. 
Drying qat plants struggle to survive on water purchased from distant wells in tankers. 
Even drinking water is in very short supply. Children, women, and men travel long distances 
by donkey or camel to collect water at the few taps that still run.
The problem began in the early 1980s, when Ta’iz city drilled some wells and pumped 
out water from the valley for its urban water supply. The villagers were told that the new 
wells were in the deep aquifer, 500m down, and would not affect the shallow farm wells. 
However, people found their shallow wells drying up. Ta’iz city came in 1987 to drill more 
wells, but the villagers were refused permission to deepen their own wells. The locals 
stopped the city’s drilling rigs by force of arms. The army came; the village men took to 
the hills with their arms; and five sheikhs were put in prison. Eventually, a minister came 
down from Sana’a and brokered a settlement.
By 1992, the villagers’ wells were dry. They took up arms again and disconnected one 
of the water supply wells. Twenty truckloads of soldiers moved in. The President of the 
Republic intervened. The villagers were obliged to surrender their claims.
Sources: Moench 1997; World Bank 1997.
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is recorded over spate than over springs. However, his explanation 
does little to explain the surge of conflict in recent years in nonspate 
systems.
A second factor that can affect the level of conflict is the number 
of people sharing in the system. Large systems of water-sharing among 
many irrigators generate more potential for stress at both the human 
and the hydraulic levels because individual control diminishes. By con-
trast, individual well systems involve only their owners.
A third factor is visibility. A moved boundary stone or a turn at a 
stream that lasts longer than agreed is a highly visible infraction. On 
the other hand, the depletion of an underground resource for which 
even the experts do not understand the hydrogeology and for which 
the pumps that are depleting the groundwater are on private land is 
hard to contest. 
A fourth factor is the degree of symmetry of cause and effect. Stealing 
a neighbor’s water concerns only two parties. Depleting groundwater 
affects a broader community. However, in the latter case, a direct cause 
and effect relationship is not as discernible, and it is more difficult to 
claim harm to identified individuals.
Thus, it is not surprising that considerable conflict is reported over 
spate flows, but less over spring water. Until recently, conflict over 
groundwater was limited by the above factors, particularly visibility 
and symmetry. Now, however, rural people everywhere are aware that 
groundwater is a hydraulically connected and fast-depleting resource. 
Once the aquifer is fully developed, it becomes a zero-sum game. 
Every new well simply subtracts from the finite resource—and the 
wealth—available to existing participants. This growing awareness of 
the competitive nature of groundwater extraction has led to increasing 
conflict (previous section).
One additional important factor influencing whether conflict will 
develop is power relations. The groundwater problem highlights the 
unequal competition between large farmers, who have bigger land 
areas to drill over and more financial resources to dig wells; and smaller 
farmers, whose wells dry up or who find it harder and more expensive 
to access communal or third-party sources. In al Dumayd, a big trader 
established a 10-ha citrus orchard with 8 pumps. As a result, a number 
of wells in the vicinity dried up, and the farmers in the adjacent smaller 
farms were forced to abandon them. Conflict did not ensue because 
“the [small] farmers were aware that a big neighbour has no obligation 
to share” (Lichtenthaler 2003, 188) A similar situation exists in spate 
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irrigation in which the “weak” tail-enders feel aggrieved but powerless 
to change things (case of Wadi Tuban Case Study D ahead). 
There is some evidence that conflict is becoming more frequent. 
Certainly, tribal confrontations over water and land of substantial scale 
and intensity receive frequent notice in the Yemeni press (box 14.9). 
Government interventions also seem to be more common.
Public Intervention Also Can Provoke Conflict
The role of the state in Yemen has grown enormously in recent years. 
In the 1970s, much of the development of infrastructure and services 
was privately funded by community associations and philanthropists. 
These funding sources dropped away with the decline of remittances 
and the politicization of the community development movement.
Oil revenues now are centralized in government hands, and the 
growing volumes of donor aid are channeled through government. 
Consequently, the state has become the dominant investor in rural 
development. These interventions have not always had a positive 
Box 14.9  Water and Land Disputes Leave Many Dead
“Six people were fatally shot and seven injured in tribal clashes in Hajja which broke 
out two weeks ago and continued till Tuesday between the tribes of al Hamareen 
and Bani Dawood. Security stopped the fighting and a cease fire settlement for 
a year was forged by key sheikhs and politicians, The fighting was triggered by 
controversy over agricultural lands and water of which both sides claim posses-
sion. Meanwhile…there is speculation of retribution attacks on government forces 
which used heavy artillery and tanks to shell several villages in al-Jawf.…” 
(Al Thawra, April 29, 1999)
“Sixteen people have been killed and tens injured since the outbreak of armed 
clashes between the villagers of Qurada and state troops, who used heavy artillery 
and rockets to shell the village.* Scores of villagers were arrested and hundreds 
fled their homes. The incident began when Qurada refused to share well water 
with neighbouring villagers….” 
(Al Shoura, June 20–21, 29 1999) 
Note: * = See more on the Qurada dispute in Case Study A ahead.
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impact on water dispute and conflict (Varisco and others 2005, 12). 
Many conflictual situations have been caused, at least in part, by public 
interventions.
The development of upstream diversion structures on spate schemes 
in a series of public projects from the 1950s to the 1990s led to a de 
facto change in the spate water allocation rules (UNDP 1992, 106–07). 
More land is now irrigated at the head of the schemes and less at the 
tail. The negative distributional effect of this is stronger because the 
head-enders (for example in Wadi Mawr and Wadi Rima) generally 
are the better off, larger landowners. A survey showed that, for more 
than 80 percent of farmers in Wadi Rima, water delivery was not 
improved by the World-Bank-financed improvements (Al-Eryani and 
others 1998, 32). Instead, head-enders were able to take all of the base 
flow with impunity, increase their cropping intensity, and grow higher 
value crops, including the very water-intensive bananas, which require 
irrigation seven times a month. 
Public interventions in rural water supply and sanitation also have 
created situations of potential conflict. Problems have included an ap-
proach to siting projects that focused exclusively on engineering issues 
while ignoring community wishes and existing tensions (Al-Shaybani 
2005, 20), inappropriate technology imposed on the community, and 
little thought given to how subsequent operations were to be man-
aged and financed. The principal causes have been the lack of com-
munity consultation and the inflexible, authoritarian approach of the 
implementing agencies, low professional standards, and alleged cor-
ruption. Changes underway to “demand-driven” approaches should 
help. However, there is a legacy of disappointed expectations, low or 
nonexistent service, and a potent brew of tensions that often explode 
into conflict (Al-Shaybani 2005: 12–14, 18).
The government-f inanced program for the construction of 
small dams also is creating many potential conflicts. Apart from 
the upstream/downstream stresses already mentioned, the poor 
performance of these dams creates conflictual stresses within the 
community and with government. Water quantities often have disap-
pointed; siltation is very rapid; frequently no downstream develop-
ment of irrigation canals has been provided for; and communities are 
not trained in operation and maintenance of the asset. The principal 
causes appear to be inadequate hydrological and engineering studies; 
an approach that focused exclusively on engineering issues and does 
not even ask how the water is to be used—sometimes it is not even 
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clear which villages or individuals are the intended beneficiaries—
and generally no provision for adequate upstream and downstream 
consultations (Al-Shaybani 2005, 20; personal communication from 
Gerhard Lichtenthaler).
Agricultural programs that have pushed farmers to invest in ground-
water for cash crops are creating conflictual situations. The govern-
ment’s 30-year promotion in Sa’ada of oranges and pomegranates 
through subsidies and protection bound farmers to a huge long-term 
investment in tree crops. In many places, these trees now cannot be 
sustained by the water resource. A similar pattern is arising with the 
mango groves at Abs. Mangoes were promoted by the public subsidy 
for drip irrigation, but the water resource is rapidly disappearing. In 
time, the farmers are likely to engage in some form of conflict with 
the government (Bazza 1999).
Urban water supply. In the 1990s, the public utility aggressively 
transferred water from the southern end of the green al Haima Wadi 
to Ta’iz city. The ensuing drying up of that once fertile valley was a 
well documented national scandal. Since then, other communities in 
the Ta’iz region have fiercely guarded their water sources and chased 
off government prospectors. Government has learned the lesson and 
is trying other approaches. For example, government is using a form 
of contract in the Sana’a basin that is intended to reserve the deep 
aquifer for water supply, while giving farmers a free hand over the 
unconnected shallow alluvial aquifer.
Box 14.10  Conflicts over Dam Construction in Hobah and Shahik End  
in Waste and Death
At Hobah in Al-Mahweet, villagers obtained a grant from USAID to construct the Al-
Makik Dam. However, they made no prior agreement about who the beneficiaries would 
be. Downstream farmers who already were using the water proved unwilling to share in 
costs and management with upstream farmers, who intended to pump the water to lands 
previously unirrigated. As a result of the incomplete planning, the project comprised only 
the completed dam, which was not used. The irrigation area was not developed.
At Shahik in Khawlan Al-Tiyal district, disagreement over whether to use a new dam 
for groundwater recharge or for surface irrigation led to conflict in which one person was 
killed.
Sources: Vermillion and others 2004; Ward 2005.
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Water Conflict Can Trigger a Larger Pattern of Conflict
Throughout Yemen, attachment to water and land is fierce and forms 
a central element of Yemeni identity.4 Competition for these limited 
resources thus can quickly trigger a larger pattern of conflict. Yemeni 
rural society generally is arms bearing, and resort to violence is frequent. 
This is particularly true in the Northern Highlands, where tribal values 
of honor, shame, and revenge drive behavior, and where comparatively 
trivial origins can quickly escalate, especially when violence is employed. 
Socioeconomic factors also play a part: “unemployment and under 
employment mean many bored and frustrated young men sitting idle 
with their guns for much of the time, waiting for something exciting 
to happen” (Al-Shaybani 2005, 21).
These factors are less evident in the Southern Uplands and the 
coastal zones, in which the agrarian system has a more landlord/peasant 
character with roots in a feudal system (Carapico 1998, 67–68; Varisco 
and others 2005, 12). In these areas, tribal values are muted or non-
existent. Here it is the intense economic competition for the resource 
that can lead to broader conflict. Varieties of competition include that 
Box 14.11  Wadi Habir Resists Surrenders Its Water to Urban Use but Is Defeated 
through Violence
In 1992 villagers in Habir discovered that their area had been proposed as the next source 
of water for Ta’iz city. They had seen the impact of water transfer on the neighboring 
valley of Al Haima so determined to resist. For three years, they succeeded in postpon-
ing the project. When the rigs finally arrived in April 1995, the Habir villagers drove the 
drillers off the site by using petrol torches. Their sheikhs were imprisoned. Eventually, a 
“compensation” package was agreed, so the villagers allowed the drillers in. 
However, soon a farmer’s shallow well dried up. When he was refused permission to 
dig a new, deeper well, the villagers again stopped the drilling for Ta’iz. When the army 
arrived, the women and children threw stones and tried to disarm the soldiers. The 
soldiers fired, and two women were seriously injured. Eventually, the wells were drilled, 
but with a legacy of distrust and anger that persists to this day.
Source: World Bank 1996.
4 Because water rights generally go with land, water and land disputes often are 
the same thing.
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between large landowners and smallholders or sharecroppers, between 
town and country, or within communities over drinking water. 
What Forms Does Conflict Take—and Why?
As background to this chapter, Al-Shaybani and Al-Zubayri (2005) 
carried out a field study of water conflict in Ta’iz and Lahej. The 
following four case studies from their findings illustrate many of the 
themes of this chapter.
Case Study A. Murderous Dispute over Spring Water Rights Is 
Resolved in Yemen’s Highest Court
In 1997, a dispute over water arose between two villages on Jabal Sabr, 
the huge mountain that towers over Ta’iz city. The dispute lasted until 
2001, left many dead, and had to be resolved in the Court of Appeal 
after the intervention of the army and the President of the Republic.
The story began in the mid-1990s, when one village—Qurada—
received money from the government’s rural water supply agency to 
rehabilitate the village piped water supply system. This system was fed 
from springs belonging to Qurada that flowed into a collection tank. 
However, the tank was sited uphill of a spring that belonged to a second 
village, al Marzooh. Al Marzooh became afraid that the project would 
reduce the flow of their spring.
In night raids, al Marzooh blew up part of the new project. The 
police made arrests, and the governor visited and ordered the project 
to continue. Al Marzooh responded by blowing up more installations 
and equipment. Soldiers sent in only exacerbated tensions (box 14.9). 
Although traditional mediation managed to get the case into court, the 
explosions continued. Gun battles left five dead (including one woman, 
a fact that really shocked the nation) and more than 20 injured. The 
situation got so out of hand that the President of the Republic inter-
vened. Only then did both sides agree to go to court, from which the 
dispute rose all the way up to the Court of Appeal.
The final court ruling was accepted reluctantly on both sides. The 
villages were to construct one collective tank for their water supply. 
Qurada could connect a 4" pipe, and al Marzooh a 2" pipe, with a 
pro-rata reduction in supply in case of shortage.
It seems incredible that so much should be expended for such a 
seemingly small a problem. The lessons so dearly won were:
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In some areas, water scarcity has reached a point that it is not ag-1. 
riculture but the much smaller quantities needed for drinking water 
that are under threat. Ta’iz Governorate essentially is a nontribal 
area, so the dispute was not inflamed by tribal values. Rather, the 
very high value that the two communities placed on drinking water 
made them prepared to resort to violence to defend it.
Public money, apparently allocated without proper understanding 2. 
of the issues, was at the origin of the dispute.
Even when they were at each other’s throats, the villages were 3. 
highly opposed to outside intervention. When the army intervened, 
the villages effectively closed ranks against them. Ultimately, 
only the highest authorities in the land brought the villages to 
reconciliation.
The tensions around water are so great that traditional rules of 4. 
mediation proved quite inadequate. Al Marzooh continued its as-
saults even while mediation was going on.
In the end, and only after extreme effort, the state was able to 5. 
impose settlement in this water dispute. Mobilization on this scale 
is plainly out of the question for every 2" pipe dispute that may 
arise.
Case Study B. Two Village Water Committees Cooperate to Protect 
Their Resource—and Fight off Threat from Government Agency
In the very water-scarce Qadas area of Ta’iz Governorate, al Karee-
fah and al Dhunaib are neighboring villages. Each village has its own 
potable water scheme with its own management committee. Having 
seen the problems of water scarcity in other parts of Qadas, the two 
villages cooperate to protect the drinking water resource, which is 
their first priority.
The committees keep an eye on the activities of local farmers and 
have stopped the digging of many new wells. Armed with a permit from 
the NWRA branch office in Taiz, one al Kareefah farmer started to drill 
a new well. The al Kareefah water management committee entered 
an objection with NWRA, which then cancelled the permit. Another 
farmer, this time from al Dhunaib, failed to get a permit but started 
to dig a well anyway, stealthily by night. By the time the village found 
out, the well was more than 20 meters deep and lined with reinforced 
concrete. The farmer threatened to kill anyone who came close. The al 
Dhunaib water committee chairman convened a meeting of the whole 
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community, and it was decided that the well should be filled in. Faced 
with this community solidarity, the farmer had no choice but to agree. 
The whole community took part in filling in the well.
Ironically, the committees had the most problem with the official 
rural water agency, the General Authority for Rural Water and Sanita-
tion Projects (GARWSP). GARWSP started to drill a borehole in the 
catchment area of the existing drinking water schemes of both villages, 
and within 400 meters of an existing well. The committees pointed 
out to GARWSP that this proximity violated the 500 meter harim rule. 
Their protest fell on deaf ears. The two villages were on the point of 
resorting to violence to stop the contractor when it was learned that 
the new well was dry. GARWSP made a second attempt to drill, this 
time within 200 meters of the water source of al Kareefah and in the 
direct catchment area of Al Dhunaib’s water source. This second at-
tempt was met with armed resistance from both communities, and the 
contractor was forced to leave the area. The two committees then 
decided jointly to hand-dig a well for community use at the new site to 
prevent GARWSP from any future attempt to drill in this location.
The lessons are:
When water is very short, drinking water becomes the top priority 1. 
for groundwater use, and communities show solidarity in setting 
up and running potable water schemes.
Community solidarity can influence or block even the most intran-2. 
sigent water users.
In situations of scarcity, cooperation among communities becomes 3. 
possible.
Communities may deploy both traditional rules such as the 4. harim rule 
and modern rules such as licensing to defend their water source.
Government agencies trying to help solve the water problem can 5. 
create more problems than they solve. In this case, GARWSP’s 
technical appraisal of the source was deficient. Furthermore, 
the agency totally lacked a “demand-driven” and participatory 
approach.
Case Study C. Dispute between Farmers Is Settled by NWRA’s 
Proposal That New Well Be Used Largely for Drinking Water
A conflict between villagers from Al Sayani district of Ibb concerned a 
well drilled close to a neighbor’s well without permission. The dispute 
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started when a downstream well owner made a complaint to NWRA, 
asking that it stop a farmer who was digging a new shallow well 
upstream. 
NWRA visited the site. Its team found that the new well was, 
in fact, close to two existing wells. The first well belonged to the 
complainant and was approximately 120 m downstream of the new 
well. The second old well belonged to the farmer who was digging 
the new well: it lay about 120 m upstream of the new well. The visit 
took place during the dry season, and all three wells were dry at the 
time of the visit.
Although the new well breached the 500-meter distance require-
ment under the harim rule, NWRA proposed that the well be regu-
larized on condition that it be used only for the drinking supply of the 
villagers. Only surplus water during the rainy season could be used by 
the well owner for irrigation, and only on the condition that he paid 
the capital and operating costs of the well. This deal was agreed and 
confirmed in writing by all concerned.
This small case in which again the priority accorded to drinking 
water is clear demonstrates three important lessons:
The 1. harim rule is being widely invoked as a useful rule of thumb to 
protect water resources. The potential of the new well licensing 
procedures being introduced by NWRA is beginning to be explored 
by villagers as part of their armory of water management rules.
Villagers may be willing to bring in NWRA as part of dispute 2. 
resolution. This willingness is probably stronger in nontribal areas 
such as Ibb.
NWRA and the villagers proved capable of adapting the 3. harim rule 
to suit local conditions and to reconcile the interests of the two 
parties and of the community.
Case Study D. Wadi Tuban Tail-Enders Say That Modernized Scheme 
Has Brought Them Less Water but That They Lack The Capacity to 
Fight for More
In the Wadi Tuban spate irrigation scheme, by law, an irrigation council 
composed of officials and representatives of the water user associa-
tions is responsible for deciding the rules of water distribution. These 
rules are quite precise (box 14.12). However, the field work done by 
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Al-Shaybani and Al-Zubayri (2005) found that reality differed from 
theory.
Downstream farmers said that they used to have access to spate 
water on average once every two years. Now the interval is 5–10 
years. These farmers believe that upstream farmers are taking more 
water than before thanks to improved concrete diversion structures 
and to the upstreamers’ influence over the management agencies. The 
tail-enders believe that the traditional upstream first rule—al ‘ala fa 
al ‘ala—is abused by the big farmers upstream, who are expanding 
their irrigated areas, getting up to 4 floods in 1 year, and even planting 
bananas. 
However, the downstream farmers have not lodged a complaint. 
The reason in part is that they are unsure which agency is responsible. 
They believe that, in addition to the Irrigation Council, the Ministry of 
Agriculture Irrigation Department and the new elected local authori-
ties all have a say. They do not know to which agency or to whom to 
complain, nor what the rules and penalties are. They do believe that 
it would be a long and expensive (due to bribes) business to complain. 
They grudgingly accept that spate flows are uncertain and that spate 
water rights for downstreamers are hard to assert.
The case of Wadi Tuban reflects findings from previous studies in 
spate schemes. They showed that the benefits of spate improvement 
often go largely to the better-off upstream farmers. This case also 
shows other lessons:
Box 14.12 Irrigation Council Water Allocation Rules
In theory, water allocation is to be based on a fixed irrigation plan:
When the spate flow is low (5 mN 3/s–15 m3/s), priority is given to schemes in the upper 
part of the delta, namely, Ras Al Wadi and Al-Arais.
When spate flow is of medium size (15 mN 3/s–25 m3/s), priority is given to schemes in 
the middle part of the delta, including Beizag and Faleg systems.
When spate floods are high (25 mN 3/s–40 m3/s), the flow is directed at the main wadi 
bifurcation point at Ras al Wadi Weir: to either Wadi Kabir or Wadi Saghir, depend-
ing on which one’s turn is due.
When spate floods exceed 40 mN 3/s, the flow is divided evenly between Wadi Kabir 
and Wadi Saghir.
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The modernization programs that government has introduced have 1. 
focused more on physical improvements than on strengthening man-
agement institutions. The user associations now being promoted in 
Tuban do not appear to have figured in the farmers’ discourse, and 
certainly were not seen as powerful champions of their rights.
The old causes of friction regarding spate still exist. In fact, these 2. 
frictions are built into a system with such uncertain water rights. 
At present, the power relations are such that downstreamers feel 
badly treated. Furthermore, they shrink from conflict with the 
powerful upstreamers.
Resolving Conflict
What dispute resolution mechanisms exist and how have they evolved 
to meet these new challenges?
Settling Disputes in Largely Tribal Areas
“Although it is important not to overemphasize the nature of tribal-
ism, it must still be recognized as the major system of governance and 
community organization in most highland rural communities” (Varisco 
and others 1995, 12). In these tribal areas, sheikhs and tribal leaders 
still play a vital role in settling disputes. Elected officials also have tribal 
affiliations, so tribal and modern power structures largely overlap.
During a field survey, farmers in the Sana’a Plain were asked to explain 
the different mechanisms employed for resolving water conflict. The over-
whelming majority of respondents (96 percent) said that water conflicts 
would be dealt with by local “arbitration systems.” In other words, water 
conflicts would be addressed first by tribal arbiters at the neighborhood 
level. If not resolved at the first level, conflicts move to the sheikh at 
the head of the tribe. Most respondents said that only when a dispute 
could not be resolved through these procedures would it be referred to 
the courts. In general, respondents felt that the courts were expensive 
(largely due to bribes), slow, and remote from tribal concerns.
Al-Shaybani (2005, 22) argues that resolution of water conflict in 
tribal areas follows the same pattern as that of any other conflict. In a 
conflict, any respected person (modareek) can call a ceasefire. Then a 
mediation process takes place, often led by the clan head (aqil)) or the 
head of the tribe (sheikh), to agree the terms of a truce and to broker a 
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settlement. In case of legal technicalities, a tribal specialist on customary 
rights and duties (maragha) can be called in. His decision is final.
In the past, the sheikh’s ability to mediate conflicts used to rest 
primarily on his social standing and on his knowledge of customary 
law. Over time, this has changed, as sheikhs have joined the political 
and economic elite of the country. It is now just as much the sheikh’s 
status as a rich man and his political influence and power at the re-
gional and national level that give him the authority to decide disputes 
(Lichtenthaler 2003, 74)
However, these additional sources of authority create a risk of 
conflict of interest. Sheikhs often are part of the problem because 
often they are the largest users of groundwater. Some sheikhs have 
become big commercial farmers and have benefited from their status 
in the tribe to build up large land holdings. In cases in Sa’ada, villages 
and communities have closed ranks to prevent their own sheikh from 
buying more land—and the water rights that come with it. Thus, while 
the cooperation of the sheikhs is crucial to conflict resolution in tribal 
areas, their role as big water users compromises their role as impartial 
mediators (Lichtenthaler 1999, 2, 14). 
Tribal mediation also is limited by population movement and land 
sales. These days more than ever, villages may be inhabited by multiple 
tribes who do not cooperate. For example, villages in Amran often are 
inhabited by different branches of the great Hashid and Bakil confed-
erations, and some by sayyids (religious scholars who have a knowledge 
of water rules) (Moench 1997, 16; Lichtenthaler 1999, 14). In addition, 
within one village, economic interests may be different—agricultural, 
artisanal, and domestic. These different interests can conflict and thus 
undermine solidarity.
Religious and cultural values play a role in reinforcing traditional dis-
pute resolution mechanisms. These values recall principles of fairness, 
reconciliation, and integrity to a population still largely sensitive to these 
values. These values occasionally can be invoked directly in dispute reso-
lution by the sayyids. Over the centuries, these religious scholars have 
been involved in the evolution of water rules. The recent revival of Zaydi 
scholarship and practice in Sa’ada has led to the emergence of a younger 
group of religious scholars and teachers. They invoke the Islamic principle 
of maslaha ‘amma (“welfare of the community over individual interest”). 
It was a Zaydi scholar in Sa’ada who issued the fatwa on conversion of 
runoff rights in 1976 (Lichtenthaler 1999, 2–3, 18). 
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Settling Disputes in Other Areas
In nontribal areas of Yemen, traditional and modern community insti-
tutions exist for water management and for dispute resolution. These 
institutions can be highly evolved, as was shown by the management 
of spate in Wadi Tuban (Case Study D above).
In recent years, dedicated water management associations have 
emerged, most frequently for potable water supply. Some of these 
associations have grown into strong community institutions with a 
range of other activities, such as schooling, health services, rural roads, 
and water for livestock. The best documented example is that of the 
Administration of Local Projects of al Sinah near Turba (Moench 1997, 
15). Water management associations focus on managing the water sup-
ply scheme rather than on the resource itself, However, most schemes 
are now experiencing problems with the source, as illustrated by the 
Qadas case above. Thus, the associations are obliged to become active 
in settling disputes over water resources. In some cases, associations—
or the community at large—have organized themselves (box 14.13). 
Some have resisted new drilling. Others have prevented the loss of 
community water and land resources to the rich and powerful—traders, 
speculators, absentee landlords (Lichtenthaler 1999, 2).
Box 14.13  Sa’ada: Examples of Successful Community Initiatives 
To safeguard their water resources, villages cooperate in a range of way to resist sheikhs, 
traders, and land dealers. Three examples follow.
In one case in Sa’ada, fearing decline in groundwater levels, the tribal group refused N
the request from the community owning the runoff area to develop its groundwater 
resources. Now the sheikhs have agreed to a 20-year halt to any development of 
the land.
In another area of Sa’ada, in consultation with the tribe, the sheikh ruled that no in-N
dividual member was to sell land to people from outside the village. This community 
had seen what had happened when the neighboring tribe sold large amounts of land 
to investors, who then drained the area of groundwater.
In several other cases in Sa’ada, villages and communities have closed ranks to prevent N
their own sheikh from buying land from them.
Source: Lichtenthaler 1999.
260  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
Modern Civil Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
Yemeni law provides for civil dispute resolution in courts. However, ru-
ral Yemen is generally mistrustful of outside involvement. Conflicting 
parties tend to close ranks in the face of it. No data exist on the 
actual number of water disputes referred to the courts. However, in 
the survey of farmers in the Sana’a Plain discussed above (Al-Hamdi 
2000, 81), only 4 percent of respondents said that water disputes 
would be referred to the civil courts rather than to local arbitration 
systems. The proportion may be higher in nontribal areas that lack 
trusted local dispute resolution mechanisms. In Wadi Tuban, cited 
above, downstream farmers do not have much confidence in the 
capacity or probity of the courts either. A referral to the court is 
generally forced on the disputants by the civil authority, particu-
larly for violence. If one of the disputants voluntarily refers a case, 
he generally does so because he sees it as a way to gain additional 
advantages.
Under the Water Law, NWRA has regulatory powers over water 
management. As a result, a number of disputes are now being referred 
to NWRA branches for a decision on the legality of well drilling and 
other issues. In four basins—Sana’a, Ta’iz, Sa’ada, and Amran—the 
central government has set up basin committees comprising represen-
tatives of central and local government and civil society. It is too early 
to tell whether this joint forum will be effective in imposing order on 
WRM. The new, elected local district councils have responsibility for 
all local affairs. NWRA’s policy is to engage them in water resource 
regulatory activities. However, the little evidence that is available 
—for example, the local council involvement in spate water allocation 
in Wadi Tuban—suggests that this form of decentralization has multi-
plied, rather than solved, problems (Al-Shaybani 2005, 26).
In 2005, apparently alarmed at the prevalence of tribal disputes in 
general, the President of the Republic ordered a five-year truce. He 
established a National Supreme Committee for Dispute Resolution. 
This committee is chaired by a deputy prime minister and includes a 
large membership from the Cabinet, the judiciary, Parliament, and the 
sheikhs. Its mission is to put an end to tribal feuds through mediation. 
To date, there has been no indication of its effectiveness.
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Power and Political Economy: Who Really Benefits from Water 
and How?
From the discussion above, it will be clear that Yemen has moved a 
long way from the early Islamic moral economy of the “right of thirst.” 
Already in the nineteenth century, when the Ottomans installed the 
iltizam system of taxation of the agricultural surplus in the higher 
water- availability areas of the southern uplands and the eastern and 
southern escarpments and plains, control of water was readily identifi-
able with an accumulation of power. In these areas, it took a feudal 
form. Great sheikhs held sway over numerous tax-paying ra’iyya, or 
peasants. This system is still traceable in the pattern of land and water 
holdings in these areas (Carapico 1998, 67–68). In the dry north and 
east areas, scant water meant virtually no taxable surplus. In these 
areas, the warrior-farmer character of tribalism proved able to resist 
both Ottoman conquest and the imposition of centralizing tax trans-
fers. The more egalitarian political economy of the tribe persisted 
until a generation ago.
Change in the use of water has brought profound shifts in eco-
nomic and political power. In the southern uplands, the groundwater 
revolution is largely over. The process of appropriation of water by 
the locally powerful—and by the cities—has reduced the economic 
opportunities for small farmers. Appropriation is gradually returning 
most of these areas to the old rural ecology of rainfed agriculture. 
They have only sporadic access to supplementary irrigation and 
pumped drinking water. The political and social counterpart to this 
economic change seems to have given a new impetus to the civil 
society, local self-help mechanisms that have existed in the area 
for a generation or more. Associations of local people defend their 
communities’ interests and conserve and develop what resources 
are available.
In the coastal regions, the brief improvement in the lives of down-
stream farmers that came with spate upgrading and the tubewell is 
dwindling as large upstream landholders appropriate both the surface 
flows and the groundwater.
In the tribal areas of the north and east, the end of the groundwater 
boom has left an impaired ecology of reduced groundwater and spring 
flow. These sources are less and less adequate to support the commercial 
farming that has developed. The available water and land resources have 
become more concentrated in the hands of tribal leaders. They have 
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benefited from traditional patterns of loyalty and cooperation and from 
their access to the modern centers of political and economic power. A 
new class of capitalist investor/trader has sprung up, too. Those left 
out of this process have been the smaller farmers, who have seen the 
economic boom come and go in a generation. Among them, there 
appears to be a process of change, not yet radical, that consolidates 
resistance to further resource capture. Whether this resistance will 
have a political counterpart—for example, a distancing of tribesmen 
from their tribal leader—is far from clear.
These processes of capitalism and concentration of power have been 
readily abetted by the state through incentives for groundwater extraction 
and through direct investment. The rapid development of water resources 
helped to legitimize the state as a “development agent.” Meanwhile, the more 
discreet underlying processes of accumulation of wealth and power through 
growing control of water and land have consolidated the important political 
support of the military and capitalist elite around the central state.
Lessons
Civil Society Lessons
Traditional Yemeni society and institutions have demonstrated con-
siderable capacity to adapt to the changing challenges of water. The 
“upside” capacity to adapt to the changing supply and demand signals 
in the 1970s and 1980s was remarkable. Technology, farming systems, 
cropping patterns, and cultural and social attitudes adapted quickly to 
the market economy. Time-honored rules were adjusted; traditional 
institutions evolved; and new ones were established.
Naturally, the country’s “downside” capacity to make the pain-
ful adjustment to scarcity, competition, and conflict has been more 
limited. Yemenis adapted rapidly to the tubewell but have had great 
trouble adapting to the resultant water stress and scarcity. Nonethe-
less, communities continue to evolve their own rules and have shown 
some ability to adapt to scarcity. Institutions have begun to adapt, and 
rules are being rewritten. The old harim rule on well spacing is now 
evoked almost everywhere to control new well drilling. Communities 
also may seek to restrict deepening, pumping time, or water sales. New 
users are being excluded by a variety of techniques.
In tribal areas, the ambiguous role of the sheikh is a problem. 
Nonetheless, even there, some communities have combined to 
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neutralize the negative effects of the sheikh’s business interests. In 
nontribal areas, community associations are commonly found, with 
varying degrees of capability to manage water resources and resolve 
conflictual situations.
Communities everywhere prefer to exclude government from their 
problems. This consensus is not surprising, given that government 
interventions frequently created rather than resolved conflict.
Government Lessons
The capacity of central government to regulate activities at the level 
of individual users is very limited. Typically, government intervention 
requires a show of disproportionate strength, justified only in extreme 
cases, after local dispute resolution methods have failed (Moench 
1997, 3).
Government can best influence outcomes positively by broad policy 
and institutional measures. Good examples are the sectoral policy 
frameworks, and a few enforceable regulatory measures, such as the 
ban on import of drilling rigs (Norton 1995).
Government’s move to improve the professionalism of its water 
management services by setting up NWRA and decentralizing its pow-
ers to local branches clearly was a step in the right direction. There 
is limited evidence that NWRA has helped in dispute resolution. The 
decentralization of some official responsibilities to the participatory 
basin committees and to the local authorities also may help. There is 
no reason to suppose that decentralized structures will be more ef-
ficient or less politically driven than centralized ones. However, the 
decentralization at least may back up the power of local communities 
to control abstraction and drilling (Lichtenthaler 1997, 11). 
Evidence shows that it is not only scarcity, but also the supply 
side remedies introduced, that triggers conflict. Unfortunately, gov-
ernment emerges as a leading source of conflict. Some of this conflict 
stems from poor water resource decisions—particularly for projects 
based on inadequate understanding of the water balance or of water 
rights. Other conflictual situations arise from inadequate social and 
institutional preparation. Programs frequently fail to ensure that the 
community structure that can deal with planned changes is in place. 
In the most flagrant cases, government has ridden roughshod over all 
local understanding of water rights and appropriated the resource for 
transfer to the towns (World Bank 2005).
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Looking to the Future
In the Yemeni context, the only viable solutions are local and participa-
tory, initiated by the water users. Moench (1997) details the reasons 
that these solutions work:
Local people are the stakeholders.a. 
Government can never have the capacity nor the full confidence b. 
of local people.
Every village has its own hydrology and history, and only micro-c. 
level solutions make sense.
It is not government but millions of individuals at the local level who d. 
take the decisions about Yemen’s water management.
Clearly, the future of water management and dispute resolution in Ye-
men depends on local institutions. These institutions are creakily adapting 
to water scarcity. There is a role for government to lend a hand by 
supporting community self-management initiatives through education, 
training, and intelligent cost-sharing. Future government interventions 
must avoid creating new problems while trying to resolve others. To do 
so, government interventions in rural water and dams will have to be 
technically better prepared, demand driven, and negotiated by a more 
intelligent process that takes account of local social setups, institutional 
structures, and patterns of water rights.
Longer-Term Lessons
There is no “solution” to Yemen’s water crisis. Given the population 
increases and lack of alternative employment opportunities, demand 
will continue to far exceed supply. The depletion of natural capital will 
oblige economic retrenchment, with painful political and social con-
sequences. Managing the transition to extreme scarcity and avoiding 
conflict at the local level will be an obligation of all Yemenis. However, 
the government is responsible for mitigating the underlying causes 
of scarcity as much as possible and for planning for the longer-term 
structural transition of the economy.
Government must pay attention to the uncompleted demand man-N
agement agenda. In particular, readjusting the incentive system can 
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reduce agricultural water use while equitably protecting incomes 
(Lichtenthaler 1999, 24; Norton 1995, 10–12)
To replace the present ad hoc and arbitrary transfer systems, gov-N
ernment needs to set fair rules for intersectoral transfer of water. 
These rules must require the development of equitable markets 
or other fair transfer mechanisms (Norton 1995, 13–14; Moench 
1997, 4, 21).
Government has to plan for a less water-intensive economy. The N
planning should include measures to ease the intersectoral move-
ment of labor and to create an environment friendly to alternative 
economic activities (Norton 1995, 16).
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Water Diplomacy  
in the 21st Century
N. Vijay Jagannathan
In many parts of the world, competition among countries for water resources is being exacerbated by population growth, urbanization, and industrialization. When water resources are shared across na-
tional boundaries, the challenge of sustainable management becomes 
even more complicated for several reasons. First, in the case of trans-
boundary conflicts over water, international laws and conventions are 
not enforceable unless a process of ratification has been completed 
through national legislative bodies. Second, countries could cheat or 
not comply with water treaties unless these treaties are self enforcing. 
Finally, it would take just a small group of opponents of a water treaty 
to make any of these agreements “politically unacceptable.”
In addition, two independent variables determine how countries 
interact when it comes to sharing international watercourses. First 
is the spatial configuration of the watercourse in relation to national 
boundaries: an upstream state has different incentives for cooperat-
ing compared to a downstream state. Dinar (2006) describes these as 
through-border situations in that the downstream state’s ability to retali-
ate and reciprocate through its water policies to externalities created 
from the upstream state is minimal. Other situations exist in which 
externalities become reciprocal: any harm to an open-access resource 
(such as an inland sea, lake, or shared aquifer) affects all states that 
share this resource. Dinar terms these border-creator situations.
Second, relative political and economic strengths and weaknesses 
of countries that share the water resource influence their dealings with 
one another. If one state were far more economically advanced than 
its fellow riparians, its behavior would be influenced by the political 
and economic importance attached to maintaining and building on 
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relations with its neighbors. On the one hand, a situation of complete 
asymmetry of economic power could tempt the powerful country to 
display “hegemonic” tendencies. On the other hand, trade and market 
protection considerations very well could induce the powerful hegemon 
to collaborate with its weak neighbor(s). Asymmetry in economic well-
being also affects the way that countries view pollution. The capacity 
to accept pollution may be higher in a poor country than in a rich one, 
whereas the ability to mitigate the problem is the opposite.
When Do Bilateral Agreements Take Place?
Political, spatial, and economic interests propel countries to work out 
international water agreements with one another with or without an 
exchange of financial investments. When scarcity or degradation induces 
parties to coordinate actions, country-level interests could be congru-
ent through a desire to negotiate and cooperate. Dinar analyzed the 
characteristics of these agreements and concluded that through-border 
situations carry a much greater likelihood of side payments or sharing 
investment costs from the downstream state to the upstream state.
The next paragraphs will discuss examples of situations in which a 
congruence of interests led to countries working out bilateral solutions 
to their water issues in the spirit of mutual accommodation. Typically, 
these solutions take place when the “low-hanging fruits” are obvious 
to all negotiating parties. For example, flood control and generation of 
hydroelectric power are obvious areas in which a downstream state 
perceives the need to cooperate. Iran paid Afghanistan; India has paid 
Bhutan and Nepal; the United States has paid Canada for hydropower, 
irrigation, and flood control.
There could be other examples wherein congruence of interests 
led to bilateral agreements. Table 15.1 illustrates some bilateral agree-
ments among the Mashreq countries of the MNA region.
Challenge of Working through Bilateralism and beyond
However, for every successful treaty, there are many more situations 
in which mutually beneficial agreements are not concluded. These 
arise because there are many political, geographic, and economic 
considerations that lead to countries being either unwilling or unable 
to collaborate to share water resources. Typically, disagreements arise 
when countries assert their “rights” to water quantities. A downstream 
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country with significant hydraulic investments, such as Egypt or the 
Netherlands, claims prior rights in that the water passing through its 
territory already has been put to productive use by its farmers and 
urban and industrial consumers and therefore needs to be safeguarded 
in any subsequent treaty. By contrast, an upstream country such 
Ethiopia or Turkey will claim sovereign rights to the water quantities 
flowing through its territory. In these situations, the absence of a vi-
able international adjudication system often leads to a breakdown of 
the bilateral dialogue.
As a consequence, countries situated along the watercourse 
often are unable to work toward optimal utilization of the water. 
If the number of countries is three or more, the transaction costs 
of reaching such agreements become even more complex because 
these countries often do not fully appreciate their interdependence. 
Examples are countries that share water from very large watercourses, 
such as the Nile, Mekong, and Brahmaputra-Ganges Rivers, Nubian 
aquifer, and Arabian Gulf. Instead, as with bilateral water relations, 
countries tend to perceive water rights synonymously with country 
interests.
In such situations, crafting institutional platforms that facilitate 
water agreements becomes a formidable challenge. For example, since 
1997, the UN Watercourse Convention has attempted to codify a 
Table 15.1  Disputes and Agreements in Mashreq Countries, 2008
Water conflict Issue Countries involved Outcome
River Tigris Irrigation in Syria with Tigris Syria, Iraq, Turkey No formal agreements as yet  
 waters 
Shatt al Arab River Boundary demarcation Iran and Iraq 1974 agreement by which the river is   
   recognized as the boundary
River Euphrates Sharing river for irrigation Syria and Iraq 1990 agreement to share waters   
   42:58 between Syria and Iraq
River Orontes Sharing river for irrigation Syria, Lebanon, Turkey Lebanon gets 80mcm, Syria 430 mcm.  
   Turkey gets adequate water for irrigated lands.
River Jordan Sharing river for irrigation, Jordan and Syria Syria retains flow from springs above 250m.  
 urban, and industrial use  Maqarin Dam flows used by Jordan but 70%  
   of power generated allocated to Syria
Source: Hadadin 2008, 79–81.
Notes:
Mashreq = Eastern countries of the Arab Region.
In border-creator situations, as the water or the externalities are shared, the tendency is to share (often equally) the costs of mitigating measures. 
For example, the Baltic countries saw clear advantages of sharing the benefits and the costs of protecting the Baltic Sea from land-based pollution.
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broad framework for countries to work within to resolve water issues.1 
Despite almost 40 years of consultations and meetings, the suggested 
legal framework to govern international water agreements has not 
been ratified (table 15.2).
Table 15.2  UN Watercourses Convention Timeline, 1970–1997
Year Result Comment
1970 UN asks International Law Commission to start codification 5 rapporteurs produced 15 reports
1997 UN passes draft Convention on Watercourses 103 countries vote for convention
2007 Only 15 states sign the convention Minimum of 35 states ratifying convention not achieved
Source: Salman 2007.
Delays in ratification have arisen principally because of differing 
interpretations of the relative importance of two articles of the Con-
vention:
Article 5, which enjoins participating states to ensure equitable 1. 
and rational utilization of shared waters
Article 7, which obligates states to do no harm.2. 
Upstream states emphasize the need to honor Article 5 (protects 
their sovereign right to exploit the economic potentials of watercourses 
running through their territories). Downstream states emphasize the 
importance of protecting historic investments in hydraulic infrastructure 
(from future or contemplated actions by the upstream states) that 
could adversely affect watercourse flows.
When interpretations of water rights differ—as in any system 
of jurisprudence—there needs to be a body of tort law to guide the 
adjudication system. In the case of international water disputes, 
such a system is absent. Therefore, except in either the case of the 
“low-hanging fruits” referred to earlier, or cooperation through side-
payments, differing interpretations of water rights quickly degenerate 
into zero-sum games.
Under these circumstances, water diplomacy needs to focus on build-
ing confidence and capacity among the parties sharing a watercourse. 
 The full name is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non- 1
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The convention was passed in final 
by the General Assembly in 1997.
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Diplomacy can enable the parties to see beyond arguing about conflict-
ing interpretations of rights. It leads them to recognize that, because 
of their interdependence, cooperation is the only way forward if the 
water is to be utilized to its highest economic and environmental po-
tentials. Sadoff and others (2008) have articulated the advantages of 
benefit sharing.
Three Phases of Interdependence
Geographic Interdependence
The fact that a watercourse is shared by two or more countries 
highlights the geographic or spatial interdependence of these countries. 
Whether it is a flow of a river from the headwaters to the sea, an aquifer 
across national boundaries, or a water body surrounded by countries, 
the resource is available through one ecosystem. Any action—water 
extractions or water insertions—taken by one state impacts all of the 
others. When populations were still relatively small and demands on 
the resource were low compared to the available resource, conflicting 
views of water rights could be resolved through bilateral agreements. 
These agreements took a static view of water availability (as validated 
by historical hydrological data): that future available quantities would 
be fully predictable.
Economic Interdependence
The second phase of water interdependence occurs as a consequence 
of growing economic interdependence. Through trade and commerce, 
countries have spun a complex web of interrelationships. As a result, 
often those sharing a watercourse become so economically interde-
pendent that disagreements over water get resolved through “give and 
take” within a broader congruence of economic interests. In Europe, 
for example, disputes over the Danube and Rhine Rivers and other 
important international watercourses are no longer perceived by each 
country with the same degree of passion as in past centuries because 
the economic benefits from their interdependence far outweigh the 
advantages of nationalist rhetoric. Seeing beyond asserting rights to 
water quantity, these communities are moving forward toward insti-
tutionalizing the rights to water quality for the benefit of the entire 
ecosystem.
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Water Interdependence
A third phase of water interdependence recently acquired prominence 
because inter-temporal projections warn of entire water ecosystems 
around the world being affected by climate change. Variability in 
rainfall patterns, retreat of mountain glaciers, and higher evaporation 
rates in reservoirs impounding water (particularly in arid regions such 
as the Middle East) bring in new climatic risks that need immediate 
and long-term mitigation. For example, the Khabour River in Syria 
has a large command area of irrigation. The country has witnessed 
a steady decline in discharge at Ras Al Ain from an average of 60 m3 
per second between 1942 and 1972 to no water after 2001. Figure 15.1 
indicates similar trends in Morocco.
More fundamentally, predicting future water flows in a watercourse 
on the basis of past historical data is becoming a dubious exercise. In other 
words, country interpretations of quantity rights to international wa-
tercourses already are affected by prolonged droughts in many parts 
of the Middle East and North Africa. These new climate-induced 
risks are forecast to get worse in the ensuing decades. This prediction 
makes it imperative for countries that share watercourses to recognize 
their joint and individual vulnerability to catastrophic events such as 
prolonged droughts, floods, or both.
The three phases of water interdependence both influence and are 
influenced by different congruences of national interests. Historically, 
geographic interdependence has been the independent variable that 
has led to the largest number of 
international treaties on water. 
These treaties have institution-
alized mechanisms for coopera-
tion, even when the participating 
countries have widely differing 
economic and political power 
(Dinar 2000, 2005). In another 
paper, Dinar (2006) analyzed a 
wide cross-section of interna-
tional water agreements. He 
concluded that treaties between 
countries for through-border 
configuration (water flows from 
one country to another) have 
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Figure 15.1  Secular Rainfall Trends in Morocco’s Major River 
Basins, 2030–80 (%)
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involved tort-oriented outcomes in which richer downstream countries 
usually have financed upstream hydraulic infrastructure. By contrast, 
for border-creator configurations (waters are shared, as in an inland 
lake, or a river serves as an international boundary), treaties often have 
led to a more equal sharing of investment costs, even when power 
relations are asymmetric. There also could be situations in which the 
wealthier country agrees to finance a disproportionate amount for 
internal economic, social, or political reasons.
Regarding economic interdependence, factors “beyond the water-
course” have been the independent variables facilitating international 
cooperation along watercourses (Dinar 2005). For example:
The US and Canada share a close political, cultural, and economic a. 
relationship that goes much beyond the water resources they share. 
The resulting congruence of economic and political interests has facili-
tated agreements on sharing watercourses of 150 rivers and lakes.
Similarly, the International Commission for the Protection of the b. 
Rhine has been able to establish itself as a supra-national body 
because of the common economic and political interests of the 
Rhine riparian states (Sadoff and others 2008).
More recently, the European Water Framework Directive of 2000 c. 
(EU aquis) has created a binding legal framework to protect all 
European watercourses, over which the European Court of Justice 
has enforcement powers. These Water Directives become relevant 
in reshaping water policies for states that apply to join the European 
Union (notably Turkey). The directives have led to Turkey’s National 
Programme for the adoption of the EU aquis, with consequences 
for how the country deals with downstream riparians with which 
it shares geographic interdependence (IDRA 2004).
There is also the example of the Mekong accord in which the d. 
riparians recognized their growing economic interdependence by 
agreeing to equal rights to the use of the Mekong waters according 
to economic and social needs.
The third phase of environmental interdependence—due to climate 
change—has just begun and still is not fully internalized by most coun-
tries. This concern was highlighted by the 2007 Inter-governmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report. This report projected global 
warming with very serious consequences for rivers whose headwaters 
are in tropical and semitropical zones. A combination of increased 
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variability of rainfall with receding glaciers and rising temperatures 
makes the quantity of flows in the major international watercourses 
unpredictable. Certainly, historic data can offer no reliable forecast of 
the quantities and variability of future water.
In fact, many arid countries already are witnessing prolonged 
droughts and irregular rainfall. In the MNA region, Morocco and 
countries in West Asia (Israel, Jordan, Palestine, and Syria) have been 
particularly affected. In the future, Egypt runs the risk of losing a con-
siderable part of its populous Nile Delta lands to sea-level rise by the 
Mediterranean. At Egypt’s southern end, inflows to Lake Nasser/Nubia 
are projected to increase because extra precipitation in the Ethiopian 
highlands will exceed the reservoir capacity. This overflow will lead to 
two forms of wastage of the precious resource:
Excess waters increasingly will have to be diverted to the Toshka a. 
depressions. These function as mega-sized evaporation ponds 
(these water bodies already are so large that they are captured by 
remote-sensing images).
With the expected rise in temperatures, evaporation rates in Lake b. 
Nasser are expected to increase, thereby reducing the water stock 
available for use downstream of the High Aswan Dam.
Table 15.3 summarizes the suggested three-phase typology and 
its consequences on water diplomacy. The first column represents the 
geographic interdependence phase. These are situations in which countries 
have worked out bilateral or multilateral agreements based on recogni-
tion of common geography. The second column represents economic 
interdependence. In these situations, economic factors outside the ge-
ography of sharing watercourses have acted as powerful instruments to 
Table 15.3  Typology of Interdependence
Geographic interdependence leads to Economic interdependence leads to Environmental interdependence leads  
agreements between/among countries based on: agreements between/among to agreements between/among  
 countries based on: countries based on:
  Recognizing and sharing ecosystem  
  risks due to climate change
 Overall economic and political  
 congruence through sharing  
 economic benefits 
Territorial sovereignty and sharing water rights  
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promote international water agreements. The third column represents 
the additional phase of environmental interdependence. It signifies emerging 
situations in which global externalities will require countries that share 
watercourses to work with one another to mitigate these emerging risks 
to their economies. The biggest challenges to water diplomacy in the 
years ahead lie in this third arena.
To sum up, the nature of interdependence among countries that 
share watercourses leads to either a congruence or lack of congru-
ence of interests. These lead to either the success or failure of water 
diplomacy. Past disputes over international watercourses have arisen 
in the region from a variety of social, political, economic, and histori-
cal reasons. With projected increased variability in rainfall and rising 
temperatures, countries simply cannot afford to risk water conflicts 
based on existing rights-based paradigms such as territorial sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. The development challenge is how to create a 
culture of learning and knowledge-sharing, so that policymakers are able 
to understand that growing environmental interdependence is forcing a 
much greater congruence of interests in managing water than has ever 
been necessary before.
How Can Countries Be Persuaded to Recognize the Importance 
of Environmental Interdependence?
The IPCC Report of 2007 generated global awareness of the risks of 
climate change, particularly in terms of rainfall declines and variability 
(figure 15.2). Specific adverse impacts and risks are becoming apparent 
to policymakers at country levels. Under these circumstances, politi-
cal leadership has been quick to 
recognize the importance of 
adapting policies to meet the 
challenges of rainfall variabil-
ity. Tunisian President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali, for example, 
has directed the country’s water 
utilities to explore how treated 
wastewater, which the country 
is discharging into the Mediter-
ranean, instead can best be 
conveyed and reutilized in the 
drought-prone areas.
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Figure 15.2  Climate Change Impacts in North Africa: 
Range of Change in Runoff (%)
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In Morocco, many of the dams constructed over the past three 
decades are not filling to design capacity because of rainfall variability. 
Earlier, this variability was viewed as prolonged droughts. However, 
now it is being interpreted as the first stage of climate change. These 
shortages have affected carefully calculated allocations from the 
water stored in dams of the country’s river basins for use by farmers, 
industries, and urban communities. Such experiences are galvanizing 
policymakers to work on a new range of economic and investment 
policies. Table 15.4 describes recent simulations of the Rio Bravo Basin 
in Mexico that show the extent of economic damage with a decline 
in rainfall. 
Table 15.4  Simulations for Rio Bravo Basin, Mexico
If runoff falls by 20%:
$7.5B pesos of damages in the residential sector.t
$5.3B pesos of damages in the industrial sector.t
$69M pesos of damages in the agricultural sector.t
Industrial and residential sectors will be damaged considerably more than agriculture because the third places a much higher value t
on water.
Overall welfare losses = $13.0B pesos annually.t
If the reduction in runoff is 10%, the damages fall to $5.5B pesos.
If the reduction in runoff is 5%, the damages are $2.6B pesos.
Source: B. Debewo, personal communication, 2008.
While country leaders have been quick to recognize the adverse 
impacts of rainfall variability and prolonged droughts on their economies, 
they are less familiar with the risks caused by the interdependence of 
countries that share watercourses and ecosystems. The need is urgent 
to build collaborative learning and knowledge-sharing on how countries 
that share watercourses can work with each other in a new world of 
global externalities. Regional resilience programs—similar to the one 
at country-levels—will be possible only when there is a universal rec-
ognition of the congruence of interests to cooperate among nations 
sharing watercourses.
Investment in Capacity Building Is Key
Recognizing environmental interdependence, therefore, poses a major 
capacity building challenge to the development community. Recognition 
requires investments on three fronts:
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1. Developing communication strategies and country dialogues
Making clear information on resource publicly available to all N
watercourse beneficiaries: How much water is available where, 
with what reliability, and of what quality to technical staff in all 
interested countries?
Utilizing similar methods of data analysis, so that policymakers and N
other national stakeholders receive objective, professional advice 
on available options to share the resources equitably and without 
causing any harm.
Articulating the risks posed by climate change projections, par-N
ticularly regarding (a) design assumption failures for hydraulic 
infrastructure and (b) dangers of misdirected investments and 
misdirected water and energy policies.
Facilitating country-level dialogues aimed at mitigating this new N
risk vector.
2. Build partnerships to understand and mitigate risk
A second front is to build partnerships among scientific institutions, 
civil society, international and bilateral donor agencies, and national 
policymakers, so that the nature and consequences of emerging hy-
drological risks are understood, and appropriate mitigating measures 
are taken. Some pilot initiatives are underway. The Red Sea-Dead Sea 
Study Program is a $15 million initiative financed by the international 
donor community in response to acute water shortage in the Jordan 
Valley and the rapid shrinking of the Dead Sea. Jordan, Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority are collaborating on this study because all three 
countries recognize not only their geographic interdependence but 
also the critical importance of building up joint resilience to climate 
change predictions.
The study is evaluating the feasibility of constructing a water 
conveyance system from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea to generate 
electricity and desalinating the water to meet the unmet water demand 
in Jordan. The feasibility of the project will be evaluated against other 
cost-effective options (including what is currently a politically unac-
ceptable option of reducing water consumption by irrigated agriculture 
in Jordan and Israel), and establishing a common monitoring system 
for water resources in the Jordan Valley.
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3. Develop regional investment programs to build regional resilience  
to climate change
The third front would emerge after the basic awareness of environmen-
tal interdependence and detailed technical knowledge are generated. 
The third front is to develop investment programs to build regional 
resilience to climate change. Of course, countries will need to agree 
to sign off on such programs.
If they do, it could be the evidence that hydropolitics and the ensuing 
water diplomacy finally have recognized the third aspect of interdepen-
dence: environmental interdependence. Awakening to this understanding 
is the challenge of water diplomacy in the early 21st century.
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 Based on the “Report Submitted to the Ministry of Water and Electricity, King-1
dom of Saudi Arabia,” 2005.
 The countries used for this study include (a) Lebanon, (b) Yemen, (c) Jordan, 2
(d) Morocco, (e) Tunisia, (f) Egypt, and (g) Oman.
 3 Editor’s note: Due to these authors’ comprehensive documentation of their 
sources, the citations are in footnote form rather than text note form, as in the 
other chapters.
Comparative Analysis of  
Water Laws in MNA Countries
Jackson Morill and Jose Simas
Codification of water laws creates the institutional environment in which water resources and water service deliveries are managed. The countries selected for this study were Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, and Yemen.1 Choosing a 
group of representative countries within the region to use in a compara-
tive study was somewhat complicated, as the majority of countries do 
not possess a framework water law. Given the authors’ difficulty in 
locating legal texts, it is also hard to determine whether the analysis 
of each country represented in this study is totally complete. Laws 
may have changed or there may be new laws in force that have not 
been made public.2
Methodology
The methodology for this study was to divide the analysis of water laws 
in each country by religious and customary law background (addressed 
in the next section) and WRM topical areas. The topics are (1) prin-
ciples and objectives, (2) water rights, (3) water allocation, (4) transfer 
of water rights, (5) water pricing, (6) management of water pollution, 
(7) flood control, (8) penalties, (9) planning, development and information, 
286  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
 Conflict resolution usually involves some amount of “give and take,” or bargaining 4
(discussed in Bargaining), although bargaining does not lead to conflict resolution.
 Water laws have to take into account the limited capacity of those who are charged 5
with enforcement. However, it seems that the legal minds working in international 
water law have yet to identify a legal framework for pollution prevention that is 
workable in the context of areas with limited capacity.
(10) groundwater management, and (11) institutional arrangements.3 
Several of these categories overlapped, and in these cases, the analysis 
was arbitrarily dedicated to one category and noted in the areas of 
overlap.
The list of water issues above is certainly not comprehensive. The 
topics chosen for discussion represented the most common issues ad-
dressed in the water laws of the region. There was a paucity of law in 
such areas as investment and conflict resolution.4 If any law did exist 
in these areas, it was included in the institutional category.
This chapter does not touch upon the larger question of the ad-
ministration or enforcement of water law. Given the limited capacities 
of ministries, some of these laws appear difficult to administer. For 
example, in Yemen, 6–7 people working in the ministry are assigned 
to the Sana’a Basin Catchment Area, in which over 1.5 million people 
live and over-extract groundwater for agricultural activity (especially 
qat), as well as sell to several water vendors in the city of Sana’a. It is 
difficult to imagine that so few staff could enforce the entirety of the 
legal regime of water for such a large populous area.5
Religious and Historical Influences on Water Law  
in Selected MNA Countries
Countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) have a long, 
rich legal tradition in codifying water resource management (WRM). 
The scarcity of water in the region and its importance to early agrarian 
and nomadic societies necessitated the development of fairly complex 
systems of tribal law and Islamic doctrine to manage and share the re-
source. In modern day MNA countries, population growth and changing 
economies, as well as globalization and common water management 
principles, have led many countries in the region to consider modern-
izing their water law systems to address the modern-day issues of 
scarcity and demand management. The challenge for legal drafting in 
this region lies in aligning Islamic and customary law with the realities 
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 As Caponera wrote, “Islam always reacted against tribal life by preaching equal-6
ity and fraternity in the faith. Prophet Mohammed preached charity as the principal 
virtue to help the destitute and to show detachment from material things.” The idea 
of charity is represented in the basic principle of shafa. Where force was used to 
dictate water use in the tribal societies, water was made available to all in need. See 
D.A. Caponera, Water Laws in Muslim Countries, Irrigation and Drainage chapter 
(FAO 1973, 10) (hereinafter “Caponera”).
 7 Figh can be found in the second part of the Shari’a. Figh governs the manner in 
which faithful Muslims should live their lives, including methods of worship, diet, 
and clothing. Id., 1.
 Within the Sunni tradition, there are four recognized schools: the Hanifites, Ma-8
likites, Shafi’ites, and Hanbalites. The Shi’ite school has even more branches, including 
the Imamites, Ismailites, Zaidites, Carmatians, Assassins, Druses, Ahl-al Hagg, and 
Buhain-in. There are no separate branches within the Ibadite school. Id., 5.
of modern day WRM law and policy. Any new water law framework 
must at least consider and respect the traditions built in the region 
over the centuries.
Islamic religious law, or Shari’a, regulates all human actions, 
including the use of water resources. The Holy Qu’ran, the funda-
mental text of the Islamic faith and the foundation of Muslim law, 
provides the central tenet of water resource management, which is 
that water is a gift of God and in principle belongs to the community.6 
This central tenet, in turn, creates a primary right of shafa (“drink”) 
for all individuals and domesticated livestock. All Islamic water law 
is shaped by this baseline principle, as evidenced by the examples of 
religious doctrine developed in the Prophet’s teachings, the hadiths 
and the figh.7
The application of Islamic law in WRM becomes complex when 
examining the varied approaches adopted by the different schools 
within Islam. The three main schools are the Sunnites, Shi’ites, and 
Ibadites. Within each of these schools, there are different branches 
as well,8 and each of these schools has a nuanced approach that 
may differ slightly in certain areas of WRM. For example, under the 
Sunni, Shi’ite, and Ibadite traditions, the right of thirst applies to all 
public waters. The Sunni and Ibadite traditions expand the right of 
thirst to some private waters as well, but the Shi’ites hold that no one 
other than the proprietor is entitled to the use of his private waters. 
Examining the issue even further within the Sunni school, one of the 
branches (Malikite) holds that the right of thirst applies to private 
waters as well. However, if the one in need has the financial means, 
he is liable to pay compensation. Under the Hanbalite and Shafi’ite 
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 9 Id., 14.
 Late 1200s to 1922.10
 The Majalla was authored in the second half of the 19th Century by a council 11
of major Hanafi faqihs. It is very significant for several reasons. It was the first sys-
tematic codification of Islamic law and was based on one school (Hanafi). It also 
consciously addressed many pressing issues in law. It came to conclusions that some-
times were not “traditional” positions of the Hanafi school, although they always 
were grounded in the positions of the Hanafi school’s imams. The text was written 
so that someone without a deep background in the style and usage of classical fiqh 
texts could understand it.
 Lebanon still has in force Title 4, Chapter 10, Articles 1234–1328 of the 12
Majalla.
schools, the right of thirst may be exercised without compensation 
under certain conditions.9
While religious principles have maintained significant influence 
over WRM, practical needs also have had a significant effect on rules 
and regulations. Geography and the general availability of water vary 
within the region. Customary law also differs throughout the Muslim 
countries in this study. However, as Caponera writes in his article, 
“Water Law in Muslim Countries,” core principles can be gleaned from 
the varied customs in place. First, it is clear that, due to scarcity in 
the region, water ownership is important and is seen as real property. 
Water rights can be held individually or collectively. These rights may 
be sold, purchased, inherited, gifted, donated, or transferred. However, 
the rights of religious communities cannot be alienated. Water rights 
often have been recorded by local authorities.
The Ottoman Empire,10 which united the Middle East, also in-
fluenced modern day water law in the region through the Majalla, 
or the Ottoman Code.11 Within the Majalla, a large section governs 
water rights, and many of its precepts still hold true in countries such 
as Lebanon.12 In addition, the subsequent colonial influences of Brit-
ain and France are strong in MNA. Francophone countries possess a 
code-based system, whereas the British legacy was a more piecemeal, 
common law approach. As a result, some countries, for example, Mo-
rocco, have passed fairly comprehensive Water Codes, whereas other 
countries, Jordan, for instance, have a group of laws that addresses 
various aspects of WRM.
This historical background is not meant simply to elaborate on 
the diverse origins of water law in North African and Middle Eastern 
Islamic countries. While many modern water experts believe that 
the region is increasingly willing to stretch the bounds of Islamic and 
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customary law to better address modern issues of rising demand and 
rapidly decreasing supply, Government officials still have the clear inten-
tion to respect legal traditions. This is why, as Caponera writes in his 
seminal work, many Muslim communities have a “justifiable mistrust” 
regarding water code projects developed by non-Muslims, because 
they fear that innovations may offend religious law.13 Therefore, any 
legal reforms in the region must respect and attempt to incorporate the 
traditions of customary and Islamic law.
Current Water Law in Selected MNA Countries
The following sections will address the approaches to 11 issues in each 
country, highlighting best practices and possible approaches.
Principles and Objectives
Morocco and Yemen have been two of the first countries to put in 
force a framework water law that reflects modern water principles and 
attempts to address the country-specific issues faced in these coun-
tries. Jordan, while it does not possess a framework law, does have a 
very well-developed set of water laws, which address groundwater, 
water rights, and water pollution; and the institutional mechanisms 
for managing them.
Many “modern” framework water laws contain a statement of 
principles or objectives, or both. For example, the Brazilian Water Law 
includes both a set of principles and objectives at the beginning of its 
law to establish the broad national water policy (box 16.1).
In the countries reviewed for this study, only Morocco and Yemen, 
the two countries with framework water laws in force, have a series of 
principles or objectives. Other countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, 
clearly establish under their respective legal regimes the basic principle 
of water ownership by the state by virtue of its control of the public 
domain. However, each of these countries does not have any laws that 
begin with a set of principles and objectives.
Of the two countries with framework laws, Morocco’s is the most 
complete. Yemen’s law focuses almost entirely on the specifics of water 
rights administration.
 13 Id., 1.
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 See Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995), “Grounds for the Law” and “Benefits 14
of Water Legislation,” 1.
The Moroccan law begins with a basic set of principles, focusing 
on the fact that water is an “essential commodity” that is both scarce 
and extremely vulnerable.14 A set of objectives for the law follow, which 
begins with an overarching statement of purpose:
“Water resources development must ensure the availability of water 
adequate in quantity and quality to meet the needs of all water us-
ers, in accordance with the aspirations of balanced economic and 
social development, the guidelines of national land-use development 
Box 16.1  Brazilian Water Law 9.433, 1997
Chapter I: Basic Principles
Art. 1. The National Water Resource Policy is based on the following principles:
Water is public property.1. 
Water is a limited natural resource, which has economic value.2. 
When there is a shortage, priority in the use of water resources is given to human 3. 
consumption and the watering of animals.
The management of water resources should always allow for multiple uses of wa-4. 
ter.
The river basin is the territorial unit for the implementation of the National Water Re-5. 
sources Policy and the actions of National Water Resource Management System.
The management of water resources should be decentralized and should involve 6. 
participation by the government, the users, and the communities.
Chapter II: Objectives
Art. 2. The objectives of the National Water Resources Policy are as follows:
To ensure that present and future generations have the necessary access to water of 1. 
a quality adequate for their various uses.
To ensure the rational and integrated use of water resources, including transportation 2. 
by aqueduct, with a view to achieving sustainable development.
To prevent and protect against water crises due to either natural causes or the inap-3. 
propriate use of natural resources.
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 15 Id., 2.
 16 Id., 2–3.
 Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law 12/1982), 17
Art. 18.
 18 Id.
planning and the possibilities offered for harnessing potential water 
resources, all at lowest possible cost.”15
The remaining objectives touch on issues of “coherent and flexible 
planning,” using the catchment basin as the method for decentralized 
management, seeking optimal use of the resource that is in line with 
the priority uses outlined in the law, protecting the resource (both 
in quantity and quality), and establishing the appropriate water ad-
ministration. Finally, the law outlines a set of “principles” that flow 
from the objectives. They further define the tools and parameters 
for achieving sound water management through the implementation 
of the framework law.16
Water Rights
As outlined in the background section, the history of water rights in 
the Islamic world is complex. In many ways, the basic tenet of shafa 
(“drink”) continues today in all Muslim countries. However, how it 
is applied varies greatly. Most countries allow for customary private 
water rights to coexist with state-owned water administered by a 
permitting scheme. Several countries, most notably Egypt, tie water 
rights exclusively to land. Others separate water and land ownership/
use rights. Each country also varies as to the rights and obligations 
that accompany water rights. Because of these great differences, this 
chapter presents a separate section on each country.
 Egypt
Egypt is unique in that surface water rights are tied to land, and thus 
are tied to land ownership.17 Egyptian water law provides water rights 
only for irrigation purposes. No other uses are addressed under the 
law. Landowners must submit to the irrigation supervisor a scheduling 
table for irrigation based on the amount of land and the type of crops 
to be grown. This schedule will dictate the amount of water allocated, 
a process covered more extensively in the next section.18
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 19 Id. at Art. 82.
 20 Id. at Arts. 9 and 49.
 Jordan Water Authority Law (#18/1998), Art. 25. See also Underground Wa-21
ter Control By-Law (#85/2002), Art. 3. Under the Underground Water By-Law, 
ownership of the land does not in fact include ownership of the underground water 
therein. Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002), Art. 3.
 22 See Jordan Water Authority Law (#10/1998), Art. 25.
 23 Id.
Landowners have certain responsibilities that accompany their water 
use rights. The responsibilities include keeping the drains, mesqas, and 
canals clean and free of debris. For landowners holding water rights, 
a variety of actions are prohibited:
Wasteful use of irrigation water through a private drain, public N
drain, fallow land, or unlicensed land
Impeding the irrigation networkN
Preventing flow in the main canal or any other action that might N
compromise the water elevation
Opening or closing any lock or any other regulation worksN
Demolishing any hydraulic infrastructure constructed by MWRIN
Cutting banks of the Nile or canals or drains without licenseN
Excavating in the banks or changing their elevation (hack filling N
mud or clay or soil).19
Licenses are required for any water-related works or operation of N
equipment.20
Jordan
Jordan is distinct from the other countries primarily because it treats 
almost all water resources within the Kingdom, whether surface or 
groundwater, as state-owned property.21 The slight exception lies 
with any waters that are not considered “under the management, 
responsibility or supervision of the Authority.”22 These waters may not 
be used in excess of personal or domestic needs or other acceptable 
private usage. Moreover, they may not exceed the amounts set in laws 
pertaining to drinking water and irrigation rights.23
Jordan also is somewhat unusual in that it maintains a separate law 
for the Jordan Valley that determines water and land use in that region. 
Under this law, waters acquired by means of government projects—
and that were not used for irrigation purposes prior to the law—are 
considered government property. These waters may be leased, sold, or 
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 Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001), Art. 18.24
 Decree #144, Art. 3. Note that these private rights are recorded in the Land 25
Registry. Id.
 Majalla, Title IV, Chapter 10, Arts. 1262 and 1265.26
 27 Id. at Art. 1254. For example, any person in full ownership of water in wells or 
streams is allowed to prohibit another’s right for cattle to drink or to irrigate crops in 
the area if another source exists that is available to the public. Id. at Art. 1268.
 28 Id. at Art. 1269.
 Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 129
 30 Id. at Art. 2.
 31 Id. at Art. 6.
otherwise disposed of as decided by the Water Board. In addition, for 
any irrigation project, any excess water not claimed under registered 
water rights is considered government property.24
Lebanon
The law in Lebanon holds that the state has exclusive ownership over the 
public domain. Nonetheless, some acquired private water rights remain 
protected. Generally, private water rights could be acquired through 
the usual means of property acquisition (inheritance, settlement, or 
purchase) if acquired before 1926.25 The right of use that accompanies 
these rights is governed by the Majalla, which distinguishes between 
two rights: drinking water, and water for livestock and irrigation.26 Both 
of these rights are limited by the condition that they do not infringe 
on the rights of others. The right to drink water has fewer limitations 
than the right to water livestock.27 For irrigation rights, in particular, 
it is prohibited for anyone to change the periodicity of irrigation by 
transferring water to land belonging to him or her if he does not hold 
irrigation rights for said waterway.28
Morocco
The Moroccan Water Law holds that “Water is a public asset and 
as such…cannot be the object of private appropriation.”29 The law 
lists 10 specific types of water body (natural and constructed) that 
are considered to be in the public domain.30 Almost any conceivable 
surface water body falls within this definition. However, the law 
does provide that some vested rights over the public domain may 
be retained, provided that (1) ownership preceded the publication 
of the Dahir (law) (1914 and 1925) and (2) claims concerning these 
rights were filed within five years of publication of the law. After this 
date, no more claims may be filed.31 These recognized water rights 
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 32 Id. at Art. 8.
 33 Id. at Art. 25.
 Id. 34 at Art. 26.
 35 Id. at Art. 31.
 Oman Ministerial Decision No. 2/1990, Art. 4.36
 Tunisia Water Code (1975), Art. 53.37
 38 Id. at Art. 21.
 FAO, Water Law and Standards: Framework for Analyzing National Water 39
Laws, Tunisia, 3. www.who.int/waterlaw/WQ.exe$QU_Search
will remain subject to the provisions concerning water use as laid 
down in the national water plan and in integrated water resources 
development master plans.32
Landowners have certain rights and obligations for use of water 
that falls outside the public domain. Owners have the right to use 
rain falling on their lands. However, any attempt to artificially collect 
rainwater is subject to regulation.33 An owner may dig a well on his or 
her land not to exceed a certain depth and subject to concessions and 
public domain regulation.34 In addition, landowners abutting a water-
course assigned to public use are subject to an easement within four 
meters of the freeboards. The easement will enable free passage for 
administration or catchment basin authority works.35
Oman
The available legal texts for Oman limited the analysis to groundwater. 
Under Article 2 of the Ministerial Decision No. 2/1990, all persons 
claiming ownership of existing wells, whether used or unused, must 
apply to the Ministry of Water Resources for registration. All wells 
were to be registered by July 1990. Any well that was not registered 
by that date would be considered illegal thereafter.36
Tunisia
Under the Tunisian Water Code, water use rights are private rights 
existing prior to the commencement of the law, provided that they are 
recognized by the Drainage Commission.37 The code also provides that 
any existing water right at the time of the publication of the code be-
comes a private right.38 Water use rights are appurtenant to the land. As 
a result, when land on which a water right exists is sold or transferred, 
the water use right is transferred to the new landowner. In addition, 
if the land is parceled, then a new water right must be requested and 
issued to reflect the change.39 Existing rights for the use of natural 
spring waters located on private lands also may be recognized by the 
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 Tunisia Water Code (1975), Art. 30.40
 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 5.41
 42 Id. at Art. 27.
 43 Id. at Art. 28.
 Id. at Art. 29. Note that these rights must be registered and also be used only 44
for their original purposes. Id.
 45 Id. at Art. 30.
 46 Id. at Art. 32.
Ministry of Agriculture, provided that these rights are not suitable for 
exploitation and use for public purposes.40
Yemen
Under the 2002 Yemen framework water law, all watercourses in the 
wadis (natural streams) are the common property of all beneficiaries. In 
contrast, all water installations and wells set up by the government are 
considered public property and subject to registration and licensing.41 As 
evidenced by this water rights regime, the Yemen water law provides 
for a significant number of private water rights. Existing and acquired 
water rights, whether prior to the issuance of the law or thereafter, are 
maintained. They are not touched by the government except in times 
of critical need and for the public welfare. The government should 
compensate any infringement on the right of use.42
Traditional water rights derived from rainwater harvesting and 
natural runoff flows that are tied to irrigation are protected for all own-
ers of agricultural lands. The law gives due consideration to customs, 
traditions, and irrigation systems in effect.43
Traditional rights of use from natural springs, brooks, creeks, 
and surface wells (the depth of which can not exceed 60 meters) 
are maintained, provided they were held prior to the issuance of the 
law.44 Finally, quantities of water may be collected in cisterns, pools, 
or streams, provided that this acquired right does not infringe on other 
acquired rights and that the use accords with traditional rights and 
customs.45 The only caveat for all of these rights is that they must be 
registered with the Water Authority within three years of the date of 
the announcement of the issuance of this law.46
Allocation of Public Water
Every country examined in this study has in place a scheme to allocate 
publicly owned water. However, as might be expected, differences 
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 Since the water legislation was passed, the proportion of crops regulated by 47
licensing has fallen considerably.
 Egyptian law: Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law 48
#13/1982), Art. 36.
 49 Id.
 50 Id. at Art. 37. In fact, the Irrigation Director may alter the flow coming through 
a privately constructed withdrawal on the Nile or a main canal should she/he feel it 
exceeds irrigation needs. However, a public hearing is required, and any increase or 
decrease will be at the expense of the government. Id. at Art. 40.
are significant depending on whether the water allocation is tied 
to the land or is considered a separate right. In addition, countries 
differ as to which type of water abstraction requires a permit and 
which does not. Some countries allow underground abstraction to 
a certain depth while others require a license for any underground 
abstraction. Finally, administration of the allocation system varies 
among countries.
 Egypt
As mentioned previously, water rights in Egypt are tied exclusively 
to land, and water rights are used only for irrigation. The effect is to 
create a flexible system of water allocation based on factors similar 
to those of the Jordan Valley Development Law, including size of the 
land and crop rotations. Therefore, water rights allocations are tied 
to land-holding and the types of crops licensed to be grown on each 
parcel.47
The Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWRI) is responsible for 
the distribution of water in all waterways up to the mesqa level and for 
determining and publishing the irrigation calendar.48 MWRI reserves 
the right to modify the system in accordance with agricultural needs.49 
In fact, the Irrigation Director is empowered to stop diverting water 
from a main canal to ensure more equitable distribution or to avoid 
over-application.50
To irrigate new lands, defined as lands that have never received 
an irrigation license, the MWRI must approve the appropriation to 
ensure that there is enough water. Then a license is required from the 
Irrigation Director. The licensee must include in the license application 
the acreage, soil classification, irrigation source, irrigation technology, 
and cropping calendars. The Irrigation Director is then responsible to 
validate the data and determine how much water to allocate and which 
irrigation technology should be used.
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 51 Id. at Arts. 9–16.
 52 Id. at Arts. 39–44.
 53 Id. at Arts. 49–60.
 54 Id. at Art. 7.
 Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002), Arts. 4–42.55
 Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001), Arts. 18–2456
 The Water Authority Law calls for the Water Authority to “regulate the uses of 57
water, prevent its waste and conserve its consumption.” See The Water Authority 
Law (#18/1988), Art. 6(h). In addition, Article 25 provides that all waters available 
in the Kingdom are State-owned property and may not be distributed, except in 
compliance with this law. Id. However, no guidance is provided in this law as to how 
publicly owned water will be allocated.
 Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001), Art. 24.58
 59 Id. at Art. 21.
The law also requires licensing for any water works completed on 
public lands,51 or for any water intake established on the Nile or main 
canals,52 to construct any pumping stations,53 and even to cultivate 
lands.54 Each of these requirements is designed to further control the 
withdrawal and use of public water resources drawn from the Nile.
Jordan
The amalgamation of laws in Jordan covers the allocation of underground 
water through the Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002) 
and of surface/groundwater in the Jordan Valley through the Jordan 
Valley Development Law (#30/2001). These two laws work in entirely 
different ways. The underground water law calls for a standard permit 
system for well digging and water abstraction.55 The Jordan Valley law 
ties water allocation to land size and crop rotations.56 In addition, it 
was not apparent from any of the laws reviewed for Jordan whether 
it has a national scheme for allocating surface water.57
The surface and groundwater allocation system for the Jordan 
Valley Authority is managed by a Board. It sets all of the necessary 
regulations to control the use of water in farm units in the valley. The 
Board determines when to allocate or cut off water flows. It also fixes 
the maximum quantities in accordance with water availability and the 
nature of the crops planted in each unit. Finally, the Board enforces 
the water prices set by a Cabinet of Ministers upon recommendation 
by the Board.58
The Authority also may expropriate any lands, water shares, or 
both, as necessary for projects, either by absolute expropriation with 
compensation or by lease for any period it deems appropriate.59 The 
law establishes a fairly complex system for estimating the value of 
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 60 Id.
 61 Id. at 22. Note that no other Agency or Ministry can execute “any construction 
activities” in the Jordan Valley. Id. at Art. 32.
 Lebanon Decree 320/26 (Titles 2–3), Art. 3.62
 63 Id. at Art. 4.
 64 Id. at Art. 5.
 Id.65
the lands or water rights, and provides for appeals as to the amount 
granted for the expropriation.60 The Authority also has the right to 
take all necessary measures to implement irrigation networks and 
improve their works.61
To avoid overlap, the discussion of Jordan’s Underground Water 
Control By-Law appears in the groundwater section.
Lebanon
The Lebanese framework water law provides that the state has 
exclusive property rights over water resources in the public domain, 
Nevertheless, many private water rights are held in the country. The 
allocation law concerning private water rights seems to focus on water 
extraction. For example, the use of water from wells drilled on private 
lands, the flow of which does not exceed 100 m3 per day, is exempt 
from any permit or other authorization.62
Under Decree 320/26, the head of state or any other delegated 
authority can require specific permits for:
Temporary erection of structures for the use of waters in the 1. 
public domain
Extraction of materials from a permanent or seasonal water 2. 
body
Planting or construction on the sides of waterways3. 
Prospecting for underground water (but not for its use)4. 
Structures designed to control and use waters from natural sources, 5. 
whose flows are not sufficient to justify needing these waters for 
public use.63
To drill for underground waters, permits are required.64 Any civil 
engineering works on waterways require a permit that specifies the 
scope of the work, its nature, materials to be used, and the overall 
management scheme.65 Although the duration of a permit is usually 
provided case by case, some activities are accorded temporary use of 
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 66 Id. at Art. 7. The activities include (1) permanent pumping of water from a wa-
terway; (2) irrigation of lands by waters of the public domain by motorized methods 
or the use of such waters for energy; (3) use of underground and spring waters; 
(4) use of hot and mineral springs; and (5) purification and development of marshes. 
Id. Note also that these uses may be declared public and thus subject to the specific 
regulations of the concessions. In such cases, the length may not exceed 75 years. 
Id. at Art. 12.
 67 Id. at Art. 10.
 Moroccan Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 39.68
 69 Id. at Art. 38.
 70 Id. at Art. 39.
 71 Id.
 72 Id.
up to four years.66 If the permit is issued to a farmer, it may be renewed 
indefinitely for successive periods of 40 years.67
Morocco
Morocco has in place a system for allocating all water held in the public 
domain through a permit system administered by Catchment Basin 
Authorities.68 Permits are required to (1) prospect projects for tapping 
underground or out-welling water, (2) construct dug wells with depths 
exceeding the maximum provided in law (Art. 26), (3) establish works 
to impound and harness natural spring water on private property, 
(4) establish works meant for using waters of the public domain (for 
five-year intervals with possibility of renewal), (5) establish intakes 
from the underground water table in excess of the maximum set by 
regulation, (6) establish water intakes on watercourses or canals de-
rived from wadis, (7) establish intake of water of any kind for sale or 
therapeutic use, and (8) operate ferries or crossings on watercourse.69 
The permit granted by the Catchment Basin Authority specifies the 
duration (not to exceed 20 years), and renewal is possible.70 The per-
mit also should include the measures to be taken by the recipient to 
prevent water degradation, amount of the fee and payment arrange-
ments, and terms of use.71
The Authority is granted the ability to revoke a permit at any time, 
without compensation, following written notice, if (1) the terms of the 
permit have not been met, (2) utilization of the permit does not begin 
within two years, (3) permit is assigned or transferred without agree-
ment of the Authority, (4) fees or dues are not paid, and (5) water was 
used for a purpose other than that authorized by the permit.72 The 
Authority also may revoke, amend, or restrict the permit for reasons 
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 73 Id.
 74 Id. at Art. 41.
 75 Id.
 76 Id. at Art. 44.
 77 Id. at Art. 45.
 78 Id. at Art. 47.
 79 Id. at Art. 86.
 80 Id. at Art. 87.
 Id. 81 at Art. 88.
 Water Code (1975), Art. 1. The water bodies include all watercourses and the 82
land comprised within their overflow banks, springs, groundwater, lakes and subkhas, 
aqueducts, wells and watering places constructed in the public interest, irrigation, 
and navigation canals including the land comprised within their overflow banks, and 
their appurtenances. All belong to the public domain of the State. Id.
of the public interest, subject to prior notice of not fewer than 30 days. 
The permit holder is entitled to compensation.73
In addition, the law provides for a system of concessions for various 
categories of works, including development of thermal springs, con-
struction on public water domain, water storage, flood protection, or 
derivation works.74 These concessions are considered real rights, but 
they do not entitle the holder to the right of ownership over the water.75 
The law limits what the concessionaire may do under the contract,76 
and specifies a set of events that would forfeit the concession contract.77 
The Authority may demolish any structure constructed without a 
permit or concession and order the offending party to restore the area 
to its original condition.78
Finally, in cases of water shortage, the law provides that the ad-
ministration can declare a state of shortage, define the affected area, 
and enact the necessary local temporary regulations to ensure, at the 
least, potable water for human and livestock consumption.79 During 
this period, the administration is entitled to requisition water, provided 
it follows prevailing law.80 The cost imposed may be borne in part by 
the government. During times of shortage, specific regulations that 
restrict water use apply to areas under irrigation.81
Oman
The available law for Oman provided guidance only on groundwater al-
location. This guidance will be discussed in the groundwater section.
Tunisia
Under the 1975 Water Code, Article 1, it is clear that most water in 
Tunisia is within the public domain.82 Water may be used subject to a 
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 83 Id. at Arts. 21, 52, and 53.
 84 Id. at Art. 52.
 85 Id. at Art. 53. In certain cases, a concession may be decreed a public utility. Id. 
at Art. 56.
 86 Id. at Art. 60.
 Id. at Art. 67. Forfeiture occurs in these instances: (1) nonobservance of the law; 87
(2) if the concessionaire uses waters for purposes other than those granted in the 
concession; (3) if charges are not paid; (4) if the concession is transferred without 
authorization of the responsible authority; (5) if water is not used for a consecutive 
period of one year from the issuing of the concession; or (6) if the concessionaire fails 
to make full beneficial use of the water for a consecutive period of two years. Id.
 88 Id. at Art. 9.
 89 Id. at Art. 33.
 90 Id. at Art. 72.
simple authorization or concession, or under a water use right.83 An 
authorization is required (1) to use public domain water for nonper-
manent waterworks; (2) to construct infrastructures located within 
the overflow banks of a watercourse or on canals, lakes, and subkhas; 
(3) for groundwater exploration and exploitation activities, but not for 
the use of the water; and (4) for the exploitation and use of natural 
spring waters that are located on private lands but are not suitable for 
exploitation and use for public purposes.84
Concessions are granted for (1) permanent water intakes in wa-
tercourse beds, (2) use of underground or spring waters, (3) use of 
mineral and thermal waters, (4) construction of permanent dams and 
use of the water stored therein, and (5) drainage of lakes and subkhas 
and their use.85 Concessions may be renewed, but the law is silent on 
the duration.86 The law does provide for specific instances in which 
concessions may be forfeited.87 In addition, the law exempts some uses 
from licensing requirements, including any well dug no deeper than 50 
meters88 and rainwater falling on a landowner’s property.89 The conces-
sions or authorizations can be altered or forfeited if the water is needed 
for a public purpose so long as compensation is paid for any damages or 
loss.90 Nothing in the legislation covers the recording of water rights or 
the monitoring and enforcement of water abstraction licenses.
Yemen
Yemen is approving a series of amendments to the Framework Water 
Law (#33/2002). Among many other issues, the government may al-
ter the process for allocating water resources. Generally, the proposed 
amendments are designed to address the creation of the new Ministry 
of Water and Environment. It has taken over the functions of several 
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different ministerial bodies that either predated it or were created by 
the 2002 law. These amendments have not been passed, so it is not 
possible to speculate on their impact on the water allocation law or 
the other issues covered in this chapter. The only area for which reli-
able information on the proposed amendments is available regards the 
division of administrative duties, a topic addressed in the institutional 
section of this chapter.
The 2002 Yemen framework water law provides guidance on al-
location of groundwater and of water between catchment basins or 
zones. However, the law says little about surface water. Article 5 of 
the law does provide that the wadis are property in common to all 
beneficiaries. Thus, all water installations and water wells set up by 
the government are considered public property and require a license. 
However, these requirements are the extent of the regulation for 
surface water allocation.
What is interesting is that the law considers allocation among 
basins and provides specific guidance as to when these transactions 
might occur. Under certain conditions (listed in the law), after review-
ing all possible options and alternatives, the National Water Resources 
Authority (NWRA) may permit the pumping of specific volumes of 
ground or surface water from one basin to another on a temporary or 
permanent basis. The six conditions are that:
Conveyance does not damage the potable and domestic water. 1. 
Furthermore, it creates no future adverse effect on quantity and 
quality of the water in the basin or zone from which it was con-
veyed.
Water is conveyed only for drinking and domestic uses in the re-2. 
cipient region.
Water in the recipient basin is either insufficient to meet the needs 3. 
due to the shortage of the water there, or unsuitable for drinking 
after all other uses have been suspended.
Coordination and consultation have taken place with the local 4. 
authorities, water basin committees, and actual beneficiaries of 
the water basin from which the water is conveyed.
If conveyance of water damages any existing interests of beneficia-5. 
ries (the holders of use rights), such damages will be compensated 
fairly and only once.
In some cases, several possible source basins exist, and the eco-6. 
nomic costs of conveyance from all or some of these basins is close 
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 Jordan Water Authority Law (#18/1988), Art. 25.91
 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 29.92
 Tunisia Water Code (1975), Art. 23.93
 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 29.94
 Morocco Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 40.95
 96 Id. at Art. 9.
to the cost of conveyance from a single basin, In these cases, due 
consideration shall be given to drawing the required quantities 
of water from more than one source to distribute the effects of 
drawing water among the basins accordingly.
The licensing regime for groundwater is discussed in the ground-
water section.
 Transfer of Water Rights
Generally, every country reviewed for this study allows the transfer 
of water rights, but the mechanisms vary. In Jordan, all natural or 
juridical bodies may sell or transfer water from any source only with 
advance written approval from the ministry. The conditions of the 
sale or transfer will be included in a contract between the transferring 
party and NWRA.91 In Lebanon, water rights are transferable by sale 
or inheritance, provided they have been recorded in the Land Register 
and were acquired before the 1926 Decree 320. Yemen provides for 
the transfer of all traditional or vested rights (natural springs, streams, 
brooks, creeks, and maintained surface wells that do not exceed a 
depth of 60 meters).92
Many countries tie the transfer of land to the transfer of water 
rights. In Tunisia, if the land on which a water right exists is sold, the 
water use right is transferred with the land. The new landowner must 
notify the ministry of the transfer within six months of the land sale.93 
In Yemen, if the land upon which a water right exists is partitioned, the 
rights are apportioned by land area.94 In Morocco, when an irrigated 
landholding is transferred, the water use permit passes automatically 
to the new owner. He or she must declare this transfer to the Catch-
ment Basin Authority within three months of the change.95 If a water 
permit is held separately from a land holding, for the transfer to comply 
with the law, the buyer must own agricultural land to which the water 
rights can be attached.96 Any transfer of a permit effected separately 
from the holding for which it was granted is null and void and, in 
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 98 Id. at Art. 10.
 Caponera, 20.99
 Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation and Drainage (Law #12/1982), 100
Art. 32.
 101 Id. at Arts. 49, 53, and 73.
 102 Id. at Art. 74.
effect, revokes the permit.97 Furthermore, the holders of vested rights 
over water, or over water they use only partially for their land, are 
required to assign all or part of the rights that they do not use to either 
individuals or juridical persons who own agricultural holdings that can 
benefit from the water.98
Water Pricing
In the Islamic world, this segment of water law is perhaps the most dif-
ficult to implement due to the right of shafa (“drink”) for every Muslim 
and his or her livestock. The Shi’ites believe that water may be trans-
ferred or sold on a volumetric basis but not in globo. However, several 
Sunni branches are not as open to selling or transferring water. The 
Hanifites and Hanbalites allow only the sale of water from receptacles. 
In contrast, the Shafi’ites and the Malakites follow the principle that 
the owner of a water supply may sell and dispose of it at will, except 
water in a well dug for livestock.99 Clearly, these policies allow persons 
to sell water from private sources. Many MNA countries charge water 
user fees for public water.
 Egypt
Egypt does not charge for the water itself. However, the law envisages 
that the state should recover the cost of all of the money expended 
in administering the water. MWRI is to accomplish this by preparing 
an inventory of expenditures for drainage and then adding 10 percent 
for administrative costs. These costs are to be shared proportionally 
among beneficiary land owners.100 MWRI is to impose fees on the use 
of government-owned water intakes, pumps, and drains.101 In addition, 
anyone who draws from a government-owned pump should pay for 
that water if it is not meant for agricultural use.102
 Jordan
Jordan has a fairly well-developed system of water charges. It 
charges for the base resource as well as processing fees for ground-
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 In Jordan, as mandated by the Underground Water Control By-Law, the financial 103
resources of the Authority consist of (among others), revenues from water prices, 
subscriptions, deposits, and other fees the Authority may collect for its services. 
Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002), Art. 15.
 104 Id. at Art. 37.
 105 Id. at Art. 38. It is interesting to note that water extracted from the Al-Azraq-area 
licensed wells that fall within specified quantities are free. Charges for withdrawals 
up to and then exceeding 100,000 m3/yr incur two separate costs. Id.
 106 Id.
 107 Id.
 108 Id. at Art. 39.
water.103 First, a series of fees are levied for drilling licenses, drilling 
permit renewal, well deepening, well maintenance, and possession 
or use of a drilling rig.104 The prices levied annually for water ab-
stracted from private sources are fixed by law. There is no charge 
for water use under 150,000 m3/yr. There is a 25 Fils charge/m3/yr 
from 151,000–200,000 m3/yr, and a 60 Fils charge/m3/yr for over 
200,000 m3/yr.105
Prices also are fixed for water extracted annually from government-
owned wells, for industry-owned wells, for wells used for tourism or 
university purposes, and for active unlicensed agricultural wells whose 
status will be rectified under the law.106 There is a charge of 250 Fils 
per m3 for the sale of water from wells designated as drinkable water, 
as well as a lesser charge for water extracted from wells designated 
as nondrinkable.107 Finally, the law provides for charges imposed by 
the government for services rendered in supervision, technical field 
inspections, and other monitoring activities.108
 Lebanon
Lebanese law holds that beneficiaries and users of household, irrigation, 
and industrial water are subject to an annual contribution fixed by, or 
in proportion to, their water use. However, as in many of the countries 
reviewed in this region, these fees were fixed by law, making readjustment 
very difficult. As a result, almost all of the water charges are outdated and 
do not reflect the full cost of the water. However, this legal lag does not 
take away from the extraordinary commitment by many of the countries 
in the region to encourage controlled water use through water fees.
 Morocco
In Morocco, any individual or juridical person using public domain water 
is required to pay a water user fee. It is unclear whether the regulations 
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 Morocco Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 37.109
 110 Id.
 Tunisia Water Code (1975), Art. 63.111
 The law also calls for the regulation of weed control and waterway pollution 112
by agrochemicals.
 Egyptian National Water Resources Plan (June 2004), 17.113
have been passed that would govern the collection and quantification 
of the fees.109 Collection of fees can be enforced against either the 
owner or the operator of a water intake (jointly and severally liable).110 
Tunisia also provides for water use fees for authorizations or conces-
sions not declared of a public nature. Charges are calculated based on 
the volume of water granted in the agreement.111
Management of Water Pollution
The law on managing water pollution is very rich in some countries. 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen are at the forefront.
 Egypt
The basis for the protection of surface and groundwater may be found 
in the Protection of the Nile from Pollution Law (#48/1982). Under 
it, MWRI is responsible for licensing wastewater discharge, and the 
Ministry of Health is responsible for monitoring effluents. Only the 
discharge of treated effluent is permitted, and treated wastewater 
from animal or human sources can be discharged only into nonpot-
able water.112 Water quality standards are provided in the Executive 
Regulations to Law 48 for 5 categories of water bodies. Finally, the 
law establishes a fund to be supported by fines and cost recovery 
mechanisms that can be used for water administration, donations, 
research, and rewards.113
Jordan
Jordan has an extensive group of laws and regulations that govern water 
pollution. The identification of pollutants and their use and disposal 
are governed under two laws: (1) Protection of the Environment Law 
(#13/1995) and (2) Environment Protection Law (Temporary Law 
#1/2003). Under the 1995 law, the dumping, disposal, or piling up of 
any substance that is detrimental to the environment (solid, liquid, 
gaseous, radial, or heat in water sources) is prohibited. Storing any of 
these substances within a specified proximity to water sources also is 
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 The Environment Protection Law for Jordan (#1/2003), Arts. 6 and 11.115
 116 Id. at Art. 13.
 117 Id.
 118 Id. at Art. 17.
 Jordan Law of Public Health (#21/1971).119
 Jordan Wastewater Regulations (#36/1994).120
prohibited. However, the law provide exceptions for certain substances: 
those used to treat pollutants, to fight epidemics (including weeds, 
flies, and rodents—all within approved specifications), and to carry 
out experiments or research.114
The 2003 law expands upon the provisions of the 1995 law with 
articles that address the importation, use, storage, and disposal of 
environmentally detrimental substances.115 This law also provides that 
any owner of a factory or workshop, or any person who practices any 
activity that negatively impacts the environment, should install devices 
to prevent or reduce the diffusion of such pollutants to meet the stan-
dards established by the ministry.116 In addition, this law entitles the 
minister to require any legal entity or party to prepare an environmental 
evaluation of its activities prior to the law’s coming into force.117 A set 
of penalties applies to any violations of the law.118
One other large body of law deals with the collection and treatment 
of wastewater. A Law on Public Health provides the basic framework 
for establishing the wastewater network in Jordan.119 Supporting this 
law is a major Wastewater Regulation (#36/1994), which provides 
the regulations for the disposal of wastewater. Under the law, it is 
prohibited to dispose of waste and liquids (with some noted excep-
tions) into the public watercourse without having treated the water 
and acquired a written approval from the Water Authority. The law 
also governs the management of public and private wastewater disposal 
with provisions mandating connection to public systems at a cost to 
the user. As would be expected, the Water Authority is entitled to 
act on any violation through fining or even blocking a watercourse to 
prevent further pollution.120
As with the other water issues discussed previously, Jordan 
maintains a slightly different regime for the Jordan Valley. Articles 
of the Jordan Valley Development Law ban the importation of cer-
tain chemicals. The authority is given the ability to monitor water 
pollution through periodic testing. The authority also possesses the 
right to cut off or alter water sources that have been polluted to 
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 127 Id. at Art. 12.
 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 24.128
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prevent further damage. A series of penalties are made available for 
enforcement.121
Morocco
The Moroccan framework water law empowers the administration 
to prescribe quality standards for water according to its use. Waste-
water and polluted water are distinguished and treated separately.122 
Any person seeking to discharge effluents into surface or groundwater 
must apply for a permit with the Catchment Basin Authority. Thirty 
days are allowed for public inquiry, after which the permit may be is-
sued for a fee.123
The law outright forbids seven distinct activities such as dumping 
wastewater or solid waste into dry wadis, dug wells, or water sources; 
and washing linens or food products in water supply sources.124 The 
Catchment Basin Authority is authorized to periodically monitor the 
point source.125 The Authority may take any appropriate actions against 
any nuisance that could affect public health or safety.126
The law also governs any kind of excavation or works that might 
affect a watercourse and, in a number of instances, calls for formal 
authorizations from the Authority. Certain acts that might damage a 
watercourse or its banks are prohibited.127
Yemen
Yemen also has a permit system in place, under the framework law, 
for any activity that changes the physical or chemical characteristics 
of water.128 All entities that dispose of liquid, solid, radiation, thermal, 
or lubricant wastes must follow executive regulations (not yet in force) 
and the framework law regarding their transport, handling, and disposal. 
Special regulations (also not yet in force) will apply to the Protected 
Water Zones, which are determined by NWRA. The Authority also is 
empowered to protect all water resources from pollution. Last, NWRA 
monitors water quantity and quality.129 NWRA is free to alter or change 
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 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 61.135
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any permit in cases in which circumstances changed after the permit 
was issued and for which continued operation under the permit would 
cause damage.130 The National Water Supply and Sanitation Author-
ity (NWSA) is called on to regulate the disposal of industrial wastes, 
fertilizer, and pesticides; and other hazardous substances.131
 Flood Control
Given the fact that most surface water sources (such as wadis) are 
fed seasonally, provisions for flood control have been made in several 
countries. In Morocco, the protection of public property is the only 
purpose for which the construction of submersible lands, dikes, or levees 
to hinder floodwater runoff does not require a permit.132 The Catchment 
Basin Authority is entitled to construct any dike or other structure if 
doing so is in the public interest to prevent flooding.133 Under Tunisian 
law, permits granted for water use may be forfeited or varied in case 
of flood.134 The Yemen Water Law grants the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Irrigation the responsibility for controlling and regulating rainy areas 
that get rainwater runoff and flooding, their related collections areas, 
and the water flow and drainage passages. The ministry also is called 
on to prepare a plan for rainwater runoff and flood drainage outlets, 
and to collaborate with other related entities and local authorities in 
executing this plan. The law further provides several provisions on 
erosion control, including protecting agricultural terraces.135
Egypt has in place a somewhat unique flood control legal regime. 
The Irrigation and Drainage Law is clear in granting the government 
immunity from any fault for flood damage to lands or infrastructure 
neighboring the Nile or main canals.136 Because flooding can happen 
quickly, several people are authorized to gather citizens to prevent 
breaches of the banks of the Nile or main canal. The people empowered 
to organize flood prevention teams include the chief engineer and the 
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mayor or community leader.137 MWRI also is entitled to take action 
when water levels are high.138
Penalties
The enforcement of water laws can be accomplished through a system 
of both carrots and sticks. It appears that the majority of countries in 
the region have opted more for the stick (command and control regula-
tion) than the carrot approach. Every country except Egypt provides 
for the possibility of both imprisonment and/or fines. The penalties are 
meted out for violations of the laws that affect both the quality (anti-
pollution provisions, effluent standards, permitting, implementation 
of best available technology) and quantity (drilling without a permit, 
illegal use of water) of the resource.
Most countries include the penalties within the water legislation, 
but Lebanon has chosen instead to include all of the pollution control 
penalties in the penal code. Several countries, such as Morocco, have 
opted to leave many of the specifics as to fine amounts and terms of 
imprisonment to regulations. The majority of the other countries pro-
vide specific maximum and/or minimum penalties for every offense. 
In the majority of countries, the lead water authority is charged with 
the enforcement of all penalties. However, Morocco takes a unique 
approach by calling on the police force, agents commissioned by the 
administration, and the Catchment Basin Authority to enforce the 
laws after swearing to uphold the law.139
Planning and Development and Information
The importance of long-term planning in the water sector has come 
into greater importance only in the last decade as water shortages 
coupled with dramatic increases in demand have captured the attention 
of policymakers. Only the most recent framework laws in the Middle 
East and North Africa region include any significant coverage of plan-
ning for the water sector. Both Yemen and Morocco have developed 
significant legal frameworks for planning. However, as with enforce-
ment, the larger issue is really how well the law is applied.
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Although information gathering is critical for planning, almost 
no law includes any significant attention to providing a structure to 
gather information and translate it into plans for the short, medium, 
and long term.
 Morocco
The catchment basin is the chosen planning and organizational unit.140 
Under the water law, the administration is responsible for developing 
integrated water resources development master plans for each catch-
ment basin or group of catchment basins.141 These plans are designed 
to last for 20 years. The opportunity for revision is available every five 
years or if there are exceptional circumstances that require a change. 
Regulations govern the procedures for revision.142 The law provides 
specifics as to what each integrated development master plan should 
include:
Territorial boundaries of basin(s) to which it applies.1. 
Assessment and development, in both quantity and quality, of 2. 
water resources and needs within the basin.
Plan for water-sharing among the various sectors of basin and chief 3. 
water usages therein. Where appropriate, this plan shall specify 
which surplus water quantities may be transferred from one basin 
to another.
Operations required for harnessing, distributing, protecting, and 4. 
restoring water resources and public water domain, notably water 
infrastructure.
Quality goals and deadlines and required measures for achieving 5. 
them.
Priority ranking to be applied in water-sharing pursuant to point(3) 6. 
above, and measures required to cope with exceptional climatic 
conditions.
General scheme of water development of basin required to ensure 7. 
conservation of resources and their adaptation to needs.
Safeguarding and interdiction perimeters.8. 
Special conditions of water utilization, notably those relating to its 9. 
optimal use, preserving its quality, and combating waste.143
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The administration also is responsible for developing a National 
Water Plan based on the results and conclusions of the catchment 
basin integrated water resources development master plans. The na-
tional plan is approved by decree after consultation with the Council 
for Water and Climate. The national plan is prepared for at least 20 
years, with the possibility of revision every 5 years. The law provides 
the specifics of what the national plan should cover, including national 
priorities, timetable and program for completion of all works, linkages 
to land-use development plans, support measures including education 
and grassroots work, and the conditions for transferring water among 
catchment basins in times of shortage.144
Yemen
In Yemen, the water planning units are water basins and water zones.145 
The NWRA is responsible for all planning. It is charged with devel-
oping a classification system for water basins and water zones; and 
determining indicators of the water situation; trends for demand; and 
short-, medium-, and long-term water budgets.146 The law provides 
that NWRA must develop water plans for each water basin and water 
zone. After they are ratified by the Council of Ministers, these plans 
become part of the National Water Plan.147 The process for gathering 
the standards, data, and measures used to develop the unit plans is 
governed in separate executive regulations. However, the law does 
provide a list of what should be included in these plans.148 Priority is given 
to critical water basins or zones by preparing these plans first.149 Water 
plans are binding on everyone, and acting outside of their guidelines or 
contrary to their stipulations is forbidden under the law.150
Coordination of the National Water Plan is important, because 
two other ministries are responsible for issuing plans in the water 
sector. The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation is charged with 
preparing and implementing plans and programs related to the control 
of wadi flows and general canals, monitoring rainwater runoff and 
floods, and overseeing the use of irrigation water and installations.151 
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 Egypt has a small provision in Concerning the Issue of the Law on Irrigation 155
and Drainage (Law #12/1982) that states that drainage water may not be reused for 
irrigation unless MWRI issues a license. The reuse must be in accordance with the 
conditions of the permit. Art. 46. The Protection of the Nile from Pollution (Law 
#48/1982) regulates the reuse of drainage water.
The Ministry of Electricity and Water is responsible for preparing 
policies and executive plans for the water and sanitation sector.152 To 
facilitate cooperation among these plans, the National Water Plan is 
considered one of the components of the economic and social devel-
opment plans of the government, thereby suggesting that it reaches 
the highest levels of Government.153 NWRA is charged with reviewing 
other sectoral plans and coordinating with relevant concerned entities 
before preparing the National Water Plan.154
Wastewater Reuse
Wastewater reuse is of tremendous potential importance for the region. 
It can serve as additional supply for irrigated farming and groundwater 
injection, thereby reducing groundwater overdraws that plague many 
MNA countries. Fortunately, many countries have in place provisions 
to govern the handling, and in particular, the reuse of wastewater. 
Jordan, Morocco, Oman, and Yemen have included wastewater reuse 
provisions in their laws.155
 Jordan
Under the Reclaimed Domestic Wastewater Standard Specification 
(Standard No. 893/2002), the reuse of reclaimed water to replenish 
artificial groundwater is allowed if its quality meets agreed standards. 
However, using groundwater replenishments for aquifers used for 
drinking is forbidden. Reclaimed water is prohibited in irrigating veg-
etables eaten raw and in sprinkler irrigation. Irrigating fruit trees with 
reclaimed water must be stopped two weeks prior to harvest time. 
The uses for reclaimed water allowed by the law are split into three 
different classes, each requiring different quality standards:
Field crops, industrial crops, and forest trees1. 
Fruit trees, sides of roads outside city limits, and green areas2. 
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 Morocco Water Law (#10/1995), Art. 57.157
 158 Id. at Art. 84.
 159 Id. at Art. 57.
 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 26.160
 161 Id.
 162 Id. at Art. 47.
Cooked vegetables, parks, playgrounds, and sides of roads within 3. 
city limits.156
Morocco
The central administration is charged with prescribing the conditions 
for the use of wastewater. Any use of wastewater requires an au-
thorization granted by the Catchment Basin Authority.157 The use of 
wastewater for agricultural purposes that do not meet the standards 
set in regulation is prohibited.158 To encourage the proper reuse of 
wastewater, users are entitled to government financial assistance and 
technical assistance from Authority if the use achieves water economies 
and preserves water resources against further pollution.159
Yemen
The Ministry of Electricity and Water is responsible for the treatment 
and disposal of wastewater in accordance with a uniform system that 
conforms to qualitative and environmental standards.160 However, the 
reuse of wastewater is allowed only after coordinating with NWRA 
and other affected populations nearby.161 NWRA is responsible for 
issuing the reuse permits for treated wastewater that must meet spe-
cific conditions, standards, and specifications described in separate 
regulations.162
Oman
Under Ministerial Decree (#5/1986) on Regulations for Wastewater 
Re-use and Discharge, it is permitted to reuse wastewater in four 
situations: (1) a buried drip-feed system to irrigate ornamental trees 
and shrubs in areas in which there should not be public exposure; 
(2) approved groundwater recharge areas in which there should not 
be public exposure (may include open lands or wadis); (3) reuse of 
treated effluent for industrial processes within a closed-circuit system 
that will pose no dangers to the workers; and (4) flood, hosepipe, 
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 Yemen Water Law (#33/2002), Art. 33.169
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 Lebanon Decree No. 14438, Art. 2. Under this article, a permit is required only 172
for drilling over 150 meters. Id.
 Jordan Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002), Art. 8.173
 174 Id. at Arts. 31–33.
sprinkler, or spray irrigation, on condition of prior consent from the 
ministry. The full details and nature of reuse of treated effluent for 
industrial purposes within a closed circuit system are provided in the 
permit for discharge.163 Wastewater quality requirements for reuse and 
discharge are provided in table I of the Ministerial Decree (#5/1986). 
The reuse of wastewater or sludge containing radioactive material is 
not permitted.164
The law provides specific instruction as to how owners of waste-
water treatment plants should handle and transport sludge. Each is 
required to keep a detailed record specifying at least (1) date of delivery; 
(2) name and address of contractor or user of sludge; and (3) quantity 
delivered.165 These regulations do not apply to owners of septic tanks 
and holding tanks, as they are subject to a separate set of regulations 
(not available).166 Finally, if wastewater or sludge is used in a manner 
outside the stated limits and represents a risk to public health, the 
ministry or approved authorities reserve the right to inspect, record, 
and request samples and tests in accordance with a separate royal 
decree (#10/1982).167
Groundwater Management
All of the countries reviewed in this study require some form of au-
thorization for drilling new wells, but this is their only similarity. Only 
Jordan168 and Yemen169 have laws with provisions for registering preex-
isting wells. Yemen,170 Morocco,171 and Lebanon172 do not require well 
permits unless the well will exceed a certain depth. Jordan requires 
a permit for all well-drilling activities regardless of depth.173 Jordan174 
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 184 Id. at Arts. 40–42. However, there is no provision as to the creation of a cadastre 
for preexisting wells.
 185 Id. at Arts. 11–12.
and Oman175 are the only countries to require a license for professional 
drillers. Jordan also requires a license for drilling rigs.176 Given these 
significant differences, each country’s legal approach to groundwater 
management is detailed individually below.
 Egypt
In accordance with relevant regulations, a license from MWRI is 
required to dig any groundwater well (shallow or deep) within na-
tional lands.177 For desert lands, Special Law #143/1981 applies. This 
law requires that a license must be obtained from MWRI, but only 
after meeting the approval of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Reclamation.178
Jordan
Jordan maintains perhaps the most complete and extensive legal 
framework for managing groundwater resources. The central piece of 
legislation is the Underground Water Control By-Law (#85/2002).179 
This by-law governs the permitting system for drilling any new well;180 
deepening, cleaning, or maintaining existing wells;181 digging substitute 
wells;182 and licensing drill operators and drilling rigs.183 In addition, 
a system to register and monitor preexisting wells184 and provisions 
governing the use of underground water and the transfer or sale of 
wells are in place.185
Under the by-law, the ministry is charged with performing the 
technical studies for all underground water resources, including any 
exploratory activity; monitoring the quality and quantity of the resource; 
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general have the right to enter any land for conducting studies or investigation or 
collection of information related to underground water or for carrying out any mea-
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is no longer eligible for a drilling permit (Art. 21).
and identifying the appropriate uses of these resources.186 On the 
submission of the minister, a board determines the maximum quantity 
of underground water permitted to be extracted annually from each 
groundwater basin, within the limits of safe yield. With board approval, 
the Council of Ministers can identify areas in which drilling is prohib-
ited, provided such resolutions are published in the “Official Gazette” 
and two local newsletters.187 The Water Authority is responsible for 
administering all of the permitting procedures.188
The drilling permit system has the following key provisions. First, 
before granting a permit, the Water Authority is required to carry out 
a pumping test before the well may be used. The test measures the 
well production capacity and water quality to determine the amount 
of water that can be extracted annually, and the possible uses for the 
resource.189 After the study performed by the Authority, the applica-
tion for the drilling license may be submitted. It must include a recent 
real estate deed for the relevant plot of land. The secretary general 
publishes the application in two publications at the licensee’s expense. 
Any person has 15 days within which to raise an objection. After the 
expiration of this period, the secretary general presents the applica-
tion to the board for final decision. If approved, the minister issues the 
drilling license,190 which contains the specifics, including the permitted 
depth. The license is valid for one year, renewable by decision of the 
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 192 Id. at Art. 10. If any areas were found to be polluted or depleted, the board 
should take a decision to set the appropriate measures that would end such pollu-
tion or depletion and restore the natural balance to the aquifer or the underground 
water basin. Such measures could include the rationalization or reduction of the 
extraction rate. Id. at Art. 16.
 193 Id. at Art. 11.
 194 Id. at Art. 17.
 195 Id. at Art. 18.
minister. The license is deemed cancelled if drilling is not completed 
within the established time.191
Each drilling permit has a series of other conditions that apply, some 
of which are listed below:
Licensee is prohibited from undertaking any activities that could N
cause pollution or deplete the resource.192
Owner or the possessor of a private well is prohibited from (1) ir-N
rigating any land other than that specified in the water extraction 
license or selling this water for irrigation; and (2) selling the water 
extracted from the well by water-tankers for drinking or any other 
purpose without obtaining a prior written approval from the secre-
tary general, or his delegate, and according to conditions outlined 
for this purpose.193
On the submission of the secretary general, the board may cancel 
a drilling or extraction license if the licensee violates any of the license 
conditions, or if the public interest so requires.194 In addition, the sec-
retary general may take any of the following measures: (1) backfill any 
well drilled without a license in pursuance of the provisions of this by-
law; (2) backfill any well whose owner did not abide by the conditions 
of the license granted thereto. The offender must bear the costs of 
rectifying these violations. Should the offender not rectify the offense, 
the license is cancelled.195
Every owner of a drilling permit also must obtain a license for water 
abstraction from the secretary general or a delegated authority. Eight 
conditions are required to be included in the application:
Maximum amount of water that may be extracted from the well 1. 
within a fixed period.
Purpose of water use.2. 
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Maximum area that may be irrigated using water from the well 3. 
licensed for agricultural purposes.
Installation, at the expense of the well owner, of a water meter 4. 
that has been approved and stamped by the Authority. This con-
dition should be met prior to the issuance of the water extraction 
license.
Notification of the Authority within a period not exceeding 48 5. 
hours in case of nonfunction of the water-meter. The owner of 
the well shall reimburse the Authority for the fixed maintenance 
expenses.
Taking no measure that impedes the flow of water from the well 6. 
directly to the water meter that will measure it.
Obligation of the licensee to pay to the Authority, in time, the 7. 
prices fixed for the extracted water.
Maintaining by the licensee of a register, approved by the Author-8. 
ity, in which all data relating to the well and extraction shall be 
registered regularly in accordance with instructions issued by the 
Authority.196
A license for drilling operators may be obtained from the sec-
retary general. It is valid for one year and renewable for the same 
period.197 In turn, the Authority is required to keep official records of 
rigs and drillers and all activities related to the profession.198 Licenses 
granted for drilling rigs themselves are obtained from the Authority. 
It is prohibited to transfer a drilling rig to a different site without an 
additional permit.199
Lebanon
Citizens may prospect for groundwater, provided an application is made 
to the administration200 for any well that will exceed 150 meters.201 
Decree #14438/1970 provides details of what should be included in 
the application. Specifics include the location and aim of the works, 
copy of the land registry, and survey maps.202 After the application 
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has been presented, the Directorate General for Equipment within 
the Ministry of Water Resources and Electricity examines the permit 
and makes a recommendation to the minister.203 Once granted, the 
proposal will provide the specifics as to the location of the well, modes 
of prospecting, data required for collection, and determination of taxes 
to be paid by the applicant.204
Any use of underground water that did not result from the drilling 
of a well is governed by a decree that grants temporary occupation of 
four years.205 The decree includes information on the nature of the use, 
number, and size of the properties concerned; maximum authorized 
quantities; and required equipment and installations.206 A permit is not 
required for the use of water from a drilled well on private property if 
the use does not exceed 100 m3 per day and the water does not come 
directly from a river or water course.207
Morocco
Under the Morocco Water Law, a license is required to drill any well that 
would exceed a depth to be determined by regulation.208 Any person 
wishing to drill a well may approach the administration for information 
as to the technical, hydrological, and hydrogeological characteristics 
of the proposed site. Authorizations are granted by the Catchment 
Basin Authority.209 After receiving the authorization, the well driller is 
required to provide the Authority with any data required and to permit 
the Authority to enter on his/her property at any time to do so.210 One 
of the most interesting provisions deals with safeguard perimeters in 
areas in which groundwater levels appear to be low. Within these 
perimeters, prior authorization is required to drill, reconstruct wells, 
and/or extract water.211 Some exceptions might be made in the case 
of severe shortages, but the water extracted could be used only for 
consumption by people or livestock.212
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Oman
The Ministry of Water Resources is charged with specifying the water 
quantity discharged from any well and is responsible for monitoring the 
use through well meters issued to each well owner. These meters are 
the responsibility of the well owner, who must keep them in working 
order.213 Permits may be granted to landowners for any groundwater 
exploration activities. These include the construction of a new well, 
modifications to an existing well, change in the use of an existing well, 
or installation of a pump in a borehole.214 The permit holder must reg-
ister his/her well permit to obtain a Well Registration Certificate and 
a Well Registration Plate, to be placed on the well. To register, the 
responsible authority must verify that the permit holder has complied 
with the conditions set in the permit.215 At any time, Ministry of Water 
Resources staff may enter the property of a permit holder to inspect, 
take samples, or carry out tests.216
No well construction, development, maintenance, modification, 
yield testing, or pump installation on boreholes may be carried out 
except by a government-registered contractor.217 Contractors are 
classified into categories that reflect their technical capabilities and 
qualifications.218 Registration is valid for one year and subject to re-
newal.219 The contractor is responsible for making sure that any well 
s/he works on has a permit.220
Tunisia
Groundwater exploration activities are subject to an authorization.221 
In contrast, the extraction and use of groundwater are subject to a 
concession.222 Detailed provisions on groundwater are said to be set 
by a specific decree (not available).223
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Yemen
The Water Law provides a licensing regime to control drilling and to 
classify drilling operators, and provisions to control the equipment used 
in drilling wells. Under the drilling permit system, a permit is required 
for any well that will exceed a depth of 60 meters.224 To deepen a 
well, no permit is required if it is the first time and the depth does not 
exceed an additional 20 meters.225 All procedures for the administra-
tion of the permit process are to be detailed in regulations yet to be 
formulated. However, there is some guidance on how to register the 
wells. Holders of permits to drill wells must approach the NWRA 
within three months of completing the authorized works to register 
the wells. Well owners acquire their water rights within 15 days of 
presenting the application.226
Contractors and engineering offices must obtain a permit from 
the NWRA for three activities: (1) drilling water wells; (2) exploring 
for groundwater, executing consultancy studies, and carrying out 
works in the field of water resources: and (3) distributing well wa-
ters, whether directly or indirectly, through private supply networks 
or by bottling it.227 Any natural or legal person must register her/his 
offices or firms with the NWRA to obtain a license to undertake any 
groundwater exploration activities.228 In addition, all important drilling 
rigs or water well metal casings must meet specifications issued by 
the NWRA.229
 Institutional Arrangements
 Jordan
In 1992 the Administrative Organization for the Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation Law (#54/1992) consolidated the previous administrative 
system under one ministry. According to the law, the Ministry of Water 
and Irrigation, Water Authority, and Jordan Valley Authority all come 
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under the purview of the Minister of Water and Irrigation.230 As a result, 
the minister assumes responsibility for WRM in the Kingdom. WRM 
includes the roles and responsibilities set out in the Water Authority 
Law (#18/1988) and the Jordan Valley Authority Law (#19/1988).231
Ministry of Water and Irrigation
The Ministry of Water and Irrigation consists of a secretary general, 
the minister’s office, and six directorates. They are (1) Planning, De-
velopment and Information, (2) Financing and Loans, (3) Legal Affairs, 
(4) Citizens’ Service, (5) Financial and Administrative Affairs, and 
(6) Projects Follow-up.232 The roles of these directorates are outlined 
in the law.233 The secretary general is responsible for implementing 
the ministry’s policy and running its affairs according to the laws in 
force.234 In addition, the directorates report to the secretary general, 
who channels the information to the minister.235 The law creates 
one additional body, the Consultative Body, which is formed in the 
ministry and chaired by the minister. The Consultative Body’s three 
core members are the (1) Secretary General of the Ministry of Water 
and Irrigation, (2) Secretary General of the Water Authority, and 
(3) Secretary General of the Jordan Valley Authority. Four additional 
members may be added, on the recommendation of the minister.236 The 
consultative body is charged with providing the minister with technical, 
economic, legal, financial, and administrative advice on policy, water 
planning, and strategies.237
Water Authority
One of the key bodies incorporated under the Minister of Water 
and Irrigation is the Water Authority, created by law in 1988 as an 
autonomous body with financial and administrative independence. 
This ministry is charged with the full responsibility for all water and 
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wastewater systems and related projects.238 Among the many tasks 
and responsibilities assumed by the Water Authority are to (1) estab-
lish plans and programs to implement water policies and exploit the 
resources for domestic and municipal purposes; (2) administer the 
licensing regime for groundwater; (3) study, design, construct, oper-
ate, and maintain water and public wastewater projects; (4) develop 
standards and special requirements for the preservation of water and 
water basins (quality and quantity); (5) carry out related research 
and studies on water and wastewater; (6) regulate the uses of water, 
prevent its waste, and conserve its consumption.239
The secretary general is the executing agent for the Water Au-
thority.240 The Authority is empowered to establish additional depart-
ments for implementing all of its duties as it sees fit. In addition, water 
departments are to be established in all parts of the Kingdom, with 
a Water Council in each department. These councils are to provide 
citizens and local authorities with the opportunity to participate in 
deciding priorities regarding water and wastewater projects and plans 
for implementation. Gathering from all of these sources, the Author-
ity is responsible to submit to the Council of Ministers a report on 
the Authority’s activities, general budget, and balance covering the 
preceding year.241
Supporting the Authority is a Board of Directors made up of related 
ministries’ representatives. The board meets when called upon by the 
Minister of Water and Irrigation, who is its chairperson.242 The board 
is responsible for setting water policy, approving policies and plans for 
the development and conservation of water, reviewing the Authority’s 
draft regulations and submitting them to the Council of Ministers for 
approval, reviewing the annual budget, obtaining foreign and local loans, 
recommending water fees and pricing tariffs, investing the Authority’s 
revenue, and appointing members to district Water Councils.243
Jordan Valley Authority
The other important body incorporated under the Minister of Wa-
ter and Irrigation is the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), created by 
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law in 1988 under the Jordan Valley Development Law (#30/2001 
as amended). The JVA is responsible for carrying out the social and 
economic development of the Valley, including the development of all 
water resources and the works associated with water use and con-
servation. In particular, the JVA (1) carries out studies for evaluating 
water resources (both surface and groundwater); (2) plans, designs, 
and carries out irrigation projects and related works, including dams, 
hydropower stations, well-pumping stations, reservoirs, distribution 
networks, drainage works, and flood protection works; (3) surveys 
and classifies soil to determine lands suitable for irrigation; (4) settles 
disputes on water use; and (5) organizes and directs the construc-
tion of private and public wells. In addition, the JVA is responsible for 
protecting and improving the environment in the Valley. The JVA’s 
duties also extend to developing tourism in the Valley and studying 
and improving the agricultural road network.244
JVA is made up of the minister, board of directors, secretary 
general, executing staff, and administrative units.245 These different 
groups work together in much the same way as the administration of 
the Water Authority.246 Because the JVA is considered an autono-
mous corporate body, it, too, may raise funds; lease, purchase, and 
acquire land or immovable properties; and borrow through bond is-
sues.247 JVA also may raise funds through fees and can benefit from 
national or international grants or loans. All funds raised are placed in 
a special account in the Central Bank to be administered by a Special 
Treasury established by the JVA. The withdrawal of any monies is to 
be governed by regulation.248 Given the relative financial autonomy 
of the JVA, it is responsible for a series of reports to the Cabinet of 
Ministers, including annual reports on works undertaken or completed, 
audits, future planned works or projects, and any other data requested 
by the Cabinet.249
Relevant ministries and coordination
Two ministries share the responsibility for managing potable water and 
protecting water quality. The Ministry of Health is charged with the 
326  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
 Jordan Temporary Public Health Law (#54/2002), Art. 39.250
 251 Id. at Art. 41.
 252 Id. at Art. 52.
 Jordan Environment Protection Law (Temporary Law #1/2003), Art. 3.253
 Jordan Protection of Environment Law (#12/1995), Art. 6.254
 Jordan Environment Protection Law (Temporary Law #1/2003), Art. 4.255
 The Jordan Standards and Specifications Law (#22/2000), Art. 5.256
 257 Egypt’s Concerning the Issue on Irrigation and Drainage Law (#12/1982), Art. 4.
 258 Id. at Art. 5.
 259 Id. at Art. 18.
 260 Id. at Art .5.
 261 Id. at Art. 31.
control of potable water to ensure its fitness for human consumption.250 
In so doing, it is entitled to control (1) potable water resources and 
their networks to ensure that they are not affected by pollution; and 
(2) the method used for treating, transmitting, and storing water.251 The 
Ministry of Health also is charged with managing sewage networks, 
including all treatment stations, to ensure that health conditions are 
maintained.252
The Ministry of Environment is the competent authority for devel-
oping all standards and specifications governing environmental protec-
tion, including water resources.253 The Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
is a member of the Council for the Protection of the Environment, 
which is chaired by the Minister of Environment.254 The Ministry of 
Environment conducts all research, issues all regulations and enforces 
them, prepares all emergency environmental plans, and executes all 
awareness-building efforts for the environment.255
One final government body, the Standards and Specifications Cor-
poration, is responsible for issuing all of the standard specifications and 
technical rules. In addition, the corporation is responsible for supervising 
the application of all standard specifications.256
 Egypt
The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) oversees all 
public-water-related entities but can outsource management responsi-
bilities to other ministries or public authorities.257 MWRI’s responsibili-
ties include the protection of Nile and Main Canal banks, O&M of all 
publicly owned infrastructure,258 allocating water up to the main canals, 
adjudicating water rights conflicts,259 enforcing the provisions of the Ir-
rigation and Drainage Law (#12/1982),260 and building and maintaining 
the covered drain systems.261 Mayors and village elites are charged with 
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protecting the industrial works for irrigation and drainage that have been 
handed over to them in accordance with MWRI decisions.262
Lebanon
At the national level, the Ministry of Energy and Water is charged 
with managing all water projects, applying the laws and regulations 
regarding the protection and use of public waters, supervising the 
work of 44 autonomous offices and the commissions responsible for 
water,263 and controlling water concessions. The ministry is divided into 
two directorates: (1) Water Infrastructure and (2) Management. The 
Directorate for Water Infrastructure (équipement hydraulique) oversees 
the construction of all hydraulic equipment and has delegated to the 44 
water offices and commissions the responsibility for distributing water 
to users.264 The Directorate for Management has responsibility for 
overseeing the 44 water agencies (granted by decree from the state) 
and controls water concessions.
Decree 320 provides for the possibility of owners to enter into 
partnerships to undertake certain works, including flood control, clean-
up and maintenance of watercourses, marsh drainage, and organizing 
collective irrigation. The decree provides a series of administrative 
procedures for creating the partnership. In over 60 years of operation, 
only 1 project has come to fruition.265
Morocco
The Moroccan Water Law establishes two government bodies that 
are responsible to support the government’s role in managing water 
resources in the country. These bodies are the (1) High Council on 
Water and Climate266 and (2) Catchment Basin Authority.267 The High 
Council formulates the general guidelines of national water and climate 
policy. In particular, it is responsible for commenting on the national 
strategy to improve knowledge of the resources, the national water 
plan, and integrated WRM plans for the catchment basins.268 Member-
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ship of the High Council includes government officials, scientific and 
academic communities, and community representatives.269
The Moroccan Catchment Basin Authority (CBA) is the most 
complete attempt by any country in the region to decentralize the 
management of water resources. Each CBA is considered a public entity 
with a juridical personality and financial autonomy. The responsibilities 
of each CBA are to:
Draw up the integrated water resources development master plan 1. 
for its particular area of operation
Monitor implementation of the water resources integrated develop-2. 
ment master plan within its particular area of operation
Issue the public domain water usage authorizations and conces-3. 
sions provided for in the water resources integrated development 
master plan for its particular area of operation
Furnish any financial aid and provide any services, including TA, 4. 
to public or private persons who request it either to prevent water 
pollution or to develop or harness public domain water resources
Carry out all piezometric measurements and gauge operations and 5. 
all hydraulic, hydrogeological, planning, and water management 
studies at both the quantitative and qualitative levels
Perform all quality measurements and apply the provisions of cur-6. 
rent legislation on the protection of water resources and restoration 
of water quality, in collaboration with the government authority 
with responsibility for the environment
Propose and implement appropriate measures, particularly regula-7. 
tory measures, to ensure water supply in the event of an officially 
declared water shortage or to prevent the risk of flooding
Manage and control use of the water resources harnessed8. 
Build the necessary structures to prevent and combat floods9. 
Maintain a register of recognized water rights and of water intake 10. 
concessions and authorizations granted.270
The CBA is administered by a Management Board chaired by the 
government authority responsible for water resources. The board is 
responsible for (1) examining the catchment basin integrated develop-
ment master plan prior to its approval; (2) studying the authority’s 
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WRM and development programs and its annual and multiannual 
programs of activities prior to their approval by the governmental 
water resources authority; (3) drawing up the authority’s budget and 
accounts; (4) determining pollution-related fees to specific water pol-
lution correction measures; (5) proposing to the governmental water 
resources authority the charge base and rates for user fees remunerating 
the authority for its services; (6) drawing up the authority’s personnel 
rules, which shall be approved in accordance with the current legisla-
tion governing public establishments’ personnel; and (7) approving 
agreements and concession contracts entered into by the Catchment 
Basin Authority.271
At the local level, a Prefecture or Provincial Water Commission 
should be created to assist in the preparation of catchment basin wa-
ter resources development plans, support water saving and pollution 
prevention activities in the municipalities, and help build public aware-
ness.272 Under the law, local communities can undertake partnership 
projects with the assistance of the CBA. These projects could include 
cleaning out watercourses, conserving water resources (in quality and 
quantity), and creating necessary flood prevention structures.273
Outside of these new government bodies created under law, the 
“administration” maintains certain responsibilities related to develop-
ing the catchment integrated development national water plan. These 
national water plans would result from the inputs from all of the vari-
ous CBAs.274 The law does not make it clear who the “administration” 
would be.
Oman
Finally, in Oman, there are two separate laws that created two enti-
ties responsible for administering the country’s public water resources. 
This section will focus only on the more recent Ministry of Water 
Resources.
The Ministry of Water Resources is charged with the develop-
ment and conservation of all water resources in the Sultanate. The 
ministry is responsible for making general policies for the preparation 
of long-term plans consistent with the economic and social develop-
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 Royal Decree #100/1989: For the Establishment of the Ministry of Water Re-275
sources and Designation of its Duties and Responsibilities, Art. 4.
ment plan of the Sultanate. The ministry also is endowed with all of 
the appropriate authorities to carry out 13 other activities:
Undertaking the general plan for the development of water resources 1. 
and their conservation after coordination with other ministries and 
government units
Establishing an information and data center for water resources 2. 
and programs related to the use of water resources
Collecting data and information about ground and surface water 3. 
resources and springs, as well as the computation, classification, 
and filing of these data for use in related studies
Undertaking research, studies, and surveys aimed at the explora-4. 
tion of other water resources; executing studies on conservation 
and use of available water
Operating, developing, and maintaining the hydrologic and hydro-5. 
geologic monitoring networks in the Sultanate; recording, reviewing, 
and analyzing information on different uses of the resource
Assessing the water balance and water availability in the 6. 
Sultanate
Collecting water samples from wells and 7. aflaj (“traditional chan-
nels”) and analyzing these samples to determine salinity rates, 
treatment methods, and suitability for different uses
Undertaking site visits to new agricultural lands to ensure water 8. 
availability in new lands and to ensure their suitability for growing 
crops
Coordinating with the Ministry of Agriculture and fisheries to 9. 
ensure the suitability of agricultural development
Issuing permits for the construction of new wells that take into 10. 
consideration the regulation in regard to banned areas and distance 
from mother wells
Providing TA and policy advice to government units in the water 11. 
field and providing methods for determining use
Preparing regulations according to Royal Decree #100/1989, after 12. 
coordination with concerned authorities
Undertaking the training and qualification of Omani employees 13. 
working in the Ministry of Water Resources.275
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Tunisia
The Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources is entrusted with 
the administration and management of public domain waters.276 Un-
der the 1975 Water Code, within each governorate a “Water Interest 
Group” is to be established. These groups would prepare studies for 
the implementation of water works of public interest, advise the gov-
ernorate on waterworks undertaken in the area, and control WUAs.277 
WUAs can be freely established upon the request of interested water 
users, or they can be established by the state. Responsibilities of WUAs 
could include the management of an irrigation system, drinking water 
system, and/or the undertaking of drainage works.278
Yemen
As mentioned, in 2003 the government of Yemen created a new 
Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE). The creation of MWE 
has since triggered a series of pending amendments to the Framework 
Water Law (#33/2002). MWE was created by pulling the environ-
mental responsibilities from the Ministry of Tourism and the water 
responsibilities from the Ministry of Water and Electricity, leaving a 
self-standing, separate Ministry of Electricity. The NWRA, NWSA, 
General Authority for Rural Water and Sanitation Projects (GARWSP), 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and local corporations that 
operate urban water supply and sanitation systems in a quasiprivatized 
manner all have been brought under MWE’s control.
MWE is separate from the pre-existing NWRA, NWSA, and 
others. Internally, MWE’s responsibilities have been divided into two 
separate groups: (1) Environment and (2) Water Supply and Sanitation. 
Under the Environment group, there are subunits in charge of policies 
and programs, treaties and regulation, and emergencies. The Water 
Supply and Sanitation group has subunits for water resources, water 
supply and sanitation (WSS), and water sector reforms.
It is clear that the pending amendments will alter the current 
structure posed by the 2002 Framework Law. However, it is unclear 
as to how much change will occur in the duties of the NWRA and 
the NWSA as outlined in the 2002 Law. This chapter therefore will 
provide a description of the 2002 Yemen Water Law’s institutional 
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framework with the caveat that all may change after the passage 
of the amendments. The 2002 law centralizes authority under the 
NWRA. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry 
of Electricity and Water still hold important responsibilities over the 
irrigation and WSS sectors, respectively.279 The central responsibility 
of the NWRA is to control the use of the country’s water resources.280 
Control includes monitoring, data collection, and information-gathering 
that can be used to estimate water budgets and evaluate demand and 
the quantities that can and may be exploited.281
The NWRA also is charged with collecting the information that 
can serve as the basis for water planning,282 as well as preparing the 
National Water Plan through reviewing sectoral and water basin 
plans.283 The NWRA must devise a classification system for water 
basins and water zones to control water use.284 Additional tasks include 
(1) enforcement of the law through inspectors, with the cooperation 
of the police and security forces;285 (2) providing farmers with sup-
port to new technologies and modern irrigation methods to improve 
water savings; (3) setting up water dams, dikes, and reservoirs to 
harvest rainwater and make optimal use of all surface water resources; 
(4) preventing desertification through conserving soil and water; and 
(5) encouraging community participation and education.286 Finally, 
the NWRA is responsible for establishing Water Basin and Water 
Zone Committees to operate under its supervision. These basins or 
committees are encouraged to include nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and community representatives. The NWRA has yet 
to develop the Executive Regulations that would govern the operation 
of the basins and zones.287
MAI rations the use of water for irrigation and potable water use 
in rural areas in accordance with the Water Plan developed by the 
NWRA. MAI’s other responsibilities include:
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Preparing irrigation policies and executive plans, which ensure the 1. 
optimal benefit of the agricultural sector’s share of water.
Undertaking theoretical and practical studies, implementing the 2. 
extension programs, and taking all the measures that will lead to 
the rationing of water use, increasing the productivity of water and 
agricultural crops, and encouraging the use of modern irrigation 
methods. All of these actions should be in keeping with economic 
feasibility and adjusted to the set allocation of water for such use 
and for the conservation of water and the environment.
Setting up, operating, and maintaining water installations to lead to 3. 
benefit from the use of rainwater and rainwater runoff, within the 
context of the indicators of the national water plan, water budgets 
for the Water Basins and Zones, and Water Plan.
Drawing up a plan for protection from rainwater runoff and flood-4. 
ing; setting up meteorological agricultural surveillance stations; 
analyzing, recording, documenting, and exchanging the informa-
tion picked up by these stations with the NWRA and with the 
beneficiaries thereof; and making use of the output of the national 
hydrological station network.
Preparing and implementing the plans and programs related to 5. 
the control of wadi flows and general or public canals; monitoring 
the flow of rainwater runoff and floods; and monitoring the use of 
irrigation water and installations to ensure the safety of such instal-
lations and the protection of water from waste and pollution.
Preparing indicators for the short-, medium- and long-term demand 6. 
for irrigation water. Demand includes the need of private sector 
projects for irrigation water, whereby they constitute—after the 
review and assessment thereof—one of the inputs of the water 
plans.288
Under the 2002 law, the former Ministry of Electricity and Water 
(MEW) was responsible for managing all water allocated to it through 
the NWRA’s Water Plan. The water was to be used largely for water 
supply and sanitation. MEW was charged with preparing policies and 
executive plans for the WSS sector; ensuring potable supply for do-
mestic uses and applying the proper standards for water quality; and 
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providing water supply to public and private industrial, tourism-related, 
or other service-provision areas. In addition, MEW was responsible 
for setting up and managing wastewater networks for collection, 
treatment, and disposal. MEW also oversaw projects in potable water 
supply and sanitation, with NWRA participation. The treatment of 
wastewater would be governed by a uniform system established by 
MEW. Any reuse would be strictly regulated and coordinated with 
the NWRA.289
Finally, water user groups and beneficiary associations may be 
formed to involve the public and the beneficiaries of water in regulating 
water resources or in the O&M of water installations. The Executive 
Regulations would establish the implementation of this provision.290
Conclusions
Many MNA countries have successfully developed new water law re-
gimes that address modern water demand and supply concerns, while 
remaining fully compatible with customary law and religious doctrine. 
Maintaining such a balance is feasible because society has internalized 
the customary laws and religious doctrines. Often, introducing new 
ideas and technologies is possible within the existing frameworks. For 
example, the region-wide interest in wastewater reuse has evolved 
gradually as stakeholders began appreciating that treated wastewater 
is a significant additional resource so long as treatment was adequate, 
and use restricted to tree crops and fodder crops. Where the balance 
has been disturbed (as in countries witnessing excessive drawdowns 
of groundwater), the problem has been caused by perverse economic 
incentives (such as the diesel subsidies in Yemen).291
Good examples of modern legal approaches exist for such key issues 
as groundwater management, water rights allocation, and wastewater 
reuse. Other chapters that follow deal with specific aspects of codifica-
tion, such as financing rules aimed to better target government subsidies 
to the poor, and bidding rules aimed at creating incentives for private 
sector participation in irrigation infrastructure.
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 For more information, visit Global Partnership on Output-Based AID’s (GPOBA) 1
website, www.gpoba.org
Subsidies for the Poor: 
An Innovative Output-Based  
Aid Approach
Providing Basic Services to Poor 
Periurban Neighborhoods in Morocco
Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and Pier Mantovani
What Is Output-Based Aid?
Output-based aid (OBA) is an innovative approach to increase ac-
cess to basic services for the poor in developing countries and to 
improve the delivery of services that exhibit positive externalities, 
such as reductions in CO2 and improvements in health.1 OBA is 
also known as “performance-based aid” or (in the health sector) 
“results-based financing.” OBA is part of a broader effort to ensure 
aid effectiveness.
OBA links the payment of aid to the delivery of specific services, 
or “outputs” (box 17.1). These can include the connection of poor 
households to electricity grids or water and sanitation systems, the 
installation of solar heating systems, or the delivery of basic healthcare 
services. Under an OBA scheme, service delivery is contracted out to 
a third party—usually a private service provider but, in some cases, 
community or nongovernmental organizations or public sector utilities. 
The third party receives a subsidy to complement or replace connection 
fees for poor households (HH) that cannot afford to pay the full con-
nection fee. The service provider is responsible for “pre-financing” the 
project until output delivery, when it receives reimbursement through 
an OBA subsidy. The subsidy is performance based, meaning that most 
of it is paid only after the services or outputs have been delivered and 
delivery verified by an independent agent.
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OBA schemes contrast with traditional aid approaches, which usu-
ally focus on financing “inputs” such as infrastructure (for example, 
a water treatment plant or a hospital) or equipment (such as books 
for schools) (figure 17.1). Under the OBA approach, the priority shifts 
from making a service generally available to ensuring that the poorest 
households actually benefit from the service. For instance, a traditional 
electricity project might finance the expansion of the electricity grid 
to poor areas. In contrast, an OBA project would subsidize the cost 
of connecting households in the poor areas to the grid, or it could sub-
sidize off-grid solutions such as solar home systems for communities 
in remote areas. OBA schemes thus can complement traditional aid 
and make service delivery more 
inclusive.
 Why Is OBA Relevant  
for Morocco?
By regional standards, Morocco 
already has good water infra-
structure assets. Ninety percent 
of accessible resources are stored 
in 116 large dams; irrigation is de-
veloped over 1.4 million hectares 
Box 17.1  Output-Based Aid: Core Concepts
Increased transparency through the explicit targeting of subsidiesN  and tying these 
subsidies to defined outputs
Increased accountability through shifting performance risk to service providersN  
by paying them after they have delivered an agreed output
Increased engagement of private sector capital and expertiseN  by encouraging the 
private sector to serve customers, usually the poor, whom they might otherwise 
disregard
Encouraging innovation and efficiencyN  by leaving the service “solutions” partly up 
to the service provider
Increased sustainability of public fundingN  through the use of one-off subsidies and 
by linking ongoing subsidies to sustainable service
Enhancing monitoring of resultsN  since payments are made against agreed outputs
Inputs
(such as materials)
Service provider Service provider
Private financing mobilized
by service provider
Public financing linked to
 service delivery
Service
recipients
Service
recipients
Public
finance
Private
finance
Traditional approach Output-based approach
Inputs
(such as materials)
Figure 17.1  Input-Based Approach vs. Output-Based Approach
Source: Author.
Note: Scale = 1: 70,000. 
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(ha); and potable water supply reaches almost all urban dwellers. In 
fact, with individual connections and continuous service for 83 percent 
of households, Morocco has one of the best potable water supply rates 
in the region. However, infrastructure is lagging for rural water supply 
(70 percent in 2007), urban sewerage (70 percent of households con-
nected as of 2005), and wastewater treatment (5 percent of discharges 
treated in 2004). Access to service remains particularly inadequate in 
poor urban and periurban areas.
Today, the country faces two challenges. First, it must adapt water 
usage to levels compatible with the renewable resources supplied by 
nature. Second, Morocco has to improve service access and efficiency 
while reducing the burden on the state and on poor consumers. Reforms 
have been initiated to address these challenges, including through policy 
and expenditure reorientation.
The government developed a comprehensive reform program 
that focused on the integrated and sustainable management of water 
resources. This program included the National Initiative for Human 
Development (INDH), launched by the King in May 2005. This initia-
tive included a significant component to expand basic services to the 
poor, particularly those in urban and periurban settlements previously 
considered illegal and, therefore, ineligible for services.
Pilot OBA schemes were set up to encourage water utilities to 
improve access in low-income communities. The next sections review 
the design and results of these pilot interventions.
 Nature of Service Deficit in Periurban Areas of Morocco
Currently, approximately 2 million Moroccans remain without access 
to water supply and sanitation services (WSS) in illegal settlements 
surrounding the country’s major cities.2 In the Casablanca metropolitan 
area alone, approximately 145,000 households (or 900,000 inhabit-
ants) are estimated not to receive adequate water supply and sanita-
tion services. These residents who lack access to reliable and clean 
water supply services get water from (1) contaminated shallow wells; 
(2) water providers selling nonpotable water at a relatively high unit price; 
 In this context, “periurban” includes all settlements located at the outskirts of 2
a city and structures in city quarters or hamlets, illegal or not; and encompasses 
hamlets presenting characteristics of rural areas but not belonging to rural com-
munes (municipalities).
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 “Social Connection” programs offer to pay HH for the full connection cost in 3
installments over time. However, the program requires that, to access these basic 
services, households get into debt for durations of 7 to 10 years. This outcome ap-
pears neither plausible nor equitable.
or (3) standposts located at the entrance of these areas, which often 
require women or children to stand for several hours in a queue.
Access to basic sanitation is even more deficient. A majority of 
households use cesspits and poorly designed septic tanks. These rudi-
mentary accommodations risk increasing the contamination of shal-
low groundwater. A large number of inhabitants of the poorest areas 
remain without any form of sanitation.
The situation described above directly affects people’s health, their 
ability to engage in income-generating activities, and, for children, to 
attend school. It also harms the water utilities’ finances, as cost recovery 
from these public standposts is usually very low. The municipalities 
(communes) responsible rarely pay the bills.
Four factors have contributed to the lack of WSS for Morocco’s 
poor:
Unplanned growth of periurban areas and the fact that they were N
systematically not included in the service areas of water and sani-
tation operators.
Technical and administrative hurdles that made interventions by N
operators in illegal settlements difficult, linked to, for instance, lack 
of title, poverty, and lack of basic access infrastructure.
Operators’ difficulty in financing infrastructure for water users eli-N
gible for the loss-making “social tranche” of existing water tariffs.
Connection fees charged to the beneficiaries at their marginal N
costs, to which a Participation au Premier Etablissement (PPE)” fee 
is added. The latter drives up costs of access to unaffordable levels 
for most HH living in the city outskirts, even when the option of 
payment by installments is available through the “Social Connec-
tion” program.3
 Mobilization through the National Initiative  
for Human Development (INDH)
Since 2005, the National Initiative for Human Development (Initiative 
Nationale de Développement Humain, or INDH) and the government’s 
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 Households are offered the opportunity to pay their connection fees over time, 4
the terms varying by operator. For instance, in Meknes, the household contribution 
has to remain below MAD 9,240 for connections to WSS services, reimbursable in 
84 monthly payments of MAD 110.
 Waiver of an important “First Settlement Fee-5 Participation au Premier Etablisse-
ment (PPE)” and of the 10% design and supervision fee otherwise charged by the 
operators.
Cities Without Slums program (Ville Sans Bidonville, or VSB) have 
mobilized stakeholders to upgrade poor urban and periurban areas.
INDH/VSB programs removed the most important obstacle by 
recognizing informal areas, and promoting their inhabitants’ resettlement 
to housing units in apartment buildings (relogement), their resettlement 
in fully or partially serviced plots (recasement), or “restructuring with 
on-site upgrading” through the expansion and strengthening of basic 
infrastructure. INDH also promotes service coverage expansion by pro-
moting agreements among relevant stakeholders. The specific arrange-
ments developed through INDH regarding the financial contribution of 
households4 for a house connection to water and/or sanitation services5 
are of paramount importance in reaching coverage objectives.
Although significant, the activities above only partly address the 
INDH’s water and sanitation access objectives for 2010:
Due to lack of financing, connection development is inadequate a. 
for on-site upgrading areas. For example, in the metropolitan 
Casablanca area, INDH is considering expanding WSS only to 
the 65,000 households to be resettled either in housing units or in 
serviced plots. That leaves a population of approximately 80,000 
households, representing over 500,000 inhabitants, targeted by 
the on-site upgrading approach for whom no service expansion 
solution is proposed.
Implementation of INDH/VSB programs is not always optimal. For b. 
example, problems linked to coordination and implementation of 
network expansion works often prevent house connections from 
being established.
 INDH’s Urban Water Supply and Sanitation OBA Pilots
The objectives of the project pilots are to demonstrate replicable OBA 
mechanisms to extend WSS services in poor and vulnerable communi-
ties, as part of the INDH.
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Started in the spring of 2007, Morocco’s Urban WS&S OBA pilots 
aim at connecting 11,300 households to piped WSS in poor, unzoned, 
periurban neighborhoods of 3 municipalities: Casablanca, Meknes, and 
Tangiers. The pilots are funded through a US$7 million grant by the 
Global Partnership for Output-Based Aid (GPOBA). They are imple-
mented by the respective service providers in these municipalities: 2 
international private concessionaires, namely, Amendis in Tangiers and 
LYDEC in Casablanca; and 1 municipal utility, the Régie Autonome 
de Distribution d’Eau et d’Électricité de Meknès. The Government of 
Morocco is also a partner to this approach, playing an oversight and 
monitoring role.
While the details of the schemes vary, the common objective of 
the pilots is to test an OBA subsidy mechanism specifically targeted 
toward poor neighborhoods and households; and bridging the gap 
between capacity to pay and a competitive cost of connection. In ad-
dition to the waiver, for areas identified as part of the INDH program, 
the scheme offers a subsidized connection fee for some of the fees 
otherwise charged by the operator.
The approach builds on previous “social connection” programs by 
which households were offered the opportunity to pay their connec-
tion fees in installments.
Awarded to individual eligible households who agree to pay the 
operator-specific beneficiary contribution, the subsidies are prefinanced 
by the operators, who first are required to complete the pipe and 
connection works. They get reimbursed after a verification process 
that certifies that the eligible household is in fact receiving piped WSS 
service (that is, the output).
The built-in incentives of this OBA approach are designed to 
mitigate traditional impediments of service expansion programs in 
marginal neighborhoods. Impediments include (1) unaffordability of 
connection costs by households, (2) unsustainable program financing 
for operators, (3) complex technical and administrative obstacles to 
infrastructure development in poor unzoned areas, and (4) reticence 
by national and local governments to fund subsidy programs that have 
no accountability or guarantee of results.
The outputs for which OBA subsidies are disbursed are individual 
HH network connections for simultaneous water supply and sewerage 
services in designated, predominantly poor periurban neighborhoods. 
These HH have the recognized right to access services through the INDH 
program. In Meknes, the output is the connection to either service.
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The disbursement profile of the individual subsidy follows: (1) 
60 percent of unit subsidy is released upon verification of eligible 
water and sewerage household connection, and (2) 40 percent of 
unit subsidy is released upon verification of sustained service for at 
least 6 months.
 Subsidy Targeting Is Geographic in Nature
The target neighborhoods are recognized as being among the poor-
est in urban Morocco, and are on the INDH’s shortlist of 160 most 
disadvantaged urban and periurban communities. All households in 
the selected pilot areas are eligible to participate in the connection 
subsidy program. However, participation is strictly demand driven. It 
therefore requires communication campaigns to raise awareness about 
the program and explain its conditions. Operators also develop new 
means of reaching potential customers. They use dedicated teams who 
go to market places or to the heart of the targeted neighborhood to 
record the demands of beneficiaries who may not easily travel to one 
of the operator’s agencies.
Scope and size aside, the project breaks new ground in many 
regards. It is the first
OBA project in MoroccoN
Project involving multiple incumbent operatorsN
Project involving a public operatorN
World-Bank-implemented OBA involving connection to sanitationN
World-Bank-implemented OBA project in local currency.N
 Lessons Learned So Far
A key element of the approach is to shift risks to incentivize all parties 
to perform. In this case, the financial and operational risk in extend-
ing service requires a good assessment of the demand for services 
by the targeted population, as demand will determine the amount 
of subsidy the operator will receive. 
Another key element is the limitation of the risk of capture of 
outputs. As in former social connection programs, an authorization 
to connect from the municipality is required. Therefore, there is a risk 
that political pressure could be put on the operator to extend subsidized 
connections to populations who may otherwise have the means to 
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 Essentially, benefits are time savings but also can include reduced health costs 6
and improved hygiene practices. Further study would be necessary to quantify such 
benefits.
pay the full cost of connection. The pilot is organized on a geographic 
basis, for lack of a better targeting mechanism. However, it targets 
poor neighborhoods that had been without piped services up to that 
point. Socioeconomic surveys carried out show that a significant share 
of the population living in these informal areas are below the poverty 
or vulnerability lines for Morocco.
Nevertheless, to avoid the risk that the relatively wealthier house-
holds could benefit from the subsidy, the operator and local authorities 
(province, governor) have developed additional eligibility criteria, for 
example, based on the number of stories or house size and appearance. 
Moreover, to increase transparency, the operator has requested that 
the list of beneficiaries be signed by the municipality and countersigned 
by the governor (local representative of the state).
Although a substantial number of outputs have been delivered 
and verified in all three sites, the pilots experienced a slow start. The 
first 12 months of the pilot program have produced approximately 
only 2,000 connections, that is, 15 percent of the program’s 3-year 
objective. However, an independent midterm review of the pilots 
shows that the delay is due to implementation difficulties unrelated to 
the OBA approach: procurement procedures, upstream investment 
delays, and lack of clarity over land tenure. The parties appreciate that 
conventional financing would have resulted in fewer connections than 
OBA in the same circumstances. Thus, scaling up the OBA approach 
to other INDH areas now is considered possible before pilot program 
completion in December 2009.
The midterm review confirmed important direct benefits6 to house-
holds, and recorded the high satisfaction of beneficiary households 
with the service provided. This information is further demonstrated 
by evidence of uptake significantly increasing after works start and a 
collection rate equal or superior to the average experienced by each 
operator in his/her service area.
Operators and government generally are satisfied and appreciate 
the flexibility allowed by the pilot. The OBA approach is seen as help-
ing to improve processes, overcome financing blockages, and mobilize 
stakeholder partnerships. In addition, all parties appreciate that quar-
terly inspections by the Technical Independent Reviewer have proven 
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effective in firming up the operators’ reporting requirements as well 
as improving their implementation methods. The demand-driven ap-
proach contributed to refocus service provision around the households, 
which increased accountability, strengthened partnerships between 
local authorities and operators, and prioritized monitoring of service 
delivery.
After a slow year 1, a dou-
bling of connection rates is re-
ported in year 2. Figure 17.2 
shows connection realizations 
during the f irst two years of 
implementation.
Lessons learned for the po-
tential scale-up of the pilots 
include the need for:
Better advance planning and a. 
working partnerships among 
operators, local governments, 
and neighborhood associa-
tions to clarify eligibility and 
permitting questions
Streamlining OBA-specific b. 
ex-post eligibility verification 
procedures.
 Scaling up OBA: Toward a National Strategy to Reduce Urban 
and Periurban Service Access Deficit
Given the lack of targeted subsidy mechanisms for poor households, 
especially in informal urban settings, OBA is perceived as strategi-
cally relevant to Morocco. The OBA pilots are taking place at a time 
that the government of Morocco is seeking new ways to deliver on 
INDH’s promise. The government has expressed interest in replicating, 
with due adaptation, the OBA approach on a citywide or nationwide 
scale. The Bank is working with the government on the best ways to 
evolve toward a scaled-up operation, while strengthening coordina-
tion among institutions in charge of the different aspects of periurban 
utility service.
0%
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Note: Figure 17.2 re$ects progress on the de!ned "outputs" under the project, 
namely, the working connections to water and/or sanitation services. The !gure does 
not re$ect the progress achieved on the upstream/trunk infrastructure development 
necessary to deliver the outputs. Therefore, it may not accurately re$ect the progress 
under the pilots.
Remaining Year 2 Year 1
Figure 17.2  Connections Realized in the First Two Years 
of Implementation
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Use of Output-Based Aid to 
Jumpstart a Rural Water Supply 
Service Market in Morocco
Xavier Chauvot de Beauchêne and  
Pier Mantovani
In a Nutshell
As mentioned in an earlier chapter on Moroccan water strategies 
(Chauvot de Beauchêne and Mantovani 2009), developing access to 
potable water in rural areas became a policy priority only in 1995. Since 
then, Morocco’s PAGER (National Program for Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation) has made big strides in developing drinking water sources. 
PAGER has provided over 87 percent of the rural population with 
access to drinking water, typically through public fountains. Today, 
the government of Morocco is aware of the need to redeploy its rural 
water supply (RWS) strategy to promote the development of RWS 
service through individual household (HH) connections.
The RWS objective is the same as for urban and perirurban areas: to 
expand access to water supply services. However, the approach piloted 
in Morocco’s rural areas is rather different from the approaches pursued 
in urban areas. In rural areas, the National Water Supply Company 
(ONEP) is evolving from its core business of producing and delivering 
water to service providers to becoming a provider of water supply and 
sanitation services. To facilitate this new mission, ONEP has developed 
an important network of standpipes within rural communities.
However, HH in these communities were asking for domestic con-
nections. ONEP then engaged in the development of house connec-
tions in small centers and rural areas. In fact, organizational structure 
and internal procedures translate into fixed costs that make service 
provision to smaller communities a loss-making business. ONEP is 
piloting the subcontracting water service provision and management 
in 8 rural communes (municipalities) to a private operator through a 
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10-year management subcontracting arrangement with aspects of an 
affermage-type contract. During the first years, the private sector will 
receive performance-based subsidies from ONEP under an output-
based aid (OBA) approach. Specific outputs eligible for a subsidy are 
water production, service expansion to new settlements, and a working 
HH connection. The private operator will be selected competitively 
on the basis of the lowest total subsidy. This approach is expected 
to be win-win for all parties. ONEP will benefit from the efficiency 
gains of the private operator. From day 1, the private operator will 
have incentives to work to establish a profit-making business before 
the fifth year of service provision. While this OBA approach is still to 
be tested, it appears a very promising management model for water 
service provision in small towns and surrounding rural areas.
In Morocco, local authorities are responsible for water supply and 
sanitation (WSS) services. Major cities have delegated WSS either 
to the private sector or to financially independent municipal utilities. 
ONEP is the national utility in charge of potable water production 
and transmission in bulk to large urban distribution utilities. Because 
small cities and rural areas lacked capacity, they increasingly requested 
ONEP’s assistance to manage their water distribution services. As a 
result, over time, ONEP’s mandate broadened to include the provision 
of water supply services to small towns and rural areas. More recently, 
ONEP has been mandated also to bring sanitation services to second-
ary urban and rural centers.
 Urgency to Increase Rural Household Water Connections
At the same time, the government decided to accelerate the pace 
of ONEP’s investments in RWS to reach the coverage target of 90 
percent of the rural population by 2007. This coverage target was 
one destination on the way to the overarching objective: reaching the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for Morocco by 2015. At the 
end of 2008, ONEP covered 80 percent of national water needs. It 
also is the country’s leader in water distribution and provides water 
to 28 percent of the Moroccan population. The national company 
distributes water to 5.6 million people in medium-sized cities and to 
2.8 million people in rural areas. ONEP is a profit-making, autonomous 
public corporation. However, its organizational structure and internal 
procedures translate into fixed costs that are too high to make service 
provision in smaller scale operations profitable.
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Morocco’s rural sector is composed of 31,000 localities (douars) with 
a total population of nearly 13 million. Prior programs contributed to 
provide water to 70 percent of the douars through public standpipes. 
Those programs left unserved approximately 10,000 douars. In addition, 
the demand for rural HH connections to water supply is estimated at 
1,700,000. ONEP and village associations have already developed ap-
proximately 680,000 HH connections in rural areas. Therefore, the 
challenge in the rural areas consists of connecting a little over 1,000,000 
new HH to water supply.
In the meantime, ONEP is facing the following constraints: (1) the 
necessity to satisfy so many new customers without hiring new staff; 
(2) the necessity to keep operational charges in line with its costs; and 
(3) the necessity to preserve its financial equilibrium, because its invest-
ment needs are skyrocketing. Regarding point 2, the tariff structure 
is the same throughout Morocco. The tariff levels for bulk and retail 
water are fixed by the government. As for point 3, in recent years, 
ONEP has tested different models of private sector involvement, from 
established standpipe-managers to more comprehensive performance-
based service contracts. Learning from these experiences, ONEP is 
ready to take private sector involvement in water service distribution 
in rural areas one step further.
ONEP Pilots Innovative Public-Private Partnership  
to Increase Household Connections
ONEP intends to pilot the first public-private partnership for ex-
tended subcontracting of its water distribution responsibilities. The 
objective of the pilot is to provide sustainable water supply services 
and service expansion in rural areas served by ONEP through a new 
PPP approach that includes both technical and, for the first time, 
commercial management. The private sector would be expected to 
develop technically and financially efficient management of water 
distribution in rural areas. The private sector also would be encour-
aged to develop access to piped water supply services through HH 
connections and to expand the service area to other douars. This 
approach should enable ONEP to significantly reduce its O&M costs 
in water provision while maintaining its current staffing level, thus 
ensuring its long-term financial sustainability. To sum up, the pilot will 
help ONEP to determine the future organization of water services 
management in rural areas. This is an important issue for Morocco’s 
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 A rural household is estimated to include 6.4 people.1
water sector sustainability, itself a focus of World Bank dialogue with 
the government.
ONEP determined the pilot area based on six elements. They 
were (1) poverty and vulnerability levels; (2) readiness of primary and 
secondary infrastructure to enable quick service expansion; (3) high 
HH demand for house connections; (4) difficulties faced in providing 
an appropriate level of service; (5) size of the pilot area enough to 
enable financial and technical feasibility of the operation; and (6) posi-
tive deliberations of councils of all concerned communes to authorize 
ONEP to develop the proposed PPP approach.
For the pilot, ONEP selected the Sidi Kacem area in northwest 
Morocco, which comprises small towns and the surrounding rural areas. 
By bundling rural areas with more densely populated small towns, the 
pilot area has a population of 130,000 inhabitants. Of these, approxi-
mately 25 percent are poor HH,1 that is, HH with monthly incomes 
under US$201 (MAD 1745). Another 25 percent of HH are considered 
vulnerable, that is, their monthly incomes are below US$302 (150 per-
cent of the poverty line). ONEP is providing services to approximately 
7,200 of these vulnerable HH at a loss. As a result, ONEP has no 
incentive to connect additional vulnerable HH. In any event, poor or 
vulnerable HH would not be able to pay for the full connection, which 
costs on average US$577 (MAD 5,000).
 Using Output-Based Aid to Subsidize Rural HH  
Water Connections
Although demand for house connections in the pilot area was high, 
demand correlated strongly with the cost of the connection fee. This 
correlation threatened the financial sustainability of the pilot and, there-
fore, the interest of the private sector. Building on the output-based 
aid (OBA) approach developed in urban areas, ONEP decided to add 
to the proposed PPP an OBA approach that decreased the connection 
fee and subsidized house connections developed by the private opera-
tor. The innovation is that the private operator must prefinance the 
outputs, for instance, the working connections to piped water supply 
service. The operator receives the subsidy after these outputs have 
been delivered and independently verified. ONEP requested support 
from the World Bank and the Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid 
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 The Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA) is a global partnership 2
administered by the World Bank. GPOBA was established in 2003, initially as a mul-
tidonor trust fund to develop output-based aid (OBA) approaches across a variety of 
sectors including infrastructure, health, and education. OBA subsidies are designed 
to create incentives for efficiency and the long-term success of development projects. 
For more information on output-based aid approaches, go to www.gpoba.org.
(GPOBA)2 to design the OBA approach. GPOBA funded an important 
technical assistance contract to help design the pilot and help structure 
the OBA approach. GPOBA was not in a position to fund the pilot. 
Nonetheless, ONEP decided to use the approach and finance it.
The main goal for ONEP is that the subcontracted private op-
erator who takes on the management of small-scale operations for a 
10-year period is able to reduce O&M costs to a level enabling ONEP 
to break even early enough to develop a profitable business within 
the existing tariff structure. The private operator would not receive a 
management fee but would be remunerated through the revenue col-
lected from customers. In addition, the operator would have specific 
performance targets and associated outputs for which it will receive an 
OBA subsidy from ONEP. The three required outputs are (1) water 
sales in the pilot area, new douars or settlements reached, and new 
house connections. Each output was designed to help the private op-
erator develop the critical mass of customers and water sales to make 
its business financially sustainable. To incentivize performance, the 
subsidies will be time bound. The outputs and associated subsidies 
appear in table 18.1.
Table 18.1  Performance Targets and Outputs Required to Receive ONEP OBA Subsidy 
Contract objective Output Measuring unit Targets Subsidy available for the first
Minimize initial Water sales in the 
operational deficit pilot area m3 sold 3 million m3 3 years of operation
Expand service area to New douars or Linear meters (ml) of Initial estimates:    
14 new douars settlements reached expanded network 40,000 ml 4 years of operation
Increase customer base New working house  
through new house connections to piped   8,500 new house 
 connections water supply House connection connections 5 years of operation
 
The amount of subsidy, hence the unit cost per connection, would 
be determined by a competitive bidding process based on targets 
clearly stated in the bidding documents. The bidder requiring the least 
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 This amount is to be confirmed and may increase. The current discounted fee 3
refers to 2005 prices. With support from the World Bank, an analysis is ongoing to 
update the information that will lead to the proposed revised discounted fee.
amount of combined subsidy wins the bid. The allowable subsidy may 
be capped.
The following paragraph details the OBA approach to house con-
nections. The private operator would be expected to make approxi-
mately 8,500 new connections during the 10-year contract period, thus 
increasing the connection coverage rate in the pilot area from 32 percent 
to over 68 percent of HH. The OBA subsidy for a house connection 
would equal the difference between a set discounted connection fee 
for the HH and the cost of connection.
Household Connection Cost
ONEP has promoted MAD 2,500 (US$289) as the country-wide 
set discounted connection fee in ONEP-managed rural areas.3 To be 
eligible, a HH needs to express interest and provide a down payment 
of MAD 1,000 before the completion of service extension works in 
its area. Households that fail to do so will later be charged the full 
connection fee. Poor and vulnerable HH that meet the “social con-
nections” criteria (monthly revenues lower than MAD 3,000) will 
have the option of paying the remaining MAD 1,500 in installments 
over 3 years at 5 percent interest (compared to the usual 18 percent 
microcredit rate).
Under the proposed PPP, the user contribution to house connec-
tion would amount to MAD 2,500 (US$289), that is, half of the con-
nection cost. However, it will be up to the private operator to decide 
whether it wants to develop conditions similar to the ones proposed 
by ONEP, or to develop new ones that would better serve its interests 
in promoting house connections. Surveys carried out in the pilot area 
have demonstrated that 80 percent of HH would be willing to connect 
at the MAD 2,500 price.
While only 50 percent of the pilot area population is below the 
vulnerability or poverty lines, the assumption is that the wealthiest 
HH are among the 7,400 already connected. For lack of a better 
targeting mechanism, it was decided that all HH located in the pilot 
area will be eligible for a subsidized connection, on a first come-first 
served basis.
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 At 2.54Dh for the first 6 m4 3 and 7.91Dh for the following 14 m3.
The scheme ensures that monthly payments for poor and vulnerable 
HH will be affordable, based on the unit price of water and projected 
monthly consumption after the connection. Currently, HH purchase 
water from standpipes within 500 meters of their settlements at an 
average price of MAD 10 per m3, and consume on average 8 liters/
capita/day. After connection, experience shows that the average 
monthly consumption increases over time to an average of 45 liters/
capita/day, corresponding to a unit cost of water of MAD 4.9 per m3.4 
On this basis, and assuming that payment is made under ONEP condi-
tions, the cumulative user’s monthly payment represents approximately 
5 percent, or 3.4 percent of the monthly spending of a HH at the 
poverty or vulnerability line, respectively. This cost is deemed afford-
able, as demonstrated by the 100 percent collection rate experienced 
by ONEP nationwide.
Multiple Benefits of Household Connection
The expected benefits resulting from house connections include, first 
and foremost, having access to safe and reliable water supply at home, in 
appropriate quality and quantity, and at an affordable price. Additional 
benefits include time savings that can be used for income-generating 
activities primarily by adult women and improved education for chil-
dren; reduced health costs and improved hygiene practices resulting 
in decreased morbidity and mortality rates, especially among children 
under 5; reduced medical expenditures; and improved labor productivity. 
Broader outcomes of the pilot will include the introduction of demand-
driven service provision in rural areas. Currently, significant investments 
by ONEP to develop access to water through standpipes generate very 
little income because populations increasingly disregard the standpipes. 
Moreover, the pilot also will demonstrate and document one possible 
solution to reduce ONEP’s fixed and variable O&M costs, which, 
if replicable, might improve ONEP’s long-term financial sustainability.
This pilot is very innovative. In fact, it will pave the way for a reform 
of water distribution management in Morocco’s rural areas for at least 
four reasons. The pilot:
Will bring a new dimension of risk-sharing1.  by introducing the first 
PPP in water supply distribution in small towns and surrounding 
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rural areas in Morocco. For the first time, ONEP will subcontract 
utility management, including commercial risk. The pilot structure 
creates the right incentives: it provides targeted support until a 
critical mass of customers enables the financial sustainability of the 
operator. Namely, ONEP will retain the legal responsibility, and 
final beneficiaries will remain ONEP’s clients. The private operator 
will bear technical, financial, and commercial risk. The approach 
will provide both ONEP and the private operator with the highest 
incentives to perform. The private operator risks losing the subsidy 
funds if the outputs are not delivered. ONEP risks having to take 
over if the private operator does not perform.
Will result in a win-win situation2. . The pilot will test a possible so-
lution to ensure ONEP’s long-term financial sustainability, while 
accompanying the creation of a new set of local operators for utility 
management. These local operators might, at a later stage, bid for 
full delegation of service and/or manage sanitation.
May involve local commercial banks to channel the subsidies3. . This ar-
rangement might create favorable conditions for ONEP, the private 
operator, and that bank to develop integrated financial packages for 
HH through small short-term loans to HH to pay the whole of the 
users’ contributions. This arrangement would enable each party 
to concentrate on his/her respective core business and would give 
the private operator more assurance that it would get paid timely 
after the independent verification recommends the payment.
Presents a window of opportunity for small and medium private-sector 4. 
firms (SMEs) in Morocco to develop a new expertise in the water 
sector. These firms have seen large, international private operators 
capture water business opportunities in large cities such as Casa-
blanca, Rabat, and Tanger/Tetouan. This proposed rural water 
operation, with its smaller size, gives SMEs a chance to enter the 
water business on a scale that they can handle.
The pilot is at advanced stages of procurement and has generated 
great interest from the private sector. Because of the pilot’s innovative 
nature, workshops were organized to gather prospective bidders to 
present the pilot and answer questions. Recently, another workshop 
was organized with prequalified bidders to explain the bidding docu-
ments and go through the financial model it entails. The Bank financed 
consultants to help ONEP organize and moderate each of these work-
shops, and Bank staff participated in and contributed to them. Given 
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the significant interest demonstrated by the private sector in ONEP’s 
two workshops, ONEP is confident that all shortlisted bidders will 
submit qualifying bids.
If successful, this model for rural water supply can be scaled up in 
other bundles of small towns and surrounding rural areas in Morocco, 
thus presenting business opportunity for the Moroccan private sector 
while enhancing access to piped water services in rural areas. This pi-
lot is a pivotal operation. It is providing the Moroccan private sector with 
unique market entry opportunities in the rural water sector and potentially 
in large urban centers.
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New Approaches to Private 
Sector Participation in Irrigation:
Lessons from Egypt’s  
West Delta Project
Aldo Baietti and Safwat Abdel-Dayem
In Middle East and North Africa (MNA) countries, the irrigation and drainage sector plays a vital role in food production and rural development. However, the sector has faced very difficult chal-
lenges in financing capital and maintenance costs.
Cost recovery in the sector has been exceedingly low, even 
for solely operation and maintenance (O&M) functions. Indeed, 
investment and O&M of irrigation schemes traditionally have been 
founded on massive public funding programs. In many cases, these 
resulted in a significant and unplanned fiscal burden on government, 
long after the programs’ initial commissioning. Following a prolonged 
period of inadequate funding for O&M, many schemes have been 
abandoned.
Fortunately, the irrigation sector now is benefiting from new 
approaches to planning, design, and financing. There is particular 
emphasis on involving private investors and the farming community 
in sharing risks.
Private-Public Partnerships in Irrigation
A study by Tardieu and others (2004) examined the experience in 
private participation in the irrigation sector. The study reviewed ap-
proximately 21 cases of projects with some level of private sector 
participation, most of which was in the form of service contracts for 
O&M and financing schemes for farmers to invest in on-farm pumping 
equipment. Moreover, these experiences limited the role of the private 
sector because they dealt primarily with smaller systems.
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 A similar model of public-private partnership is under implementation in Guerdaine, 1
Morocco, in an area close to Agadir. In this model, high-value export crops are being 
grown with irrigated water from rapidly depleting aquifers.
 1 feddan = 0.42 hectares (ha).2
Important developments are taking place in MNA in expanding 
the role of private participation in financing and operation. The West 
Delta Project is a large-scale project based on the “utility model,” 
which introduces reforms of the sector as well as new approaches 
to project development, transaction design, and public-private ar-
rangements.1 Useful lessons are already emerging from the West 
Delta design.
West Delta Project Concept
Since the late 1960s, with the 
support of the government, 
Egyptian commercial farmers 
have been reclaiming desert 
lands. The West Delta region is 
one of these areas (figure 19.1). 
It comprises 255,000 feddans 
(approximately 110,000 ha total)2 
on the fringes of the delta. Begin-
ning in the early 1990s, through 
the exploitation of groundwater 
resources, the West Delta Region 
has been developed into a flourishing agricultural economy.
Today, the West Delta Region contributes between $300 mil-
lion–$500 million annually to the Egyptian economy. The area sup-
plies domestic and European Union markets with high-value fruits and 
vegetables. Moreover, the area is now home to 500,000 people and 
provides approximately 250,000 jobs in the agriculture sector alone. 
However, the rapid development of the past few years has been ac-
companied by excessive exploitation of groundwater reserves, resulting 
in costly and deeper pumping as well as eroded water quality.
In response to concern about a possible collapse of this thriving 
agricultural economy, the Government of Egypt (GOE) conceived a 
surface water irrigation project that would replace groundwater pump-
ing. However, the government also took this opportunity to advance a 
Figure 19.1  Aerial View of West Delta of Nile River
Note: The West Delta area is located approximately 60 km north of Cairo to the west of 
the Nile Delta. The West Delta consists of 255,000 feddans of primarily commercial 
farms that cultivate high-value fruits and vegetables, much of which are exported to 
Europe and other markets.
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new vision for irrigation services. The new approach was founded on 
full cost recovery, volumetric pricing, formal water entitlements, and 
private-sector participation in financing and management.
The proposed model was for a public-private partnership (PPP). 
A private investor would be identified through a competitive tender. 
The investor would build the irrigation system, operate the system, and 
earn a commercial return by collecting water fees from farmers. The 
private investor would be offered concessional credit from international 
financial institutions (IFIs) channeled via the GOE.
The rest of this chapter describes the project design and the ra-
tionale for the chosen approach in more detail. At the time of writing, 
bidders for the West Delta project are preparing their bids, so it is too 
early to judge its performance on the ground. This chapter instead 
describes the structure of project rules and incentives, as these have 
useful lessons for the practice of irrigation.
Demand-Driven Approach to Project Design
At government’s request, the World Bank commissioned an assess-
ment in 2004–05 using a grant from the Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility (PPIAF). The assessment presented a conceptual 
framework and transaction model for implementing a surface water 
irrigation system on a cost-recovery basis and with private sector 
participation.
Farmers’ involvement in the design was essential to minimize the 
risk of low participation in the scheme. After an initial focus on de-
mand forecasts and technical specifications, the emphasis of the design 
process therefore shifted to extensive user consultations and surveys. 
From these, the growers’ service requirements and their willingness 
to connect and pay would guide the development of technical design 
options. Each design option entailed a corresponding level of tariffs.
A key feature of the West Delta preparation work involved a detailed 
“willingness to connect” survey of the farms in the area to understand 
their needs and willingness to pay for surface water.
No longer could the government expect farmers to sign up to the 
system by GOE’s simply carrying out the required engineering stud-
ies, forecasting an appropriate mix of crops and water requirements, 
and designing the layout of the main and subsidiary branch canals. Too 
many projects had been built around this top-down approach and were 
lying idle in red ink.
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 There also was concern that an open channel would lead to significant water theft 3
between the intake point on the River Nile and the project area.
Instead, the West Delta approach placed the farmers in the driver’s 
seat and informed them so that they could:
Understand what service and performance standards are expected 1. 
of them
Understand their ability to absorb the cost of service and convince 2. 
them to buy into the project
Take an early stake in the preparation.3. 
Accordingly, the preparation work at the outset involved extensive 
consultations with farmers in the area as well as setting up an advisory 
group that would represent all beneficiaries throughout the entire 
project preparation process.
Preference for a Piped System
The technical work began with a longstanding preconception that an 
open channel system with several intakes and a network of main and 
subsidiary branches would be the most cost-effective technical option. 
However, user surveys revealed that, while the open channel system 
was perhaps the least-cost solution on a unit-cost basis, it could not 
fully meet the performance standards of farmers.3
The closed conduit or piped system also was found to offer dis-
tinct advantages to a prospective private operator, who would be 
expected to operate the system on commercial principles and assume 
the related risks. Most important, the piped system would enable the 
private investor to better manage its cash flow. A piped system could 
be constructed in smaller modules, thus spreading capital costs over 
time and allowing the private operator to generate revenue in the early 
phase of implementation, while other parts of the systems were under 
construction. The open channel model was cheaper on a unit-cost 
basis, but the piped system offered fewer risks for a PPP operator and 
better addressed the expressed needs of farmers (table 19.1).
The piped system could (1) be implemented in smaller, financially 
sustainable modules based on the exact location of connecting con-
sumers; (2) deliver a pressurized water flow directly to a connecting 
farm; (3) offer better control over water usage through metering, and 
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lower evaporation, water losses and water theft; and (4) raise minimal 
right-of-way issues, land acquisition, and other environmental and 
safeguard concerns. In essence, the piped system was the preferred 
choice because it offered a prospective private operator better control 
over its financial operations.
Risk Allocation and Mitigation
Much of the PPP design work focused on the assessment and mitigation 
of risk factors and on determining which party should assume which 
risks. The financial analysis, which was supported by a dynamic financial 
model, analyzed how variation in key parameters such as construction 
period, conjunctive use of water, cost, capitalization requirements and 
financing plan, financing terms, currency movements, interest-rates, 
and bonding and insurance requirements would affect tariffs.
The intent was to identify the transaction elements that would 
minimize tariffs and mitigate risks.
Pre-eminent among the risks are N demand risk, due to the possibility 
of continued groundwater pumping; and system-planning risk due 
to oversized infrastructure. Either would lead to the system being 
underutilized. The project must not only yield positive returns but 
also ensure positive cash flows throughout the entire project, espe-
cially during the critical early years. Maximizing utilization efficiency 
of the system from the outset would contribute significantly to this 
end. Two devices were introduced to mitigate demand risk:
Tariff structure that would minimize the risk of conjunctive L
groundwater use by employing a fixed-capacity charge.
Table 19.1  Comparison of Characteristics of Piped and Open Channel Irrigation 
Feature Piped Open channel
Cost  Traditional low cost solution but high fixed  
 Generally more costly per unit cost element
Implementation Highly flexible. Can adjust system to actual demand Not adaptable to large variances in demand
Land Acquisition Minimal Substantial. Can reduce agricultural area substantially
Commercial Control High control for water theft, metering UFW,   
 and disconnection Lower distribution efficiency, higher commercial risks
Environmental  If not supervised closely, channels can become  
 Minimal dump sites
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“Subscription period.” The selected operator would carry out L
a subscription program to sign up farmers to the service. The 
operator would have the option to cancel in the event that 
the subscribing farmers came up short of the required 90,000 
feddans. Moreover, it would be after the subscription that the 
operator would design the system.
The analysis studied N financing risks, including securing the longest 
possible loan terms available to keep user tariff affordable. Need-
less to say, the longer the debt repayment terms, the lower the 
user tariffs could be.
The team further found that N construction delay is a major risk factor. 
The operator must therefore implement the construction program 
swiftly to take full advantage of the long term of initial IFI loans 
that were being made available through GOE.
The preparation team also well understood the N political risk involved, 
given Egypt’s lack of experience in public-private partnerships and, 
most importantly, the lack of comparable successful efforts in the 
irrigation sector.
Finally, the issue of N currency risk was daunting, given that the 
project was financed in foreign currency but generated revenues 
in Egyptian pounds. Although local currency financing was avail-
able in Egypt, it could not be offered in the maturities needed to 
make the project viable.
Cost Analysis and Minimum Bid and Project Size
The technical analysis reviewed numerous design options to reduce the 
risk of oversizing. First, the analysis determined which basic infrastruc-
ture was common to all scenarios (that is, the fixed cost component). 
Second, it simulated the addition of independent modules of land area 
(that is, the variable cost component) such that the operator could 
connect farmers on the basis of demand without jeopardizing his own 
cash flow. This was a critical element of the analysis. The analysis 
yielded the supply cost curve in figure 19.2.
The cost analysis provided both important information on minimum 
project size to ensure that user tariffs remained affordable and incentives 
for the operator to expand coverage.
On this basis, the minimum project size was determined to fall 
within the range of 60,000–90,000 feddans, this being the range at 
which the development cost per feddan would achieve the affordability 
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 The loan facility would reimburse a maximum of 85% of the total eligible construc-4
tion costs to the private operator, meaning a minimum of 15% contribution from the 
private operator. The private operator may, in some circumstances, be required to 
increase its proportion of financing, particularly if the initial subscription by farmers 
exceeds 90,000 feddans. No restrictions are provided as to where the private operator 
can source this financing. It can be in the form of both equity and debt.
thresholds indicated in the user 
survey. More importantly, the 
cost curve revealed that as the 
scheme approached 100 percent 
coverage, average costs would 
continue to drop. In other words, 
the private investor would con-
tinue to have the incentive to 
expand the network and connect 
the additional farms. As such, 
the reference project for the bid tariff was set at 90,000 feddans.
Structure of PPP Transaction
The West Delta PPP transaction was to be a hybrid scheme, largely 
founded on the Design-Build-Operate (DBO) model. Under this model, 
the government contracts a private operator take over a concession area 
consisting of approximately 190,000 feddans in the southern portion 
of the West Delta. The operator will design, construct, and assume 
the full responsibilities of operating the system for 30 years, including 
taking on the associated demand and commercial risks.
In turn, the public sector party will assume ownership of the assets 
and most of the financing-related responsibilities and risks, including 
the currency risk related to the potential devaluation of the Egyptian 
currency. For its part, GOE will make available financing on the order 
of US$175 million to the operator for the initial phase of the construc-
tion. The funds were to be sourced through a loan facility that GOE 
had already established with the World Bank and Agence Française 
de Développement (AFD).
The private operator, at its option, may draw up to 85 percent 
of total construction costs from the facility, leaving the private op-
erator’s own contribution to be at least 15 percent.4 As the operator 
draws down from the loan facility, it triggers an annual repayment 
obligation (annual concession fee) to GOE based on defined payment 
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terms and conditions. The amount of the annual concession fee will 
be in direct proportion to the amount of funds drawn down and 
would cease upon the private operator’s fulfilling completely its full 
repayment obligations over 20 years. The concession fee is designed 
as a back-to-back payment to cover GOE’s loan obligations to the 
World Bank and AFD.
Once the initial loan facility of $175 million is exhausted by initial 
construction costs, the operator will be obliged to source its own fund-
ing by debt and equity to expand the system to the extent of additional 
demand. In this phase, the structure would revert more to a traditional 
concession Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, with the operator 
assuming full financing risks.
The private operator would collect combined two-part tariffs de-
nominated in Egyptian pounds (LE) from connecting farmers to recoup 
its costs. He will collect a fixed tariff (flat tariff) that will be charged on 
a per-feddan basis to connecting farmers over a 20-year period to defray 
the private operator’s concession fee, additional capital expenditures 
financed by the operator, replacement costs, and a return on invest-
ment. The operator also will collect a volumetric tariff based on actual 
water consumption, which will defray the operator’s cost of operations 
and routine maintenance, and provide a management fee.
Rationale
This hybrid option was regarded as the preferred approach for the 
proposed project because it balanced risks evenly between the public 
and private parties. The DBO model transferred as much project risk as 
possible from public to private. A pure public model or a management 
contract would have had a high probability for successful implementation 
but would have transferred few risks to the private sector. By compari-
son, a classic BOT concession would have transferred essentially all 
risks to the private sector. However, it would have been be too costly 
in the initial stage and likely would have received low interest from 
prospective private investors without sizable subsidy, as was recently 
demonstrated in the Guerdane Concession in Morocco.
Institutional and Regulatory Arrangements
Regulatory responsibilities would be shared between a Project Man-
agement Unit (PMU) within the Ministry of Water Resources and 
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Irrigation, a Regulatory Office (RO), and a Water User Council 
(WUC) representing farmers in the area. The PMU would manage 
the day-to-day business of the project, including financial management 
and disbursement functions. The PMU would also supervise the con-
tractual arrangements for the initial construction and expansion of the 
irrigation system. The RO would regulate rate adjustments and tariff 
rebasing and oversee the contractual commitments of the operator 
with regard to prescribed service standards. Finally, an Independent 
Panel of Experts would be set up as needed to mediate disputes.
The WUC was established as an independent farmers’ organization 
to take an active part in preparing the project and, ultimately, during 
implementation, in monitoring the relationships and potential conflicts 
among farmers on such matters as water entitlements, usage, and al-
ternating hours of irrigation. The WUC also will monitor groundwater 
pumping in the area, along with the more official program that will be 
implemented by the PMU.
Conclusion
The challenge posed to the West Delta project was to provide quality ir-
rigation services to a highly discriminating user group without significant 
public subsidy. The West Delta Project has responded by introducing 
a transaction concept that relies on full cost recovery, volumetric pric-
ing, a balanced risk framework, user participation, tariff regulation, and 
technical specifications to reduce the financial exposure of private operators. 
The transaction would involve sharing the financing between GOE, a 
private operator, and farmers, with the debt portion underwritten by 
a government guarantee.
While the project has its own specificities, in particular, a pre-
existing community of commercial, successful, and technically savvy 
farmers, it provides useful lessons about the design of self-financing 
irrigation schemes. Whether the project’s formula for apportioning risks 
and rewards will succeed in the market remains to be seen. Whatever 
the outcome, however, the project will be keenly observed by MNA 
countries looking for new approaches to meet the service demands of 
their irrigated farmers.
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Participatory Irrigation 
Management and Cost-Sharing  
in Yemen
Naji Abu-Hatim and Ahmed Shawky Mohamed
Yemen is among the poorest countries in the world. Its agriculture is an important driving force of economic growth, contributing 14 percent–23 percent to GDP. Agriculture also makes very 
significant indirect contributions by providing employment and income 
to more than 55 percent of the active population. Nevertheless, pov-
erty is spread mainly throughout rural areas, which are home to 83 
percent of the poor. They derive their livelihoods and incomes mainly 
from agriculture-related activities.
Yemen is also one of the most populated among the Arab Peninsula 
countries. Yemen’s 3.2 percent demographic growth puts high pressure 
on its natural resources.
Yemen is one of the most water-constrained countries in the world. 
With a per capita availability of 150m3 a year, Yemen’s water availability 
is 10 percent of the regional average and 2 percent of the global average. 
The country also has one of the highest sectoral water allocations to 
agriculture: more than 90 percent of total use.
With a largely arid to hyperarid climate and no perennial riv-
ers, the country relies heavily on the exploitation of groundwater. 
Groundwater reserves are being critically depleted. Renewable re-
sources, estimated at approximately 2,100 million cubic meters (m3) 
a year, are being supplemented by groundwater mining from deep 
aquifers at a rate of approximately 1,300 million m3 a year (with 
desalination and reclaimed wastewater accounting for a negligible 
percentage). In some areas, groundwater tables are dropping at 3 
meters a year, and many farms are being abandoned. Spate flood is 
the second-order means of irrigation. However, as opposed to using 
groundwater, utilizing spate water proved costly to the government 
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since it requires developing and maintaining spate-regulating, off-
farm infrastructure.
Irrigation in Yemen has grown rapidly, both from groundwater and 
surface water. Traditionally, Yemenis had many ingenious techniques 
to husband their scant water. Early development of modern spate 
schemes in the 1950s successfully adapted traditional flood recession 
technology to a more controlled system. Later, in the 1970s, the in-
troduction of the tubewell and motor pump revolutionized irrigation. 
Now, full or supplemental groundwater irrigation accounts for over 
two-thirds of the value of crop production. Irrigation efficiencies are 
low (nationwide average approximately 40 percent). Water consump-
tion in the irrigation subsector continues to increase at an average 
annual rate of 30 million m3, or 5 percent. Already by 1990, irrigated 
agriculture alone was consuming 130 percent of Yemen’s renewable 
water resources, meaning that the overdraft beyond the “safe yield” 
was approximately 30 percent. By 2005, this figure had reached over 
50 percent. If agricultural expansion continues, groundwater overdraft 
will reach 100 percent by 2025. However, many aquifers will be pumped 
dry long before then.
Water markets exist in Yemen but only on the margins of the 
water-related activities. The private sector and market mechanisms are 
found only in irrigation water sales to water tankers. However, these 
markets are informal. Yemen lacks clear groundwater rules. Third-
party externalities are not accounted for, and there is no enabling or 
regulatory environment.
Water scarcity is exacerbated both by significant spatial and temporal 
variations and by significant water (rights) allocation problems. With the 
expected rapid population growth, by 2025, water availability per capita 
is estimated to decrease by 35 percent from 2005, well below levels 
generally reckoned to indicate severe water stress.
As a result, one challenge facing Yemen is to reduce groundwater 
use in agriculture while maintaining the rural economy and farmers’ in-
comes. A compounding challenge is to improve the sustainability of 
spate irrigation infrastructure and to reduce the government’s financial 
burden through strengthening farmers’ self-reliance on financing and 
maintaining spate irrigation systems.
In the past, the government intentionally subsidized irrigation and 
drinking water to promote development, reduce the cost of living, raise 
farm incomes, and vest powerful influence groups with patronage. 
By the late 1990s, the government recognized that this pattern posed 
Participatory Irrigation Management and Cost-Sharing in Yemen  N  369
economic and environmental 
pressures and that new pricing 
regimes were needed to target 
cost recovery and—to a lesser 
extent—demand management.
Nevertheless, despite a de-
centralization program for cost- 
sharing in water investment 
programs, government remains 
the dominant financier. During 
2000–04, water sector capital 
expenditures were f inanced 
mainly by budget transfers 
(41 percent) and loans (29 per-
cent). User fees financed only 28 
percent of the investment program. According to the 5-year government 
investment plan proposed for 2005–09 (figures 20.1 and 20.2), budget 
transfers are expected to represent only 30 percent of total financing for 
the water sector. Funds committed by donors (loans/grants) amount 
to 31 percent. Therefore, 39 percent of additional financing—the 
balance—is required by 2009. Self-financing may be needed to cover 
most of this balance. Furthermore, the government has developed an 
ambitious investment plan for the water supply and sanitation (WSS) 
subsectors to achieve the MDGs (figure 20.1). Thus, the government 
would prioritize its sovereign financing of these subsectors over the 
irrigation and water resource management subsectors.
For the irrigation subsector, it 
can be concluded from the above 
that cost recovery and demand 
management policies need to 
be coupled and fostered, thus 
replacing the old patronage and 
supply-driven approaches. The 
government has set f inancial 
autonomy as a policy for rural 
decentralized water supplies and 
has started to work with water 
user groups (WUGs) toward cost 
recovery, particularly in spate 
irrigation.
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This chapter presents success stories and lessons learned from 
the cost-sharing and water user-participation activities of the World-
Bank-supported Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP) in Yemen. The 
chapter also presents comparable experiences from other demand-
management-oriented projects in Yemen.
 Experiences from the Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP)
To improve the use of spate irrigation in Yemen, the World Bank 
Institute (WBI) facilitated a review of the prospects for WUAs and 
the ultimate transfer of spate schemes to users. In 2001 this review 
envisioned the IIP: “…an Adaptable Program Loan to support physical 
rehabilitation and to move the reform agenda forward” (US$20 mil-
lion). One IIP component aimed to establish water user organizations 
that would share investment/rehabilitation costs of the main irrigation 
system and gradually take over the operation and maintenance (O&M) 
of the secondary/tertiary system.
 Formulation of Water User Organizations toward Cost-Sharing
The IIP was articulated around Participatory Irrigation Management 
(PIM). The project prompted the government to create enabling legal 
and institutional environments to establish two main irrigation-user 
organizations: water user associations (WUAs) and irrigation councils 
(ICs). Each WUA is in charge of implementing PIM in its respective 
irrigation command area.
The WUA was to (1) provide reliable and sustainable irrigation 
services, (2) perform maintenance and rehabilitation, (3) collect fees 
from beneficiaries, and (4) develop the capability for self-reliant O&M. 
At later, more advanced stages, ICs were established in both Wadi 
Zabid and Wadi Tuban with potent representation from the WUAs. 
The ICs act as the High Executive and Administrative Authorities 
in each wadi (riverbed). The ICs are responsible for (1) applying the 
IC’s by-laws and implementing its executive procedures; (2) coordi-
nating activities between government authorities that continue to be 
in charge of O&M of head works/primary canals and the WUAs in 
charge of O&M of the secondary and tertiary systems; (3) protecting 
water user rights and resolving conflicts and pending issues; and (4) 
monitoring the social, financial, and technical performance of WUAs. 
The ICs represent the local government, WUAs, and the Ministry of 
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Agriculture and Irrigation (through its Regional Development Author-
ity/Agriculture Office).
The project initiated the PIM approach through undertaking a 
comprehensive awareness program to inculcate the concept of PIM in 
farmers’ minds and to clarify the roles and responsibilities of irrigation 
beneficiaries within their representative user groups. The program 
targeted all relevant stakeholders, including farmers (owners, sharecrop-
pers, and tenants), government officials, and local councils. As a result 
of the program, informal water user groups (WUGs) were formulated 
at the onset, which later metamorphosed into formal WUAs. ICs 
were formed at an advanced stage of IIP. The project then developed 
training activities to build the managerial and technical capabilities of 
the WUAs and ICs.
PIM called for farmers’ participation in overall project activities 
starting from decisionmaking to completion of the rehabilitation and 
improvement works, as well as farmers’ contribution of 10 percent 
of investment costs in kind. Thereafter, farmers would take over 
responsibility and financing for the O&M of secondary and tertiary 
canals.
 IIP’s Approach to Community Cost-Sharing of Off-Farm Investments
For the investment/rehabilitation works, as mentioned earlier, the 
IIP introduced an in-kind cost-sharing approach through community- 
implemented contracts. To enable low-income farmers to share the capi-
tal costs of the project, IIP divided civil works into two categories:
Priority works1.  to be fully financed by the project (government funds 
and loans). These works include feeder roads and flood/environ-
mental protection works, which are deemed public goods outside 
the canal system and thus require no earmarked user fees.
Participatory works,2.  requiring a 10 percent farmer contribution to 
rehabilitation/improvement capital costs. This percentage was 
agreed between the project government team and farmer repre-
sentatives (initially the WUGs; eventually the WUAs). Farmers 
were allowed to contribute this percentage in kind: labor and mate-
rial. In this arrangement, each WUA would implement 1–2 small 
community contract(s) up to $10,000 per contract, to an aggre-
gate $1.4 million per project. To further persuade irrigation end- 
beneficiaries to contribute 10 percent in kind, the project guaranteed 
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that the unit rates of the contracts awarded to WUAs would be 30 
percent cheaper than those implemented by the national/regional 
contractors. (These rates otherwise would have embodied signifi-
cant profit margins for the WUA contractors.) This percentage 
thereby represents the total contribution from end-beneficiaries 
and, intrinsically, from the WUA contractors.
 Farmers’ Response to Joining WUAs and Sharing Capital Costs
One major incentive for farmers to join WUAs was to vest the farmers 
with the authority to co-design and co-implement spate subprojects. 
Due to past, persistent centralized subsidies of irrigation in Yemen, 
farmers at first felt little incentive to buy in to the idea of forming 
WUAs under the project, especially since spate irrigation depends 
on erratic floodwater that is becoming ever more scarce and less 
predictable.
However, through IIP’s public awareness program, many farmers have 
come forward and joined the WUAs. The farmers pay subscription and 
annual fees and play an active role in selecting the types of irrigation 
structures needed and contributing to subsequent implementation/
supervision of civil works contracts.
Farmers became more interested after they were vested with 
the right to participate in decisionmaking and (as explained above) to 
directly implement small contracts in which they would cost-share the 
rehabilitation and improvement works. The project’s Credit Agree-
ment included a prerequisite that civil works could not start before 
establishing the respective WUAs.
Farmers also exhibited willingness to share costs of on-farm im-
provements after the project evidenced improved yields and profits. The 
IIP included a major component to demonstrate improved irrigation 
technologies and agronomic practices at the on-farm level.
The demonstrations were conducted with 360 farmers and 590 
farmers at Wadis Zabid and Tuban, respectively. An additional 1500 
farmers were involved in the associated awareness campaigns. As a 
result of the various on-farm interventions (table 20.1), some crop yields 
increased up to 100 percent! In the Rapid Appraisal Survey conducted 
in March 2005, farmers rated the overall outcome as highly satisfactory. 
They expressed willingness to share 25 percent and 50 percent of the 
on-farm costs of improved technologies for the spate and tube-well 
demonstrations, respectively.
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 Backstopping the WUAs and Tackling PIM Implementation 
Difficulties
The project provided the needed training and necessary administra-
tive, financial, and technical backstopping to WUAs. Primarily due to 
their weak legal and financial status at start-up, WUAs experienced 
various obstacles in actualizing their roles. These difficulties called 
for creating options to empower the WUAs in carrying out the com-
munity contracts. For instance, it proved difficult for the WUAs to 
issue bank/commercial guarantees for the community contracts. Al-
ternatively, they were permitted to issue guarantee letters endorsed 
by the governors.
Backstopping the WUAs included the following five activities:
A training program has been carried out for each WUA Board of 1. 
Directors and for their Auditing and Inspection Committees to 
enable them to understand the legal status, objectives, and admin-
istration/financial management of O&M activities. The emphasis 
has been sustainable O&M.
Table 20.1  Yield and Farm Revenue Increases Due to Improved Farming Practices: Planned Project Estimates 
vs. Actual Measurements (%)
Crop Planned yield increase (%) Measured yield increase (end 2005) (%) Internal rate of return (%)
Cotton 13 Zabid 45–100 Up to 6 
 15 Tuban 
Sorghum grain 5 Up to 98 9.5
Sorghum fodder 4 Zabid–8 Tuban Up to 44 4.5
Sesame 10 Up to 55 8
Maize 18 Zabid 62–97 Zabid NA
Cucurbits 3 Tuban Up to 200 Up to 90
Tomatoes 20 87 4
Onions 20 12 to 25 2
Eggplant 20 Tuban 44 13
Red chilies 20 Tuban NA NA
Banana 10–15 NA NA
Mango 10 NA NA
Okra 15 25 3
Water melon NA 28 Zabid NA
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Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) Agreements were prepared 2. 
in Arabic and were endorsed by the governors.
The project team has trained the WUAs’ construction managers 3. 
on contracting procedures as well as procedures covered in the 
Project Operations Manual.
The WUA representatives have participated in three workshops 4. 
at the regional and national levels on institutional assessment of 
the irrigation sector.
The draft by-laws for establishing the ICs have been approved by 5. 
the project’s interministerial Steering Committee, thus hastening 
the establishment of an IC for each of the two wadis.
Approximately 30 working papers and operational manuals have 
been prepared by the training consultants for the project’s PIM 
component.
The cost of training and WUA-backstopping in the IIP has been 
considerable, amounting to approximately 20 percent of total project 
costs. The Yemeni government could seek to scale up the PIM concept 
after the completion of Bank-supported projects. If so, the government 
would need to secure financing for such software-type investments 
from the sovereign resources allocated to rural extension and research. 
From international experience, this is deemed one of the examples for 
“virtuous” subsidies that a “lean-and-mean” government (as opposed 
to the private sector or end-beneficiaries) could shoulder.
 Status and O&M Roles of WUAs/ICs, and Expected Progress
Promising results have been observed thus far as irrigation stakehold-
ers in the two wadis participated in the IIP design, cost-sharing, and 
implementation stages.
All WUAs in Wadi Zabid and Wadi Tuban have been established 
and become fully operational with active boards of directors, proper 
bookkeeping, and bank accounts. The WUAs have worked closely with 
the project management units (PMUs) and the project consultants 
during the design and implementation of the rehabilitation and improve-
ment activities. As part of the WUAs, Farmer Design Committees 
(FDCs) have been elected (with the facilitation of existing Farmers’ 
Organizations, or FOs) to determine priority ranking of rehabilitation 
needs and to participate in their design.
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The WUAs have efficiently been implementing the participatory 
contracts and signing IMT Agreements for all secondary and tertiary 
canals. More importantly, they started to contribute to O&M costs of 
the secondary/tertiary system (as it has been agreed that the O&M 
costs of the main system be shouldered by the government). The 
IIP has prepared an O&M manual including a detailed inventory of 
required O&M items and a description of how WUAs could prepare 
O&M plans/budgets and collect O&M fees. The WUAs have been 
attending an extensive training program on how to use this manual 
and how to implement it. Thus far, WUAs have been collecting user 
fees for heavy-equipment rentals to carry out immediate O&M of 
the secondary/tertiary canals. The fees collected are deposited 
in WUAs’ bank accounts and disbursed from these accounts. To 
date, O&M fees are being collected ad hoc since O&M of the IIP-
introduced works have not been in effect. However, it is reported 
that farmers are paying their contributions and that the collection 
process is transparent.
The ICs also have started to hold regular meetings and discuss 
issues related to water rights and water distribution. The role of the 
WUAs and the ICs will become more obvious after completion of the 
rehabilitation/improvement works. One sign of WUAs’ effectiveness 
in Wadi Zabid was that they managed to persuade powerful farmers to 
restore canal cross-sections and to remove the control works that they had 
unilaterally placed in the canals to extend their irrigated areas.
To summarize, thus far, IIP has been deemed a successful “process” 
project, in testing and scaling up the PIM concept. The beneficiaries 
formed grassroots-level WUAs and wadi-level ICs that have been 
successfully:
Participating in decisionmaking and in selecting design optionsN
Contributing to capital investment costs and to implementation N
of civil works contracts
Gradually taking over responsibilities for the recurrent financing N
and O&M of the secondary and tertiary systems.
The viability of this “process” project is to be assessed based on 
its far-reaching impacts. They include financial sustainability; natural-
resource-base sustainability; reduction of avoidable transaction and 
overhead costs; and piloting, transferring, and scaling up best practices. 
Most of the off-farm rehabilitation and improvement activities are in 
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progress. Thus, it is too early to draw conclusions on the quality of 
irrigation services provided by ICs/WUAs, as opposed to those previ-
ously provided by corresponding government entities.
 Experiences from the Groundwater Management Projects
In the early 1990s, Yemen began tentative steps to reverse the groundwa-
ter water mining problem and improve cost-sharing. A major constraint 
was the very weak legal governance environment and the strong traditions 
of tribal and local autonomy and fragmented water institutions that had 
virtually no influence over the water-extraction decisions made by tens 
of thousands of independent-minded farmers. In response, a decentral-
ized partnership approach was proposed. The following sections touch 
on the PIM and cost-sharing experiences obtained from a number of 
irrigation demand-management-oriented projects in Yemen.
 Groundwater Management Called for Introducing PIM
As one building block for an integrated approach to the water problem, 
the Bank-supported Land and Water Conservation Project (LWCP 
1994–99) was launched to demonstrate a package of technical improve-
ments to reduce water use at farm level. LWCP targeted improving 
Yemen’s very low (approximately 40 percent) overall irrigation efficien-
cies. The project offered a package of technical advice to groundwater 
irrigators on water-saving technology and financed capital improve-
ments on a cost-sharing basis, typically 30 percent from farmers and 
the balance from government. Technology comprised predominantly 
piped on-farm water distribution systems and the use of drip or bubbler 
micro-irrigation. The project decentralized implementation to local 
specialist teams and required farmers’ contributions up-front, with a 
credit facility available. The project was well received by farmers and 
achieved its water-saving objectives.
A second phase—the Groundwater and Soil Conservation Project 
(GSCP)—began in 2003. It is extending the technical and financial 
package from 11 to 15 governorates. GSCP builds on the LWCP exercise 
by adding a key element: a technical advisory service. It complements 
physical investment in water-use-efficiency equipment with improved 
water management (through better irrigation scheduling and agronomic 
improvements), adjusted cropping patterns, and crop husbandry—all 
toward raising farm returns per m3 of water.
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The project deepens the innovative partnership approach that 
LWCP introduced. The government has created a framework of rights, 
regulations, and basin planning that—in Yemen’s weak governance 
context—can be implemented only through decentralized approaches 
and the cooperation of groundwater users. Ways to develop this 
cooperation through partnership approaches are being tested at two 
levels: the basin level through basin committees that are based on basin 
hydrological boundaries rather than on governorate boundaries; and 
the local level through WUAs similar to those introduced under IIP. 
Complementing the GSCP, a Japanese-grant-financed pilot program, 
the Community Water Management Project (CWMP), has been 
harnessed to test community self-management approaches to water 
conservation. CWMP groups the irrigators together for groundwater 
management and conservation, using participatory monitoring tech-
niques (“peer monitoring”).
 Water Reforms Enable Coupling Demand Management  
with Cost-Sharing
Alongside these field approaches, the government is strengthening 
groundwater governance. A 2003 water law defined water rights and 
set up a regulatory system of permits. Created in 1996, the National 
Water Resources Authority (NWRA) is preparing basin plans, working 
with basin committees that bring together government and water users, 
and encouraging participatory and community-based solutions aimed 
at self-regulation and self-financing of recurrent costs by water users. 
The Sana’a Basin Water Management Project (SBWMP) is testing 
these approaches in the stressed basin around the nation’s capital.
At the same time, government is fostering water conservation 
incentives by using macroeconomic measures, raising the price of 
diesel fuel, and phasing out border protection of irrigated commodi-
ties. Government doubled the price of diesel in 2005, a key demand-
management measure.
 Cost-Sharing Created Revolving Funds to Finance  
Water-Saving Practices
The LWCP piloted improvements for groundwater management and 
innovative approaches to watershed management. The adoption of 
cost-sharing proved the key to demonstrating farmer commitment. 
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Previously, projects had provided equipment free of charge, with disap-
pointing results. Cost-sharing has created a revolving capital fund of 
approximately US$2 million to finance expansion of the LWCP. The 
project’s decentralized and participatory approach to identification, 
design, and implementation brought farmer knowledge and commit-
ment into partnership with the skills and resources of government. 
LWCP also laid the basis for the current GSCP/CWMP phase in which 
the government will partner increasingly with user groups rather than 
with individual elites.
Farmers jointly invested approximately US$250/ha to achieve wa-
ter savings of approximately 2,300 m3/ha/year. The investment costs 
thus are approximately US$0.11/m3 of annual water saving. Savings 
in pumping costs averaged US$0.06/m3. Thus, the investment cost is 
recouped by farmers in just two years, even without accounting for 
the opportunity value of the water saved in the aquifer.
 Political Economy of Introducing PIM to Groundwater Users
Although combating groundwater mining generally seemed to be 
pro-poor in Yemen, the better-off may have been capturing most of 
the initial benefits. Under LWCP, a pro-poor filter was applied to the 
project’s subsidized investments in water-use efficiency by applying a 
ceiling on the area that the project would co-finance. However, this 
mechanism proved weak, and there was certainly a bias toward the 
better-off, who had land/water privileges and could afford the cost-
sharing. It was clear that the better-off farmers control the lion’s share 
of groundwater. Therefore, Bank-supported actions to reduce mining 
inevitably had to deal with these farmers. However, WUAs are a means 
of helping the disadvantaged avail of the benefits.
Forgoing WUAs would have risked excluding the poorer farmers, 
the landless, and women. Incidentally, this risk was a hot issue in the 
preceding Bank-supported Ta’iz Rural Water Supply Project. In it, 
there was a debate on the ethics of a Bank project dealing directly 
with the “sheikhs,” who controlled most groundwater, rather than 
with WUAs, who were poor but did not actually “own” much water. 
The design of the Japanese-financed CWMP (box 20.1) attempted 
to resolve this problem by promoting WUAs that integrate all water 
users, from big well-owners to those who own no resource at all, on 
the basis of common responsibility.
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 Community-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System
To maintain sustainability, the IIP ensured that ICs closely monitor 
the performance of the WUAs. The project has established three 
broad performance indicators: (a) institutional, (b) financial, and 
(c) technical.
Institutional performance indicators 1. include (a) representation (per-
centage of farmers subscribing to membership in each WUA); 
(b) transparency and accountability (whether the chair and members 
Box 20.1  Yemen Community Water Management Project
The Japanese government is providing a grant for a Community Water Management 
Project (CWMP). The project, which is executed by the World Bank, would test and 
develop replicable models for sustainable self-management of local water resources by 
poor farming communities in areas of Yemen in which water, particularly groundwater, 
is becoming increasingly scarce. The project would have three components:
Participatory water management component. 1. Would (a) identify areas in which social 
conditions are appropriate for local community self-management of water resources, 
and (b) build the capacity of local user groups across a discrete hydrological unit to 
manage the resource
Water management and monitoring component2. . Would work with user groups to define 
the water balance and a hydraulic goal, to draw up and carry out water management 
plans, and to monitor progress against the plan
Monitoring and evaluation component3. . Would document the project in full, evaluate 
and disseminate results, propose ways of scaling up successes, and create and support 
a network of practitioners.
At the end of the 4-year grant period, the project is expected to have developed mod-
els and institutional capacity in at least 3 representative areas. In these areas, local user 
groups will have the capability to work in partnership with local and central government 
agencies. The groups also will be able to set, enforce, and monitor local water manage-
ment plans that reduce both net water loss and losses from pumping from the aquifer, 
while sustaining incomes equitably. The project will have documented the proven models, 
created a network of practitioners capable of scaling up the models, and influenced the 
policies and practices of local and central government agencies to partner with communi-
ties on local water management.
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of the WUA executive body were properly elected; whether the 
executive body meets and produces minutes of meetings; whether 
WUAs members are being timely informed of the executive body 
decisions; whether WUAs adopted proper Internal Rules and 
Regulations and bookkeeping concerning managerial, financial, and 
technical aspects); and (c) authority (the degree to which WUAs 
have the power to execute their decisions).
Financial performance indicators2.  monitor whether WUAs are will-
ing and able to collect/receive adequate funds to cover O&M and 
whether WUAs maintain proper bank accounts and accounting 
records.
Technical performance indicators3.  monitor whether WUA members 
master the O&M and supervision plans and are well informed of 
their foreseen costs.
However, WUAs and ICs may need to be empowered to fully under-
take the M&E, and ICs may need to be bottom-up rather than top-down 
entities.
The water law enacted in 2003 enunciated that WUAs and ICs 
need to be established and need to contribute to the Wadi Integrated 
Water Management Plans, which are adopted by the government. 
With technical backstopping from the regional line agencies and local 
authorities/councils, WUAs and ICs need to gradually take over the 
role of overseeing service provision and facilitating the application of 
water-related incentives and regulations. They also can be entrusted 
with more monitoring/benchmarking roles in coordination with the 
regional line agencies, and with more enforcement roles in coordina-
tion with local authorities.
Nonetheless, the best alternative for a monitoring/benchmarking/
planning body would be the technical secretariat of a basin commit-
tee. The basin committee would be based on hydrological boundaries. 
Its board would be composed of water user groups/federations, local 
authorities, local line agencies, and NGOs. This composition would 
reduce the immense forgone resource-economic costs posed by the 
administrative boundaries; and would limit the transaction costs posed 
by assigning monitoring/benchmarking roles to mono-user water 
groups.
The technical secretariat for the SBWMP thus far has been the 
Sana’a branch of the National Water Resources Authority, which needs 
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to be capacitated. Basin committees are mentioned in the recent water 
law. However, the law/by-law is silent on:
Whether the committee board would approve the basin plans (de-a. 
veloped by its technical secretariat) by consensus or by majority.
An indispensable provision entailing that the board members be b. 
from user groups and local entities rather than from line agencies. 
(Sana’a’s board is not in compliance with this by-law as its members 
include many top ministerial officials.)
A provision stipulating that the board members are to be elected c. 
rather than appointed, with the chairmanship of the board being 
rotated among them.
 Conclusions
Five conclusions can be drawn from the cost-sharing and related PIM 
experiences in Yemen’s irrigation subsector:
WUAs and ICs could play an important role in rendering (a) services 1.  
responsive to farmers’ demands, (b) easier expansion of irrigation 
coverage, and (c) more timely water delivery, thus matching crop 
water requirements.
Farmer participation and cost-sharing create a sense of ownership 2.  
of irrigation schemes, since farmers (a) become more proactive in 
dealing with emerging problems and in resolving the long-lasting 
social and technical problems that the government failed to resolve; 
and (b) start to speak up openly about issues that were controversial 
in the past, such as revisiting water rights that no longer maintain 
equity between upstream and downstream users.
Without sound water rights, rehabilitation and improvement of 3.  
the irrigation infrastructure would not contribute substantially 
to improve equity of water distribution between upstream and 
downstream users. In addition, the relationship between landlords 
and sharecropper/tenant farmers needs to be clearer on who does 
what and how much each should contribute, thus avoiding exploi-
tation of poor farmers.
Government can provide farmers with three key incentives to 4.  
participate in cost-sharing and to organize themselves in WUAs: 
(a) Producing public awareness activities prior to any physical in-
terventions. Advance notice would ensure upfront transparency 
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and notify farmers of the benefits forgone by not opting into the 
PIM process; (b) entrusting farmers to participate in the design, 
implementation, supervision, and O&M activities of the feeder-level 
(as opposed to trunk-level) irrigation contracts; and (c) producing 
public awareness activities after the physical interventions have been 
completed so that farmers could witness the resultant increase in 
production and net revenue.
Beneficiaries’ contributions to capital and O&M costs relieved 5.  
pressure on government budget and contingent liability.
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Community Management  
of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation 
of User Satisfaction in Yemen
Susmita Dasgupta, Craig Meisner,  
Andrew Makokha, and Richard Pollard
Meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in water supply and sanitation in Yemen is a formidable challenge for several reasons. First, the country is challenged by an inhos-
pitable and dry geography. Second, the predominantly (75 percent) rural 
population is typified by small tribal communities dispersed in scattered 
settlements. Third, many of these approximately 100,000 villages are 
situated on rocky mountain tops, making service delivery and outreach 
difficult and expensive. Finally, only 41 percent of the population has 
access to health services, and less than 31 percent has adequate access 
to water and sanitation services (WSS) (figure 21.1).
These significant service deficit gaps obviously require substantial 
investments from the public sector, communities, and individuals. 
At the same time, many policy-
makers are concerned whether 
publicly financed investments are 
providing sustainable services to 
communities once the project 
investment is completed and sup-
port services are removed.
In recent years, the Govern-
ment of Yemen, with support 
from the World Bank, the Gov-
ernment of the Netherlands, and 
UNICEF and other agencies, 
has initiated several projects and 
programs to improve WSS in ru-
ral communities. These programs 
21
Source: Project files.
Figure 21.1  Rural Population Lacking Access to Public/Private/ 
Cooperative Water Supply Networks in Yemen
Al-MahrahHadramoutAl-Jawf
Mareb
Shabwah
Abyan
Al-Baida
Al-Daleh
Lahj
Taiz
Ibb
Dhamar
Sana’a
Amran
Sa’adah
Hajjah Capital
City
Al-Hodeidah
Al-
Mahweet
Number of rural dwellings w.o pub/priv/coop water supply (’000)
Reymah
Aden
0 - 67
6.7 - 31.2
31.2 - 49.4
49.4 - 78.2
78.2 - 239.6
Socotra
384  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
have differing institutional and technical designs. Among other charac-
teristics, they range from being strongly community-driven to strongly 
government-led programs in which communities are provided with 
infrastructure through centrally managed programs. Community-driven 
means that users are given extensive voice and choice in project plan-
ning, implementation, and water system management along with train-
ing and support to develop local water system management capacity. 
The World-Bank-funded Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project 
(RWSSP) was perhaps the most community driven of the initiatives in 
that it provides users with a relatively open menu of choices of service 
levels (within the technical and resource limitations of the community) 
and management arrangements.
RWSSP was prepared during a period of reform and institutional 
uncertainty in Yemen’s water and sanitation sector. As a result, one 
of the key elements built into the project was technical assistance 
to support the formulation of a national rural WSS strategy and the 
development of a subsector investment program based on the imple-
mentation experience of RWSSP.
Yemen now has comparatively streamlined water sector agencies. 
All the main government bodies working in the water supply and sanita-
tion sector are located under the Ministry of Water and Environment. 
They include the General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects 
(GARWSP), the National Water Resources Authority, the National 
Water and Sanitation Authority, the Technical Secretariat for Water 
Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform, and the Environmental Protec-
tion Authority.
The Government of Yemen (GOY) issued a policy statement 
agreeing to the guiding principles of the RWSSP, namely, a “decen-
tralized, demand-responsive approach (DRA) to RWSS development, 
integrating sanitation and hygiene education with water supply in order 
to maximize health benefits and the sustainability of RWSS systems.” 
The policy statement laid out three major principles of a demand-
responsive approach:
Communities self-select to participate in the project by applying for 1. 
assistance and meeting project conditions for local contributions 
and organizing for local management.
Communities participate in the design of their water supply and 2. 
sanitation system and in the selection of the technology and ser-
vice level that they consider suitable for their needs and for which 
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they are willing and able to pay partial investment costs and full 
operation and maintenance costs (O&M).
Communities create formal water user associations (WUAs) to 3. 
manage their water and sanitation systems.
A number of major investment projects and programs that were 
either underway or prepared in the early 2000s adhere, to varying 
degrees, to these principles. The main investment programs include 
the Social Fund for Development, the Public Works Program, the na-
tional RWSS program executed by GARWSP, and UNICEF’s Water, 
Environment and Sanitation (WES) Programme in Yemen.
User satisfaction with RWSS services provides a useful measure of 
the success or failure of a WSS investment program and the likelihood 
that the infrastructure will be sustained through its design life. An 
analysis of user satisfaction therefore can enable comparisons among 
the different approaches. The comparisons can indicate the relative 
sustainability of the WSS services that were constructed through the 
different programs.
 Yemen RWSSP Household Survey
From October 2007 to September 2008, a household survey was 
conducted in the Abyan, Hajjah, and Ibb Governorates of Yemen to 
evaluate water users’ satisfaction with water and sanitation services. 
The objectives of the survey were to (1) assess the performance of 
the RWSSP with respect to several indicators of user satisfaction with 
the services provided and their ability to operate and maintain water 
systems, and (2) compare the RWSSP’s performance with that of 
other ongoing RWSS projects in Yemen. As mentioned above, the 
outcomes of this survey were to guide the design of rural water and 
sanitation interventions.
Table 21.1 breaks down the total number of community water 
systems established through RWSSP and four other projects included 
in the survey as of June 2007.
 Survey Sample
Sample selection for the survey was carried out in three stages. First, 
a record of all existing water supplies was culled from different sources 
and stakeholders. Next, with support from local governments and 
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 The initial selection of the number of water schemes was not necessarily repre-1
sentative of all schemes.
social workers, a field review was carried out at the district and Uzla 
(subdistrict) levels to establish which supplies were operational. Third, 
operational water suppliers were arranged by source of funding (do-
nor or government). A sample of water schemes by each donor and 
governorate was then selected for the detailed survey (table 21.2).1 A 
random sample of households was then selected from each of the 168 
selected water schemes. In total, 5,035 households covering 41 districts 
and 152 Uzlas participated in the survey.
Table 21.1  Number of Rural Water Schemes, June 2007
Governorate Total RWSSP GARWSP Public works (PWP) Social Fund (SFD) UNICEF
Ibb 423 38 315 27 41 6
Abyan 248 33 153 38 8 23
Hajjah 176 19 96 28 34 1
Source: General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP).
Table 21.2  Sample Composition
   No. of water schemes surveyed (no. HH surveyed)
Governorate RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF
Abyan 7 29 6 4 6 
 (210) (870) (180) (120) (180)
Hajjah 4 20 4 6 0 
 (120) (600) (120) (180) 
Ibb 17 38 11 10 6 
 (510) (1140) (330) (295) (180)
Total 28 87 21 20 12 
 (840) (2610) (630) (595) (360)
 
 Description of Projects to Be Compared
 Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (RWSSP)
In 2000 the Republic of Yemen received a US$20 million credit from the 
International Development Agency (IDA) for the Rural Water Supply 
and Sanitation Project (RWSSP). The project’s overall objective is to 
expand sustainable rural water supply and sanitation service coverage 
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to approximately 400,000 mostly poor rural dwellers in 6 governorates: 
Abyan, Hajjah, Ibb, Amran, Lahje, and Al Dhalea. In 2007 the project 
was extended for one year to December 2008 with additional financ-
ing to expand coverage to a total of approximately 800,000 people 
(including the original target population) through approximately 150 
rural water supply systems. Table 21.3 summarizes rural water supply 
and sanitation service coverage within the six governorates covered by 
the project as of 2004, at which time the project had completed only 
a few water systems.
Table 21.3  Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Coverage in the Six Governorates of Yemen Included in RWSSP
 Rural  No access to water  
Governorate population No. of dwellings network (%) No sanitation (%)
Ibb 1,748,126 259,492 69.8 44.0
Abyan 321,026 43,446 71.9 42.5
Hajjah 1,346,407 169,586 87.7 71.4
Lahj 657,652 104,882 71.6 40.1
Amran 728,562 80,408 86.1 53.2
Al-daleh 409,391 52,640 86.8 52.4
Average for rural Yemen   76.1 50.4
Source: CSO-Demographic Census 2004.
The project was to achieve these targets by:
Introducing demand-responsive, decentralized, community-managed N
RWSS approaches
Building and strengthening governorate, district, and local-level N
RWSS systems’ implementation capacity
Providing a platform for a national RWSS implementation strategy N
based on the principles of demand-responsive, community-owned 
RWSS services
Enhancing a learning process for RWSS systems sustainabilityN
Implementing RWSS development schemes and expansion of N
service coverage.
The project is managed by a central Project Implementation Unit 
(PIU), which operates through governorate PIUs in each of the admin-
istrative areas in which the project is active. The PIUs are independent 
of existing sector agencies to enable the units to develop and use de-
centralized, demand-responsive, community-managed approaches. 
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Nonetheless, the project is relatively “embedded” within government 
institutions. All major decisions pertaining to geographic priorities or 
changes in the project implementation strategy require approval from 
the Project Steering Committee, which is chaired by the Minister of 
Water and Environment.
Subprojects are planned and managed with extensive water user 
group (WUG) involvement guided by social mobilization teams. Howev-
er, design and construction are carried out by private firms contracted by 
the PIUs. Communities contribute a minimum of 5 percent of subproject 
costs. Communities co-sign the contracts and payment authorizations. 
RWSSP schemes tend to be large, piped, pumped water systems aimed 
at providing continuous or near-continuous water services through 
metered house connections. The project does not fund groundwater 
exploration or borehole drilling. Nonmechanized technologies such as 
hand pumps are supported only in cases in which piped services would 
not be feasible. The project uses existing water sources, or it coordinates 
with GARWSP, which locates water sources and drills and develops 
the boreholes that can be the sources of water for RWSSP systems. 
Table 21.4 summarizes the number of RWSSP schemes completed and 
incremental coverage achieved by June, 2007.
 General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP)
The General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects (GARWSP) is 
the national agency that manages the Government of Yemen’s national 
rural water supply program. In addition to national funds, it receives 
sector budget support from the Netherlands.
The program is highly centralized. Bulk procurement of raw materials 
(pipes, pumps) is carried out in Sana’a. Governorate offices of GARWSP 
coordinate with local governments to identify, design, and construct 
subprojects. As a national program, GARWSP is under considerable 
pressure to spread resources across all parts of the country, rather than 
Table 21.4  Coverage of RWSSP, June 2007
 No. of RWSSP No. of villages  
Governorate water schemes served Population coverage
  % of total
Ibb 38 184 117,508 6.7
Abyan 33 262 50,568 15.8
Hajjah 19 274 64,302 4.8
Source: RWSSP.
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prioritize regions or respond to community self-selection. Budget al-
locations are usually insufficient to enable individual subprojects to be 
completed in a single fiscal year. As a result, individual subprojects are 
implemented in phases so may require several years to be completed.
Just as does Public Works Project (PWP), GARWSP has tended to 
focus on implementation rather than on community capacity building 
for O&M. However, in recent years, GARWSP has begun to support 
the establishment of water user groups (WUGs) for water scheme 
management.
 Public Works Project
The Public Works Project (PWP) has an institutional and financial set-
up similar to that of the Social Fund for Development (SFD). PWP is 
autonomous, financed through a special account, managed by a Project 
Management Unit (PMU) in Sana’a and six regional suboffices, and 
implemented through private contractors and consultants. PWP also 
is a multisector initiative with approximately 30 percent of funds going 
to water and sanitation subprojects. Beneficiaries contribute at least 5 
percent of subproject costs. However, project financing is only for civil 
works, such as constructing a reservoir or pumping house station.
PWP’s focus is on creating labor-intensive employment. This 
focus has led to financing only labor-intensive civil works rather than 
comprehensive infrastructure systems. This policy creates institutional 
constraints when communities apply for a mechanized water supply 
system. PWP then becomes reliant on other partners (GARWSP, UNI-
CEF) to finance and implement the capital-intensive components of 
these subprojects. Conversely, communities often ask PWP to complete 
civil works components in unfinished community water supply schemes 
or to implement scheme designs prepared by other agencies.
PWP has developed a reputation for rapid and efficient implementa-
tion. However, it rarely offers communities much participation in plan-
ning, choice of technology, service level, or user contributions. PWP 
focuses on implementation and does relatively little capacity building.
 Social Fund for Development
The Social Fund for Development (SFD) was established in 1997 by 
law, which granted SFD a great degree of autonomy. In essence, and 
despite the managing director’s being a government minister, the law 
enables SFD to be managed as an independent body The fund’s ap-
proach is to provide services in response to communities’ demands and 
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needs. Communities decide on their key priorities, contribute to the 
capital costs, and take a role in operation and maintenance (O&M) 
of the facilities.
Now in its third phase, SFD has grown from a US$30 million project 
in 1997 to a $400 million national program supported by 10 multi- and 
bi-lateral donors. It is an “open menu” project providing funds for a wide 
variety of community-prioritized investments., Approximately 20 percent 
of the funds provided for community investments are spent on water 
subprojects. The subprojects designed are simple systems (standposts, 
rainwater collectors). SFD water projects are limited to water-harvesting 
schemes and water supplies based on shallow wells and springs. SFD 
does not have the same degree of flexibility as the RWSSP in respond-
ing to community demands for piped systems with or without house 
connections. Therefore, the fund does not finance drilling for boreholes 
or mechanized systems. Activities with an environmental focus include 
wastewater management and solid waste management.
SFD has been expanding community contracting in its subprojects, 
and most construction is undertaken by private contractors. Cash com-
munity contributions amount to approximately 15 percent of subproject 
costs. Contributions in kind in the form of labor and local materials 
are growing. The project aims to provide only technical assistance and 
material inputs that are not available locally.
 UNICEF
Through its Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) Program, 
UNICEF also finances water supply systems on a grant finance basis, 
although not on the same scale as the other projects.
RWSSP and SFD have much greater sustained engagement with 
communities than PWP or GARWSP. One thus could hypothesize 
that user satisfaction would be greater in RWSSP and SFD than in 
the other two projects.
 Survey Findings
Household connections and water use
The percentage of households with connections in each subproject 
ranges from 100 percent in the RWSSP to approximately 80 percent 
for the other projects (table 21.5). The reasons for the range are that 
(a) not all technologies are amenable to piped house connections and 
(b) some of the projects (such as SFD as explained earlier) concentrate 
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on low-cost rainwater harvest-
ing and other nonmechanized 
technologies.
Irrespective of the manner 
of access and type of water 
scheme, almost all HH used the 
water provided through the sub-
projects primarily for drinking, 
cooking, washing-bathing, and 
watering animals (figure 21.2). 
Very little of the water was used 
for irrigation.
Adequacy of water
All water users reported a level 
of dissatisfaction with the extent to which the projects met all house-
hold needs (table 21.6).
Reasons for inadequacy
The four main reasons for inadequacy of water relate to water resource 
constraints (table 21.7) Due to seasonal variations, WUAs are forced to 
regulate availability of water in order to maintain service to an acceptable 
number of users. This regulation leads to intermittent nonavailability of 
project water. In addition, there also are a substantial number of cases 
in which water is inadequate because of breakdowns.
Comparison of actual and scheduled water service provision
The survey compared perceptions of the users of RWSSP to the per-
ceptions of users of the other projects. In governorates—Hajjah, and 
Table 21.5  Surveyed Households with Connection to Piped Water Network (%) (no. of HH in parentheses) 
 % RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Total others
Abyan  100.0 85.8 83.3 75.0 40.6 78.4* 
 Connection (210) (870) (180) (120) (180) (1350)
Hajjah  100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 — 100.0 
 Connection (120) (600) (120) (180)  (900)
Ibb  99.8 94.6 88.2 30.5 87.8 83.1 
 Connection (510) (1140) (330) (295) (180) (1945)
Note: * = Sum of GARWSP, PWP, SFD, and UNICEF projects.
Figure 21.2  Various Uses of RWSSP and Other Subprojects 
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Ibb— RWSSP’s actual water delivery schedule was reported to be better 
than the other projects’ (tables 21.8a and 21.8b). The difference held 
good for both “dry” and “wet” seasons. All of the regions, particularly 
Abyan, needed much improvement. Such improvement would bring the 
ratio closer to 1.0 and increase the number of water days available.
Scheme failures
Even though respondents reveal that RWSSP performed better than 
the others, the need to reduce service failures is evident in all projects 
(table 21.9).
Performance of water user associations (WUAs)
On average, over 90 percent of consumers can contact their WUAs 
about services and bills and get attention (table 21.10a). This percent-
age is higher than for most urban systems in the region. However, ap-
proximately 10 percent of water users believe that the WUAs are just 
Table 21.6  HH Reporting That “Project Water” Was Not Meeting Their Entire Household Needs (%)  
(no. of HH in parentheses)
 RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Total others
Abyan 40.0 44.4 23.3 44.2 75.6 45.7* 
 (84) (386) (42) (53) (136) (617)
Hajjah 25.8 31.5 50.0 67.8 — 41.2 
 (31) (189) (60) (122)  (371)
Ibb 16.3 36.7 51.8 69.8 16.1 42.4 
 (83) (418) (171) (206) (29) (824)
Notes: * = Sum of GARWSP, PWP, SFD, UNICEF projects.
Table 21.7  Top 7 Reasons Why “Project Water” Is Not Sufficient to Meet Entire Household Needs (%)  
(sample surveyed in parentheses) 
Reason RWSSP Total others
Seasonal variation 4.9 (41) 14.6 (612)
WUA regulates water consumption 4.5 (38) 8.9 (374)
Quality of project water not good enough 4.5 (38) 9.2 (390)
Project water not available all the time 4.0 (33) 3.1 (130)
Frequent breakdowns in water delivery due to poor O&M 4.0 (32) 8.1 (338)
Inadequate capacity of delivery network 2.0 (15) 5.2 (218)
Project water not sufficient in dry season 1.5 (12) 2.0 (85)
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looking out for themselves. Although small, this percentage points to 
a need to carry out even more community campaigns before project 
implementation.
Nearly 50 percent of all users say it takes less than 1 day for project 
staff to fix a service problem; 28 percent say it takes 1–5 days; and 23 
percent say it takes more than 5 days. In all cases, RWSSP users have 
the most positive responses: 56 percent report that RWSSP takes less 
than 1 day to fix problems (table 21.10b).
Table 21.8a  Actual vs. Scheduled Water Supply in Dry Season (no. of HH in parentheses)
Governorate  RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Total others
Abyan Avg. no. of days/wk 5.3 4.9 4.3 5.1 3.9 4.7* 
 Range: Days/wk (210) (870) (180) (120) (180) (1350) 
 (Actual/ scheduled) 0.11–7.0 0.25–7.0 0.25–7.0 1–7.0 0.25–7.0 0.25–7.0 
  0.82 0.84 0.85 0.94 0.96 0.87
Hajjah Avg. no. of days/wk 5.7 3.5 2.2 7.0 — 4.0 
 Range: Days/wk (120) (600) (120) (180)  (900) 
 (Actual/ scheduled) 1–7.0 0.25–7.0 1–7.0 6–7.0 — 0.25–7.0 
  0.97 0.82 0.75 1.0 — 0.85
Ibb Avg. no. of days/wk 2.1 1.6 1.7 2.6 2.5 1.9 
 Range: Days/wk (509) (1106) (328) (285) (169) (1888) 
 (Actual/ scheduled) 0.125–7.0 0.083–7.0 0.125–7.0 0.083–7.0 0.25–7.0 0.083–7.0 
  0.93 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.90 0.80
Note: * = Sum of GARWSP, PWP, SFD, and UNICEF projects.
Table 21.8b  Actual vs. Scheduled Water Supply in Wet Season
Governorate  RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Total others
Abyan Avg. no. of days/wk 5.3 5.1 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.1* 
 Range: Days/wk (210) (870) (180) (120) (180) (1350) 
 (Actual/ scheduled) 0.11–7 0.25–7 1–7 1–7 0.25–7 0.25–7 
  0.82 0.87 0.92 0.94 0.88 0.88
Hajjah Avg. no. of days/wk 5.8 3.5 2.3 7.0 — 4.1 
 Range: Days/wk (120) (600) (120) (180)  (900) 
 (Actual/ scheduled) 1–7 0.25–7 1–7 7 -7 - 0.25–7 
  0.98 0.82 0.78 1.0 - 0.85
Ibb Avg. no. of days/wk 2.3 1.8 2.3 3.8 2.5 2.2 
 Range: Days/wk (509) (1108) (328) (285) (169) (1890) 
 (Actual/ scheduled) 0.25–7 0.083–7 0.125–7 0.25–7 0.25–7 0.083–7 
  0.94 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.91 0.82
Note: * = Sum of GARWSP, PWP, SFD, and UNICEF projects.
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Table 21.9  Record of Service Failure on Scheduled Days in Past Year (% reporting)
 RWSSP GARWSP PWP SFD UNICEF Total others
Abyan: 
Several times 21.4 32.6 18.3 26.7 27.2 29.5*
Few times 16.2 22.5 25.0 18.3 13.9 21.3
Once 10.5 20.1 16.1 16.7 39.4 21.9
Never 52.0 24.7 40.6 38.3 19.4 27.3
No. HH 210 870 180 120 180 1,350
Hajjah:      
Several times 3.3 29.2 50.8 1.7 - 26.6
Few times 0.8 17.7 20.8 2.2 - 15.0
Once 32.5 29.7 16.7 20.0 - 26.0
Never 63.3 23.5 11.7 76.1 - 32.4
No. HH 120 600 120 180 - 900
Ibb:      
Several times 8.8 26.4 24.5 18.0 3.0 22.7
Few times 10.0 13.1 19.5 17.0 2.4 13.8
Once 28.7 25.5 22.6 7.8 21.0 21.9
Never 52.5 35.1 33.4 57.2 73.7 41.5
No. HH 509 1,110 323 283 167 1,883
Note: *”Total others” = Sum of GARWSP, PWP, SFD, and UNICEF projects.
Table 21.10a RWSSP and Other Projects: Users’ Perceptions Regarding Their WUAs (% reporting)
  HH reporting WUA does  
 HH reporting WUA cannot be not take complaints seriously  
 contacted about services and and makes no attempt  HH reporting WUA is 
 billing and have not received assistance to improve service just looking out for itself
RWSSP:   
Abyan 1.9 3.8 3.8
Hajjah 9.2 11.7 21.7
Ibb 12.9 13.5 14.5
Other:   
Abyan 9.6 12.3 13.6
Hajjah 11.7 15.7 16.7
Ibb 17.5 21.4 23.3
  
 Users’ satisfaction with water services
In general, all respondents expressed increased satisfaction with the 
frequency and duration of water supply and water pressure, and reduced 
overcrowding near public standposts (figures 21.3a and 21.3b). However, 
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respondents from water schemes 
other than RWSSP have ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the 
current water charges. Their 
complaints contrast with the 
responses received from areas 
served by RWSSP schemes.
Concerning water service, 
the survey reveals greater satis-
faction with RWSSP schemes, 
compared to schemes supported 
by other programs in frequency 
of supply (days/week), duration 
of supply (hours/day), water 
pressure, and crowding near 
public standposts (table 21.11).
The study also assessed 
consumer perceptions of the 
direction of change in water net-
work maintenance after project 
completion. RWSSP communi-
ties showed a greater percep-
tion of change for the better 
than communities served by 
other projects (figures 21.4a and 
21.4b). When the categories of 
“Satisfied,” “Changed to well,” 
Table 21.10b  RWSSP and Other Projects: Average Time for WUA to Fix a Problem
 HH reporting (%)
Less than 1 day 1–5 days 5+ days
RWSSP
Abyan 66.7 19.5 9.5
Hajjah 56.7 23.3 12.5
Ibb 46.9 35.5 13.3
Others
Abyan 53.6 23.3 18.0
Hajjah 40.3 20.7 22.7
Ibb 35.5 28.0 25.9
Figures  21.3a & b  Satisfaction with Water Services 
before and after RWSSP and Other Projects
Note: Services =  Location, frequency, duration, water charges, water pressure, and 
overcrowding.
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and “Changed to better” are 
combined, RWSSP project HH 
are more satisfied with the main-
tenance of their water network 
after project implementation.
Levels of water network 
maintenance satisfaction are also 
higher for RWSSP projects.
User preference for management 
of water schemes
To elicit users’ preferences for the 
management of water schemes, 
survey questions included the 
current and preferred arrange-
ment for ownership of water 
scheme, revenue collection, 
water allocation, budgeting, ex-
penditure control, O&M, major 
repairs/replacements, and invest-
ments in the expansion of the sys-
tem. Potential choices included 
WUA, WUA chairperson, all 
consumers, operating staff, wa-
ter scheme manager, the sheik, 
district committee, GARWSP 
branch office, the government, 
and other.
Table 21.11  Differences between RWSSP and Other Projects in Service Satisfaction 
RWSSP Non-Bank
Before Current Before Current
Location 21.0 — 24.6 —
Frequency of supply (days/week) 17.4 73.7 20.1 53.1
Duration of supply (hours/day) 16.4 73.9 20.2 53.1
Water charges 64.4 64.9 65.8 62.0
Water pressure 18.8 69.6 21.6 49.9
Overcrowding (if public standpost) 12.9 48.0 15.7 35.9
Figures  21.4a & b  Consumers’ Perceptions of Direction 
of Change in Water System Maintenance after Completion 
of RWSSP and Other Projects 
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Figure 21.4a  Consumers’ Perceptions of Direction of Change in Water 
System Maintenance after RWSSP Completion (%)
Figure 21.4b  Consumers’ Perceptions of Direction of Change in Water System 
Maintenance after Completion in Projects Other Than RWSSP (%)
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Survey responses for all projects (table 21.12) revealed clear pref-
erences for:
Ownership of water schemes: By N consumers.
O&M scheme, revenue collection, and water allocation: By N op-
erating staff.
Budgeting, expenditure control, and investments in the expansion N
of the system: By WUA.
Major repairs and replacements: Respondents served by RWSSP N
schemes are content with the lead role of the WUA. Respondents 
from “non-Bank” schemes expressed preferences for a dominant 
government role.
Budgeting and expenditure control and investments to expand the N
system: Although a plurality of both RWSSP and other respondents 
expressed a preference for water user groups to manage these 3 
processes, the percentage was much higher for RWSSP respondents 
(46.8 percent) than for non-RWSSP beneficiaries (27.7 percent). 
These data suggests RWSSP communities’ comparatively high 
Table 21.12  User Preferences for Management of Water Schemes (% of HH reporting)
Mgmt. 
alternatives:
Ownership
Revenue 
collection
Water 
allocation
Budgeting and 
expenditure 
control
Operation
& 
maintenance
Major
repairs
and
replacements
Investments 
to expand 
system
RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other RWSSP Other
WUA 28.5 7.4 27.6 11.3 29.6 17.9 46.8 27.7 19.9 9.4 42.3 20.6 46.1 25.3
WUA 
chairperson 
7.5 0.8 6.4 1.4 12.2 5.1 19.0 3.4 5.5 0.6 16.6 2.0 17.2 2.4
All consumers 44.0 58.3 3.2 3.7 4.3 10.8 6.6 8.6 4.0 7.6 3.4 7.0 3.3 5.5
Operating 
staff
0.3 1.0 46.6 48.8 40.6 33.5 5.2 6.6 57.6 58.3 2.4 3.2 2.0 3.3
Water scheme 
manager
3.8 5.6 5.0 10.2 3.8 12.9 8.1 16.0 3.5 7.3 7.1 15.4 8.2 16.6
Sheik 3.5 7.5 1.5 4.4 1.3 5.3 2.2 8.4 1.5 4.1 3.3 8.6 3.3 8.6
District 
committee
2.8 3.2 1.3 2.3 1.1 2.5 2.3 5.6 1.3 2.5 3.8 4.6 3.3 4.6
GARWSP 
branch office
3.1 5.5 2.8 3.7 2.2 4.3 2.8 5.2 2.7 3.3 6.8 11.4 5.4 9.2
Government 6.5 9.6 5.1 5.7 4.7 5.8 6.6 8.5 4.0 5.8 13.5 22.9 10.9 16.8
Other 0.0 1.2 0.6 8.5 0.2 1.8 0.3 10.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 4.4 0.5 7.6
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levels of confidence in the technical and financial management 
capabilities of the WUAs.
Cost of water
Table 21.13 portrays the change in average monthly water service charges 
paid by consumers. WUAs in RWSSP schemes are provided with train-
ing and technical support to determine the actual tariffs that need to be 
charged to cover operation, maintenance, and rehabilitation costs for 
their water systems. Table 21.13 shows that post-completion water pay-
ments for metered connections in RWSSP villages in all three districts are 
significantly higher than in other projects. The higher payments can be 
attributed to more accurate calculation of full costs, higher per-household 
water consumption (due partially to more reliable service), and limited 
but highly subsidized nonmetered access for the very poor.
 Conclusion and Lessons
The Government of Yemen’s National Water Sector Strategy and 
action plan espouses four policies:
Decentralizing implementation mechanisms1. 
Enhancing beneficiary community roles and responsibilities2. 
Adopting a demand-responsive approach to identify communities 3. 
for inclusion in sector programs and making this approach standard 
practice
Table 21.13  Cost of Water Bill per Month in Unmetered and Metered HH, 2007–08 (YR)
RWSSP Other
Before After Before After
Abyan
Unmetered (YR) 846.2 335.7 696.9 1095.0
Metered (YR) 71.4 962.5 51..0 724.0
Hajjah 
Unmetered (YR) 293.3 261.7 278.2 437.0
Metered (YR) 0.0 1523.0 14.9 555.8
Ibb
Unmetered (YR) 234.7 0.0 118.5 158.8
Metered (YR) 11.0 1178.0 39.4 724.5
Note: YR = Yemeni Rial.
Community Management of Rural Water Supply: Evaluation of User Satisfaction in Yemen  N  399
Improving cost effectiveness by identifying means to implement 4. 
projects that meet basic needs at lower costs.
The RWSSP was designed to develop and test approaches for 
sector programs that operationalize these policies. More than other 
projects that support rural water supplies and sanitation in Yemen, 
RWSSP has focused on developing the capacity of communities to take on 
the delegated responsibilities of planning and managing their own water 
and sanitation systems. The RWSSP invested considerable resources in 
establishing and building up the technical and financial management and 
planning capabilities of democratically elected water user associations 
(WUAs). The consumer satisfaction survey findings suggest that the 
project’s strategy for developing communities’ capacity and meaningful 
involvement in planning and managing their own water and sanitation 
systems is effective. The strategy has resulted in relatively high levels 
of beneficiary satisfaction and has increased the likelihood that the 
communities will sustain the systems over their design lives.
RWSSP beneficiaries enjoy relatively reliable water systems. Over 
60 percent of residents had one or no service failures within the past 
year. Confidence in WUAs as governing and management bodies for 
water schemes also is high. Beneficiaries are agreeing to and paying 
tariffs that cover O&M costs. In fact, they are paying the full costs 
and spending more per month, on average, for water service than 
they did before RWSSP was completed. Through their WUAs, com-
munities are developing a range of mechanisms to prepare to finance 
major repairs.
In addition to all of these positives, progress is needed in two 
areas:
The RWSS subsector still lacks a clearly agreed strategy.1. 
All programs need to follow this strategy and other water policies 2. 
consistently. GARWSP and the other projects and agencies work-
ing in the subsector increasingly are cooperating. Nevertheless, 
further development of procedures for joint programming and for 
aligning their respective approaches to conform to national policies 
is still needed.

401
22
Rural Sanitation within an  
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Case Study of Application  
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Case for a New Approach to Rural Sanitation in Egypt
At the macroeconomic level, the analysis of public spending on water 
in Egypt concluded that spending more on wastewater collection and 
treatment would boost GDP by at least 1 percent. The antipollution 
measures in the 2003 National Water Resources Protection Plan would 
benefit Egypt by LE 2 billion. Adding community-based and self-financed 
sanitation programs would add an extra LE 1 billion in net benefits. 
Public spending is best focused on public goods: nonexcludable items 
that benefit many. However, in Egypt, much public expenditure has 
been on “private-like” goods (irrigation and urban households). The 
government therefore should shift resources toward controlling water 
pollution, which is a public health hazard; and away from subsidies for 
irrigation and urban water supply, which provide private benefits.
Rural Poverty and Public Health Issues Are Correlated with Lack 
of Sanitation Services and Lack of Water-Quality-Management 
Solutions.
In Egypt’s rural areas, there is a huge gap between water supply and 
sanitation coverage. Currently, 80 percent of the rural population 
relies on piped water supply, whereas only 4 percent is connected 
to sanitation systems. Even when HH are connected, the collected 
sewage is not always safely disposed of. Due to the narrowness of the 
Nile Valley in which the rural inhabitants live, the interconnection of 
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the irrigation/drainage system, 
and the extensive (often un-
off icial) reuse of agricultural 
drainage water, the semi/mal-
treated sewage diffuses into the 
waterways and reaches the food 
chain. This diffusion negatively 
affects public health, crop pro-
duction and quality, and poverty 
(figure 22.1). Extending the “con-
ventional” sanitation and treat-
ment services to a larger share 
of the rural population would 
be prohibitively expensive. Low 
water tariffs undermine both 
the public and private sectors’ 
capability to maintain existing 
water supply and sanitation 
(WSS) facilities, let alone expand 
coverage.
 Conventional/Centralized Approaches to WSS Contributed  
to Fiscal Deficit.
The efficiency of Egypt’s public spending on water falls short of interna-
tional norms. Egypt’s WSS services are less financially efficient than their 
developing-country peers. They are possibly on a par with utilities in East-
ern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa regarding public management. The 
Integrated Sanitation and Sewage 
Infrastructure Project (ISSIP) 
design envisages that entrusting 
the decentralized institutions to 
take over part of the WSS services 
could reduce such inefficiencies. 
Public spending on water would 
be more equitable and efficient by 
gradually transferring finance and 
management from the central-
ized/public agencies to decentral-
ized/autonomous utilities.
Figures  22.1a & b  Poverty-Sanitation Link
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Figure 22.1a  Poverty Correlated with Lack of Water and Sanitation Services
Figure 22.1b  Socioeconomic Losses Due to Lack of Sanitation and Treatment
 
0
1
Crop
(official reuse)
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Health Crop
(unofficial reuse)
Fisheries
Forgone benefits monetized in % of GDP
Figure 22.2  Consequence at National Level: Escalating 
Public Debt, 2000–05
0
16,000,000
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04
14,000,000
12,000,000
10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
2004/05
Years
(1
00
0 L
E)
WSS cumulative debt Irrigation cumulative debt
Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework  N  403
 Environmental Damage
The absence of proper wastewater collection and treatment, combined 
with inadequate solid waste disposal is causing severe environmental 
sanitation problems in the rural areas of the Nile Delta. These problems 
affect the life expectancy and morbidity of the population, cause health 
costs for treatment and care, reduce the possibilities for agricultural 
reuse, influence the costs of drinking water supply, and have an adverse 
effect on fisheries. In addition, families are forced to incur costs for 
sludge evacuation of their cesspits, provided they can afford them.
 New Approach Based on IWRM
Providing sustainable sanitation solutions in rural areas faces three 
inherent challenges:
Higher unit cost per capita due to the topography and dispersed 1. 
population
Limited ownership and voice of the local communities in influencing 2. 
planning processes and decisionmaking at the central level
Limited ability of many developing countries to provide sustainable 3. 
O&M over a large number of small systems, particularly in view 
of low cost-recovery ratios.
Addressing these challenges can be assisted by applying the key 
principles of integrated water resource management: treating water as a 
Box 22.1 Untreated Sewage Results in National Economic Loss
The latest Country Environmental 
Analysis of Egypt (World Bank 
2005) estimated that the socio-
economic cost of maltreated or 
untreated wastewater is higher than 
LE 9 billion, or 2% of GDP. These 
costs represent the harm caused 
to human health, agriculture, and 
fisheries.
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Improving Wastewater Disposal
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holistic resource, management at the lowest appropriate level, and stakeholder 
participation. In addition, lessons from global implementation in several 
countries, including Brazil and India, provide helpful examples of how to 
manage the community interface and enhance local ownership.
This chapter presents a recent case example in the Delta region in 
Egypt in which these principles have been integrated in the planning, 
management structures, monitoring arrangements, and community 
participation framework for rural sanitation service provision. The 
resulting methodology has been reflected in the design of the World 
Bank’s Integrated Sanitation and Sewerage Infrastructure Project 
(ISSIP), which will be implemented by the Government of Egypt 
(GOE) during 2009–14.
Egypt has lacked a separate clear national strategy for addressing 
rural sanitation due partly to the priority in recent decades of increasing 
coverage for urban centers. With the more recent increased attention 
given to the problems resulting from poor sanitation infrastructure in rural 
areas, the rural sanitation issue moved to the forefront of the political 
Box 22.2 Local Context
The ISSIP area in the three Governorates of Gharbeya, Kafr El Sheikh, and Beheira can be 
characterized as mostly flat agricultural land with a high water table (less than 5 meters). 
Most development is fairly recent in origin, and rights of way, other than through roads, 
are not raised much above the natural ground surface. The high water table in the area 
can pose problems. Annual rainfall is low, ranging from approximately 50mm per year 
in the south of Gharbeya to 100mm or more per year in the north of Kafr El Sheikh and 
Beheira.
Villages in Gharbeya tend to be urban in character with many buildings rising to three 
stories or more. As a general rule, villages in Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira are more rural in 
character, but even in them, many buildings have more than 1 story and are occupied by 
more than 1 household. Rights of way tend to be narrow, often less than three meters, 
with houses built up to the road.
Water use varies considerably among villages but is often in the range of 100–140 l/cd. 
Most households in the three governorates covered by the project already have water-
flushed sanitation, although few are connected to sewers. Most houses that are not 
connected to sewers discharge wastewater to cesspits; a small percentage discharge 
directly to nearby drains. The high water table exacerbates existing inadequate sanitation 
arrangements, often resulting in very unhealthy environments. In many cases, this threat 
to human health has led to a very high demand for improved sanitation services.
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agenda. The president has declared a national program for rural sanita-
tion to increase the sewerage coverage in rural areas from 4 percent to 
40 percent. In addition, in 2007 a national strategy for rural sanitation 
was initiated that incorporates several of the principles presented below. 
It is hoped that the lessons from ISSIP implementation will refine the 
methodology and provide lessons for wider replication.
Planning around a Hydraulic Basin and the Concept of Clustering
A number of challenges face the planner when a fragmented top-down 
approach to planning wastewater service delivery based on individual 
population centers is applied to rural areas. Planning for single cities or 
towns can yield clear results based on large urban population centers. 
However, when it comes to the rural setting, it is harder to prioritize 
investment allocations and establish the link between the inputs and 
desired outcomes. The example of the rural areas of the Delta in Egypt 
illustrates the need to shift the planning framework to a bottom-up 
approach based on a number of technical, environmental, and social 
criteria and considerations.
Historically, central planners focused on providing services to 
the large cities and towns. Mother villages were included only if they 
were near planned urban systems. Hence, only 4 percent of Egypt’s 
rural areas were served with sewerage systems. The remainder often 
relied on failing on-site solutions that compounded water logging and 
groundwater pollution problems in the dense areas.
Moreover, Egypt is a hydraulic society. Its historic system of irriga-
tion canals and drains has shaped the rural landscapes and livelihoods 
for millennia. Thirty-seven percent of the population relies on surface 
water irrigation for agriculture. Increasing water quality deterioration in 
both canals and drains is due in large part to the discharge of untreated 
effluents (both domestic and industrial) into the waterways.
Box 22.3 Egypt’s Rural Villages
Egypt’s villages range in size from small remote hamlets with 200 inhabitants to larger 
“mother villages” that have up to 80,000 inhabitants. Of the 5,633 villages (main and 
satellite), 73% have populations of fewer than 10,000; 25% have population between 
10,000 and 30,000; and 2% have populations exceeding 30,000. The average population 
density in rural areas is 1,500 persons/km2.
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The following were the considerations for putting in place a strategic 
sanitation plan for the Delta region.
Planning Rural Sanitation Provisions around a Hydraulic Basin 
Increases Environmental Benefits.
The first planning consideration is the need to shift from adminis-
trative planning boundaries to integrating the hydraulic boundaries 
in the planning process. These boundaries are defined by hydraulic 
basins, or sub-basins in the case of Egypt, since the whole Nile valley 
can be considered one large interconnected basin. Within this basin, 
well-defined irrigation command areas include smaller sub-basins, 
typically around secondary drains with reaches in the range of 15–20 
km. (Figure 22.3 illustrates the 
example of the Mahmoudia 
Canal Command Area in the 
western Delta, including its sub-
basins.) This use of hydraulic 
boundaries enables the planner 
to select and group target vil-
lages based on their locations 
vis-à-vis existing water bodies 
and to prioritize these village 
groups/waterways in which a 
combination of current water 
quality conditions and expected 
improvements from implement-
ing rural sanitation in these 
areas would yield the highest 
environmental benefits. The tools and criteria elaborated in the fol-
lowing sections of this chapter are proposed for such prioritization: 
(1) clustering villages (2) water quality modeling, and (3) applying 
multicriteria prioritization.
The use of hydraulic boundaries also enables the mobilization of 
integrated water resource management institutions. Local institutional 
mechanisms for WRM, such as farmer groups and water user asso-
ciations (WUAs), can be integrated with water supply and sanitation 
management within one monitoring framework. These aspects are 
further elaborated in the last two sections of this chapter.
Figure 22.3  Mahmoudia Canal Command Area Sub-Basins
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Clustering Concept Provides a Comprehensive and Cost-Effective 
Approach That Maximizes Technical Feasibility Based  
on Pollution Abatement Objectives.
To facilitate planning, the grouping of villages around a hydraulic 
sub-basin needs to integrate several additional considerations. In this 
context, a cluster can be defined as a geographical unit of planning 
and implementation that provides comprehensive and cost-effective 
sanitation solutions for almost all villages falling within this unit, thereby 
maximizing the feasibility of technical solutions. Grouping villages into 
one cluster along hydraulic boundaries and taking into consideration 
technical criteria and administrative boundaries enable linking sanita-
tion service provision with final environmental improvement impacts. 
Hence, the planner needs to set the final cluster boundaries to minimize 
expensive crossings, such as main canals and railways, and the number of 
administrative units for each cluster. Simultaneously, the planner needs 
to maximize the use of existing facilities and maintain a manageable 
overall cluster size from a technical and financial point of view. Too small 
a cluster would result in a very large number of small-scale sanitation 
solutions. In the case of the dense Delta areas, small-scale solutions 
would not be not cost effective, and would increase the management 
burden of water utilities. On the other hand, a cluster size that is too large 
would lead to crossing a large number of administrative boundaries and 
would bring the scale closer to those in urbanized settings. In addition, 
an over-sized cluster would limit 
the ability to apply small-scale, 
community-managed solutions 
and reduce the ability for com-
munity oversight and financial 
cost recovery.
The iterative planning and 
cluster-sizing process for the Mit 
Yazid Canal Command Area in 
the Delta (figure 22.4) illustrates 
this case. The first scenario, with 
an average cluster diameter of 
approximately 5 km, resulted in 
approximately 41 new proposed wastewater treatment plants with 
an average treatment capacity of approximately 3,000m3/day. The 
second scenario, with an average cluster diameter of approximately 
Figure 22.4  Applying Two Scenarios for Varying Cluster Sizes: 
Mit Yazid Command Area
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10 km, reduced the number of new treatment plants to approximately 
10. The average treatment capacity per plant of approximately 6,000 
m3/day resulted in an overall investment plan that was deemed a more 
appropriate scale for the Egyptian setting.
Applying Multicriteria Assessment to Prioritizing Village Clusters 
Targets Interventions at Areas in Which the Largest Impacts  
Can Be Achieved.
In developing a strategic sanitation plan for a region, existing service 
needs should be compared with available funds to determine the extent 
of required prioritization. For the case examples of Mahmoudia and Mit 
Yazid in the Delta, a methodology for selecting priority areas/clusters 
was developed based on multicriteria analysis of the most relevant fac-
tors. The criteria were population served, reuse potential of the irriga-
tion canals, potential health benefits, and water quality improvement 
potential (see section below), 
potential for tie-in to existing 
treatment works, and proximity 
to water treatment plant intakes.1 
These factors are implicitly based 
on the key principle that interven-
tions should target areas in which 
the largest impacts can be achieved. 
The result of the analysis con-
stitutes the strategic sanitation 
plan, with prioritized ranking of 
clusters, so that a forecasting 
financing plan can be agreed by 
the decisionmakers. The result 
for the Mit Yazid Command 
Area is illustrated in figure 22.5, 
which ranks the areas (1 being 
the highest priority) that receive 
ISSIP financing. Furthermore, the 
application of advance (ex-ante) 
 These criteria and the relative weighting for each should be a dynamic process, 1
to be modified and updated based on implementation progress and emerging 
considerations.
Figure 22.5  Priority Ranking within the Mit Yazid 
Command Area
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economic analysis, with consideration of national scale-up options, is 
elaborated below (“Assessing the Results of Water Quality Management 
Investments in Egypt” section) and provides additional information to 
policymakers in making final investment allocation decisions.
Water Quality Modeling Is an Indispensable Tool in Identifying 
Which Groups of Villages to Serve Using Decentralized Treatment 
Approaches and Which Drains Have Enough Self-Purification Capacity 
to Enable Them to Assimilate the Partially Treated Rural Sewage.
Limited financial resources often 
are a major constraint facing rural 
sanitation coverage expansion. In 
the case of ISSIP, limited funds 
lead to a trade-off between 
(a) implementing secondary 
wastewater treatment for a 
few villages, thus complying 
with Law 48 (the law that 
regulates discharges to inland 
waterways) effluent standards; 
and (b) implementing advanced 
primary treatment for a larger 
number of villages, allowing 
natural attenuation in the drains 
to reach ambient standards, 
even if falling short of Law 48 
effluent standards.
Mathematical modeling was 
used to make a judgment call on 
whether option (b) is possible 
and for which drains. Visual 
observation showed that, for some drains, self-purification processes 
can and do improve the water quality. Figure 22.6 illustrates three 
locations along Nishil drain in the ISSIP study area and shows water 
quality improvement along the downstream direction. Mathematical 
modeling confirmed that if the villages along this drain’s reach are 
served with advanced primary treatment, then the water quality of 
the drain can achieve Law 48 requirements downstream from the 
discharge points (figure 22.7).
Figure 22.6  Example of Nishil Drain
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Notwithstanding the ambi-
ent water quality legislation, 
decisionmakers can accept the 
aforementioned decentralized 
treatment approach introduced 
by ISSIP as a transitional mea-
sure so long as:
  A “free zone” without any N
domestic-wastewater point 
sources is enforced along the 
drain, downstream of the ISSIP-introduced treatment point (with a 
free length of approximately 5 km–8 km for most drains). This free 
zone will enable the self-purification to function as modelled.
Predominance of the diffuse source, the agricultural drainage N
water, is maintained. The modelling results showed that the ag-
riculture drainage water provided an overall “net dilution” factor 
along the drain. Achieving the necessary dilution rate requires a 
typical drainage catchment for third-order drains of 5,000–10,000 
feddans. Another necessary factor is to have discharge flows along 
the drains no less than the following range: 0.6 mm/day (from 
Cairo up to Tanta City) to 7.5 mm/day (north from Tanta City 
up toward the coastal areas).
There is N minimal upstream pollution load (headwater quality): 
with dissolved oxygen (DO) no less than 5 mg/l, biological oxygen 
demand (BOD) not exceeding 12 mg/l, and coliform bacteria not 
exceeding 8,000 most probable number (MPN)/100ml.
The point-source villages and hamlets are small,N  up to 500–1,500 
capita each. In them, domestic wastewater would be much smaller 
than the agricultural drainage water, hence enabling sufficient 
dilution by the latter. An acceptable ratio between domestic and 
agricultural return flow would be 1:10 (or, to be on the safe side, a 
more conservative ratio of 1:20).
Within-Cluster Optimization Based on Available Sanitation Options 
Balances Service Coverage with Financial Feasibility.
The final step of the planning process concerns the selection of the appli-
cable sanitation solution(s) within each cluster. It is important to emphasize 
that part of the integrated cluster approach maintains that the planner 
Figure 22.7  Simulation Results for the Self-Purification of BOD 
along Nishil Drain before and after the Decentralized Treatment
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should seek to provide a type of sanitation service for 100 percent of the 
population living within the cluster, so that the anticipated resulting benefits 
can be achieved. However, given the varying typography and conditions 
for the individual villages within each cluster, a one-size-fits-all approach 
to the technology and proposed solution would not be feasible.
The proportion of villages falling under each of the solution catego-
ries is determined by an optimiza-
tion process within each cluster, 
by which the cost comparison 
and technical feasibility of the 
different solutions is applied. Fig-
ure 22.8 illustrates the technical 
solutions, within an ISSIP sample 
cluster, based on consideration of 
the different project intervention 
options. The options compared 
include tying remote villages to 
the central treatment plant, with 
stages of pumping along the way 
Box 22.4  ISSIP Intervention Categories
The following three broad categories of sanitation solutions have been considered in the 
Egypt case study and related investment program:
Centralized systems:1.  For villages with populations greater than 1,500 inhabitants and 
smaller villages in their proximity. These villages would be served by a sewerage col-
lection network leading to a single central wastewater treatment plant. Smaller villages 
would be connected if the cost of doing so does not exceed the cost of decentralized 
treatment solutions.
Decentralized systems: 2. For settlements with 500–1,500 inhabitants, not located along 
the networks serving larger villages. These villages would be served by local collec-
tion systems discharging into simple treatment works providing advanced primary 
treatment, typically consisting of a communal septic tank followed by a series of 
anaerobic baffled reactors (ABRs). Effluent is then discharged into a nearby drain. 
Pumping should be avoided if possible.
3. Onsite systems: For settlements with fewer than 500 inhabitants. These will continue 
to use onsite sanitation systems based on cesspits or septic tanks. The capacity of 
the central treatment plant would take into account the septage resulting from these 
onsite systems.
Figure 22.8  Within-Cluster Optimization
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Option 2
Decentralized facility
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(option 4), versus establishing decentralized facilities for 1 or 2 villages 
(options 1, 2, and 3).
Assessing the Results of Water Quality Management 
Investments in Egypt
 Ex-ante Economic Assessment Used Cost-Benefit Analysis.
The economic analysis of the ISSIP has been performed via a cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) approach (see the logical framework for the 
economic analysis in appendix A22.1), rather than the cost-effectiveness 
approach commonly applied to assess sanitation projects. The CBA 
has been conducted by factoring in the following considerations:
For phase 1, the weighted average of the unit capital cost is ap-N
proximately $130 per target inhabitant (year 2040). Hence, the 
(amortized) capital cost per household/month is approximately 45 
LE/month/family at maximum, and O&M costs are approximately 
10 LE/month/family.
The private benefits are estimated as the non-income-constrained N
willingness to pay (WTP), per the “contingent valuation” method. 
A proxy for this WTP is the upper bound of the current payments 
that households pay vacuum trucks to empty their cesspits in 
some of the ISSIP command areas. Hence, approximately 50 LE/
month/family.
The public benefits associated with fully improving rural sanitation N
are estimated at approximately 81 LE/month/family. This is the 
summation of the monetized, incremental benefits accruing (or 
damages avoided) to the following subsectors:
Health (avoided morbidity and mortality, plus avoided medica-L
tion costs)
Reuse of agricultural drainage (reduced BOD improves the L
reuse potential)
Fisheries (increased DO increases fish production and qualityL )
Recreational activities related to waterways and northern lakesL .
These incremental benefits have been calculated by estimating 
the impact of reducing the baseline concentration of sewage-related 
pollutants such as BOD, fecal coliforms, ammonia, and dissolved 
oxygen toward their ambient and user-specific standards. Using the 
Rural Sanitation within an IWRM Framework  N  413
aforementioned (capital and recurrent) unit costs and (private plus 
public) unit benefits, the project’s economic rate of return (ERR) 
has been performed against (a) 2 strategic scenarios, which adjusted 
the valuation of the incremental public benefits as these benefits 
correspond to 2 alternative assumptions on 1 of the project’s major 
externalities: the “headwater quality” in the drains served by ISSIP; 
and (b) 3 sensitivity tests. The two strategic scenarios are:
“Low” scenario1. . This scenario assumes that ISSIP is not followed 
by a country-wide program that can scale up the ISSIP model. In 
that (unlikely) case, within ISSIP command areas, it is assumed that 
only 40 percent of ISSIP area drains will be cleaned. Factoring in 
the centralized systems’ secondary treatment along with the ad-
vanced primary treatment provided by the decentralized systems, 
the overall improvement in these drains would only be “partial.” 
This partial improvement in the in-stream quality is estimated at 60 
percent (incremental improvement of the baseline Water Quality 
Index, or WQI, toward the standards). The remaining drains (60 
percent) cannot be sufficiently cleaned because of the already poor 
headwater quality. The “dose-response” relationship in this case 
has been estimated at 60 percent:70 percent (due to the “increas-
ing returns to scale”). Under this scenario, the central estimate of 
the ERR would be approximately 10 percent.
“High” (or optimistic) scenario.2.  This scenario assumes that this 
area eventually would be considerably cleaned, with the ISSIP con-
cept being fully replicated (that is, through the nation-wide sanitation 
program for which 20 billion LE has been earmarked by the GOE). 
In this case, the incremental public benefits would be the product of 
70 percent and 81 LE/month/family, hence 56 LE/month/family. The 
total (public cum private) benefits therefore would be 106 LE/month/
family. The resulting ERR would be on a safer side: 15 percent.
Sensitivity tests have been performed to work out the ERR 
switching values (or strategic “flags”) that could bring ERR down to 
10 percent or less:
Marginal increase in unit costs (due to price escalations and/or 1. 
physical contingencies and contract variation orders)
Marginal postponement of the benefits stream by a number of years, 2. 
for example, due to delays in construction/implementation
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Marginal reduction in public or private benefits (for example, due 3. 
to changes in unit prices or in other conditions or assumptions).
The low/high scenario analysis and the sensitivity tests demon-
strated that the project interventions can be socioeconomically viable. 
The “switching values” indicate that the ERR has some limited scope of 
accommodating marginal cost escalation, benefits reduction, and delays 
in implementation. However, both the sanitation (private) benefits and 
the water quality (public) benefits need to be fairly guaranteed.
 Ex-Post M&E Framework Needs to Reflect and Validate the 
IWRM Approach.
Monitoring outcomes and impacts is a key focus of any project as it 
establishes the link between inputs (sanitation services in the case 
of ISSIP) and objectives (such as improvements in water quality and 
environmental conditions). The results-based M&E system under 
ISSIP will focus on monitoring outcomes and reporting on impacts of 
the implemented sanitation services, thus evaluating these impacts 
against the project development objectives (PDOs). The monitoring 
arrangements will, for the first time in Egypt, include the quantifica-
tion of benefits occurring due to improved sanitation and feed into 
decisionmaking on allocating new funds and prioritizing investments. 
Many of the M&E activities will make use of the M&E tools/models, 
laboratories, and analysis results already existing per the mandate of 
the Ministries of Water Resources and Irrigation; Health and Popula-
tion; and Housing, Utilities and Urban Development.
Supplementing an ongoing irrigation improvement project being 
implemented in the same area, ISSIP’s development objective is to 
contribute to the sustainable improvement in (a) sanitation and envi-
ronmental conditions for the resident communities and (b) water quality 
in the selected drainage basins within the served project areas. This 
ambitious objective entails looking beyond typical physical measures, 
such as service coverage ratio and the number of households connected. 
Instead, the project targets interacting with the community to evalu-
ate satisfaction levels with local environmental conditions associated 
with improved wastewater management (local ponding, canal water 
quality), and conducting qualitative research to identify households 
practicing improved hygiene behavior. Improvements in water quality are 
another key objective of the project. To this end, an innovative M&E 
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application based on developing site-specific water quality indexes to 
be monitored has been adopted for ISSIP (box 22.5).
To monitor intermediate outcomes under the centralized invest-
ments, the M&E unit will coordinate with the mandated central or-
ganization, the National Organization for Potable Water and Sanitary 
Drainage (NOPWASD), and with the respective subsidiary WSS utili-
ties. As for monitoring intermediate outcomes under the decentralized 
sanitation systems, the M&E unit will coordinate with the respective 
subsidiary WSS utilities and with the beneficiary community develop-
ment associations (CDAs).
Community Participation Framework
As noted earlier in the chapter, two key principles of integrated WRM 
are management at the lowest appropriate level, and stakeholder participa-
tion. A participatory, demand-driven approach is used to help ensure 
sustainability by putting in place sanitation systems that users want 
and are willing to pay for and maintain. The Community Participation 
Framework (CPF) summarizes the concepts and principles for com-
munity participation, mobilization, and awareness-raising techniques; 
roles of individual actors; and plans for community capacity building.
Box 22.5 Water Quality Index M&E Application
In the case of the ISSIP, there will be several subcatchment-specific water quality indexes. 
Each index is to be weighted by population served and by proximity to the (surface or 
groundwater) potable-water supply off-takes and drainage-reuse locations within each 
project subcatchment.
The index can be based on in-stream ambient concentrations of fecal coliforms and 
BOD, as well as on any other user-specific in-stream concentrations (as applicable for 
each subcatchment) such as DO for fisheries and ammonia for potable water and for 
reuse of agricultural drainage.
Provided that a water-quality-modeling tool will be used by the M&E unit (similar 
to what has been used for project preparation), monitoring and compliance regarding the 
“in-stream” concentrations would take precedence over the “at-effluent” concentrations. 
“In-stream concentrations” would take priority, especially for the drains/canals that used 
to be polluted by the untreated sewage from adjacent villages rather than from project 
externalities (effluents upstream of ISSIP’s command area). This approach would make 
use of the self-purification occurring along the monitored streams.
416  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
Three overall steps are crucial to this process: information-sharing, 
demand verification, and institutional arrangements for community par-
ticipation in implementation.
Initially, communities being considered for interventions need to N
be informed about the project and proposed options so that they 
can make informed choices about whether to participate.
During the demand verification, communities’ willingness to par-N
ticipate (their demand for the project) can be verified. Confirming 
demand is crucial to ensure that communities will use and pay 
toward the operation and maintenance (O&M) of the systems so 
that investments will not be wasted.
Institutional arrangements need to be designed carefully, so that N
management of systems is at the lowest appropriate level—the 
level at which systems are the most likely to be managed well and 
thus sustained. Institutional arrangements need to be as clear and 
simple as possible. In addition, the various stakeholders need to 
receive adequate capacity building and any ongoing support needed 
to ensure that they can fulfill their roles.
An important part of the stakeholder participation principle includes 
identifying and addressing the needs/preferences of various groups of 
stakeholders. At the community level, this includes various community 
sub-groups such as men and women, youth, and the poor. The CPF 
should be implemented so that the needs and preferences of these 
sub-groups are addressed and so that they can play appropriate roles 
in implementation.
 Community Participation Implementation Framework
While community participation will be more extensive in decentralized 
systems, in both centralized and decentralized systems, community 
participation in the project will cover the following phases:
Information dissemination to communitiesN
Community-level discussions on the projectN
Demand verificationN
Community selection (based on criteria)N
Communication with communities during constructionN
Capacity building of community organizations (as appropriate)N
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Involvement in hygiene promotion activitiesN
Involvement in O&M (decentralized systems)N
Involvement in participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E).N
 Information Will Be Disseminated to Communities and 
Community-Level Discussions on the Project.
The first step will be for Rural Sanitation Unit (RSU) staff, working in 
some cases with an NGO or staff of a consulting firm, to disseminate 
project information to communities that have been targeted for inclusion 
in the project. The information will include the type of system proposed 
(centralized or decentralized, type of technology), expected amount of 
monthly charges, expected level of community involvement, implemen-
tation timeframe, and possible land acquisition requirements.
Schemes should be presented to the communities as an oppor-
tunity to participate in a public-private partnership (PPP) in which 
the government will be committing a huge amount of capital funds 
for infrastructure development (WWTPs and networks). ISSIPs will 
undertake to build necessary infrastructure in areas in which villagers 
are willing to pay for sewage disposal and treatment.
RSU staff (in some cases, working with an NGO or local consulting 
firm) can present the basic project information to community members 
and then have a general discussion to answer questions. Meetings could 
take several forms:
An open, public meetingN
A meeting with the CDA and/or local unit staffN
Separate meetings for community men and women, with steps N
taken to ensure that other subgroups such as the poor and youth 
are involved.
The goal is to spread information about the project as widely as 
possible in the proposed communities, discuss the proposed project with 
community members, and answer any questions they may have.
 Demand Verification and Community Selection
After the community meetings have been held, verification of demand 
for the project can take place in communities that have indicated 
an initial interest in the project (that is, communities in which, after 
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receiving information at the community meetings, either the CDA or 
the local government unit has expressed an interest in the project).
In both types of systems, the CDA or the local unit will need to 
send an initial letter indicating its interest in the project. In centralized 
communities, RSU staff working with consultants (or an NGO) can 
perform a simple willingness-to-pay survey, confirming that households 
would be willing to pay expected monthly tariffs. After this confirma-
tion, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) can be signed between 
the CDA or the local unit and the project (RSU), agreeing to the 
conditions of the project.
Demand verification will be more extensive in communities being 
considered for decentralized systems, as these communities will have 
larger roles to play in implementation. In the decentralized communi-
ties, a more extensive willingness-to-pay survey will be conducted. It 
will include focus group discussions with various groups of community 
members to ensure that they understand all that will be expected of 
the community (concerning community management of systems) and 
that they are willing to undertake these roles. In this case, the MOU 
can be accompanied by a list of households agreeing to pay the monthly 
charge and willing to participate in the project.
 Construction
During construction, RSU staff (working with the NGO/consultants) will 
keep communities informed of construction activities and answer any 
questions/address any complaints that arise. With decentralized systems, 
communities (CDA) may help monitor some construction activities.
 Capacity Building
Communities will need capacity building related to their roles in the 
project. In centralized communities, CDAs/local units will receive 
capacity building in participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
during construction to enable them to help monitor the contractor 
as the system is being built and afterwards to help monitor system 
functioning and provide feedback to the RSU. There can be training 
in proper system usage (ways to prevent blockages).
In decentralized communities, CDAs/local units will receive in-
depth training before system start-up in how to operate and manage 
the system (financial, administrative, technical, and social aspects) as 
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well as training in M&E. This training can be provided by the NGO/
consulting firm, supervised by the RSU. Communities will be provided 
with manuals to assist them in their work.
 Hygiene Promotion
The hygiene promotion campaign will be pivotal to convincing com-
munity members to change hygiene and waste management behaviors. 
Hygiene promotion activities will target children as well as mothers 
and fathers of children under five (there may be other target groups 
as well). Hygiene promotion activities will take place during and after 
construction activities.
 Operation and Maintenance (O&M)
In centralized systems, CDAs/local units will provide community 
feedback on system functioning to the RSU and alert the RSU to any 
problems that occur (system blockages) With decentralized systems, 
the CDA/local unit will manage the system, receiving back-up technical 
support from the RSU as needed.
 Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)
In centralized and decentralized communities, CDAs/local units will 
be involved in participatory M&E, assessing project progress and then 
system functioning through monitoring specific indicators and related 
targets. Various community sub-groups can be involved in this moni-
toring, such as women and men and youth.
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Water Management in Spain: 
Highlights Relevant for MNA 
Countries
Ahmed Shawky Mohamed,  
Abdulhamid Azad and Alexander Bakalian
The Middle East and North Africa (MNA) water team, along with counterparts from the various MNA countries, spent two weeks in July 2008 on a study tour of Spain. The tour 
included participating in the Zaragoza Water EXPO, and visiting Spanish 
institutions responsible for water resource management, water supply, 
irrigation, and desalination.
The significance of Spain’s water sector to the MNA region is 
three-fold:
They share similar climatic and hydrological conditions.1. 
They share many common cultural and historical links dating back 2. 
to the Moorish period.
Perhaps most importantly, in many areas of water services, Spain 3. 
appears to have transitioned its Integrated Water Resource Manage-
ment (IWRM) practices to more decentralized decisionmaking and 
successful implementation of public-private partnerships (PPP).
The first part of this chapter discusses the MNA water team observations 
from the field visits. The second part summarizes the key messages on climate 
change from the Water EXPO deliberations that the team attended.
Observations from Field Visits
Ebro River Basin Authority (Confederation Higrografica del Ebro) at 
Its headquarters in Zaragoza
Spanish river basin authorities use reliable data, drought and flood con-
trol tools, as well as coordinated operations of reservoirs and aquifers.1 
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An advanced hydrological information system manages real-time data 
on meteorology, hydrology, and water resources (level of reservoirs, 
state of main water control gates, and discharge at control points) in 
the basin. This advanced information system enables good management 
and prediction, and supports an alarm system for flood prevention and 
drought management.
One of the highlights of the tour was the visit to understand how 
Spain’s hydrological information system works. The operations room 
does real-time monitoring of data (Sistema Automático de Información 
Hidrológica, or SAIH).2 The data comes through sensors in some 620 
remote stations (dams, rivers, canals, rainfall measuring stations) and 
is processed for decisionmaking through a software developed for this 
purpose (decision support system, or SAD in Spanish). SAD allows 
real-time flood management and provides flow forecasts along the 
different stretches of the rivers in the basin as well as simulates the 
operation of the existing infrastructure.
In addition, the automated Water Quality Information System monitors 
water quality in rivers and discharge points of industries and towns. The 
availability of reliable, easily understood (by stakeholders), real-time data 
has been a key factor behind the success of the governance structure.
 Canal de Isabel II by Water Supply and Sanitation Group
Canal de Isabel II is the water utility for the Madrid autonomous re-
gion.3 This utility is considered one of the oldest in the world. It was 
founded 150 years ago (1858). It serves 6 million people and has ap-
proximately 2250 employees. Unlike many countries’ water utilities, 
this canal manages the full water cycle:
Water reservoirs (14)N
Conveyance systemsN
Water treatment plants (11)N
Distribution networksN
Wastewater collection treatment (140 plants of all sizes, the largest N
with 16 m3/sec capacity).
 1 www.chebro.es
 2 www.saihebro.com
 3 www.cyii.es
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 Wastewater reuse 
The company reached the level of 100 percent wastewater treatment 
in 2006. Currently, it is implementing a treated wastewater reuse 
program that will provide irrigation water for 40 percent of the green 
areas in the Madrid region. (As a reference point, the MNA team was 
informed that the price for reused water is 0.15 Euro per m3).
Water supply
The company provides different levels of service to the some 140 
municipalities and towns in the Madrid autonomous region under dif-
ferent arrangements: full concession contracts covering all activities; 
operations and maintenance (O&M) contracts; and contracts for 
commercial activities only (billing and tariff collection).
Some key indicators given were (a) unaccounted-for-water (UFW): 
22 percent, of which 11 percent is physical losses; and (b) tariff for 
water and wastewater: 1.3 Euro per m3 for the consumption of less 
than 25 m3 (per 2 months).
It is noteworthy that the company has created a subsidiary that 
works as a successful private operator in a number of countries in 
South and Central America.
Lessons for MNA countries. 
The Madrid utility could be considered as a “mature” organization, 
that is, one that has adapted over time to the local political realities 
and emerging environmental priorities. More fundamentally, the utility 
appears to have transitioned into an organization that is implementing 
IWRM while maintaining internal and external accountability.4
 Almeria
Almeria is a desert area. The team visited two examples of conjunctive 
use of desalinated water with groundwater in the coastal areas of Nijar 
and Balerma (for irrigation through distribution networks extended to 
greenhouses). In addition, some of this desalinated water is supplied 
to coastal communities for household use and to the booming tourism 
industry. The desalinated water helps to both reduce the burden on 
depleted groundwater and counteract the sea-water intrusion in the 
 See Jagannathan, “Principled Pragmatism: Lessons from the “MNA Development 4
Report on Water” in this volume.
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water-supply wells. The models were quite similar to the conjunctive 
use models being developed in Morocco’s Guerdaine project (financed 
by IFC) and Egypt’s West Delta Project5 (with surface water). The 
primary driver in both situations is the water demand from farmers who 
grow high-value crops for international markets. In addition, as most 
farmers are smallholders (<2 ha.), the model of technical assistance 
(TA) and marketing support has direct relevance to the project design 
in Egypt’s West Delta. For example, the water user commercializa-
tion association in Balerma has developed a very interesting auctioning 
system for marketing the farm produce to the local/EU markets.
The difference in the case of Almeria is that the production cost per 
unit of water is subsidized by the state budget and by EU subsidies. This 
subsidy was designed to function in a relatively targeted/objective man-
ner. It was designed to achieve desired outcomes, for example, by writing 
off the interest on the state loan to farmers upon proof of improving the 
productivity per unit of water. The average water productivity is very high: 
12 Euro/unit of water for vegetables such as tomatoes and peppers.
In summary, Almeria’s approach has enabled scaling up the supply-
side investments that are tied to the water user demand, thereby 
ensuring financial sustainability. The administration sees the subsidy 
as justified because it contributes to financing a regional/state “public 
good,” namely, that water availability has promoted a booming tourist 
industry along the coastline. Compared with MNA countries, Spain’s 
public subsidy comes at a lower social cost because public social spend-
ing (notably health and education) is at a higher level.
 Observations on irrigation model
Given its geographical position, Spain is vulnerable to climate change. 
However, Spain f inds itself in a situation that may facilitate the 
adaptations needed for the supply, demand, and management of wa-
ter resources. Regarding supply, two favorable circumstances are the 
(1) high level of regulation of the rivers and sufficient water control 
infrastructure and (2) current program to build desalination facilities. 
Demand is the subject of a series of programs for making improvements, 
such as the National Irrigation Modernization program.
The visit to Almeria, officially Europe’s only desert, is instructive 
in this regard. Its 30,000 hectares (ha) are intensely farmed. This 
area is dedicated primarily to horticultural crops under greenhouses. 
 See Baietti and Abdel-Dayen chapter on West Delta Project in this volume.5
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The water supply is from surface water, groundwater, rainwater, and 
desalinated water. The greenhouses are very labor intensive—on the 
order of 700 person days/ha/year. The Almeria type of greenhouse 
is a low-cost structure of light materials. Plastic is used for the en-
closure, and a two-layer cover captures the rainwater for irrigation. 
Under greenhouses, 1 to 2 crops per year are obtained. Production is 
interrupted in June and July, when there is considerable production 
of fruits and vegetables in other parts of Europe. Water productivity 
under greenhouses is approximately 12 Euro/m3.
Assessment of water user associations
The team visited two water user associations (WUAs) with very dif-
ferent situations. The first was the Campo de Nijar WUA, which has 
1,826 members and an irrigated area under greenhouses of 8,200 ha. 
Irrigation is by (deep) groundwater (200 m). The expansion of the ir-
rigated area since 1970 has resulted in overexploitation of the aquifer 
and sea-water intrusion. Because of the highly saline water, many 
farmers started capturing the rainwater that falls on the greenhouses, 
mixing it with the well water. Since this solution was inadequate, they 
are now using desalinated seawater from the Carboneras plant. The 
desalinated water is provided on demand with a limit of 0.3 l/s/ha for 
23 hours a day. The average investment cost to distribute this water 
is approximately 6,700 Euro/ha (using only water conveyance distri-
bution systems). This cost is subsidized by the European Union, the 
central government, and provincial authorities. In addition, farmers 
obtain certain subsidies, up to 50 percent, for their private on-farm 
drip irrigation systems. The technologies used in this area can serve 
as a good example for the recently approved West Delta irrigation 
project in Egypt.
The second visit was to the Solponiente WUA. It has 1454 mem-
bers and an irrigated area under greenhouses of 1,800 ha. Irrigation is 
done conjunctively by surface and groundwater. The irrigation water is 
distributed on demand by a pressurized system. Irrigation water is allo-
cated daily and administered using a sophisticated real-time control and 
monitoring system. Irrigation modernization recently was completed. 
It consisted of implementation of water metering and remote manage-
ment (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA) of these 
meters, as well as an irrigation advisory service. The water metering 
and SCADA investment cost was approximately 3,000 Euro/ha. As a 
result, it was estimated that savings of 16 percent of irrigation water were 
426  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
achieved. The irrigated area was not increased due to modernization. 
The average cost of irrigation water is approximately 0.18 Euro/m3. In 
future, this area also will be served by desalinated seawater, which will 
be used conjunctively with groundwater and surface water.
Spain’s irrigation areas vary considerably. Nevertheless, the WUAs 
share many common characteristics:
Constitution and legal status.N
Organization and selection of leaders and functions.N
Sharing the financing costs as well as participating in the manage-N
ment of water resources.
Water users being obliged by law to join a WUA (N comunidad de 
usarios). When most members are farmers, it is called an irrigators 
association (comunidad de regantes).
Rules of the associations written and approved by users. The rules N
must be approved for compatibility with the law but may not be 
otherwise changed by the River Basin Agency. WUAs with a com-
mon interest can form a general association around that issue.
Existence of a National Federation of WUAs with the objective N
of studying irrigation-related issues and presenting proposals to 
government.
WUAs are managed by (1) a General Assembly composed of all 
members, (2) a Board of Governors elected by users to carry out direc-
tives of the General Assembly, and (3) an Irrigation Jury, responsible 
for resolving conflicts between farmers.
 Observations on the desalination plants
The team visited two desalination-supported water schemes in Nijar 
and Balerma that provide water not only for household water supply 
and tourism but also for irrigation (via distribution networks extended 
to greenhouses). The desalinated water also helps reduce the burden 
on the depleted groundwater and helps counteract the seawater intru-
sion in the water-supply wells.
The Carboneras desalination plant started operation in 2005. 
It uses reverse osmosis technology and has a treatment capacity of 
120,000 m3/day. The desalinated seawater is used for irrigation of the 
greenhouse crops in Campo de Nijar (27 million m3/year), household 
supply (15 million m3/year), and industries (1 million m3/year). The 
desalination process is very energy intensive: it uses 4–8 kWh/m3. 
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Additionally, the desalinated water must be pumped to a reservoir 
with a dynamic head of 280 m. Thus, desalination does not appear 
to be an economically viable option. Because desalination costs are 
approximately 0.52 Euro/m3 (3,000 Euro/ha), only highly profitable 
crops can be irrigated.
Economies of scale (scaling up the desalination and water distribution 
works) and the ongoing technological advances have helped to dramati-
cally reduce unit costs. In the past, the KWH per unit of desalinated 
water in the Canary Islands was as high as 40 KWH/m3, whereas, in the 
Nijar Desal plant (visited during the tour), it is only 4 KWH/m3. With 
improved developments of membranes, these costs already are reduced 
further to 2KWH/m3. The effluent brine is a negative externality that 
often is the environmental concern in scaling up desalination schemes 
in some countries. This brine is mitigated by dilution with the water 
used for the energy plants before being disposed to the sea.
Role of subsidies
As in the case of irrigation, the production cost per unit of water is 
subsidized by the state budget and by the EU. However, these subsi-
dies are made in a relatively targeted/objective manner. The subsidy 
is relatively outcome-based (for instance, by writing off the interest 
on the state loan to farmers when they present proof of improving the 
productivity per unit of water). The water productivity is as high as 12 
Euros/unit of water (for example, with tomatoes and peppers).
 Lessons Learned from the Field Visits
The main lessons from the visit are:
Overall management of water resources requires active participa-N
tion from users. In addition, reliable, user-friendly, hydrological 
information that monitors the stocks and flows of water plays a 
key role in resolving various conflicts of interest. The Spanish river 
basin agencies have been able to play a critical role in sustainable 
water resource management, but these institutions have evolved 
over several decades.
Irrigation improvements that enhance water productivity are likely N
to lead to higher evapotranspiration (ET). Under these circum-
stances, desalination offers sustainable solutions to coastal farmers 
who are already producing high-value crops.
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The Almeria model of providing small farmers with technical as-N
sistance at three levels (on the farm, for meeting EU phytosanitary 
regulations, and for marketing) has interesting lessons for World 
Bank projects in Egypt and Morocco.
Irrigation system modernization needs to attend to both physical N
and operational aspects. Good water-level control and commu-
nication facilities are essential to good irrigation management. In 
particular, there is a need for good water balance assessment, good 
understanding of internal system processes, and high flexibility in 
water delivery arrangements.
Desalinated water could be put to conjunctive irrigation use N provided 
there is a high-value use (such as tourism) that can pay for cross-
subsidies. However, this model is not replicable in MNA because 
the Spanish farmers benefit from a variety of subsidies available 
through EU agricultural policies.
In general, desalinating costs are declining, and the costs of surface N
water and groundwater are increasing. Therefore, desalination is 
becoming more competitive for urban uses. Reverse osmosis is the 
preferred desalination technology due to the cost reductions driven 
by improvements in membranes in recent years.
For water-scarce regions similar to Almeria, such as coastal com-N
munities in MNA countries, a hybrid solution may be relevant to 
enhance productivity of periurban agriculture for local markets. 
Such a hybrid would blend the relatively cheaper treated wastewater 
(once public acceptance is achieved through adequate environmental 
and social safeguards) with desalination plants, Technologies for 
tertiary wastewater treatment and desalination have very much in 
common. However, the cost of treatment varies depending on the 
type of treatment and the intended final use of the water.
Spain has evolved a system whereby the state pays for major con-N
struction works for water resource development and recovers the 
costs through water tariffs. Equally important is the availability 
of a strong legal framework that has empowered the WUAs. It 
takes many years for WUAs to evolve. Project designs need to 
recognize the long gestation periods before WUAs can become 
fully empowered.
The Almeria experiences of conjunctive water use for growing 
vegetables are replicable in MNA in areas in which the farmers already 
have worked out supply chain/logistical issues essential to connect to 
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the export market. Examples of such areas in MNA are Agadir in 
Morocco, parts of Tunisia, Algeria, and possibly Gaza (once normalcy 
returns).
Zaragoza Water Expo: Summary of Messages for MNA Countries 
on Climate Change
Developing countries will be the most affected, notably those in N
the MNA region.
Climate change is 1 of the 4 causes of the N escalated water demand-
supply imbalance (water scarcity). The other three causes are popula-
tion growth, improved living standards, and increased system losses due 
to under-budgeted O&M. In some countries, these last three causes 
may dwarf the importance of climate change. In other countries, 
the incremental effect of climate change will be significant. Diver-
sification and trade are key adaptation solutions, namely, “virtual 
water” to maximize net exports per unit of renewable water.
In general, in MNA, climate change will:N
Increase irrigation-water demand per ha (due to increased L
temperature).
Alter the flood and drought extremes, and shift the seasonal L
rainfall and surface-water flow hydrographs. The Nile basin 
likely will encounter increased precipitation (and hence in-
creased, rather than decreased, flows).
One major challenge is the high uncertainty (of the demand and N
supply forecasts to 2050 or 2070). High uncertainty means that, 
for designing and executing the adaptation interventions, MNA 
countries inevitably will take risks:
Higher-income countries need to take some L capital-cost risk. 
For instance, they could design the water interventions to adapt 
to the most extreme (that is, highly unlikely) flood or drought 
(such as a 1-in-200 year flood/drought).
Lower-income countries need to take some L damage risk. For 
instance, they could design the water interventions to avoid 
only the more probable floods/droughts.
The adaptation options, including several supply augmentation and N
demand management measures, need to be assessed by multiple 
criteria, including, importantly, the sustainability criterion. The 
cost-benefit ratio should not be the sole factor. MNA made a 
presentation at the EXPO emphasizing that the assessment and 
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implementation of adaptation options should be performed through 
the ABCDE approach, elaborated in chapter 1, as opposed to the 
common top-down engineering approach. In Algeria and Yemen, 
for example, the latter approach resulted in costly/oversized trunk 
works without real bottom-up societal demand.
In some cases, the mitigation and adaptation agendas could overlap. N
The planner needs to address this possibility to ensure a harmonized 
overlap. Examples include:
Cropping shifts that save water (adaptation measure) without L
resulting in increased greenhouse gases (GHGs) (mitigation 
measure)
Reusing treated wastewater (adaptation measure) while se-L
questering the emitted methane (mitigation measure)
Capitalizing on the storage of bulk-waters (adaptation measure) L
to develop clean solar-thermal energy (mitigation measure, as 
planned for Balerma reservoir, which the team visited during 
the tour).
#
Engineering
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Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in 
the Nile Delta
Jose Simas, Juan Morelli, and Hani El Sadani
Introduction and Statement of the Problem
Egypt depends almost entirely on 55.5 billion m3 per year of water from 
the Nile River. This allocation represents 95 percent of the available 
resource for the country. Approximately 85 percent of the Nile water 
is used for irrigation. Demand for water is growing while the options 
for increasing supply are limited. Egypt faces the challenge of improv-
ing the productivity and sustainability of water use. To respond, the 
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) has been imple-
menting an Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) Action 
Plan. Its key strategy is to improve demand management. This plan has 
had the support of the World Bank, Germany’s KfW, the Netherlands 
Development Cooperation, and other donors.
The Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project 
(IIIMP) is an important measure of the IWRM action plan. IIIMP is 
implemented on 500,000 acres ( feddans) in the Nile Delta covering the 
command of 2 main canals, Mahmoudia and Mit Yazid. The project 
aims at improving the management of irrigation and drainage in the 
project area and increasing the efficiency of irrigated agriculture water 
use and services. The main interventions of the project are improving 
irrigation and drainage systems and improving the water management 
institutional structure.
†
This chapter was prepared in close collaboration with the staff of Egypt’s Ministry 
of Water Resources and Irrigation (Irrigation Improvement Sector; IIIMP Management 
Unit; Water Management Research Institute) and Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Reclamation (Executive Authority for Land Improvement; Soil, Water and Environ-
ment Research Institute; Center of Agricultural Economic and Statistics).
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The IIIMP interventions in irrigation modernization are based on 
the experience gained from several preceding and ongoing projects. 
The original concepts of irrigation modernization were developed in the 
early 1980’s and since then have received support from UNDP, USAID, 
Japan, World Bank, KfW, the Netherlands Government, and others. 
In 1996 implementation started on the World Bank/KfW-financed 
Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP). It was the first large-scale appli-
cation of the irrigation modernization program in Egypt. The project 
closed in December 2006. By that time, 50 percent of the tertiary 
and secondary systems of the command areas of the main canals of 
Mahmoudia and Mit Yazid had been modernized.
The IIP included three types of improvements/innovations:
Introduction of continuous flow.1.  The mode of operation of second-
ary distribution canals was changed from rotational (for example, 
5 days on/5 days off during the summer) to continuous flow (that 
is, water flows continuously in the secondary canals). The purpose 
of continuous flow was to improve water delivery services to the 
farmers. It has given more flexibility to the water management 
system to make it more suited to growing high-value crops.
Providing a single lifting point2. . The low-lying tertiary water systems 
(mesqas) were replaced by pressurized/elevated systems. Water is 
lifted from the secondary canal into the tertiary network through 
a single-point lifter rather than the old system. The latter allowed 
farmers to lift the water through several formal/informal control 
points without adequate control measures. The old system caused 
tremendous inequity in water distribution between upstream and 
tail-end users. The new system has led to better water distribution 
equity and reduced operation cost.
Piping tertiary canals.3.  Earthen open tertiary canals were converted 
into piped canals. Piped canals allow for pressurized water delivery, 
reduce seepage losses, prevent discharge of solid waste and sewage 
into the tertiary system, and save approximately 2 percent of the 
total command area.
The IIIMP widened the approach of the previous Irrigation Im-
provement Project (IIP). The initial driver was based on the economic 
analysis of various technical irrigation improvement options, including 
the IIP approach. Average IIP improvement costs were exceeding LE 
6,000 per feddan (extreme cases reached 12,000 LE/fed), due mainly 
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to over-design. In addition, IIP’s economic rate of return (ERR) was 
lower than expected at appraisal time.
In addition to reducing the cost side of the interventions, a number 
of innovative measures were considered to maximize the benefit side 
of the project from both economic and financial points of view. For 
example, at this time, the Egyptian government was implementing 
diesel fuel cost increases. These increases not only have increased the 
operational cost of nonimproved systems but also would have increased 
operational costs for improved systems if the original choice of IIP of 
diesel single lifters had been adopted. The proposed response was to take 
advantage of the relatively good electrical transmission and subtrans-
mission infrastructure in the Nile Delta and the economic efficiency, 
life span, and capital and running costs of the electro-pumps.
In general, IIIMP adopted a three-point strategy:
Proper sizing of the improved infrastructure to optimize capital 1. 
costs
Technical innovations to increase cost-savings and functionality2. 
Extension of the improvement package to the whole system (in-3. 
cluding tertiary and on-farm improvements).
Both (2) and (3) would have resulted in maximized benefits com-
pared to the associated costs.
Government engineers were reluctant to endorse the elements 
discussed during preparation for two reasons. First, this strategy had 
never been implemented in Egypt. Second, there was concern regarding 
possible rejection by farmers of innovative elements with which they 
may not have had experience before. It was clear that only a “sizeable 
pilot” could clarify the large number of issues and fine-tune the ap-
propriate technology before scaling up to the national level.
The objective of this chapter is to document the process of developing 
the pilot and to provide an interim evaluation based on real measured 
data. There is a real need for this evaluation at this time due to the 
fact that the irrigation modernization package implemented in this pilot 
has never been tested before under Egyptian conditions.
 Selection of Pilot Area
The W-10 area in Kafr El Sheikh Governorate was selected to serve as 
the “sizeable pilot” for the new approach. It comprises approximately 
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6,000 acres in the most down-
stream tail-end command area 
of the Mit Yazid main canal. It is 
supplied by 3 branch canals and 
2 sub-branch canals (table 24.1). 
The area was selected solely 
because it was the only subarea 
in which no IIP interventions had 
ever been made.
As a tail-end area, W-10 has 
restricted water supply in the 
peak summer season and there-
fore reuses drainage water. The 
water shortage and low farmer 
incomes meant that W-10 was a 
more difficult working environ-
ment than the IIIMP overall.
On the positive side, the 
W-10 area is close to the Sakha 
Experimental Station.1 This fact, 
together with the support of the 
GTZ-MALR Agriculture Wa-
ter Management Project, was 
considered a plus, because it would enable the provision of technical 
assistance and materials to implement the pilot actions.
 Package of Actions to Test for Scaling Up
Substantial differences existed between the old design criteria imple-
mented under IIP and the new approach applied in W-10. The latter 
featured 12 innovations:
Electrification of single-point lifters (mesqa pump sets) rather than 1. 
diesel pumps. While this measure has had the benefits mentioned 
above, a new dedicated distribution grid was needed, and the 
MWRI was to take care of it.
 1 Sakha is a subsection of the Soils, Water and Environment Research Institute 
(SWERI) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR).
Figure 24.1  Layout Map for Northern Part of Mit-Yazid Canal 
Showing W-10 Subproject Area 
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Adoption of prepaid electrical cards to avoid delinquent payments 2. 
and facilitate supply logistics to user farmers. This measure was 
adopted because the electric utility companies were reluctant to 
accept the new users based on risks of delinquent monthly payments 
from farmers. The IIIMP team proposed a “new deal” through the 
use of modern “prepaid credit cards.” This was a win-win option 
for both farmers and utilities.
New and cheaper equipment for the tertiary distribution systems 3. 
(mesqas): increased irrigation application time in the peak month 
from 12 hr to 20 hr; substantial reduction of pipe diameters; direct 
pumping rather than costly concrete standpipes; more compact 
pump houses equipped with smaller pump modules: 20, 40, and 
60 l/s, instead of 60 and 90 l/s units (reducing water duties from 
4–6 l/s/ha in extreme cases to 2 l/s/ha or 0.82 l/s/acre in Egyptian 
customary units).
Improvement of head works control gates of branch canals through 4. 
telemetric instrumentation and remote operation of gates with 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system.
Improvement of quaternary distribution systems (5. marwas) includ-
ing the testing of two options: lining by brick and mortar or piping 
by low-pressure pipes up to the on-farm gate. MWRI had not 
been involved before in the improvement of marwas. However, 
the Soil, Water and Environment Research Institute (SWERI) of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR) was 
implementing a pilot program to line marwas using bricks and 
mortar. Thus, an interministerial agreement was made to enable 
SWERI to implement the marwa improvement activities, although 
MWRI would be responsible.
Testing low-pressure pipes for marwas (class 2.5 bar instead of 6. 
4 bar).
Testing different types of valves for the mesqa-marwa interface 7. 
(ball, gate, and butterfly), different brands and specifications, 
optional manufacturing materials (metallic, polyvinyl chloride or 
PVC), PE, and different installation lay-outs.
Developing and testing different individual farm-gate hydrants 8. 
for on-farm use allowing future use of hoses and gated pipes—all 
provided with pre-set constant flow and pressure.
Application of laser land-leveling (LLL) practices to improve al-9. 
location efficiencies (recently initiated).
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Introduction of rotational operation schedules of pumps, valves, 10. 
and hydrants to harmonize farmer needs and efficient use of water, 
labor, and energy.
Introduction of on-farm water management improvements includ-11. 
ing irrigation scheduling (to begin soon).
Testing and introduction of modified/controlled drainage (tested 12. 
at station level and to be expanded soon).
By 2009 the approach tested in the W-10 pilot area was being 
expanded within IIIMP to more than 500,000 acres in the Delta.
This expansion depended on the collaboration among the special-
ized agencies of the MWRI and MALR, working together with water 
user associations (WUAs) and informal farmer groups. The coop-
eration between MWRI and MALR in the W-10 area provided the 
framework for MALR participation in the implementation of marwa 
and on-farm improvement programs. These programs included piped 
marwas, laser land-leveling, and training and capacity building of ben-
eficiary farmers.
The completion of the W-10 took more than four years due to 
contractors’ inexperience in implementing some of the new interven-
tions and failures of some contractors to comply with the contractual 
schedule. The marwa implementation schedule was delayed because 
of delays in agreement on procedures for interagency transfer of funds 
and materials and other accountability mechanisms. After the proj-
ect management unit (PMU) took over responsibility for completing 
the W-10 area project, the marwa improvement program began to 
accelerate.
As noted above, the new W-10 approach was strongly resisted 
during the first few years. However, after the results of the W-10 pilot 
became evident, many of the skeptical parties became convinced that 
the project’s technical and organizational innovations could succeed.
 Evaluation of the New Approach
The IIIMP Project Appraisal Document (PAD) envisaged (a) an aver-
age increase in farmers’ annual income of approximately 15 percent, 
(b) water savings of approximately 22 percent, and (c) an overall ERR 
of 20.5 percent.
An interim evaluation of W-10 pilot was conducted in late 2008. 
The aims were to:
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Verify whether the new approach was feasible and whether the N
PAD forecasts were accurate
Inform the design of a results-oriented monitoring and evaluation N
system.
 Investment Costs
Most of the W-10 improvement costs were financed by IIP, which closed 
on December 31, 2006. The improvements at the quaternary and on-
farm levels were taken on by the IIIMP. Despite having an estimated 
cost of approximately LE 120 per 
acre—less than 2 percent of the 
total improvement costs—laser 
land leveling is expected to have 
a significant impact.
Figure 24.2 shows the break-
down of the main components 
of the improvement costs in the 
W-10 pilot. Mesqa improvements 
represent 47 percent of all W-10 
improvement costs.
 Improvement in Physical Performance of Irrigation System  
of the W-10 area
At the time of writing of this report, the authors could not assess the 
full range of enhancements in irrigation system performance because 
the improvement package had not yet been implemented in full (for 
example, the crucial laser land-leveling improvement). However, 
through a number of ongoing M&E studies, the following preliminary 
observations have been evident:
Impact of marwa improvement
The N sufficiency indicator, which expresses whether enough water is 
diverted by the marwa to its served area, is the highest for pipeline 
marwas compared to lined and earthen marwas (earthen is the 
lowest).
The N equity indicator, which measures adequacy of water distribu-
tion, is the highest for pipeline marwas, compared to lined and 
earthen.
Source: Authors based on data from o"cial records.
Figure 24.2  Breakdown of W-10 Investment 
Mesqa improvements 47%
Electri!cation 17%
Mesqa pumpsets & 
pipeworks 8%
Marwa improvements 13% Other costs (LLL, etc.) 6%
Delivery system 9%
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TheN  conveyance efficiency indicator depends on calculating water 
losses due to seepage, percolation, and evaporation from marwas 
between the source and the farm. This indicator was highest for 
piped marwas. Piped marwas resulted in substantial water saving 
compared to other interventions.
The N irrigation time indicator indicates the superiority of improved 
marwas over earthen marvas.
On-farmN  (application, crop water use, and field water use) irrigation 
efficiency is highest for piped marwas.
Water table depths N were deeper for improved marwas compared 
to earthen ones, indicating less water loss and lower drainage 
coefficients.
The sN ocial assessment indicated that most farmers prefer piped mar-
was. The farmers perceived four benefits from improving marwas: 
equity enhancement, land-saving, reduction in maintenance costs, 
and reduction in irrigation time.
Impact of mesqa improvement
The average total operating cost was significantly lower for W-10 N
compared to the IIP regular improvement package.
The average irrigation time was higher for W-10 compared to N
the regular IIP-1 due to reduced pump size and pipe diameters in 
W-10 area.
Relative water supply is better for the W-10 area compared to the N
nonimproved areas, thus indicating better water availability.
 Benefits in W-10 Pilot Area
Appendix 24.1 shows which irrigation improvements produced which 
benefits.
Benefits could be summarized for one or several of the improve-
ments by the following actual production parameters:
Crop yield increasesN  (due to enhanced flexibility under continuous 
flow operation, timely irrigation, equity for tail-end farms, improved 
water quality and quantity, improved drainage and reduced water 
table and water and soil salinity, and reduction of weed infesta-
tions)
Change in cropping patternN  (due to improved reliability and timely 
access to water)
Egypt: Irrigation Innovations in the Nile Delta  N  441
Land gainsN  for communal service space (due to replacement of 
open mesqas and marwas by buried pipes)
Reduced irrigation costsN
Increased water productivityN  (due to reduced water losses, convey-
ance efficiency, controlled drainage, laser land-leveling, higher 
yields, lower irrigation costs).
The improved production parameters recorded above all are 
measurable and easy to introduce into crop and farm representative 
budget models.
To estimate the benefits of the W-10 pilot package, the authors 
worked closely with officers of MALR’s Center of Agricultural Econom-
ics and Statistics2 to update with- and without-project crop patterns 
and budgets. Such figures were obtained primarily by field-sampling 
yields and some estimates based on qualified experts. Table 24.1 sum-
marizes the resulting yields and net income parameters of the main 
crops cultivated in W-10.
As can be seen from the physical quantities and values detailed in 
table 24.1, yields are increased by 12 percent–25 percent. Net incomes 
per cultivated acre are increasing by 20 percent–64 percent as a result 
 Engineers Bayoumi Abd El Megued Bayoumi, Abd Elmahab, and Mohamed A. 2
El-din Mustafa (MALR).
Table 24.1 Average Incremental Yields and Incomes by Crop
Crop/activity
Crop yields (kg/fed) Income (LE/fed)
Without
project
With
project
Increase
(%)
Without
project
With
project
Increase
(%)
Maize 3.100 3.500 13 3,355 4,042 20
Rice 4.100 4.600 12 3,140 3,928 25
Seed cotton 1.130 1.330 18 1,769 2,602 47
Summer vegetable 15.000 18.000 20 3,450 5,254 52
Wheat 2.800 3.200 14 4,871 5,868 20
Broad beans 1.400 1.600 14 2,131 2,666 25
Winter vegetable 19.000 22.000 16 6,805 8,729 28
Berseem long season 25.000 28.000 12 2,504 3,085 23
Berseem short season 12.000 15.000 25 1,067 1,748 64
Sugar beet 18.000 21.000 17 2,332 3,186 37
Citrus 10,000 12,000 20 8,995 11,528 28
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of the combined effects of increased productivity and reduction of the 
irrigation costs (depreciation and O&M of pumps).
Table 24.2 summarizes three typical farm models. All models confirm 
the financial feasibility of the proposed improvements and the positive 
impact on beneficiaries’ family income. Through integrated on-farm 
and off-farm investments, the project not only saves approximately 20 
percent–30 percent of water but also significantly increases household 
income by 8 percent–14.5 percent (table 24.2). As W-10 pilot area 
investments are completed with laser land-leveling and other on-farm 
improvements (training, irrigation scheduling), additional income gains 
will materialize.
Financial and economic prices have been estimated using 2007–08 
data. Conversion factors (CFs) for shadow pricing are based on estimates 
prepared for this quick illustrative analysis. Conversion factors for wheat 
(1.1), cotton (0.95), sugar beet and maize (0.9), and citrus fruits and 
tomato (0.8) were used. Given the high levels of existing subsidies to 
Egypt’s energy market prices, CFs of 4.0 and 2.5 were used for diesel 
and electricity, respectively. For nontraded commodities, such as ber-
seem and other forages, financial prices are assumed to be in line with 
economic prices. According to the most recent forecasts of commodity 
prices prepared by the World Bank (November 2008), future economic 
prices for traded inputs and outputs are not expected to show major 
variations. The WB forecast made no adjustment for labor costs.
Due to the short time available for preparing the analysis, no eco-
nomic value was estimated for water saved. The farm model estimated 
that water consumption in W-10 was reduced by 30 percent from 49.6 
million to 34.8 million m3 as a result of the new improvement package 
being tested. However, water is gaining an increasing opportunity cost 
as irrigated area continues to expand in Egypt and water becomes 
more and more scarce.
Table 24.2  Farm Models: Estimated Income Increases (LE/farm)
Income 
increases 
(%)
Model
(feddan)
W-10 Area 
per model 
(feddan)
No. of 
farms
Farmer’s net income
Without 
project
With 
project
W-10 pilot area 6,000 5,583
Model 0.75 feddan (50% of area) 8.0 0.75 3,000 4,000 18,658 20,151
Model 1.5 feddan (33% of area) 11.9 1.50 2,000 1,333 23,222 25,988
Model 4 feddan (17% of area) 14.5 4.00 1,000 250 38,198 43,754
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The ERR for W-10 investments was estimated at 15.2 percent and 
the net present value (NPV) at LE 11 million at 12 percent discount 
rate. These numbers were achieved even without assigning any value 
to (1) the water being saved or (2) the significant reduction of carbon 
emissions due to substituting the more than 5,500 individual diesel 
pumps with approximately 100 single-point electric pump houses.
 Conclusions and Recommendations
This analysis uses empirical data to confirm that the W-10 pilot improve-
ments are economically viable. It produced this positive result despite 
the fact that the project was in its start-up phase. There were cost 
overruns as staff became familiar with the new approach, and not all 
project benefits had yet materialized.
The exercise is a valid first approximation of an evaluation proce-
dure that should be followed routinely. It should be updated regularly 
on the basis of systematic data collection.
Other additional preliminary conclusions that could be drawn from 
the analysis are:
As crop yields improve, the new designs introducing continuous 1. 
flow and significantly reducing the capacity of single-point mesqa 
irrigation pumps are proving to be adequate for crop and farm 
needs. These designs are showing the way to improve equity in 
the irrigation distribution systems, which, by design, have a limited 
water conveyance and delivery capacity. With the new improve-
ments approach, tail-end farmers should be in a better position 
to obtain the water they need. Farmers located in the head will 
neither need, nor be able to capture, water in excess of their crop 
consumption needs.
Electrification of the system also enables significant reductions of 2. 
the costs of irrigation. The reductions result from both the reduced 
depreciation and maintenance costs of electric pumps as opposed 
to the diesel pumps, and the lower cost of electricity as compared 
with diesel fuel. Electrification also substantially reduces a significant 
source of carbon emitted from the thousands of individual diesel 
pumps by substituting more efficient and environmentally friendly 
shared electric pump houses.
There is still a great possibility to reduce costs of irrigation improve-3. 
ment works, as implementation partners (Irrigation Improvement 
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Sector of MWRI; Executive Agency for Land Improvement of 
MALR) and private contractors learn about the innovative ap-
proaches. As investment costs are reduced with experience, the 
impact of the improvements will increase.
Integrated irrigation improvements up to the marwa and the 4. 
on-farm levels are possible due to the institutional collaboration 
and strong support from MWRI and MALR that were developed 
during IIMP. These arrangements should be reinforced and more 
training provided.
With the new approach, it is possible both to save approximately 20 5. 
percent–30 percent of the water used for irrigation and to achieve 
a significant increase in the value of production.
The evaluation exercise showed that the productivity of water 6. 
increases by more than 80 percent when comparing the total net 
economic value of production per 1000 m3 used for irrigation at 
project maturity with the pre-project productivity.
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Water Reuse in the MNA Region: 
Constraints, Experiences, and 
Policy Recommendations
Claire Kfouri, Pier Mantovani,  
and Marc Jeuland
The scarcity of freshwater in most countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) region is an increasingly acute prob-lem, particularly as populations continue to grow and place 
higher demands on water resources. Fourteen of 20 MNA nations are 
in water deficit (less than 500 m3 of renewable water supply per capita 
per year) (FAO 2006). Due to demographic growth, countries that are 
relatively well endowed with water resources, such as Egypt, Lebanon, 
Morocco, and Syria, may join the water-deficient nations by 2050. As 
rapid urbanization continues, water scarcity will create pressure to shift 
water from agricultural to domestic and industrial uses.
According to the latest collection of simulation results reviewed by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, consensus is strong 
that precipitation will decrease substantially in MNA countries (IPCC 
2007). Higher temperatures will lead to greater evaporation from 
surface water storage reservoirs and losses in soil moisture. Higher 
evapotranspiration rates in vegetated areas likely will decrease run-
off and groundwater recharge rates and could increase crop-water 
requirements in agriculture (IPCC 2007, Trenberth and others 2003, 
Schneider and others 1990).
In this context, the development of nonconventional resources 
such as desalinated water and reclaimed wastewater is increasingly 
relevant. 
Water Reuse
On paper, water reuse, or the recycling of reclaimed wastewater for 
planned beneficial uses, is particularly attractive. It can limit or eliminate 
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effluent discharges, while generating an alternate resource. Reuse indi-
rectly allows both the preservation of freshwater resources for higher 
quality uses (such as potable water supply) and the postponement of 
potentially more costly water supply approaches (storage, transfer, or 
desalination schemes). These and other environmental, public health, 
and economic benefits of water reuse are widely documented (Scott 
and others 2004, Asano and others 2007, Mantovani and others 2001). 
Water reuse is emerging as an established water management practice 
in several water-stressed countries and regions.
Despite the perceived potential advantages for a region ranked as 
the most water-scarce in the world, the spread of water reuse across 
MNA countries is surprisingly uneven and slow. To date, few countries 
in the region have achieved the implementation of substantial reuse 
programs. 
To better understand the context of wastewater reuse in MNA 
and to assess its future and potential, this chapter addresses three key 
questions:
Given the scarcity of water, why have many governments been 1. 
slow to promote wastewater reuse?
What insights for the future of wastewater reuse can be gleaned 2. 
from regional and international experiences?
How should policymakers adapt the wastewater management 3. 
agenda to their country’s economic context?
This chapter argues, first, that the development and implementation 
of water reuse strategies in MNA are impeded by four factors:
Insufficiency of economic analysis 1. 
Relatively high cost of wastewater treatment and conveyance, 2. 
coupled with pricing of irrigation water that does not adequately 
reflect its scarcity value
Technical and social issues affecting the demand for reclaimed 3. 
water
Difficulty in creating financial incentives for safe and efficient 4. 
water reuse.
Second, the chapter asserts that only the most extreme scarcity 
or institutional discipline pushes countries to adopt widespread water 
reuse. 
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Water Reuse Constraints
Many water reuse experiences in MNA are pilot projects. As such, their 
sustainability and replicability are uncertain. With some exceptions, 
most of the remaining (nonpilot-scale) projects involve the planned 
reuse of wastewater that is not treated to meet World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) standards or unplanned reuse. Some locations have 
a policy climate favorable to wastewater reuse. However, even there, 
serious obstacles remain before many of these projects can become 
self-sufficient, both operationally (timely delivery of water), financially 
(cost recovery), and environmentally (salinity risks). 
The obstacles to wastewater reuse in MNA are discussed be-
low: 
Constraint #1: The Need for More Complete Economic Analysis  
of Treatment and Reuse Options
The decision to promote wastewater reuse should depend on a full 
accounting of the economic costs and benefits of projects. Economic 
assessment rarely encompasses all relevant aspects of reuse and rarely 
goes beyond financial feasibility analysis. 
The economic impacts of reusing wastewater depend on the 
degree of treatment and the nature of the reuse. A large number of 
costs and benefits should be considered in the context of the specific 
reuse approach (table 25.1). 
When considering the demand for the water that is being reused, 
one needs to pay careful attention to whether this water is replacing 
water from other sources. In such instances, the important measure-
ment is the increase (or decrease) in benefits associated with using 
reclaimed water instead of the replaced alternative. There is therefore 
a risk of double-counting when considering changes in crop yields, 
cropping patterns, fertilizer savings, salinity impacts, and property 
value changes (IPCC 2007).
In addition, project planning tends to overlook many of the costs 
of planned reuse (opportunity cost of water to be reused, regulatory 
costs, education and training of irrigators). For example, when treated 
or untreated effluents already are reused for some purpose (either in-
directly or unplanned), their opportunity cost must be included when 
considering planned new uses. In many cases, the main impact of reuse 
will be to move a given supply of water from one place to another.
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Some of these various costs and benefits may fall disproportionately 
on certain stakeholder groups affected by the project. For example, 
farmers may have nonzero demand for untreated wastewater, to which 
they may lose access. Economic analysis therefore needs to consider the 
distributional impacts of reuse projects and address compensation. 
Similarly, irrigators are likely to face higher prices as a result of 
water-pricing reforms to promote reuse. In addition, the quality of the 
reclaimed water they receive may prevent unrestricted agriculture or 
present them with long-term productivity costs. 
Constraint #2: High Cost and Lack of Wastewater Treatment in MNA, 
and Their Impacts on Reuse
The first major cost of water reuse development is the upfront invest-
ment and cost-recovery challenge associated with wastewater collec-
tion and treatment. Although MNA countries have made significant 
progress in extending sewerage to most of their urban populations, 
important gaps remain, and treatment capacity is very uneven. 
The applications and potential for wastewater reuse differ greatly 
depending on whether wastewater is managed through local or mu-
nicipal sewerage systems or in on-site sanitation systems. The latter 
case, which is prevalent in small towns and across rural areas, is usually 
Table 25.1 Economic Impacts of Wastewater Reuse: Examples of Costs and Benefits
Costs Benefits
Value-added from displaced water (if any) Value-added from reused wastewater (varies based on quality and 
reliability differences)
Opportunity cost of reused water (if any) Alternative use of displaced water (if any)
Value of sanitation improvements
Collection and treatment of wastewater,  
final disposal costs
Reduced environmental degradation 
Conveyance/storage of reused water, including water 
losses (evaporation, leakage) and retrofitting costs for 
participating farmers
Aquifer recharge, or value of reduced aquifer depletion 
Salinity-related impacts Increases in property values
Other pollution (nitrates, heavy metals, toxic substances) Increased crop yields
Health, odor, and nuisance costs Savings in fertilizer 
Ecological impacts (opportunity cost of reused water for 
minimum flow or other purposes)
Value of improvements or reform in the water sector  
due to water reuse
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incompatible with the types of reuse systems considered in this chapter. 
However, fully successful reuse agendas need to consider all possible 
options.
The rate of treatment of collected wastewater is low in many MNA 
countries.1 Much of the wastewater collected in MNA is discharged 
untreated into the sea or other surface water bodies, or on land. While 
much progress has been made in defining the risks associated with 
such practices, enforcement of regulations prohibiting them in MNA 
is patchy. 
Furthermore, to treatment costs must be added the cost of collec-
tion and conveyance to treatment facilities from locations in which such 
infrastructure does not exist. Treatment facilities vary from location 
to location based on the infrastructure needed and the quality of the 
wastewater. Nevertheless, a review of costs indicates that the numbers 
are at the low end of the 0.46–0.74 US$/m3 range and average at 0.53 
US$/m3, as presented in Lee and others (2001): capital (0.10–0.16 US$ 
(2001 US$)/m3), operation (0.25–0.40), maintenance (0.08–0.15), and 
miscellaneous (0.03).
Many analysts argue that economic calculations for reuse projects 
require that “…only the marginal cost of wastewater recycling (addi-
tional treatment, storage, and distribution) be considered, excluding 
Table 25.2 Cost of Wastewater Collection, Treatment, and Reuse 
Component Cost/m3 (US$) Notes Source(s)
Conveyance to treatment works Highly variable a
Nonmechanized secondary treatment 0.10–0.22 Necessary for restricted reuse WHO 2005, Shelef 
1996, Haruvy 1997, 
Amami 2005
Aerated secondary treatment/activated 
sludge 
0.22–0.27 Lower land requirement Kamizoulis 2003, 
Shelef 1996, Shelef 
1991, Haruvy 1997
Tertiary treatment (in addition  
to secondary) 
0.07–0.18 Necessary for unrestricted reuse Shelef 1996, Haruvy 
1997, Shelef 1994
Distribution 0.05–0.36 Shelef 1994
Total 0.16–0.53 Shelef 1994, Lee 2001
Note:  
a Costs come from a variety of sources and have not been standardized to a specific reference year.
 See appendix A25.1.1
452  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
the cost of wastewater collection and treatment” (Lazarova and oth-
ers 2001).
Similarly, some analysts argue for subtracting the cost of safe 
disposal of treated wastewater from the cost of reuse. However, it 
only makes sense to exclude the cost of wastewater collection and 
treatment from the economic analysis if these services would have 
been in place and functioning in the absence of the recycling investment. 
This condition often is not satisfied in MNA.
Indeed, many treatment plants are plagued by poor operation and 
maintenance (O&M) and are operated well beyond their design capac-
ity. These conditions will result in degraded treatment reliability and 
diminished reuse possibilities. In such a situation, the cost of bringing 
wastewater collection and treatment up to the required standard is 
part of the cost of a reuse project.
Constraint #3: Low Demand for Reclaimed Wastewater
Robust evidence from numerous projects suggests that the demand 
for reclaimed water generally is lower than it is for alternative sources 
of freshwater, among farmers as well as households. This statement 
is true despite reused water’s potential to reduce fertilizer costs and 
promote higher yields (Benabdallah 2003). In MNA, many people re-
main suspicious of reuse since they are uncertain about the quality of 
the water (WHO 2005). The availability of untreated wastewater free 
of charge may make it difficult to convince irrigators to pay anything 
for reclaimed water that is not of high quality.
This distrust is apparent in Tunisia, for example, where, besides 
being well below cost, the price charged to farmers for reclaimed 
wastewater (0.02 US$ (2007)/m3) reflects the lower demand for this 
water. Conventional water costs approximately 0.08US$ (2007)/m3 
(WHO 2005; Lahlou 2005; Shetty 2004). Similarly, in Syria and Ye-
men, recycled wastewater is provided free of charge to farmers (Bazza 
2003 and Baquhaizel 2006).
Constraint #4: Under-Value Water Pricing
The fourth obstacle to the development of wastewater recycling is 
the fact that the prices of water tend not to reflect its scarcity value, 
especially in the agricultural sector. In fact, in no MNA country does 
the price of freshwater delivered to irrigators reflect even the cost of 
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supply. The best that some countries (Morocco and Tunisia) do is 
to charge sufficient rates to cover O&M (Bucknall and others 2007; 
Bazza and others 2002). Most countries make no charge for or take 
no control of groundwater abstractions other than the private cost of 
pumping and the permitting process (Morocco, Palestine (Seibh 2003), 
Tunisia, and Yemen (Bassa 2003)). 
Tariff structures for irrigation and other water vary substantially. In 
Israel, the block tariff designed to promote conservation among farmers 
charges only the full average cost of delivering water in the final block: 
the average cost of water supply is 0.29 US$ (2002)/m3, corresponding 
to the final 20 percent of each farmer’s allotment (Becker 2002).
Constraint #5: Wastewater Recycling in MNA Usually Requires an 
Indefinite Government Commitment to Provide Subsidies
We have seen that freshwater is sold at below cost, that recycled water 
costs more to produce than freshwater, and that recycled water is seen 
by users as inferior to freshwater. 
In addition, households (HH) do not directly perceive the envi-
ronmental benefit of wastewater treatment. So long as wastewater 
is collected and conveyed away from urban areas, householders 
consider that their service is adequate. Governments therefore find it 
easier to collect fees for connection and wastewater service than for 
eventual treatment. On the agricultural side, the seasonal nature of 
demand for irrigation water does not match the year-round supply of 
wastewater.
Table 25.3 Prices for Irrigation Water in Select MNA Countries
Country
Irrigation water price (US$/m3)
SourceLow Average High
Algeria 0.14 (Bazza 2002)]
Egypt (Bazza 2002
Jordan 0.01 0.049 0.05 (Bazza 2002, Dinar 2004)
Morocco 0.02 0.053 (Bazza 2002
Syria Annual fees (Bazza 2002
Tunisia 0.025 0.066 0.08 (Bazza 2002, Dinar 2004)
Yemen None (Bazza 2002
Israel 0.18 0.29 Becker 2002
Cyprus 0.108 (Bazza 2002
454  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
Thus, it often is impossible for governments or utilities to recover 
the financial cost of additional treatment or distribution (typically 
0.05–0.25 US$/m3, depending on the chosen level of additional treat-
ment), let alone full treatment. Regulatory and monitoring costs also 
must be acknowledged. 
For all of these reasons, wastewater recycling in MNA usually 
requires a long-term government commitment to provide subsidies. 
Only with very widespread pricing and sector reform will there be any 
possibility of self-financing wastewater recovery investments.
MNA Opportunities and Innovations
Despite these obstacles, some countries have moved aggressively to promote 
wastewater reuse. In Israel, Jordan, and Tunisia, each country has taken 
a slightly different path, but they also are similar in important ways.
MNA Experience #1. Reuse in Israel: Centralized Government Control 
and Technological Promotion
One of the best-documented and analyzed experiences of wastewater 
reuse is that of Israel, where much innovation has taken place, particu-
larly over the past three decades. 
Reuse proved a politically attractive means of increasing water sup-
ply. The severe drought of 1990–91 brought dramatic cuts in freshwater 
allocations to agriculture. Consequently, it also stimulated the start 
of major increases in wastewater reuse (Shelef 1996) as government 
sought to postpone costly desalination projects (Becker 2002). 
Today, Israel has some 400 wastewater reuse projects, mostly highly 
subsidized (Libhaler 2007). Examples are the Dan Region Project (ir-
rigating 16,000 ha with 120 mcm/yr of effluents from Tel Aviv) and the 
Jezreel Valley Project (reuse of 20 mcm/yr of high quality effluents from 
the Haifa area) (Shelef 1994; Hidalgo 2004; and Friedler 1999). 
As late as 2002, the state subsidized approximately 60 percent of 
infrastructure costs of reuse wastewater projects. Economists and 
the Finance Ministry in Israel long have pushed for pricing reforms 
and more extensive demand management, although with little success 
due to opposition from the agriculture sector (Becker 2002; Feitelson 
2005; Menahem 1998; and Mizrahi 2004). 
The institutional organization of the water sector in Israel has 
played a critical role in allowing for the development of reuse. The 
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Water Commission wields enormous power over water resources 
and strictly limits irrigators’ withdrawals. Israel has no private wells; 
all such infrastructure belongs to the government. The Water Com-
mission has full control over the planning of storage basins and other 
needed infrastructure. Within the zones that use reclaimed waste-
water, irrigators have no alternative water source for irrigation. The 
price they pay for this water is only somewhat reduced (roughly 20 
percent lower) from that of National Water Carrier water (Libhaber 
2007). This governance structure largely solves problems of reduced 
demand while ensuring a regular supply of water. 
Another aspect that distinguishes Israel from most MNA countries 
is the fact that, for years, the proportion of collected wastewater that 
is treated has been relatively high (nearing 80 percent). Municipali-
ties are responsible for financing this compulsory treatment, and are 
expected to treat wastewater to meet national standards. Approxi-
mately 6 percent of the remaining wastewater is disposed of on site 
in central septic tank systems. The remaining 15 percent receives no 
treatment. 
The fact that secondary treatment is so widespread greatly ex-
pands opportunities for reuse. In 1996 Israel had nearly 500 treatment 
plants, most of which were oxidation ponds (77 percent) or mechani-
cal biological systems (14 percent) (Shelef 1996). A third type is the 
“Third Line” conveyance and distribution system, so called because 
it was the third major water artery linking the center of Israel to the 
arid south. The Third Line enables a supply of soil-aquifer treated 
(tertiary) reclaimed wastewater to reach southern Israel, thus lower-
ing the infrastructure burden for new projects. Other infrastructure 
financed with government assistance includes small water conduits and 
sequential storage reservoirs or aquifer recharge systems that enable 
additional polishing treatment as well as regularization of water supply 
to irrigators (Juanico 2004).
The country’s long history of reuse has enabled it to develop 
national expertise. As early as 1953, Israel drafted the world’s first set 
of standards for wastewater reuse, which have continued to evolve to 
reflect the latest scientific findings on microbiological and chemical 
risks (Tal 2006). During the 1970s, a major health effects study in 81 
agricultural communities was carried out (Fattal 1981). Through this 
experience, Israel has largely perfected the use of simple technolo-
gies for reuse (oxidation ponds, soil-aquifer treatment, simple storage 
schemes) (Juanico 2004; Libhaber 1987).
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Recirculation of water in oxidation pond systems has lessened odor 
problems (Shelef 1994). Water scarcity and tight quotas have pushed 
irrigators to adopt highly conserving technologies such as underground 
drip irrigation schemes, which also reduce salinity risks (Feitelson 2005; 
Oron 1998). 
The microbiological and nutrient composition of treated wastewa-
ter is satisfactory in Israel and generally within the WHO norms for 
unrestricted reuse. Nevertheless, some technical concerns remain. As 
in other water-scarce countries, Israel has a substantial risk of long-
term salinization of groundwater. Wastewater becomes more saline 
during municipal use and treatment. This concern has led to expanding 
research on developing more salinity-tolerant crops.
The Dan Region treatment plant faces additional maintenance 
costs (for application of chlorine-based compounds) due to periodic 
bio-fouling of effluent pipelines. Bio-fouling also has proven to be a 
problem in Jordan, as it significantly increases energy needs for pumping 
(McCornick 2004; Icekson-Tal 2003). Nevertheless, Israel’s experience 
in wastewater reuse shows that the technical concerns associated 
with this management strategy generally can be addressed, although 
at a high cost.
Experience #2. Reuse in Jordan: Flexible Policy Framework Coping 
with Rapid Demographic Change and Increasing Water Scarcity
Jordan’s foray into the development of wastewater reuse capacity has 
been motivated by ever-tighter freshwater supplies (approximately 
150 m3/capita/yr) (FAO 2006), combined with a degradation in the 
quality of groundwater sources. Indeed, Jordan is one of the most 
water-deprived countries in the MNA region, and has some of the 
highest groundwater depletion rates, valued at 2.1 percent of GDP 
(Bucknall and others 2006). Agriculture has partially adapted to water 
scarcity: 62 percent of irrigated lands today use drip irrigation methods 
(Khouzam 2003). Few good options for augmenting water supply re-
main. Recent projects have been the Al Wahda dam, begun in 2004; 
construction of the costly $600 million Disi-Amman aqueduct; and 
desalination works on the Red Sea (Henry 2005). The government is 
privatizing the operation of municipal water utilities to cut down on high 
unaccounted-for-water ratios (50 percent nationwide) (Quna 2006). 
However, water policy is somewhat inconsistent with agricultural 
policy. Master plans continue to discuss and present options for expanding 
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irrigation and investing in costly conveyance infrastructures. Further-
more, even as water supplies become tighter, there is no consideration 
of options to discourage the irrigation of water-intensive crops (banana 
and citrus, which consume 35 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of 
JV irrigation water) (McCornick and others 2001b; 2001a).
Well-defined policy, standards, and institutional structures govern-
ing reuse exist in Jordan (McCornick and others 2001b; Baquhaizel 
2006; and Nazzal and others 2000). However, its experience is different 
from Israel’s in that most reuse projects have been much less strictly 
regulated and planned. Reclaimed wastewater accounts for nearly 10 
percent of the total water supply in Jordan, which is only slightly lower 
than the percentage in Israel. 
McCornick and others (2001a) describe three categories of reuse in 
Jordan: (1) planned direct use within or adjacent to wastewater treat-
ment plants, (2) unplanned reuse in wadis, and (c) indirect reuse after 
mixing with surface water supplies (mainly in the Jordan Valley). 
Projects in the first category—planned direct reuse—generally 
are under the jurisdiction of the authority responsible for wastewa-
ter treatment plants, the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ). With 
strong government support, WAJ has made a strong effort to reuse 
wastewater from all treatment plants, although much of the reuse 
remains indirect. 
Farmers involved in direct reuse have special contracts with the 
WAJ formalizing their rights to effluents. In addition, the National 
Wastewater Management Policy requires that prices cover at least 
O&M costs of delivery (McCornick and others 2001a), but not treat-
ment or collection. Some projects supply private enterprises (such as 
the date palm plantations near the Aqaba treatment plant). A few are 
experimental pilot projects cosponsored by international donors such as 
USAID. In most of these direct reuse projects, users have no alternative 
water supply besides reclaimed wastewater (McCornick 2007).
The second and third categories stem from mixing wastewater 
discharged into streams that either is first treated (indirect reuse); or 
not collected in sewers; or collected but not treated (unplanned reuse). 
In some streams (most notably the Wadi Zarqa near Amman), over-
pumping of groundwater and decreased flow from natural springs has 
led to indirect and unplanned reuse water becoming an important and 
reliable augmenter of base flows. As a result, farmers in these zones 
have increased irrigation and pay little more than the costs of pump-
ing river water to their fields. After receiving seasonal contributions 
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from runoff, and treated effluents from the Khirbet As-Samra plant 
(Amman’s treatment works), the Wadi Zarqa flows into the King Talal 
Reservoir. King Talal water is then mixed into the King Abdullah Canal, 
which supplies irrigation water to the southern Jordan Valley. 
Upstream of the King Talal reservoir, the Ministry of Health and 
WAJ enforce agricultural restrictions based on reuse standards wher-
ever possible. These authorities use fines, destroy irrigation lands, or 
impose restrictions as necessary. Once in the King Abdullah canal, 
however, the water is no longer legally considered reclaimed and can 
be used without restrictions (McCornick and others 2001). McCor-
nick states that indirect reuse will continue to dominate since demand 
for water in the Jordan Valley is generally greater than the supply of 
treated wastewater.
The steady evolution of the wastewater policy framework suggests 
that flexibility and the ability to accommodate pressures for change have 
been useful in Jordan’s experience (Nazzai 2001). Standards are regularly 
reassessed, with contributions from technical experts, government 
agencies, the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA), and the WAJ. Standards 
governing reuse have moved through four iterations, from those of the 
original WAJ (enacted in 1988) to updated versions of standards for the 
Discharge of Treated Domestic Wastewater (893/1995 and 893/2003) 
(McCornick and others 2001a) (Nazzai 2001). 
Jordan’s water standards are adapted to the needs of a severely 
water-constrained nation. The wastewater management policy of 1998 
emphasizes such assertions as: 
“Wastewater shall not be disposed of, instead it shall be a part of 1. 
the water budget”
“There shall be basin-wide planning for wastewater reuse”2. 
“Fees for wastewater treatment may be collected from those who 3. 
use the water.” (Nazzal and others 2000).
All three of these policy statements are unique and innovative in 
the region. Although the government has not achieved full success in 
implementing them, they represent a different way of thinking about 
wastewater reuse policy. Jordan also has extensive research on regional 
reuse planning in MNA, as evidenced in master plans and the general 
literature (McCornick and others 2001b; Al-Jayyousi 1995). 
The role that the As Samra plant (30 km from Amman) plays in 
Jordan’s reuse experience deserves special mention. It demonstrates both 
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the potential and the hazards of the Jordanian management approach. 
The plant is very large. In 2000, prior to the much needed expansion, 
it consisted of 32 ponds sitting on 200 ha. It processed approximately 
55 mcm of wastewater each year, corresponding to approximately 75 
percent of the country’s annual reclaimed wastewater (Nazzal and oth-
ers 2000). The secondary-treated effluent flows into the Wadi Zarqa 
and then to the King Talal Reservoir. An expanding treatment plant also 
represents a potential gain for irrigators, who are willing to use reclaimed 
wastewater even as they lose rights to other sources of freshwater. 
However, the potential of using Amman wastewater to meet 
these demands must be considered carefully. In 1996 Shatanawi and 
Fayyad showed that the massive amount of wastewater released from 
As Samra into surface water bodies created major salinity threats dur-
ing the dry summer season. Moreover, overloading the plant (which 
was designed to handle a mere 25 mcm/year) or poor operation (also 
pointed out by Bazza 2003) led to concerns over the quality of treated 
effluent. McCornick and others 2001b) state that fecal coliform counts 
exceed Jordanian standards 1 month in 4. As a result, confidence in 
the safety of recycled water among the general population, farmers, 
and agricultural exporters has suffered (Pasch 2005).
Others suggest that the plant design itself may have been inadequate, 
due to a delayed awareness of low per capita water use in Amman and 
the resulting concentrated nature of its wastewater (Nazzal 2001). A 
third set of critics has emphasized what it perceives as a dangerous 
change in balance between natural and effluent flows in the Wadi 
Zarqa and King Talal Reservoir (Mrayyan 2005). 
Jordan’s development of wastewater reuse demonstrates that 
wastewater reuse has great potential in highly water-scarce areas; but 
that reuse planning must be integrated coherently with water resource 
planning, environmental management, and financing arrangements.
Experience #3. Tunisia: Partial Steps, Experiments, and Commitment 
to Reuse
Tunisian reuse policy has been tentative. Many experts state that 
there is strong government support for using treated wastewater in 
agriculture (Bahri 1996; Benabdallah 2003; Shetty 2004; and Bahri 
2007), but this support has not translated into widespread reuse. Most 
analyses have focused on the social constraints to the use of recycled 
water in Tunisia. The logical question to ask is: What makes Tunisia 
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different from Jordan and Israel such that lower demand becomes an 
obstacle to reuse? 
The differences between Tunisia and the other two countries appear 
to stem from two key factors, which are interrelated and important 
when considering reuse in the MNA region as a whole. 
First, despite the fact that Tunisia is considered to be in water 
deficit, this country has much more renewable freshwater per capita 
(450 m3/yr) than does either Israel (250 m3/yr) or Jordan (150 m3/yr) 
(FAO 2006). Indeed, of the three countries, only Tunisia’s per capita 
water withdrawals are less than its available renewable freshwater. 
In 2002 Tunisian withdrawals were roughly 58 percent of renewable 
resources, whereas Israel and Jordan were at 122 percent and 116 
percent, respectively.2 
Second, as a consequence of the wider availability of alternative 
water sources, irrigators and other users have many more choices about 
which type of water to use. Specifically, in distinct contrast to Israel 
and Jordan, in Tunisia reclaimed wastewater has not been mixed into 
or replaced alternative sources of freshwater. Recall that in Israel, this 
mixing occurs via controlled aquifer recharge, and in Jordan via mostly 
planned disposal into surface water bodies. As a result, in Tunisia, ir-
rigators’ (as well as other users’) demand for reclaimed wastewater 
becomes vital for the success of reuse projects.
There is ample evidence that Tunisian farmers prefer not to use 
reclaimed water. In many cases, irrigators continue to use groundwater 
after large efforts have made reclaimed wastewater available to them. 
Shetty (2004) details a number of problems of social acceptance, regu-
lations concerning crop choices, and other agronomic considerations 
that affect these decisions. Farmers in the arid south express concerns 
about the long-term impacts of saline wastewater on their crops and 
soils. Such problems have been documented around the city of Moknine, 
where compensation for farmers’ damages today is provided through 
the delivery of free surface water from the Nebhana dam.
There also appears to be a general inability to match the timing of 
supply and demand for the water due to inadequate storage of treated 
effluents. The reliability problems associated with reuse erode the 
confidence of farmers who would like timely irrigation water. Perhaps 
most importantly, the fact that reclaimed water cannot be used for 
  These percentages have probably increased somewhat since then. 2
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high-value vegetable crops is discouraging to nearly half of all eligible 
farmers (Bahri 1996 and 2002). 
In response to the reluctance to use wastewater, a 1997 presidential 
decree set the price of treated wastewater (0.01 US$/m3, down from 
0.03–0.07 US$/m3) well below that of other freshwater (0.08 US$/m3). 
Even so, the use of reclaimed wastewater has hardly changed (Shetty 
2004 and Bahri 2007). Surveys also have shown that the demand for 
reclaimed wastewater is insensitive to price in a range between 0.01 
and 0.04 US$ (1998)/m3, the previous average rate (Bahri 1996).
Tunisia’s geography creates an economic alternative to recycling. 
Most wastewater facilities in Tunisia are near the population centers 
along the Mediterranean coast, so effluents can be disposed of rela-
tively easily in the sea after secondary treatment. From a wastewater 
management perspective, dumping effluents from existing treatment 
plants into the sea rather than in surface waters or on lands (where 
demand for reuse is low) has always been the simplest solution. It also 
may be the most economic one, in contrast to Israel and Jordan, in 
which water is already insufficient to meet existing demands. 
The planning of irrigation with reused water in Tunisia has not been 
sufficiently coordinated or demand driven. Some 7300 ha are equipped 
for wastewater reuse (Atiri 2005), but only a fraction of these lands 
actually receives treated effluents (Bahri 1996; Madi 2002). As a result, 
the predicted economic benefits from projects have not been realized. In 
one particularly poorly coordinated project, supply to a reuse scheme 
was interrupted just as it was scheduled to go into operation due to an 
upgrade of the associated treatment plant (Boubaker 2007). Conscious 
of these issues, Tunisian planners are starting to pay more attention to 
demand issues (Bahri 2007).
Despite these many problems, consumption of reclaimed wastewa-
ter has increased substantially. Consumption grew from approximately 
4 mcm to 18 mcm between 1996 and 2002, with annual increases of 
23 percent, 3 percent, 19 percent, and 41 percent between 1999 and 
2002 (Atiri 2005).
Restrictions for reuse designed to protect public health have received 
considerable attention and are in line with WHO recommendations. 
There have long been a large number of reuse schemes throughout 
the country. Some projects such as La Soukra—irrigation of citrus 
orchards—have enjoyed longstanding success and few demand prob-
lems (the unavailability of alternative sources is probably a factor). In 
areas along the northern coast with saltwater intrusion problems (Borj 
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Touil District), resistance to using reclaimed water for irrigation has 
been relatively low despite higher-than-average rainfall (600 mm/yr) 
due to the lack of reliable alternative water sources (Shetty 2004), In 
addition, the country is involved in experiments to promote technical 
innovation. Tunisia is investigating shallow groundwater recharge, ur-
ban beautification and recreation applications, and the improvement 
of crop yields (notably, olive trees and fodder) by using high-quality, 
stored, reclaimed water (Benabdallah 2003; Bahri 2002). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as in Jordan and Israel, Tu-
nisian policymakers today treat reuse as an essential aspect of strategic 
water and wastewater sector planning, influencing such decisions as 
the location of wastewater treatment plants (Bahri 1998).
Lessons Learned
Based on the set of experiences with reclaimed wastewater reviewed 
in this chapter and the constraints described above, it is possible to 
draw attention to key messages that should be helpful in advancing 
the reuse agenda in MNA:
1. The countries that have expanded reuse most are those that ex-
plicitly consider reuse opportunities as part of the planning of 
wastewater collection and treatment projects.
2. The state of wastewater collection and treatment is a critical 
issue in evaluating the economics of reuse projects. Countries 
or sites with little or poorly functioning wastewater collection and 
treatment infrastructure will find it impossible to justify investments 
in reuse (figure 25.1). 
3. If there are alternative water sources, users usually will prefer 
them to recycled water. If irrigators’ or other users’ access to con-
ventional sources of water is not restricted and water prices do not 
reflect costs of water delivery and resource scarcity, it generally 
will be be difficult for reuse applications to be competitive, unless 
conventional sources become overly degraded. 
4. MNA countries in general lack demand-driven planning of 
reuse projects. Too often, reuse projects are high-level decisions 
made by well-meaning governments, water sector institutions, and/
or the international donor community that do not incorporate the 
preferences of future users. 
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5. Thus far, pilot projects have been useful in solving many techni-
cal issues. However, they offer little help with scaling-up and 
strategic planning. This history of nonreplication is due largely to 
the lack of sustainability of pilot projects, the difficulty of interpret-
ing costs and other management data related to pilot efforts, and/
or the low demand for the water.
Recommendations 
Given these key messages, five 
recommendations for the MNA 
water reuse agenda emerge: 
Implement reuse projects 1. 
for which known demand 
exists for treated waste-
water effluents, rather than 
attempt to generate demand 
once a reuse site has been 
identified.
Develop sustainable fi-2. 
nancing models. If a project 
is deemed economically fea-
sible, careful consideration of 
the financial deal structure 
becomes necessary. Even 
under the most promising 
conditions, full cost recovery in reuse is unlikely, so some combina-
tion of subsidies and consumer payments may be necessary.
Consider reuse within an over-arching policy model designed 3. 
to address water scarcity, not as an adjunct to wastewater 
treatment. The benefits of reuse alone rarely will justify the costs 
of wastewater treatment.
Target reducing freshwater withdrawals4. . Demand manage-
ment and water conservation strategies clearly are the most cost-
effective approaches to reduce withdrawals. Investment in national 
water reuse strategies is difficult to justify if water allocations and 
demands are not effectively regulated.
Address institutional problems5. . Reuse must be considered via 
concerted discussion between water supply and sanitation agencies, 
On-site sanitation
Sewerage
Sewerage + treatment
On-site treatment
Planned reuse
Type 3: Type 2 + sewers relayed to treatment  
facilities + environmental
discharge
Type 1: Household sanitation infrastructures, 
i.e., on-site disposal schemes and/or flush 
toilets connected to cesspools or septic tanks
Type 2: Flush toilets relayed to conventional 
or small-diameter sewerswith 
environmental discharge
                                
                                                 Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
Type 4: On-site sanitation infrastructure 
with on-site treatment using appropriate 
technologies
Type 5: Type 3 + discharge to reuse schemes—
directly in plantations or farms, and/or 
indirectly in surface waters or aquifers
or
Type 4 + Discharge to reuse schemes—
directly in plantations or farms, and/or
indirectly in surface waters or aquifers
Figure 25.1 Recommended Steps in Wastewater Infrastructure 
Development
464  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
implying that governance at a higher, coordinating level will be 
necessary.
Conclusions
This chapter sets out to answer three questions related to wastewater 
reuse in the Middle East and North Africa region: 
Given the scarcity of water, why have many governments been 1. 
slow in promoting wastewater reuse?
What insights for the future of wastewater reuse can be gleaned 2. 
from regional and international experiences?
How should policymakers adapt the wastewater management 3. 
agenda to their country’s economic context?
 
Although the answers to these questions have not been fully re-
solved, important insights emerge from this study: 
Many constraints to more widespread reuse 1. 
Insufficient economic analysis of reuse and treatment options2. 
Generally high costs and negative or low rates of return associated 3. 
with wastewater treatment
Preference for freshwater4. 
Lack of effective price signals5. 
Difficulties in structuring financial deals, and inherent limitations 6. 
in the amount of water that can be used.
For reuse to make sense, it must be part of a larger water strategy 
that includes demand management and conservation strategies, and 
that treats water as a scarce and valuable economic resource. In most 
MNA countries, irrigation schemes are inefficient; groundwater is 
over-pumped; and surface water resources are poorly managed. Such 
conditions eliminate the potential economic benefits of reuse.
Meanwhile, population growth and urbanization are increasing the 
demand for domestic water and the production of wastewater. Climate 
change will reduce the amount of renewable freshwater resources in 
MNA. Trade networks, increasing tourism, and the preferences of a 
more educated urban populace and neighboring countries will affect 
plans for wastewater treatment, increase the demand for safe and 
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high-value agricultural products grown in the region, and encourage 
ecological and recreational uses of water. 
As countries face these evolving challenges, they will become more 
and more focused on reforming their water management systems and 
institutions, and will likely devote more attention to evaluating the op-
tion of reuse. For the time being, the constraints in the sector make 
it unlikely that a reuse revolution in MNA is imminent. However, the 
importance of this policy option surely will increase over time. 
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Appendix 25.1 Sewerage and Wastewater Treatment in MNA and Other 
Selected Countries
Country
Sewerage rate (%)
Treatment rate
(% collected)
Volume treated  
(mcm/yr)
Type of 
treatment NotesUrban Over-all
Algeria 78–85 65 73 600 1 Secondary Mostly lagoons
Bahrain 70–77 100 44.9 Secondary Activated sludge, some tertiary 
(ozone)
Djibouti 5 4 0 0 None None
Egypt 68 42 79 2971 19% primary; 
secondary
Activated sludge, ponds, trickling 
filters
Iran 17–20 11 4 130
Jordan 70 50 88 72 Secondary Lagoons and activated sludge; 
overloading frequent
Kuwait 85 87 103 Tertiary
Lebanon 40 2 4 Secondary Planning treatment and reuse 
around Beirut and Ba’albeck 
treatment plant (tertiary)
Libya 54 54 7 40
Morocco 70 40 6–8 40 Secondary Eﬄuents/raw sewage mostly 
discharged to sea and surface 
waters
Oman 90 81 13 9.8 Secondary Activated sludge, aerated ponds
Qatar 80 43
Saudi Arabia 45 37 75 548 Secondary Activated sludge, aerated ponds
Syria 96 71 57–67 550 Secondary Activated sludge, lagoons 
Significant dumping of untreated 
waste; Damascus upgrade for reuse 
of tertiary-treated eﬄuents
Tunisia 68 50 79 148 Secondary Mostly activated sludge, ponds; 
moving to tertiary
UAE 91 87 22 193 Secondary; 
tertiary
West Bank 
and Gaza
25 23 34–54 14–24 Primary; 
secondary
Sludge drying beds, ponds, frequent 
overloading, O&M problems 
Yemen 40 12 62 46 Secondary Ponds, frequent overloading 
Israel 92–95 79 296 Secondary; some 
tertiary
Ponds, activated sludge, natural 
filtration + recharge
Cyprus 73 60 100 6 Mostly tertiary
Malta 95 13 2.5 Secondary; some 
tertiary
Piloting RO to promote industrial 
reuse
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Desalination Opportunities and 
Challenges in the Middle East 
and North Africa Region
Khairy Al-Jamal and Manuel Schiffler
Seawater desalination has the potential to help alleviate global water scarcity.1 In the past century, global water consumption levels increased almost 10-fold, reaching or exceeding the limits 
of renewable water resources in some areas, including the Middle East 
and North Africa (MNA). Meanwhile, over the past decades, the cost 
of desalination and its energy intensity have decreased drastically, and 
its environmental footprint has been reduced These trends are likely 
to continue.
As experience and technology have developed, production costs 
for desalination have fallen. Technologies such as reverse osmosis, 
electrodialysis, and hybrids can deal with different types of input water 
and/or are more energy efficient. Unit sizes have increased, bringing 
economies of scale. These advances drove down prices from an aver-
age of US$1.0/m3 in 1999 to US$0.50/m3–0.80/m3 in 2004 (World 
Bank and BNWP 2004).
The MNA Region is relatively water poor. With approximately 
1000 m3/capita per year, the region falls far below the world annual 
average of 8000 m3/capita. By 2025 MNA’s annual average water per 
person is expected to fall to less than 550 m3 (Belloumi 2007).  By the 
same year, climate change is expected to have led to more drought and 
 This chapter does not discuss brackish water desalination, which is usually of 1
smaller scale than seawater desalination. Nevertheless, the former can make im-
portant contributions to alleviate local water scarcity in inland locations by desali-
nating brackish groundwater, spring water, or drainage water for both irrigation and 
domestic water supplies.
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a 20 percent reduction in renewable fresh water resources (Doumani 
2008; IPCC 4 2007).
Seawater desalination is no panacea for the water woes of the MNA 
region. It is just one instrument among many within a framework of 
integrated water resource management (IWRM). Other instruments 
include appropriate agricultural and trade policies, efficient water 
utilities with low levels of nonrevenue water, appropriate cost recov-
ery, limited use of targeted subsidies, and increased reuse of treated 
wastewater. 
This chapter summarizes the water demand and supply status 
in MNA and analyzes the projected demand growth and the water 
resources enhancement needed to bridge the gap. The chapter also 
gives a quick overview of the desalination technologies and their trend 
as well as a general cost analysis of reverse osmosis (RO) desalination 
based on recent figures. Furthermore, sensitivity analyses of the cost 
in relation to energy price, energy efficiency, and financing interest 
rate have been conducted. 
Desalination in the Geographic and Economic Context of MNA
In 2007 the total population of 
the Middle East and North Af-
rica (MNA) Region reached 300 
million inhabitants (figure 26.1), 
with a rate of annual increase of 
1.7 percent (World Bank 2007). 
The population is expected to 
reach more than 500 million by 
2030.
This population increase is 
taking place in a region that is 
largely arid and semi-arid. The 
annual per capita renewable wa-
ter resource is limited to 1,100m3 
(figure 26.2). This low annual average puts MNA among the relatively 
water-poor countries. Sixty percent of the water originates outside the 
region, and the region is already exploiting more than 75 percent of its 
total available resources (Doumani 2008; FAO AquaStat, 1998–2002). 
These two realities make it even more difficult to achieve water security. 
Moreover, these limited resources are not equally distributed. They 
Figure  26.1  MNA Region Rural and Urban Population Trends, 
1950–2030 (millions)
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can vary from 0.0m3 in Kuwait 
to 3000 m3/capita per year in 
Iraq (figure 26.3). In 14 countries 
in the region, per capita water 
resources are less than 500 m3 
per year. 
The scarcity of water re-
sources has many negative con-
sequences:
Challenges the social stabil-N
ity of a growing population
Further disturbs and de-N
grades “natural” systems by 
encouraging the use of low-
quality irrigation water
Leads to groundwater con-N
tamination
Reduces crop yields and N
limits cultivation
Raises the risk of long-term N
damage to soils and aqui-
fers that may not be easily 
recoverable
Could lead to water con-N
flicts.
In terms of its water re-
sources, the MNA region is ex-
pected to be negatively affected 
by climate change. By 2050 the 
surface temperature is expected 
to increase by 2.5oC. Precipitation is expected to decrease by 10.5 
percent, and runoff may decrease by 20 percent–30 percent (Doumani 
2008). Thus, the available renewable resource would decrease by ap-
proximately 20 percent: from 400x109 m3/yr to approximately 320x109 
m3/yr. However, most of this impact is expected to be felt after 2025. 
By 2025, renewable water resources are expected to decline by 30x109 
m3/yr (7.5 percent)—equivalent to approximately half the flow of the 
Nile—to approximately 370x109 m3/yr.
Figure  26.2  Actual Renewable Water Resources per Capita, 
by Region
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by Country
Source: Hamilton 2006.
482  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
Water Demands and Future Trend
Even though the region is severely stressed in meeting today’s water 
demands, the situation is expected to worsen. At 75 percent, the 
MNA region is rapidly approaching full use of its total available water 
resources. Water going to agriculture remains the most important 
requirement (85 percent) followed by the domestic, industry, and tour-
ism sectors (10 percent–15 percent). Municipal, industrial, and tourism 
water requirements may double or triple by 2025.
The forecast for water requirements depends on future economic 
and demographic trends as well as on agricultural policies and incen-
tives for water conservation. Climate change also will increase water 
demand, as higher temperatures will increase both domestic and agri-
culture demands through higher evapotranspiration (ET) by crops on 
the land under irrigation. However, the single largest factor influencing 
water demand will be the rate of increase of irrigated land, which in turn 
is determined largely by agricultural policies and public investment in 
irrigation infrastructure.
Bridging the Gap and the Role of Desalination
Desalination accounts for 1.8 percent of the region’s water supply. By 
2025 it could reach 8.5 percent. However, the expected decline in re-
newable water resources (30x109 m3/yr) is such that even the massive 
expected expansion of seawater desalination (24.2 x109 m3/yr) would 
only partially compensate the impact of climate change. Furthermore, 
these two major trends would impact sectors and countries differently. 
The increase in desalination capacity would be used for municipalities 
and industries, whereas the decline in renewable water resources is 
expected to affect primarily agriculture. In addition, the increase in 
desalination capacity will be concentrated almost exclusively in the 
high-income, energy-exporting wealthier countries of the region, pri-
marily in the Gulf countries. The latter have no significant renewable 
water resources and thus will not be significantly affected by a decline 
in precipitation. The MNA countries that will be affected primarily 
by a decline in precipitation are the same ones that will find it more 
difficult to afford desalination.
The speed at which desalination will be adopted in the region will be 
affected by how climate change will affect rainfall patterns. Droughts 
in Israel during 1998–2002 and in Algeria in 2004 triggered the choice 
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to invest in large-scale seawater desalination. If droughts become more 
frequent and severe as a result of climate change, governments will not 
want to their major cities to depend on drought-prone surface water 
resources. Thus, the extent and severity of droughts will be key factors 
driving desalination investments.
The prospects for desalination vary greatly among MNA countries 
depending on their incomes and water scarcity and whether their major 
cities are located close to the coast. Coastal cities in wealthy, water-
scarce countries have been and are likely to be the main drivers for future 
seawater desalination in MNA. The Gulf countries—Algeria, Israel, 
and Libya—with a combined total of less than 20 percent of the MNA 
population—belong to this first group of countries. The heavy energy 
subsidies in all of the countries in this group (except Israel) increase 
the financial viability of desalination.
A second group of countries is water scarce but cannot take advan-
tage of the benefits of desalination because of their settlement patterns, 
lack of financial resources, or ongoing conflicts. For example, most of 
the populations of Jordan, Syria, and Yemen live at high altitudes or 
far from the sea. The supply of desalinated water to highland cities is 
prohibitive, especially during times of high energy prices. Other parts 
of the region, such as Gaza, which had advanced plans for seawater 
desalination in the 1990s, cannot fulfill their potential due their current 
political circumstances. This diverse group of countries within MNA 
accounts for less than 10 percent of the region’s population.
Finally, the third group of countries has sufficient water resources to 
satisfy most municipal needs for the time being. These countries, includ-
ing Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Morocco, are home to close to 70 percent 
of the region’s population. Seawater desalination in these countries is 
likely to remain confined to their water-scarce coastal areas such as 
the Egyptian Red Sea coast and Southern Morocco. The bulk of these 
countries’ water supply will continue to be supplied by conventional 
water resources independent of climate change and future possible 
advances in desalination technology.
Thus, to sum up, desalination is no panacea to solve water scarcity in 
MNA. It is only one of many instruments to bridge the gap between water 
supply and demand within an integrated water resource management 
framework. In many countries, desalination will play a subordinate role 
to other instruments. On the demand side, these alternatives include 
agricultural policies; water conservation; increasing water use efficiency, 
particularly in agriculture; increased metering; more appropriate pricing; 
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and on-site recycling and reuse. On the supply side, other options include 
leak and loss minimization and enhancing the use of reclaimed water 
(reuse of treated wastewater). For instance, application of wastewater 
reuse (50 percent of domestic demand), reducing leaks from 40 percent 
to 20 percent, and increasing irrigation efficiency by 10 percent will save 
approximately 104x109 m3/yr (table 26.1). This amount is approximately 
three times the expected increased desalination capacity. 
MNA has approximately 60 percent of the world’s desalination 
capacity (7.2x109 m3/yr). According to the countries’ plans and the 
historic desalination capacity increase, the total capacity is expected 
to reach 19.1x109 m3/yr by 2016 and possibly 31.4x109 m3/yr by 2025 
(Balaban 2008). 
Water Desalination Trend: MNA and the World
During the last 50 years, there has been a steady growth worldwide 
of desalination plants and their 
capacity (figures 26.4 and 26.5) 
(IDA 2002). Most of this growth 
has been in the oil-rich Middle 
East and has been based on distil-
lation technology. However, al-
ternative processes, most notably 
reverse osmosis (RO), also have 
been developed during this time. 
RO has grown spectacularly over 
this period and now dominates 
some sectors of the market.
The desalination market 
is strong, with significantly in- 
creased orders over 2001–02 of 
Table 26.1  Expected Savings in Water Supply due to Application of Demand and Supply Management 
Techniques in MNA Region by 2025
Demand sector
Total demand
(109 m3/year)
Fresh
(109 m3/year)
Reuse
(109 m3/year)
Leak reduction/
efficiency
(109 m3/year)
Saving  
(109m3/yr)
Domestic 75 60.0 0 15.0 15.0
Agriculture 425 325.5 30 42.5 72.5
Total 500 385.5 30 57.5 87.5
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approximately 3.0 m3 and 1.5 
m3/day globally and in MNA, 
respectively (f igure 26.4). In 
2002, 15 million m3/day of the 
24 million m3/day seawater de-
salination plants’ global capacity 
exists in MNA (figure 26.4).
Saudi Arabia is home to 30 
percent of the MNA desalina-
tion capacity. Production of 
desalinated water there reached 
7.4 million m3/day in 2006 (Bala-
ban 2007) (figure 26.5). 
Additional desalination in-
vestment is planned in the MNA 
Gulf countries and elsewhere. 
The required investment up to 2025 is estimated at US$25 billion– 
30 billion.
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Figure  26.5  Potential Operational Desalination Capacity 
in MNA Countries, 2006
Source: Balaban 2008.
Table 26.2 Desalination Capacity in MNA (1000 m3/day) 
Country
Desalination 
capacity end 2006
Capacity forecast
2011
Capacity forecast
2016
Capacity forecast 
2025
Algeria 727 3191 4985 8,214 a
Egypt 432 528 888 1,536
Libya 899 1,869 3,775 7,206
Israel 440 1000b 1,790 3,212
Morocco 59 285 491 862
Tunisia 89 195 297 481
Jordan 240 541 898 1,541
S. Arabia 7,410 12,564 17,654 26,816
Kuwait 2,081 3,446 4,617 6,725
Bahrain 519 1,183 1,977 3,406
Qatar 1,197 1,676 2,481 3,930
Oman 377 1,140 2,059 3,713
UAE 5,730 9,030 12,330 18,270
Total (103 m3/day) 20,200 36,648 54,242 85,911
Total (103 m3/yr) 7,373,000 13,376,520 19,798,330 31,357,588
Sources: Balaban 2008; GWI 2004; and DLR 2007.
Notes: 
a Extrapolated.
b Estimated.
486  N  WATER IN THE ARAB WORLD: MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES AND INNOVATIONS
As experience and technology have developed, production costs 
for desalination have fallen. Technologies such as reverse osmosis, 
electrodialysis, and hybrids can deal with different types of input water 
and/or are more energy efficient. Unit sizes have increased, bringing 
with them economies of scale. These advances have driven down 
prices from an average of US$1.0/m3 in 1999 to between US$0.50/m3 
and US$0.80/m3 in 2004 (World Bank and BNWP 2004). However, 
the future trajectory of desalination costs will depend on energy price 
trends.
Desalination Technologies: Aspects and Limitations
One convenient and useful way to classify desalination processes is to 
separate those that use a change of phase to separate the pure water 
from the feed water from those that accomplish this separation without 
a change of phase.2 The phase-change processes are multi-stage flash 
(MSF), multi-effect boiling (MEB) or multi-effect distillation (MED), 
vapor compression (VC), thermal and mechanical and solar distillation 
(distillation processes); and freezing. The single-phase category comprises 
reverse osmosis (RO) and electrodialysis (ED) (membrane process).
The ranges of the applicability of the various desalination processes 
vis-à-vis the quality of the feed 
water appear in figure 26.6. In 
general, the phase change pro-
cesses tend to be used to treat 
high-salinity waters, particularly 
seawater. Membrane processes 
are used over a wide range of sa-
linity from brackish to seawater. 
The application of electrodialysis 
is limited to brackish water appli-
cations. In membrane processes, 
energy consumption is directly 
related to the salinity of the feed 
water. In distillation processes, 
the salinity of the feed water has 
little impact on the overall energy 
consumption.
  That is, from liquid to water vapor, or from liquid to ice.2
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Figure  26.6 Ranges of Applicability for Desalination Processes
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Other basic parameters that should be examined to select the most 
appropriate desalination process are:
Co-generation.N  In some instances, both power and water are 
required. To optimize cost, a careful analysis of the combina-
tions of processes must be carried out. 
Availability of energy resources.N  All desalination processes use 
energy. Theoretically, assuming a 100 percent efficiency rate, 
approximately 1.6 kWh/m3 is the minimum energy requirement. 
However, the actual energy requirements are sometimes much 
higher (table 26.3).Consequently, desalination has been seen as 
a very energy-intensive process. The development of reverse 
osmosis and, more recently, the improvements in energy recovery 
devices (energy exchanger and pressure exchangers) have changed 
this situation. Bringing down energy consumption in Mediter-
ranean seawater RO plants to 2.5 kWh/m3 has put seawater 
desalination within reach of many communities. To determine 
the most cost-effective process for each community, planners 
should survey all the available energy resources—conventional 
or renewable energy sources as well as waste or low grade heat 
availability. Table 26.3 illustrates the specific energy consumption 
of the various processes. The figures for the thermal processes 
have remained almost the same for the last decade.
Plant size.N  The size of the desalination plant normally is dictated 
by the water demand. Before any process is selected, the size 
Table 26.3  Estimated Energy Consumption for Desalination Processes
Process
 
Steam energy
(kWh/m3)
Elect. energy
(kWh/m3)
Elect. energy equivalent
(kWh/m3)
Seawater    
MSF 7.5–11.0 2.5–3.5 10.0–14.5
MED 4.0–7.0 2.0 6.0–9.0
VC — 7.0–15.0 7.0–15.0
SWRO — 2.5–8.0 2.5–8.0
Brackish    
BWRO — 0.5–2.5 0.5–2.5
ED — 0.7–2.5 0.7–2.5
Source: World Bank and BNWP 2004.
Notes: MSF = multi-stage flash, MED = multiple effect boiling, VC = vapor compression, SWRO = seawater reverse osmosis, BWRO = brackish 
water reverse osmosis, ED = electrodialysis.
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parameters of each process should be considered. The MSF pro-
cess has been developed and adapted to very large applications 
(10,000–60,000 m3/day). In recent years, the size of MED and VC 
processes has been increased and may have some advantages over 
MSF. The largest MED plant built to date is 20,000m3/day. Due 
to the modularity of membrane processes, they can be used for a 
wide range of applications, from very small to large scale.
The RO industry has grown 
very quickly, and the global ca-
pacity has risen from 10 percent 
during the 1990s to approxi-
mately 45 percent. RO is favor-
able due to its modularity, low 
capital investment, technological 
advancement in the membrane 
industry, compact plant size, 
ease of automation, fewer envi-
ronmental impacts, and low operation cost. The typical configuration 
of an RO plant is illustrated in figure 26.7. 
Desalination consists of placing a semipermeable membrane in 
contact with a saline solution under a pressure higher than the solu-
tion osmotic pressure, typically 50–80 bar for seawater. The feed is 
pressurized by a high-pressure pump and made to flow across the 
membrane surface. Part of this feed passes through the membrane, 
which removes the majority of the dissolved solids. The remaining 
water and rejected salt emerge from the membrane modules as a 
concentrated reject stream under high pressure. In large plants, the 
reject brine pressure energy is recovered in a turbine, energy exchanger, 
or pressure exchanger. The pretreatment required is a function of 
the scaling tendency of the water and the level of undissolved solids. 
The key to the successful operation of this process takes place during 
pretreatment. The product water from RO usually has 100–500 ppm 
of total dissolved solid (TDS), which complies with WHO guidelines 
regarding drinking water quality
Environmental Aspects of Desalination and Renewable Energy
Desalination of seawater consumes a significant amount of energy, 
which is required for the process itself (approximately 90 percent) in the 
Saline
feedwater
High-
pressure
pump
Membrane
assembly
Brine
discharge
Stabilized
freshwater
Post-
treatmentPre-
treatment
Freshwater
Figure  26.7  Schematic Diagram of Single-Pass RO 
Desalination Plant
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form of thermal energy (distillation processes) or mechanical energy, 
usually obtained from electricity (RO process). Electrical energy also is 
needed in all plants to operate auxiliary equipment such as pumps and 
dosing systems. If fossil fuels are used as the primary energy source, the 
greenhouse (mainly CO2) and acid rain gases (NOx, SOx) emitted into 
the atmosphere have a major environmental impact. Desalination plants 
also emit gases that do not originate from fossil fuel combustion but were 
dissolved in the seawater. In thermal plants, the feed water is usually de-
aerated, and gases evolve from the evaporating brine in flashing cham-
bers. Both processes increase carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, which are 
stored in the oceans in the form of bicarbonate and cause the release of 
other atmospheric gases (mainly O2 and N2) from seawater. Table 26.4 
summarizes qualitative environmental impacts of RO, MSF, and ED 
desalination plants.
Gaseous emissions. Distillation plants use both heat and electrical power. 
If the plant is large, such as those installed in the Gulf, the generation 
of power using fossil fuel is usually coupled to the production of water 
using MSF or MED distillation plants. Such plants use more total en-
ergy than RO plants, which use only electrical power. RO emits less 
CO2 than does distillation. In some areas, high-sulphur fossil fuels are 
used to generate electrical power; in these plants, SO2 as well as CO2 
emissions may occur. 
Brine discharge. There is concern about brine discharge and its envi-
ronmental impacts. In seawater plants, brine is discharged in the sea. 
Any chemicals added to the desalination process for scale and fouling 
prevention and corrosion reduction as well as corrosion products flow 
back into the sea. Coastal currents should be examined to ensure 
that discharges are not swept back around into the intake system. If 
discharge occurs in a small, enclosed bay or there is no coastal cur-
rent, concentrations of the substances can build up, a situation that 
is clearly to be avoided. There is increasing concern in the Gulf about 
the amount of desalination taking place and the fact that the Gulf is 
a small, enclosed sea. This build-up can damage the fragile marine 
ecosystem and threatens marine life. 
Land-based brackish water plants can experience severe problems 
in disposing the brine discharge. The aquifer and the surrounding habi-
tats can be endangered. There are three options: the discharge can be 
spread over the land and allowed to drain back into the ground; it can be 
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pumped into solar ponds for evaporation; or it can be re-injected back 
into the ground. None of these solutions is completely sustainable. 
Visual intrusion. Desalination plants can be visually intrusive. Seawa-
ter plants usually are built on the coast. In areas in which tourism is 
important, a plant can be an eyesore. In Cyprus, the Dhekalia and the 
Larnaca plants were located some 500 meters from the shore to keep 
the shoreline clear.
Noise emissions. Desalination plants also can be noisy. RO plants have 
high-speed pumps, which normally are housed in buildings to reduce 
the noise. Problems have arisen when, during the summer, doors have 
been left open to reduce building temperatures and have enabled the 
noise to escape.
Greenhouse gas emissions from power plants associated with 
desalination plants pose a peculiar dilemma. Although desalina-
tion plants are a tool to adapt to climate change by making water 
supplies less vulnerable to droughts, they themselves contribute 
to accelerate climate change. This dilemma could be resolved by 
either accelerating the development of renewable energy in the 
MNA region or by purchasing carbon credits to compensate for 
the GHG emissions of desalination plants. So far, neither of these 
options has been used in the region.
Renewable Energy Alternatives for Desalination
Large desalination plants in the MNA region typically are powered by 
fossil energy. The energy requirements for desalination plants can be 
met through renewable energy sources (RES), which produce no CO2 
Table 26.4 Qualitative Overview of Environmental Impacts of Three Desalination Technologies
Effect/type of plant RO MSF E.D.
Noise H M L
Water eﬄuent M H M
Microelements L H L
Toxic material M H M
Air pollution L H M
Industrial risk L H M
Note: H = high, M = medium, L = low.
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directly. Wind and photovoltaic (PV) energy are the most commonly 
used; wave power is possible in the future. 
Until recently, renewable energy was used as a power source for 
desalination only for small plants in remote areas that had no access 
to electricity from the grid. In recent years, research and development 
(R&D) in this field has intensified. Worldwide, several RES pilot desali-
nation plants have been installed, and the majority has been operated 
successfully. Virtually all of these were custom designed for specific 
locations and utilize solar, wind, or geothermal energy to produce 
fresh water.
For distillation technologies, power is supplied by using waste 
energy from adjacent power plants (co-generation). For membrane 
technologies, dedicated gas-fired power plants often are built next 
to the desalination plants. Medium-sized desalination plants receive 
electricity from the grid, which in the MNA region typically is gener-
ated by fossil energy or large-scale hydropower. 
Outside MNA, the first large desalination plant powered almost 
entirely by renewable energy was commissioned in Perth, Australia, in 
2008. The plant is powered primarily by an 80MW wind park devel-
oped concurrently with the desalination plant and located more than 
200 km from the plant. The wind park feeds into the grid, from which 
the desalination plant receives its power supply, which is independent 
of wind conditions. Despite the recent spike in world energy prices, 
similar joint developments of large-scale renewable energy and large 
desalination plants have not yet materialized in the MNA region.
Desalination Cost Analysis
For discussion, the desalination cost for SWRO plant is considered 
in this section. In general, the desalination cost is divided into capital 
and operating costs. Over the last decade, the capital and operating 
costs of seawater desalination plants have decreased significantly in 
real terms. The reasons are:
Capital Costs 
Process design improvements N
Membrane performance development and lower cost per mN 2 (RO) 
Manufacturing methods and increased volume N
Increased competition N
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Operating Costs 
Process performance N
Membrane life (RO) N
Energy efficiency improvementsN
Interstage boost pumping (RO) N
Improved chemicals N
Reduced corrosion N
Privatization. N
As a consequence of this, costs to desalinate water have fallen 
consistently for many years. The price reached US$0.52/m3 in the 
Ashkelon SWRO plant in Israel in 2005. The cost breakdown is il-
lustrated in table 26.5.
The cost can vary as the interest rate and/or the energy prices 
change. At 10 percent interest rate, the cost will rise to US$0.62/m3. 
Figures 26.8 and 26.9 illustrate the sensitivity analysis results for the 
change in the interest rate and the energy cost of the proposed SWRO 
in the Palestinian Gaza Strip.
Private Sector Participation in Desalination
As discussed above, desalination is a relatively capital intensive tech-
nology and requires high operation and management skills. The Gulf 
countries initially financed desalination plants with their own resources 
and operated them through public agencies, such as the Saline Water 
Conversion Corporation (SWCC) in Saudi Arabia. However, in the 
1990s, the Gulf countries switched to Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
contracts. Under these, private companies financed, built, and operate 
Table 26.5  Typical Cost Breakdown for RO Desalination Plant
Parameter Early 1990s Current
Capital cost $1000 to $1200/m3/day capacity $800/m3/day capacity
Capital cost/m3 at 5% interest rate $0.26 $0.18
Energy consumption kW.h/m3 6 3.5
Energy cost $/m3 at $0.06/kW.hr $0.36 $0.21
Membrane replacement cost $/m3 $0.16 $0.035
Labor and chemicals $/m3 $0.14 $0.10
Total cost $/m3 $0.92 $0.525
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desalination plants for a period 
of typically 30 years, during 
which they are being paid fees 
directly by the government or a 
public utility off-taker for their 
services. BOT contracts also 
have become the norm for the 
development of large desalina-
tion plants in the MNA region 
outside the Gulf.
However, some countries 
have been exceptions to this 
trend. For example, Malta oper-
ates all of its desalination plants 
publicly. To compare the perfor-
mance of the public and private 
operators, Israel has authorized 
its bulk water supply company, 
Mekorot, to develop one large 
desalination plant in parallel to 
a series of similar desalination 
plants under BOT contracts. 
Conclusions
Based on the above discussion, 10 
conclusions can be drawn:
Desalination is playing and will continue to play a significant role 1. 
to respond to the MNA region’s growing water demands. The 
technology became well proven and has become cheaper.
Climate change, which is expected to cause more frequent droughts 2. 
in the region, is likely to accelerate investments in desalination.
Desalination is no panacea. To maximize net benefits, it needs to 3. 
be combined with other supply-side and demand-side approaches 
within the framework of integrated water resource manage-
ment.
Advances in desalination technologies have reduced the cost of 4. 
desalination to approximately US$0.52/m3. These advances have 
increased the affordability of desalinated water.
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MNA’s desalination capacity is increasing by 1.5x105. 6 m3/day every 
year. The capacity is expected to reach 31.4x106 m3/day. This fig-
ure will entail an increase of approximately 20.0x106 m3/day from 
the current capacity. The required investment is approximately 
US$20.0 billion.
Outside the Gulf countries, almost all new desalination plants are 6. 
using reverse osmosis. This preference is due to RO plants being 
flexible and modular and having low operation and capital costs, 
and to advances in the energy recovery devices.
The cost of desalinated water is sensitive to the costs of both energy 7. 
and financing. Thus, low-interest-rate financing reduces the cost of 
desalination and increases the affordability of desalinized water.
In most MNA countries, the private sector has been and will remain 8. 
a key player in promoting desalination. The private sector can provide 
capital and increase efficiency in management and operation.
Desalination has both positive and negative environmental impacts. 9. 
On the positive side, desalination will conserve conventional water 
resources, which can preserve aquatic ecosystems in rivers, and 
will prevent groundwater depletion and saline intrusion due to 
over-abstraction. However, desalination also is associated with 
negative impacts including greenhouse gas emissions, brine discharge 
including chemicals from pre-treatment processes, and noise and 
visual pollution. The industry is well established, and mitigation 
measures are being implemented and refined continuously, par-
ticularly concerning brine discharge. 
Greenhouse gas emissions from power plants associated with 10. 
desalination plants can be significant. These GHG pose a peculiar 
dilemma. While desalination plants are a tool to adapt to climate 
change by making water supplies less vulnerable to droughts, they 
simultaneously contribute to accelerated climate change. This di-
lemma could be resolved by either accelerating the development of 
renewable energy in the MNA region or purchasing carbon credits 
to compensate for the GHG emissions of desalination plants. Nei-
ther option yet has been used in MNA.
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through Conjunctive Use  
in Coastal Areas in Yemen: 
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Introduction
Need to Integrate the Management of Spate Irrigation, Groundwater 
Irrigation, and Groundwater Recharge
The recent increase of cultivated areas and yields in Yemen is due 
largely to the increased use of groundwater. The number of wells used 
in conjunction with spate flow has increased significantly, making ir-
rigation possible between spate floods. Moreover, water productivity 
from groundwater-fed irrigation typically can be six times higher than 
from spate irrigation. Management systems no longer can be focused on 
the spate flow but also should take into account the impact of spate on 
recharging the groundwater. This chapter examines the interconnec-
tions among spate irrigation, groundwater irrigation, and groundwater 
recharge from spate flows. The chapter explains how all three processes 
form part of an integrated water system. With specific reference to 
Wadi Ahwar, the chapter shows how an integrated water resource 
management approach can improve the overall system’s productivity 
and sustainability.
Irrigation is a major source of livelihoods in rural Yemen. For cen-
turies, inhabitants of the coastal areas have been harvesting spate rain, 
mostly for irrigation but  sometimes for domestic use. However, unlike 
conventional irrigation schemes in Egypt or Iraq, spate irrigation in Ye-
men is regulated only in space—but not in time. Flash floods are too 
fast or too erratic to be stored in conventional (multipurpose) surface 
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dams. The Yemenis regulate spate runoff by building surface-water 
“diversion” structures, thus maximizing the spatial utilization of runoff 
rather than storing the water for interseasonal use. The diversion struc-
tures often are small scale and low cost because the unpredictability 
of spate flows makes large-scale investments uneconomic. 
This chapter discusses developing the “conjunctive use” potential 
of spate water in Yemen’s coastal areas. It presents unconventional low-
cost/economic solutions for storing excess spate water in the groundwater 
(or in subsurface top soils). In these ways, the stored water can be used 
later to supplement irrigation in the low flood periods, or at least for 
domestic purposes. Harnessing the conjunctive use of surface and 
groundwater also can help reduce the mining of groundwater near the 
coast, thus reducing saline intrusion into (drinking) water wells.
Artificial recharge is defined as any engineered system designed 
to introduce and store water in an aquifer (Topper and others 2004). 
However, an adverse connotation of “artificial,” in a society in which 
community participation in water resource management is becoming 
more prevalent has led to a new name: Managed Aquifer Recharge 
(MAR) (Gale 2005).
MAR can be useful for many of today’s water issues and con-
cerns. As an increasingly important tool for water managers, it may 
be useful for repressurizing aquifers subject to declining yields, saline 
intrusion, or land subsidence. MAR also can play an important role as 
Table 27.1  Characteristics of Groundwater Storage, Small Dam Storage, and Large Dam Reservoirs
 Groundwater storage Small dams and surface reservoirs Large dam reservoirs
Ad
va
nt
ag
es
Little evaporationN
Widely distributedN
Operational efficiencyN
Available on demandN
Water quality N
Ease of operationN
Response to rainfallN
Multiple useN
Groundwater rechargeN
Large, reliable yieldN
Carryover capacityN
Low cost per mN 3 water stored
Multipurpose (power and flood control)N
Groundwater rechargeN
Li
m
ita
tio
ns Slow recharge rateN
Groundwater contaminationN
Cost of extractionN
Recoverable fractionN
High evaporation lossesN
Relatively high unit costN
Absence of over-year storageN
Complexity of operationN
SitingN
High initial investment costN
Time needed to plan & constructN
Ke
y i
ss
ue
s
Declining water levelsN
Rising water levelsN
Management of access/useN
Groundwater salinizationN
Groundwater pollutionN
SedimentationN
Adequate designN
Dam safetyN
Environmental impactsN
Social impactsN
Environmental impactsN
SedimentationN
Dam safetyN
Source: IWMI 2000.
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part of a package of measures to control over-abstraction and restore 
the groundwater balance (Gale 2005), or be applied to maintain or 
improve local ecology and environment. MAR may help to improve 
water quality in aquifers and infiltrate storm runoff for both damage 
control and subsequent reuse in drinking or irrigation supplies.
MAR applications generally are not stand-alone interventions be-
cause they are a component of the broader hydrological system and 
usually part of a larger water supply or water management system. 
Application of MAR should be considered in this broader framework 
to arrive at the most cost-effective solution.
The great variety of available MAR techniques and the varying site 
specifics have led to a large variety in scheme design and construction 
(figure 27.1). 
MAR applications are subdivided into 5 principal techniques and 
14 subtypes. The main techniques are chosen in relation to the type of 
technique used either to intercept the water or to get the water infil-
trated. The subtypes are specific engineering techniques that are applied, 
many of which are known to stakeholders or often cited in references. 
Induced bank infiltration is a distinctive technique that cannot be listed 
under any other main MAR technique. Therefore, it is assigned to a 
separate class in which it is both technology and subtype.
One thus can think of groundwater recharge from spate flows 
in Yemen as the missing piece of the three-way relationship among 
Source: Gale 2005.
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spate water use, groundwater use, and groundwater recharge from 
spate flows. For sustainable resource management, project interventions 
should balance the output from spate water in the high flood periods with 
the recharge to groundwater.
When water storage solutions are developed, groundwater storage 
structures (as opposed to surface dams) often are ignored. In Yemen, 
storing water in the soil profile through subsurface or sand dams in semi-
arid areas, including spate-irrigated areas, is more cost effective than 
constructing conventional dams. Very limited research has been carried 
out on the relationship between recharge and spate. However, most 
recharge is expected to take place in the wadi beds rather than in the 
channels and irrigation fields. Through spate, recharge can be enhanced 
through flatting the river slopes and through ponding. In general, the 
flow velocity should be reduced, thereby enhancing the recharge. From 
a geological point of view, it would be better to enhance infiltration 
upstream rather than downstream, because the sediment downstream 
is often loamy to clayey. Another important aspect to consider is the 
subsurface flow. This flow is the main source of downstream wells. By 
cutting this flow through building impervious structures (such as concrete 
dams), this downstream recharge may be reduced significantly.
Applying the categorization of MAR techniques to Yemen, myriad 
options could enhance groundwater recharge and interseasonal con-
junctive use:
a. Artificial recharge. It penetrates fine soils or the impermeable un-
derlying layers (for rainfall, runoff, or return flows such as from 
treated wastewater).
b. Small recharge dams for inter/intraseasonal storage. These enhance the 
water infiltration upstream of the dam. However, sometimes (as in 
Oman) they are used to store the dam’s upstream runoff, then release 
it to recharge the groundwater downstream. For a given budget, 
having a cascade of small recharge dams is preferred to having one 
big recharge dam, as the latter may cause big evaporation losses.
c. Small, low-cost sand-storage/subsurface dams for inter/intraseasonal 
storage (at least to provide rural water supply, if not irrigation). As 
sand accumulates upstream, these structures enhance the natural 
storage capacity of the river bed/banks. Even if the underlying layer 
is relatively impermeable, a significant amount of water can be stored 
in the river bed (above the impermeable layer) and in the river banks. 
In contrast to typical surface recharge dams, this method results in 
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no evaporation and no sedimentation (bed load) issues. In addition, 
the weir can be designed so that the wash load overtops the weir’s 
sill, and subsequent flash floods will further wash out that load.
d. Surface-water diversion system. This system can be designed to divert 
part of the runoff toward a location in which recharge/subsurface 
dams can perform better, that is, in which the soil porosity and/
or permeability/storativity/transmitivity of the underlying layers is 
good enough. 
This chapter shows how such techniques to enhance groundwater 
recharge could be applied in Wadi Ahwar. 
Water Management in Coastal Areas Needs Not Only Infrastructural 
Interventions but Also Institutional and Information Measures
This chapter focuses on the groundwater issues of a typical coastal 
wadi, for which spate irrigation is one of the key elements of the water 
resources system. 
Spate irrigation is closely associated with groundwater use and 
recharge. Due to the increase of groundwater use in Wadi Ahwar, 
mainly through an increase in the number of shallow wells, agricultural 
production in the spate irrigation command area has increased. However, 
for conjunctive groundwater use to be efficient and effective, careful 
demand and resource management are essential. The over-abstraction 
of groundwater not only impacts the quality of the resource but also 
can lead to saltwater intrusion and hence water quality deterioration. 
Current observations on groundwater levels and saltwater intrusion 
in Wadi Ahwar indicate the need for a sustainable approach toward 
groundwater and its development. Stakeholders in the wadi agreed that 
intervention is urgently needed to reverse the unsustainable depletion 
of the resource, water quality deterioration, and saltwater intrusion. 
Although no conflict has yet arisen among water users such as farm-
ers and rural water supply users, conflict may be imminent. Thus, the 
necessity for certain measures, including public awareness and com-
munity involvement, is urgent. 
For sustainable water management, there are certain essential 
nonphysical requirements: 
1. Extensive information is key. In most coastal wadis including Ahwar, 
the understanding of hydrogeological processes is still limited. This 
lack of understanding is due mainly to limited historical data. Floods 
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are the main contributor to groundwater recharge. Hence, the high 
temporal variance in floods translates into high temporal variance 
in recharge. Careful monitoring is essential to predict the recharge 
and thus the groundwater that can be utilized sustainably without 
jeopardizing the resource. 
  Wadi Ahwar is characterized by a high spatial and temporal 
variability of rainfall. The temporal variability is relatively well 
known and can be measured from any adjacent meteorological 
station. However, information on the spatial variability is usually 
much more limited. Studies in the region illustrate that rainfall 
distribution is very spotty. In Saudi Arabian basins, there have 
been examples of wadi flows generated from zero observed 
rainfall. This phenomenon also illustrates the complexity of 
quantifying runoff based on conventional densities of rain-gauge 
networks. 
2. Socioeconomic and institutional measures must support physical 
interventions. For example, similar projects in Ethiopia and Kenya 
have shown that insufficient involvement of local communities in 
water harvesting schemes is a major constraint to success. Even 
when good physical investments are made, groundwater use needs 
to be regulated. In Yemen, it is difficult to enforce this regulation 
through central control. In contrast, by capitalizing on the tribal 
culture dominant in Yemen, the needed regulation can be ensured 
by local communities, namely Irrigation Councils (ICs) and Water 
User Associations (WUAs). These have been successfully piloted 
in the World-Bank-financed Irrigation Improvement Project (IIP) 
in Wadi Zabid, Tuban, and Ahwar. 
Wadi Ahwar: Typical Spate-Reliant Coastal Basin in Yemen 
The use of spate water for irrigation is as ancient as humankind’s cultiva-
tion of land. According to several archeological and historical evidences, 
Yemen was the first country in the world to practice spate irrigation. 
This unique system reached its zenith during the Shebean period in 
the first millennium BCE. The intense development of trade after the 
Islamic period may have promoted the spread of spate irrigation from 
Yemen to other arid and semi-arid regions. Yemen’s water resources 
have become unsustainable due to the neglect of the traditional spate 
irrigation system on the one hand, and over-exploitation of groundwater 
for its multiple uses on the other. In most spate irrigation systems in 
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Yemen, the major floods occur between June and September, which 
is the time of heavy rainfall in upper catchments. Crop growth takes 
place exclusively between October and February. It depends on the 
water stored in the soil and adjacent low-lying fields. Deep soils are 
able to store ample moisture for the crops during periods with no 
precipitation.
Wadi Ahwar is located in the southern Arabian Peninsula, in the 
eastern Abyan Governorate. Delta Ahwar is located approximately 
200km east of Aden. Ahwar, Al Hanad, and Al Mabrak along the coast 
of the Arabian Sea are the major villages in the delta. Wadi Ahwar is 
formed by joining the two tributaries, Wadi Saba and Wadi Jahir. 
The total catchment area is estimated at 6352 km2. The active 
catchment of Wadi Ahwar to Faud Weir is 4052 km2, and up to 
Hanad Weir is 4062 km2, because approximately 36.2 percent of the 
total catchment of this wadi does not produce runoff during small 
or average flood. Wadi Ahwar is 160 km long and originates from 
the high mountains (altitude approximately 2350m), from which it 
receives high rainfall. After flowing down from the mountainous 
region, Wadi Ahwar has formed an alluvial plain that is the main 
agricultural area of Ahwar delta. Two modern structures are con-
structed on Wadi Ahwar to irrigate 7000 ha of land by utilizing the 
available spate. The catchment has a tropical hot and arid climate 
with very poor rainfall and high evaporation. However, there is no 
credible meteorological station within the catchment to register the 
annual variations of meteorological parameters. 
The 2004 population of Wadi Ahwar was estimated at 34,646. 
The average family size was 10.2. Per the official statistics, the rural 
population was as high as 73.5 percent of the country. Rural population 
exceeds urban because agriculture and livestock production provide 
the country’s main livelihoods. The wide variation in topography and 
climate enables producing various crops, livestock, and honey. 
What Is the Safe Yield?
Scientific Rationale 
Safe yield traditionally has been defined as the maintenance of a long-
term balance between the amount of groundwater abstracted and the 
amount of groundwater recharged. Hence, pumping is restricted to 
the natural replenishment of groundwater. However, this definition 
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ignores the discharge from the system. If abstraction equals recharge, 
abstraction plus discharge is greater than recharge. Therefore, the safe 
yield does not equal the sustainable yield. 
Under natural conditions and over a long period, the discharge of 
an aquifer will equal the recharge. Additional discharge from wells de-
stroys this equilibrium. The equilibrium can be restored only if recharge 
is augmented and/or the natural discharge is decreased. 
It therefore is important not to consider sustainable groundwater 
yield as a fixed volume of water that can be utilized but to address the 
system in a more integrated manner, that is, to take into account the 
whole water system including surface water. 
To establish a sustainable yield, three aspects should be consid-
ered:
1. Conceptual water budget. In estimating the water budget, all stake-
holders should be represented so that the balance reflects both the 
natural system and all users. The natural system should include 
both ground- and surface water. Initially, this budget can be an 
estimate. Eventually, modeling will be necessary to establish the 
budget more exactly and to predict how the system will respond 
to future changes such as increased demand or climate change. 
These models also can help to estimate terms such as changes in 
storage, discharge, and hydrogeological properties.
2. Spatial scale. If the spatial scale is not understood and defined, any 
approximation of sustainable yield is meaningless. Local abstractions 
might seem sustainable when compared to the regional sustainable 
yield. However, even limited local abstractions still may have a large 
negative impact, such as localized saltwater intrusion. Therefore, 
the scale at which the sustainable yield is determined should take 
into account possible local effects.
3. Temporal scale. Pumping and recharge are time dependent, varying 
over different time scales. To estimate the sustainable yield, the 
timing of future water needs and recharge should be understood. 
In other words, the sustainable yield is not a constant but could 
change continuously and must be related to a certain time period. 
In other words, should the sustainable yield be based on figures of 
the last 10 years, or on only the last year? The time factor is critical 
for defining the sustainable yield. 
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The abovementioned uncertainties in the definition of the different 
terms of the water budget led to the idea that water resource sustain-
ability must be considered within the framework of probability (Howard 
2002). According to Howard, sustainability must be defined as “a 
system that maintains acceptable risk over an indefinite time hori-
zon.” Our inexact understanding of the water budget means that we 
should focus on adaptive management: adapting to a changing physical 
and socioeconomic environment. Adaptive management does not mean 
that specifying fixed levels of water use through instruments such as 
permits is not required. It does mean that we must recognize that the 
specified quantities can change.
Estimating Sustainable Yield in Wadi Ahwar
The main intent of sustainable groundwater use is to optimize abstrac-
tion while maintaining a minimum outflow to the ocean to prevent 
saltwater intrusion. To estimate the sustainable yield of Wadi Ahwar, 
it is not necessary to include aspects such as wetlands and stream 
base flow because perennial streams and wetlands are minimal or do 
not exist. Therefore, for Wadi Ahwar, the sustainable yield can be 
defined as almost equal to the natural recharge of the aquifer on an 
average annual basis, that is, because man-made abstraction almost 
equals total discharge.
Recharge in the wadi is not well understood, so it is difficult to 
estimate aquifer sustainability. The aquifers receive recharge via un-
derflow from the mountains or  infiltration from surface wadis; or gap 
flow during periods of more intense rainfall, direct surface recharge 
from rainfall (likely to be insignificant), and agricultural return. Un-
derstanding the relationship among the rainfall amount and intensity, 
surface hydrologic response, and aquifer recharge is of fundamental 
importance.
Although rainfall is the primary hydrological input, in arid and 
semi-arid areas such as Wadi Ahwar, rainfall is characterized by 
extremely high spatial and temporal variability. The main input to 
estimate the sustainable yield is the surface runoff and hence the 
groundwater balance. Runoff flow is composed of two main elements: 
base flow, which has its origin in groundwater; and surface runoff, 
which is the accumulation of rainfall that drains to the stream. The 
basin characteristics that affect the base flow and the surface runoff 
include geology, soil type, vegetation cover, precipitation, drainage 
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area, and moisture condition. The variable rainfall conditions in Wadi 
Ahwar make it difficult to estimate average runoff and hence the 
sustainable yield.
It therefore can be reasoned that, to estimate the safe yield, the 
variability of the hydrological and climate system can best be taken 
into account by taking average figures for a 10-year period. The cur-
rent water balance suggests that the current safe yield (estimated in 
2008) in Wadi Ahwar is 18 Mm3. The lack of data, both spatial and 
temporal, makes this figure highly approximate.
Data Collection, Information, and Monitoring
Monitoring is the main source for data and information. Examples of 
monitoring in Wadi environments include the assessment of water 
resources for future development and for rainwater and floodwater 
harvesting. 
Current Monitoring Activities and Well Inventory
No groundwater monitoring takes place in Wadi Ahwar. The only infor-
mation on available resources is based on old studies, such as the 1990 
donor-funded study. Since the 1990s, many changes have taken place 
in both Yemen’s physical and socioeconomic systems. To provide more 
recent data and to develop a management plan with different scenarios, 
a monitoring network will have to be designed and developed. 
Based on the consultancy study, a proposal was drawn up for 
monitoring wells. For a monitoring network design, additional analyses 
of the hydrological system need to be carried out. However, based 
on a preliminary assessment, it seems logical to install a number of 
monitoring wells parallel to the wadi up to the coast, and a few wells 
across the wadi.
Recommendations
NWRA has limited experience with groundwater resource monitoring. 
Moreover, it has no clear vision of information management. The water 
authority should consider delegating different information systems tasks 
to the appropriate administrative level (national, regional, and local). 
In this way, NWRA should be capable of designing and managing the 
overall monitoring system. 
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Given the above observations, the following short-term activities 
can be identified to develop a monitoring plan for Wadi Ahwar:
Develop monitoring objectives and strategy.1. 
Develop a monitoring plan that defines the required hardware, 2. 
software, and human resources.
Design monitoring network based on hydrogeology.3. 
Provide protocols, guidelines, tools, and standards for different 4. 
monitoring activities. These aspects should correspond to NWRA 
guidelines. 
Carry out an inventory of necessary capacity and equipment at 5. 
all levels.
Set up communication with regional NWRA offices, and define 6. 
mandates for each NWRA office.
Possible Measures in Wadi Ahwar
Despite the lack of accurate hydrological data on Wadi Ahwar, it is 
clear that over-abstraction takes place and leads to saltwater intrusion. 
It also is believed that a great amount of water is being lost to sea (and 
through nonbeneficial evapotranspiration). These assessments suggest 
that there is opportunity for both conventional interventions such as 
rainwater harvesting, and nonconventional measures such as artificial 
recharge and demand management. Integrating these conventional 
and nonconventional measures can lead to sustainable conjunctive use. 
The desired outcome is to balance (1) reducing water losses and stor-
ing excess water to optimize rural livelihood throughout the year; and 
(2) maintaining the minimum spillage to sea as needed to counteract 
seawater intrusion. 
Two main categories of proposed measures can be distinguished:
Supply-oriented measures to make more water available for dif-1. 
ferent users
Demand-oriented measures to reduce water demand and con-2. 
sequently reduce the groundwater abstraction and control the 
drawdown of the groundwater table. 
Such measures could be part of an overall sustainable water man-
agement plan, as described below.
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However, to decide on the appropriate measures, a better under-
standing of the hydrogeological system is important. For example, it 
would be useful to know to what extent the excess wadi runoff can be 
recharged. If the amount of excess water is limited, proposed recharge 
structures will only redistribute the groundwater resources but not 
augment them. Furthermore, it is not yet completely clear whether 
the recharged water will be temporarily or permanently intercepted by 
the shallow aquifers. The available information does give some insights. 
However, given the sharp increase in groundwater development of 
the last 20 years, a 1990 donor-funded study will have to be updated 
before any recharge structures can be constructed. 
Nevertheless, the recent well and abstraction inventory indicates 
that the total volume of surface water used for irrigation has not in-
creased. This fact suggests that a surplus outflow of water to sea still 
exists and can be intercepted and recharged. In addition, more efficient 
irrigation practices would lower evaporation and increase the volume 
of water available for recharge. 
For these measures to be effective, the abstraction of groundwater 
will need to be regulated. Although NWRA will play a key role in moni-
toring abstractions and regulating the drilling of boreholes, enforcement 
obviously will be a very difficult issue. It is suggested that community-based 
groundwater management would be the most effective approach. 
All stakeholders in the water resources in the wadi agree that 
measures need to be taken to reverse the negative impacts of unsus-
tainable abstraction. They result in depletion of the resources, quality 
deterioration, and saltwater intrusion. Although no conflicts have yet 
arisen, there is a clear need for awareness and stakeholder involvement 
in the use of the resource. 
Supply-Oriented Measures
Storage and recovery of excess water
To store excess water for later use, subsurface dams are probably the 
most feasible option. 
The use of injection boreholes requires little surface area and enables 
recharging an aquifer isolated from the surface by a semi-pervious or 
impervious layer. However, the technique is more vulnerable to disrup-
tion and requires more high-tech maintenance than surface infiltration. 
To avoid frequent clogging of the well screen of an infiltration borehole, 
degassed water and high standard water quality are needed. Before 
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large-scale implementation of injection boreholes, pilot schemes are 
required to test for the proper design and water quality characteristics 
to be used. 
Subsurface dams may operate at low hydraulic loading rates and 
also improve water quality. Subsurface dams are a relatively inexpen-
sive intervention, require low-level technology, are easy to construct, 
and offer opportunity for community involvement. The infiltration 
rate is strongly dependent on the groundwater table, which must be 
relatively deep. Recovery is usually by abstraction wells located in the 
vicinity of the infiltration site. 
Suitable locations for subsurface dams are probably upstream, 
where the wadi basement is not yet at great depth and a dam would be 
relatively easy to realize. The storage capacity of a typical subsurface 
dam and reservoir of 4 m depth, 50 m width, and 500 m length would 
be some 10,000 m3, assuming a drainable storage coefficient of 0.10. 
Already the government of Yemen has made great effort to construct 
small or subsurface dams to recharge groundwater. Most of these dams 
have not been very effective in recharging the groundwater. Nonethe-
less, the intervention is very promising in a wadi environment, subject 
to certain considerations: 
Siting of the dams is an important aspect of implementationN . The uncon-
fined layer should be within a shallow-to-moderate depth (preferably 
not more than 10 m) and in a well-defined impermeable layer.
Sites with saline soils should be avoided for dam construction.N  While 
reduction in the salt levels through continuous water use is feasible, 
reduction requires operational procedures beyond those generally 
expected of small rural farmers. 
The economic conditions of the sites are such that participatory or N
bottom-up approaches are essential in constructing the dam (and 
obtaining maximal socioeconomic benefits). Using locally avail-
able materials and community labor reduces costs and enhances 
efficiency, acceptance, and dam life span. The human factor is 
essential for the success of underground dams. If there is no co-
operative effort, and subsequent ownership, by the community, 
effective operation and adequate maintenance are unlikely. Suc-
cessful examples of community involvement in dam construction 
can be found in Ethiopia and Kenya (box 27.1).
The successful application of subsurface dams would require an N
analysis of the hydrogeological system of Wadi Ahwar. Additional 
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Box 27.1. Kitui Sand Dams, Kenya
The Kitui Sand Dam project in Kenya is an 
example of how communities use their knowl-
edge about water to cope with droughts. Since 
1990, a local NGO in Kitui (Sahelian Solutions 
Foundation, or SASOL) has been assisting lo-
cal communities to build small-scale sand dams, 
which store water in artificially created sandy 
aquifers. Water is stored within the sand and 
gravel particles, which accumulate against the 
dam wall. “Sand’ refers to the sand behind the dam wall that holds the water. The dam 
wall itself is made of concrete. Sand dams can store water in up to 35 percent of the total 
volume of sand stored upstream of the dam. The stored water is protected against high 
evaporation losses and contamination. The water is captured for use through a hand-dug 
well or tube well using a bucket or hand-pump. Downstream areas are not significantly 
influenced by the presence of a sand dam. The efficiency of the design is improved by 
constructing dams in cascade.
 
Note: A total of 500 sand dams have been constructed in Kenya, creating a reliable source of water, even 
during droughts (as was proved in 2006).
Box table 27.1.  Socioeconomic Performance of Sand Storage Dams, Kitui, Kenya 
Vulnerability 
categories Vulnerability indicators
Before dam 
construction
After dam 
construction
Agriculture
# of cash crops 1.5 2.8
Irrigated crops (%) 37.0 68.0
Special aspects
Water collection–domestic (mins.) 140.0 90.0
Water collection–livestock (mins.) 110.0 50.0
Gender Average walking distance to water–women (km) 3.0 1.0
Economic Income (US$/year) 230.0 350.0
Health Households suffering from malnutrition (%) 31.6 0.0
boreholes would be necessary to collect extra information on the 
geology and lithology of the subsoil, infiltration capacity, and po-
tential storage. After construction of the subsurface dams, these 
boreholes should be used to continuously monitor the water levels 
and water quality sampling (see appendix A27.1, comments on 
monitoring). 
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Saltwater intrusion barrier
Many boreholes and dug wells 
in a 10 km-corridor along the 
coastal zone close to Ahwar have 
become saline. To stop saltwater 
intrusion, an intrusion barrier 
should be built. The principle 
of injecting fresh water into an 
aquifer to form a barrier against 
saltwater intrusion from the sea 
is to push back the saltwater–
freshwater interface. Saliniza-
tion and a scheme to stop the 
process are shown schematically 
in figure 27.2.
The groundwater salinity 
in the Ahwar area probably is 
caused not only by a lateral shift 
in the saltwater–freshwater in-
terface but also by upward coning 
of saltwater. Rising saline water 
can be counteracted by using 2 
filters in 1 abstraction well. The 
lower well screen will intercept 
upcoming saline water; the up-
per one will continually produce 
fresh water (figure 27.3). Before 
considering implementation of a 
freshwater antisalinity barrier, 
further investigation is neces-
sary to study the mechanisms 
of increased salinity. 
The time required to reduce 
water salinity would be consider-
able and could reach the order of 
tens of years. Hence, to decrease 
the rate of saline intrusion in 
underlying aquifers, the most effective practice may be to reduce the 
extraction of coastal zone groundwater for irrigation.
Figure 27.2  Process of Saltwater Intrusion
Saline water
Sea
Initial phase of pumping from coastal freshwater aquifer
Landward shift of saltwater-freshwater interface due to pumping
Saline water
Freshwater
Sea
Recharge of aquifer with freshwater 
pushing back saltwater-freshwater interface
Saline water
Freshwater
Sea
Figure 27.3  Use of 2 Abstraction Wells at 1 Location 
to Counteract Salinization 
Brackish/salineBrackish/saline
Brackish/saline
Fresh
Fresh
Sea
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Demand-Oriented Measures
As just noted, measures to strengthen groundwater recharge should be 
complemented by equally important actions to limit groundwater ab-
straction. The design and implementation of such demand-management 
measures are extremely complex and political. They require consultation 
and bargaining among numerous stakeholder groups. Consequently, 
this chapter does not propose specific packages for the Wadi Anwar 
area, However, given that demand management is an essential com-
ponent of an integrated approach to groundwater sustainability, the 
four options below merit further investigation.
1. Downstream/upstream tradable water rights. The aim would be 
to create a financial incentive for upstream water users to allow 
more water to flow downstream as surface or groundwater. The 
increased flows would improve downstream groundwater balances. 
Clearly, the design of such a system would be extremely high risk 
and complex, and would require a long period of consultation and 
bargaining among stakeholders. Strict monitoring would be re-
quired to prevent farmers from both selling and using their water 
simultaneously.
2. Command and control measures, Regulatory measures could include 
requiring well-drilling permits and restrictions on abstractions. 
Water-saving measures, such as drip irrigation and the cultivation 
of more water-efficient crops, could be enforced. As for enhanced 
recharge, such measures would require better monitoring of the 
hydrogeological system. However, so long as groundwater is 
considered a free-access commodity, enforcement will be very 
difficult. 
3. Community-based groundwater management. Given the difficulty of 
enforcing “command and control” measures, self-regulation seems 
to be the only approach to sustainable use of groundwater at the 
local level in rural areas. Self-regulation focuses on the develop-
ment of local norms to control groundwater abstraction and use. 
As shown by projects in India (APWELL and APFAMGS),1 rais-
ing awareness of the resource among users increases the farmers’ 
commitment to proper groundwater use. In these projects, the 
farmers themselves measure the water levels and water yields. 
However, the main challenge is to translate this data into information 
that helps the farmer or community understand the groundwater 
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dynamics, increases their awareness of the need for regulation, 
and informs good decisions regarding water shortages. 
4. Incentives. Extension and training should be integral parts of the 
implementation of the new measures and regulations. Alternatively, 
negative incentives, such as groundwater pricing or higher diesel 
prices, could help to limit abstraction. 
Conclusions
The welfare of the Wadi Ahwar population depends on re-establishing 
the area’s hydrogeological balance.
The usual solution to encourage sustainable use of groundwater 
is to impose regulations. Examples are registering abstraction points 
and defining water rights. However, given the difficulty in enforcing 
regulation, self-regulation seems to be the only path toward sustain-
able use. In addition, there is an opportunity to enhance groundwater 
recharge. 
It therefore is suggested to develop a groundwater management 
plan. The plan would cover all aspects of integrated groundwater 
management, on both the demand and the supply sides: water har-
vesting, regulating use, alternative crops, and more efficient irrigation 
and monitoring.
Establishing the groundwa-
ter management plan should 
involve local stakeholders in 
three processes: assessing the 
resource, assessing the de-
mand, and negotiating the 
adoption of resource manage-
ment decisions. The ground-
water management plan should 
include simple “rules of thumb” 
that focus on water use at the 
village level and help to con-
trol the abstraction and use of 
 FAO-India projects, Andhra Pradesh Ground Water Irrigation Schemes (AP-1
WELL) and Andhra Pradesh Farmer-Managed Groundwater Systems Project (AP-
FAMGS). The latter’s online masthead reads, “Demystifying Science for Sustainable 
Development.”
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Figure 27.4  Integrated Groundwater Management Plan
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scarce groundwater resources. These management rules should be 
sustainable and environmentally sound. Options for resource enhance-
ment also will be studied. The linkages among the water resource, 
resource management, and demand management are illustrated in 
figure 27.4. 
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Appendix A27.1 Hydrogeological and Groundwater Analysis  
in Wadi Ahwar
General Hydrogeological Setting
Location
The Ahwar Delta extends along the coastline and is approximately 
bordered by coordinates 130 26'-130 36' N and 460 39'-460 48' E. 
The total area of the delta is estimated to be approximately 150 km2, 
with the greatest width of approximately 17 km at the coast. The delta 
is part of a large catchment of approximately 6,400 km2 to the south 
of a range of mountains running east from Mudiah and rising to over 
2,000m some 70 km north of the coast. The steep escarpment of the 
mountains represents the narrow watershed, with catchments draining 
in a northeast direction toward the Ramlat as Sabatayn. Because the 
high ground approaches nearer to the coast, the delta of Wadi Ahwar 
is less extensive than the deltas of Wadis Tuban and Bana. The gradi-
ent of the Wadi Ahwar bed is 1.5 percent–2.9 percent. Starting as a 
narrow canyon-shaped valley, the wadi eventually turns into piedmont 
plain, gradually widening to 2 km. The upper reaches of the wadi bed 
consist of pebbles, downstream sand, then semi-gravel, and eventually 
compact sand close to the sea. The shape of the bed is lost in the delta 
area. Figure A27.1 shows the location of Wadi Ahwar, outline of the 
catchment, and observed wells. 
The wadi drains a large area of highly dislocated basement rocks 
and the inland margins of the quaternary volcanic outcrop. The upper 
Source: Hydrosult, Inc.  2008a.
Figure A27.1 Location of Wadi Ahwar, Yemen
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catchment contains extensive areas of flat plain (Lawdar, Mudiah, De-
man, and Guishan areas) that are underlain by alluvium and are reported 
to be extensively developed for agriculture. 
Landcover
The Ahwar region landcover is 
dominated by rock outcrops and 
sandy areas. The wadi has scanty 
vegetation, mostly small shrubs. 
The small area of soil-covered 
land is used predominantly for 
agriculture. Based on satellite 
imagery, figure A27.2 gives an 
impression of the landcover of 
the whole catchment.
Climate and rainfall
The climate in the delta is arid 
and characterized by high sun-
shine radiation with an average 
annual temperature of over 
34.2°C. Potential evapotranspi-
ration (ET) is very high, averaging 
3,033 mm/year. Average annual rainfall of the whole catchment is 150 
mm. Likewise, the estimated average precipitation for the delta is 49 
mm. As long-term data are not available, it is difficult to indicate trends 
in annual rainfall. Also, as mentioned earlier, the spatial variation of 
rainfall in wadis can be significant. The accuracy of the estimations is 
therefore unknown. 
Groundwater resources system
The water resources in the Ahwar area comprise the wadi flow and 
the interconnected groundwater system, which is recharged by the 
wadi flow and by infiltration of the irrigation water. The major part of 
the rainfall in the catchment generates the surface runoff to the wadi 
flow. Only a small portion of total precipitation directly infiltrates in the 
catchment and reaches the wadi flow as lateral groundwater inflow. 
Beyond the water resources themselves, the water resources system 
comprises irrigated land and infrastructure such as wells, canals, and 
weirs. The character of the delta is largely the product of the natural 
Figure  A27.2  Interpreted Landcover, of Wadi Ahwar Region, 
Yemen
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flow of the runoff of the wadi through the delta, constructed surface 
water diversions, irrigation canal network, and irrigated fields. The 
wadi itself is shaped by the regular floods that have an average esti-
mated duration of 68 hours. The maximum flood event was reported 
in March 1982 with a discharge rate of 5,340 m3/s.
The surface runoff of the wadi is partially diverted and used for 
spate irrigation. The surface water balance in the wadi has the fol-
lowing components:
Infiltration and evaporation during irrigationN
Infiltration and evaporation during wadi flowN
Discharge to the sea.N
The groundwater balance in the wadi comprises:
Replenishment
Lateral groundwater inflowN
Recharge during irrigation (transmission losses)N
Recharge during wadi runoffN
Discharge
Consumptive groundwater useN
Groundwater outflow to the sea.N
The groundwater system of the delta consists of three major 
aquifers that are interconnected and most likely form a single aquifer 
system. The shallow aquifer 10 m–50 m thick occurs in sand and 
gravel. It is unconfined and hydraulically connected with the deeper 
aquifers. The middle aquifer consists of gritstone and conglomerate 
with calcareous matrix. It occurs throughout the delta except for the 
apex. The thickness of the aquifer ranges between 20 m–40 m. The 
depth to the top of the aquifer increases to the south from 20 m  to 
40 m. The deeper aquifer lies at a depth ranging from 70 m to 200 m 
and consists of sandstone, limestone, and conglomerate.
Groundwater Analysis 
Groundwater levels
From June–September 2008, Hydrosult carried out a well inventory 
in the Ahwar area to ascertain well depths and water levels. The data 
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were converted into a spatial 
layer using the advanced GIS 
software, ARCGIS. By overlay-
ing this data with the drainage 
layer, the spatial bias of the data 
is revealed in terms of location of 
all the observed wells only on the 
left hand side of the drainage flow 
direction. There are hardly any 
observed well data on the other 
side of the drainage network. 
These points are scattered well 
enough inside and outside the 
catchment area of the drainage 
to permit interpolation. To have 
an impression of the ground-
water flow and occurrence on 
the right hand side of the flow, 
groundwater wells data points 
were used for interpolation, using 
the Inverse Weighted Distance 
method. Moran’s I Spatial Au-
tocorrelation Index was used to 
measure clustering patterns and spatial autocorrelation. 
Figure A27.3 indicates shallow water levels in the area closer to the 
sea. The reason could be the intrusion of seawater in the groundwater 
aquifer zones. The spatial autocorrelation index is 3.1, which indicates 
clustering of the well water levels.
Figure A27.4 illustrates the well-depth variance. It indicates a slight 
tendency for shallower well depths in the area closer to the sea, where 
water levels are shallow, and in the upper region. The deeper well depths 
occur in the central delta. The reason for the presence of the relatively 
low well depths in the upper region could be the availability of surface 
spate irrigation for longer periods. The middle area shows most of the 
deeper wells, whose presence could be due to the short duration of 
availability of surface irrigation as well as the distance from the sea.
Groundwater balance
A 1990 donor-funded study estimated total groundwater resources 
based on both analytical and mathematical simulations. The total 
Figure  A27.3  Well Inventory and Extrapolated Groundwater 
Levels, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen
Wadi Ahwar well
water levels
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natural storage, defined as the 
volume of gravitational water 
accumulated in pores and fissures 
of water-bearing rock beneath 
the zone of multiyear fluctua-
tions of groundwater level, was 
estimated at 1099 Mm3. Most of 
this storage is found in the central 
and southern delta. Storage in 
the upper two aquifers amounts 
to 845 Mm3, including 84 Mm3 
with salt content >5 g/l. The 
total estimate is based on a stor-
age capacity of 0.19 for gravel/
pebbles, 0.1 for muddy sands, 
and 0.03 for conglomerates. 
Table A27.1 presents estimates 
of groundwater balance. 
The different studies provide 
very different estimates. Accord-
ing to the 1990 study, the total 
influx from outside the delta is 
4.3 Mm3–4.9 Mm3. However, the 
Hydrosult study suggests a total inflow from outside of only 0.7 Mm3. 
This difference cannot be explained. However, the difference of the 
Table A27.1 Groundwater Balance, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen
Budget items (total in Mm3) 1988–89 1972–88
Hydrosult’s 2008
estimate
Groundwater influx from north 0.2 0.2 0.7
Lateral influx 4.7 4.1
Recharge from spate irrigation 19.5 18.0 10.5
Recharge from wadi runoff 7.4
Total credit 24.4 22.3 18.7
Groundwater outflow 8.9 9.4
Groundwater abstraction (netto) 5.8 3.3 19.0
Evaporation 9.4 9.7 9.7
Total debit 24.1 22.4
Balance 0.3 –0.1 –9.0
 Source: Hydrosult, Inc. 2008b.
Figure  A27.4  Average Well Depth, Wadi Ahwar, Yemen
Wadi Ahwar well
depth levels
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direct recharge from spate or runoff probably results from a reduction 
of the command area. 
Based on the Hydrosult estimate, it could be concluded that mining 
takes place at a rate of at least 9 Mm3 per year on average. This rate is 
supported by field observations of such reported increase of saliniza-
tion of certain wells. However, given the uncertainty of the figures, 
particularly the evaporation estimate, it is difficult to draw any hard 
conclusions regarding over-abstraction and safe yield.
Given an average annual wadi flow of 66 Mm3, the outflow to sea 
amounts to almost 50 percent of the total flow. Based on the previous 
studies, it was estimated that, to prevent saltwater intrusion, ground-
water outflow to sea should not be less than 9 Mm3. However, we 
would need to consider seasonal variation in wadi flow before concluding 
whether there is scope for additional safe abstraction.
Groundwater quality and saltwater intrusion
Groundwater salinity in the upper aquifer ranges from 2.5 grams/liter 
(g/l) to 4.5 g/l, possibly reaching values of 5-9.5 g/l. Total dissolved solids 
(TDS) concentration increases 
considerably toward the coastline, 
reaching a value of 15 g/l. For the 
middle aquifer, TDS concentra-
tion ranges from 1.3 to 1.7 g/l at a 
reported 1km from the wadi chan-
nel to 2.3 g/l measured at other 
locations. TDS concentration in 
the lower aquifer is reported to 
be no more than 2 g/l. The local 
population reportedly has to use 
brackish water for domestic pur-
poses: with TDS of up to 1.5 g/l 
(3600 persons); 1.5–3 g/l (8400 
persons, including the population 
of the city of Ahwar); and even 
more than 3 g/l (approximately 
1,000 persons).
No data is available from pre-
vious studies about the position of 
the saltwater front in the delta. It 
was concluded, however, that a 
Figure  A27.5  Average Electrical Conductivity Levels, Wadi 
Ahwar, Yemen
Wadi Ahwar well
electrical conductivity
levels
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saltwater intrusion at some coastal producing wells is likely as a result of 
a continuous groundwater abstraction. A GIS analysis was performed 
on water quality data as observed by Hydrosult (2008) showing higher 
conductivity levels (that is, higher electrical conductivity, or EC) near 
the coast. Observations and discussions in the field also have shown 
strong evidence of saltwater intrusion, with a direct consequence on 
the viability of agriculture in these areas. However, lack of historic data 
prevents an analysis of trends over time.
Figure A27.5 indicates the spatial occurrence of EC in the ground-
water observations. The pattern suggests that conductivity not only 
is influenced by seawater intrusion but also may be affected by other 
factors such as soil types, leaching effects, and pre-existing saline 
groundwater.
Future Water Demands
No information is available about 
future water requirements in 
the delta. No strong population 
growth is expected. However, 
due to the increasing use of diesel 
pumps, abstraction of ground-
water is expected to continue to 
grow. The growing abstraction 
will strongly determine future 
demand. 
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